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Abstract 
A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been on the arms control agenda 
since 1954, the subject of intermittent bilateral or trilateral talks that achieved only 
partial measures. The end of the Cold War provided renewed public pressure and 
political impetus for banning nuclear explosions. This thesis analyses the context and 
processes of the multilateral test ban negotiations that opened in the Conference on 
Disarmament in 1994. 
Combining participant-observation and contemporaneous notes with extensive use of 
documentary sources, unpublished materials and interviews, the study explores the 
dynamics of the CTBT negotiations in light both of regime theory and post cold war 
concepts of multilateralism, highlighting the role of civil society actors as well as 
states. Providing historical background and rich detail on the negotiating process 
from 1994-1996, the thesis examines the causal factors, strengths and weaknesses of 
the outcomes in four key areas: prenegotiations, scope, verification and entry into 
force. 
Focusing on the strategies and mechanisms by which actors with competing 
expectations and interests reached agreement, two types of convergence are explored: 
distributive, encompassing both imposed and managed divisions of gains and losses; 
and integrative, in which expectations of what would constitute an acceptable 
agreement are expanded or changed through cognitive strategies and the shaping of 
norms and interests. 
The thesis shows that whilst sharing a general objective of a CTBT, governments had 
significantly different views on what a test ban should encompass and accomplish, 
particularly with respect to broader concepts of nonproliferation and disarmament. 
While nuclear interests played a major role in determining a state's expectations and 
negotiating posture, other factors were important in reaching convergence. These 
included: knowledge and ideas; civil society engagement; norms and regime values; 
partnerships and alliances; internal policy cohesion or division; and the level of 
domestic and international political attention and support. By choosing to incorporate 
transnational civil society as a principal unit of analysis, along with states, the thesis 
contributes to a fuller understanding of how governments' calculations of what 
constitutes self-interest and security can be influenced and shaped, opening up 
alternative solutions for agreement than might have been initially envisaged. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: Approach, Concepts and Methodology 
In 1978, the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament stated: "All the peoples 
of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. 
Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field on 
disarmament negotiations. All States have the right to participate in disarmament 
negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those 
multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national 
security. "' 
Whatever the `rights' expressed in this consensus proclamation from the UN Special 
Session, the reality is rather different. States do not participate on an equal footing. 
They enter into multilateral negotiations with different expectations and interests; 
some have a vast population, others a few thousands; some are much greater military 
or economic powers than others; where nuclear weapons are concerned five are 
declared weapons states, while three more are assumed to be in possession and others 
are suspected of having ambitions or aspirations; others, still, may have abjured such 
weapons or technology and want to see them eliminated altogether. The perceived 
security needs of states are different and they enter multilateral negotiations with 
different expectations of what they will achieve. Some seek not disarmament, the 
elimination of a class of weapons across the board, but nonproliferation - promoted 
during the cold war by the dominant nuclear weapon states (NWS) to limit the 
number of nuclear weapon possessors to five `haves' 2 Given the potential 
permutations of complexity and uncertainty and the "vast number of potential 
roadblocks" possible in negotiated interactions among a large number of parties, it is 
necessary to go behind the UN rhetoric and pose Fen Hampson's key question: how 
and why is it possible for multilateral negotiations ever to succeed? 3 
The subject of this thesis is the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT), but the 
research focus is not the treaty's substance or attributes per se, but the multilateral 
test ban negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Geneva, from 1994- 
1996. The aim is twofold: to put into the public arena a richly detailed analysis of 
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how post cold war multilateral negotiations were conducted in the case of nuclear 
testing; and to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics, strategies and 
limitations of convergence in an arms control context where the negotiators' 
perceptions of the treaty's purpose were conditioned by their different interests and 
expectations, particularly with regard to the regime objectives of nonproliferation and 
disarmament. 
Whilst relatively little theoretical work has been done on multilateralism, regime 
theory provides a conceptual starting point. Though generally understood as 
collective security arrangements, diplomats have long used the terms 
"nonproliferation regime(s)" or "security regime(s)" to cover varying shades of 
meaning on the theme of "networks of treaties, agreements and organisations". 4 In 
the foundational work of regime theory, Stephen Krasner defined regimes more 
specifically as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision- 
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations". 5 This thesis focuses on multilateral negotiations as a process 
for reaching convergence in order to establish and codify those principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures in a treaty. 6 In detailed chapters devoted to 
prenegotiations, scope, verification and entry into force, the study analyses the factors 
and dynamics that shaped particular outcomes in relation both to the expectations and 
strategies of particular state and nonstate actors and the broader framework of regime 
formation and multilateralism. 
The CTBT, which headed the agenda of the CD (or its predecessors) for decades, was 
finally concluded in August 1996, following three years of intensive multilateral 
negotiations. The treaty text banned all nuclear weapon test explosions and all nuclear 
explosions, allowing for no thresholds or exceptions above an agreed zero yield, for 
any reason, civilian or military.? It established a verification organisation co-located 
with (but independent from) the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 
Vienna, to oversee a worldwide international monitoring system (IMS). It planned for 
a regionally balanced executive council of 51 states to take decisions on matters such 
as inspections at the site of an ambiguous event or suspected nuclear explosion, as 
well as determining whether to accuse. a state of violating the treaty and resolving 
questions of noncompliance. 
11 
Though the treaty text was painstakingly worked on by all the relevant states and 
managed to satisfy the governments of the five major nuclear weapon states, the CD 
was unable to adopt its finalised treaty because one member state - India - blocked 
consensus. India, which had conducted a nuclear explosion in 1974, was not a nuclear 
weapon state by definition, but was widely regarded as seeking that status and of 
having de facto nuclear weapons capabilities. India was able to veto the treaty in the 
CD, which works according to a rule of consensus, but was outmanoeuvred 
politically when a group of countries led by Australia bypassed the CD and took the 
treaty in their own name to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in New York, 
where it was overwhelmingly adopted, by 158 votes to three (India, Bhutan and 
Libya), with five abstentions. The CTBT was opened for signature on September 24, 
1996, but despite having been signed by more than 160 countries and ratified by more 
than 100, the treaty has not, at time of writing, entered into force. Moreover, signature 
or ratification by several of the states necessary for it to enter into force look further 
away than ever. These include the United States, where a Republican majority in the 
Senate rejected ratification when it came up in 1999, and India and Pakistan, which 
each conducted a series of underground nuclear tests in May 1998. 
In considering the factors that enabled states with competing expectations and 
interests to converge and conclude the CTBT, the thesis also seeks to shed light on 
ways in which the construction of convergence can result in managed compromises 
that are so suboptimal (what Krasner, drawing from game theory, calls "below the 
Pareto frontier"8) that, despite diplomatic characterisation of the negotiations as 
successful, the viability or implementation of the primary objective - in this case the 
treaty - is left in serious doubt. 
Arms control and disarmament are more generally understood to encompass controls, 
limitations and reductions of armaments, or the elimination and prohibition of types 
of weapons. Banning nuclear testing, 9 by contrast, focuses on an activity associated 
with the research and development of a weapon, not the weapon itself. Testing is no 
longer essential for making nuclear weapons, but it is important for sophisticated, 
missile deliverable designs and modernisation. Its role in enabling further horizontal 
and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons means that a test ban is seen as an 
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important measure of disarmament as well as arms control. To establish some 
context for the thesis, the following practical questions are relevant. After five 
decades and some 2048 nuclear tests10, why did the five nuclear powers agree to 
negotiate away their legal freedom to conduct underground nuclear explosions for the 
testing and development of existing and future nuclear weapons? Why were they 
willing to sign up to this test ban in 1996, when India, a long-time publicly declared 
opponent of nuclear weapons and testing, was not? What were the expectations of 
the different negotiating parties and how did they view the role and value of a CTBT, 
especially with regard to nonproliferation, arms control, disarmament and 
international security? How were different negotiating postures and the outcome of 
the negotiations influenced by a state's interests in the possession or acquisition of 
nuclear weapons? 
One way to look for answers might be to study the policy-making process and 
governmental debates within the major countries. Undoubtedly, each player engaging 
in multilateral negotiations has domestic pressures and expectations, policy-making 
processes and, quite probably, rival or competing domestic interests and agencies. 
Understanding these is important for international relations, but while there is already 
a wealth of literature on intergovernmental debates and the processes of policy- 
formation and decision-making in certain countries, " very few studies have paid 
serious attention to the ways in which negotiations were conducted in the 
international arena, and even fewer have analysed multilateral arms control. 12 
Multilateralism involves many more players than traditional studies are used to 
considering: the larger the number of players, the greater the domestic permutations 
that would have to be taken into account, even if consideration were given only to the 
government debates of a few major states. Such a study would undoubtedly be 
worthwhile, but it is not the purpose of this thesis. By focusing on the players and 
processes in the international forum rather than in their domestic and policy-forming 
interactions, this study of the CTBT does not seek to privilege the dynamics of 
multilateral negotiations above these other factors in determining outcomes, but 
rather to illuminate an underdeveloped subject of political importance, and so 
contribute to a better overall understanding of how multilateral arms control functions 
in reality. 13 
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The first decade after the end of the cold war is of particular interest to studies of 
arms control and multilateralism as it was a period of transition in international 
relations. It was also during this period that `civil society' returned to the research 
agenda, as analysts and academics sought to understand the disintegration of the 
Soviet bloc in the late 1980s and the rise of influential pressure groups of diverse 
citizens in issues as wide-ranging as trade, human rights, dam construction and 
environmental protection. 14 Though the term had long been deployed by Marxists", 
the concept of civil society has undergone significant theoretical transformation over 
the past 15 years, as academics, analysts and the UN system came to recognise that 
the participation of nonstate actors is not confined to organisations, and that 
traditional assumptions about NGOs were too limited. 16 Civil society was chosen as 
one of the research themes because it is of increasing importance in UN and academic 
circles while poorly represented as a research category in arms control, 
notwithstanding the burgeoning treatises in other areas of international relations. 
Writing on the role of civil society in achieving the Mine Ban Treaty during the same 
period as this thesis (the 1990s), Richard Price noted: "the security policies of states 
represent, prima facie, a particularly hard case for demonstrating the role of 
transnational nonstate actors... [because] conventional wisdom assumes that the high 
politics of security policy is where the state ought to be the most autonomous from 
society at large and able to set its sights on military imperatives relatively 
independent of societal pressures. " 17 In short, studies of civil society have tended to 
leave out arms control and studies of arms control have tended to leave out civil 
society. 
The significance of civil society for the CTBT was underscored when UN Secretary- 
General Boutros Boutros Ghali opened the treaty for signature in September 1996 and 
formally saluted "all those officials in governments and citizens who have struggled 
for so long to achieve this treaty". 18 Two interesting studies into the role of scientists 
in cold war efforts to achieve a CTBT during the 1950s and 1960s had contributed to 
theories about epistemic communities and norm entrepreneurs, providing more fertile 
ground for analysis. 19 Whilst fully acknowledging that the very concept of civil 
society is contested in international relations, as discussed further in Chapters 2 and 4, 
the lack of solid research into the strategies and impact of civil society in arms 
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control, combined with Boutros Ghali's public acknowledgement and my own 
observations of the different kinds of ways by which civil society influenced the 
CTBT negotiations made it logical to explore the role of these nonstate actors as well 
as states. 
The paucity of in depth studies into either multilateral arms control or the strategies 
and impact of civil society in weapons-related issues is evidence of their relative 
neglect in international relations: by contrast, the field is well stocked with studies of 
state behaviour (especially in bilateral arms control) and domestic policy formation, 
or, as noted above, the role of civil society in a range of softer global issues. Such 
studies seldom focused on the dynamics of the negotiations per se, but rather the 
debates within governments and the personalities, bureaucracies and political interests 
on each side that contributed to policy-formation and carried out the instructions at 
the negotiating table. The principal exception, mentioned above, has been the 1997 
Mine Ban Treaty, about which much has been written in recent years; but although 
considerable emphasis has been placed on the role of civil society in banning 
landmines, it is invariably pointed out that a major factor in their success was their 
framing of the issue in humanitarian rather than arms control or disarmament terms. 20 
Moreover, although a case can be made for the military utility of landmines, they 
hardly compare to the strategic value accorded to nuclear weapons. 
Three Approaches to Multilateral Theory 
As already noted, relatively little theoretical work has been done on the concept or 
processes of multilateralism, but some parallels can be drawn with regime theory. 
Developed during the 1980s to address questions relating to international cooperation 
and security, the major schools of thought in regime analysis derive from the 
theoretical frameworks of realism and Grotian neoliberalism 2' Whilst sharing the 
positivist, rational choice assumptions about state behaviour that underpin regime 
analysis, realism and neoliberalism posit somewhat different models of how the 
world works, and the determining role of structure and power, as well as the 
significance of state and nonstate actors, and the influence of agent-centred processes 
such as bargaining, learning and institution-building. A third, post cold war approach 
to multilateralism, spearheaded by Robert Cox and Michael Schechter, has no 
corresponding regime-theoretic basis, but is instead associated with theories of global 
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governance. Although it is not necessary for this thesis to give a systematic 
theoretical analysis of these three approaches to multilateralism, their principal 
underlying assumptions are relevant in providing a conceptual context for studying 
multilateral negotiations. 
Realists, who frame the world in terms of sovereign states competing to maximise 
their power and individual security, characterise the international arena as `anarchic' 
because it lacks any overarching political authority. They understand multilateralism 
as a mechanism through which states that rely on self help can cooperate on the basis 
of temporarily shared interests. 22 The realist state is deemed to be an individualistic, 
coherent unit, capable of applying rational calculations to the available information to 
secure its survival, pursue its interests and increase its relative power. 23 While it is 
recognised that a variety of domestic actors contribute towards determining a state's 
policies, a centralised political authority enables these disparate influences to be 
unified and thereby the state represents the collective will and interests of its 
citizens. 24 
By realist reasoning, states will seek cooperation with others only where coordinating 
their policies appears to be the most rational means of aggrandising their power or 
avoiding the greater insecurity of a free-for-all in the Hobbesian bear pit. The very 
forces of "autonomously calculated self-interest that lie at the root of the anarchic 
international system also lay the foundation for international regimes... there are 
times when rational self-interested calculation leads actors to abandon independent 
decision-making in favour of joint decision-making. s2S In accordance with Arthur 
Stein's distinction between regimes established to deal with questions of common 
interest (to achieve relative gains) and regimes for resolving dilemmas of common 
aversions (such as insecurity due to the proliferation of nuclear weapons), realists 
accept the need for multilateral coordination under certain circumstances. 26 
Assuming cooperation as conditioned by the relative power and interests of 
asymmetric actors, realists expect multilateral negotiations to be both a tool and a 
reflection of the interests of dominant states. The "distribution of power between 
states determines the context of interaction and the preference orderings of the 
interacting states and thus determines the incentives and prospects" of multilateral 
negotiations. 7 The processes and products of multilateralism are expected to yield 
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differential benefits, with the more powerful states ensuring that their significant 
interests are met. However, even when rational actors would all benefit from 
cooperating, they are not necessarily able to do so. Failure to cooperate in rationally 
beneficial circumstances arises not just from what Kenneth Waltz called the 
"interference" of political interventions and social customs, 28 but may be inherent in 
the structure of the interaction, as exemplified by the negotiations on scope and entry 
into force. 
Realists would not expect multilateralism to provide long term solutions for collective 
action, though theorists of hegemonic stability argue that this would be more likely if 
the framework and payoff structure of the multilateral interaction were underpinned 
by hegemonic leadership. In this case, multilateralism would operate in accordance 
with the hegemon's interests. 29 States would engage in multilateral negotiations, 
agreements or regime formation either to further their interests (achieve relative 
gains) or because non-participation would entail relative losses. Realism accords 
little value to the activities of civil society, assumed to be an epiphenomenon of 
marginal influence on the state system. 0 Engaging in multilateral negotiations 
carries no particular expectation or connotation of justice, equality or fairness in 
international decisionmaking, although those ideals might be promoted as incentives 
in order to secure the cooperation of others. With the exception of the so-called 
`liberal realists', who introduced norm-governed limits to states' pursuit of power and 
interests and posited a state-centric `international society', realists have difficulty 
with the normative element in multilateralism implied in modem diplomatic usage. 31 
Norm-based regimes presented less of a problem to neoliberal institutionalism, 
centred around a group of American analysts and policy shapers, such as Joseph Nye, 
Robert Keohane and John Ruggie. Like realists, neoliberals operate from the 
theoretical assumption that states can be treated as unitary, rational actors pursuing 
their interests in an anarchic international system 32 Where realists saw the anarchy 
problematique in terms of power distribution and perpetually competing 
individualised states, neoliberals developed a theory of complex interdependence in 
which power was more diffused. 33 Following from this conceptualisation of world 
order, a further important difference between neoliberals and realists is the role they 
assign to other actors and to institutions in facilitating and sustaining cooperation. In 
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effect, as Joseph Grieco summarised it, neoliberals "basically argue that even if the 
realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness to cooperate, 
states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of 
international institutions. "34 Though neoliberals view multilateral negotiations as 
essentially taking place among states, other actors such as transnational corporations, 
international and national NGOs and interest groups are seen to play a constitutive 
role in shaping states' interests and influencing the conditions for cooperation. 
Extrapolating from regime analysis, realists would consider the institution and 
practices of multilateralism to be the product of the participating states' power and 
interests, capable of being weakened or strengthened as power relations and interests 
shift; by contrast, neoliberals see the institution itself playing a role in embedding 
norms and practices. These norms and practices, as they become constituted in 
particular institutions and in the institution of multilateralism itself, feed back into 
and shape the interests of states, thereby sustaining cooperation even when strategic 
relations, relative power, and the interests of states fluctuate or shift. 35 
Ruggie's focus on multilateralism in the 1990s was grounded in his earlier work on 
regimes. Where regime analysis centred on how laws, norms, ideas, power and 
perceived interests intersect under anarchic conditions in which sovereign states 
compete for power and influence, Ruggie viewed multilateralism as a "generic 
institutional form" that "coordinates behaviour among three or more states on the 
basis of generalised principles of conduct' . 36 He identified three basic institutional 
forms of interstate relations - international orders, international regimes, and 
international organisations - noting that "each type can be, but need not be, 
multilateral in form". 37 Ruggie formulated three principles of multilateralism: diffuse 
reciprocity, indivisibility (which may be interpreted as shared responsibilities and 
benefits38), and nondiscrimination. 39 The generalised principles specify conduct 
"without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies 
that may exist in any specific occurrence"4Ö Reciprocity may be specific (tit-for-tat) 
or diffuse (in which benefits are not dependent on direct, equal or specific quid pro 
quo) 41 Among the principles of state conduct, privilege is given "above all, [to] 
nondiscrimination". 42 Ruggie has carried the concepts of nondiscrimination and 
reciprocity from trade regime analysis into multilateral theory without sufficiently 
examining how applicable they are for other areas. Indeed, this CTBT study raises 
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serious doubts about the relevance of much of Ruggie's approach for security issues 
and arms control: only on the international monitoring system did the negotiations 
conform recognisably to Ruggie's principles. When he does consider multilateralism 
in security relations he rather diffidently notes that it pertains to some concept of 
"collective security or collective self-defence". 43 In this, he is reflecting the 
conventional-diplomatic perspective that multilateralism is not only about the number 
of states but also entails a qualitative dimension. In 2001, for example, UN Under- 
Secretary General for Disarmament Jayantha Dhanapala juxtaposed multilateralism 
with unilateralism as the "two leading approaches available to states in pursuit of 
their ideals and self interests' . 44 His discussion made clear that however poorly 
worked out in practice, multilateralism is imagined to convey norms and ideals about 
greater international justice, legal equality (or at least nondiscrimination) and 
legitimacy. 
Such hopes might be considered wishful thinking, but they form the basis for a third 
approach - of increasing importance in the diplomatic arena - that conceives of 
multilateralism as a tool and institution for promoting the normative goals of global 
governance and international law. Where rationalist regime theory derived from the 
realist and neoliberal schools of thought4S, the `new multilateralism'46 advanced by 
Cox and Schechter is associated with the reflectivist approach of the `third paradigm' 
of late 20`h century and early 21" century international relations theory, variously 
identified as structuralism, neomarxism and globalism 47 Instead of managing 
cooperation problems in the state-centric anarchy problematique, new multilateralism 
was developed to address what its proponents regard as the more substantive global 
problematique of transboundary security challenges, such as poverty, pollution, 
climate change, terrorism, drugs, crime, and violence. Global governance theories are 
critical of state-centred politics, and emphasise the multiplicity of actors: not just 
governments and intergovernmental institutions, but transnational corporations, 
citizens' movements, and nongovernmental organisations 48 Accordingly, new 
multilateralism encompasses nongovernmental, intergovernmental and 
transgovernmental relations, and is embedded with the normative "commitment to 
greater social equity, greater diffusion of power among countries and social groups, 
protection of the biosphere, moderation and nonviolence in dealing with conflict, and 
mutual recognition of the values of different civilisations. s49 
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To sum up the key differences: realists emphasise state power and view 
multilateralism as a mechanism for conflicting powers to coordinate in order to 
increase their relative power or mitigate security threats; neoliberals emphasise 
interstate cooperation for mutual benefits, and regard international regimes and 
institutions as being themselves instrumental in stabilising and sustaining 
cooperation; and new multilateralists emphasise participatory decision-making by 
states and civil society to promote the norms and objectives of collective security, 
global governance and international law. While regime theory per se has been 
influential for over two decades, multilateralism is still in the early stages of 
theoretical development. These three approaches have been briefly introduced here to 
give a conceptual context; though this thesis does not propose new theory, it aims to 
contribute to a deeper understanding of multilateralism in theory and practice. 
In addition to the complex interaction of domestic, regional, intergovernmental and 
international interests noted above, the conduct of negotiations depends on the 
interplay of several related factors. These include the structure and procedures of the 
negotiating forum; the motivation, preferences, perceived interests and political will 
of the players, especially major players capable of impeding or facilitating progress; 
timing; commitment and stability of governments represented in the negotiations; 
personal and organisational leadership and alliances; degree of trust, tension, conflict 
and cooperation between some or all of the parties (which may also be influenced by 
geopolitical relations and objectives or problems in parallel negotiations in other fora, 
such as trade); bargaining strategies and tactics; the diplomatic climate; and relative 
levels of public awareness, engagement and pressure. 
A single study, such as the CTBT, could yield interesting data on any of these 
variables or be relevant for developing several different theories, requiring a 
somewhat different focus or methodology for each. In focusing on the international 
negotiations, the questions I have chosen to prioritise are two-fold: those relating to 
the mechanisms and strategies by which states with significantly different 
expectations and interests converged to achieve the final treaty; and the roles and 
influence of civil society actors, whether individuals or nongovernmental 
organisations, in defining and influencing particular outcomes in the negotiations. By 
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focusing both on states and civil society, I aim to give a fuller picture of the 
strategies, factors and complexities in the construction of convergence in multilateral 
arms control than is usually provided in studies of this kind. 
Methodology, Legitimacy and Limits 
Two aspects of my methodology are discussed in the following section: the use of a 
single case study, and the empirical method of participant-observation. 
The CTBT was chosen as the research subject because it has been an important 
objective related both to disarmament and nonproliferation for more than forty years. 
Though early efforts to achieve a comprehensive treaty have been well documented, 
much less is in the public domain about the negotiations from 1994-96-50 The CTBT 
was the first multilateral nuclear arms treaty to be concluded since the 1968 Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It followed closely on the heels of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a subject of desultory negotiations in the 
CD from 1984, which was suddenly concluded in 1992 following a spurt of post cold 
war enthusiasm, spurred by the Gulf War revelations of Saddam Hussein's 
clandestine nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes. Like the CWC, 
the CTBT had languished on the arms control agenda for decades, and was a 
beneficiary of the political changes that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. By the 
mid-1990s, as noted above, a third arms control demand was catapulted onto the 
negotiating agenda by an innovative partnership between the political representatives 
of a group of middle power states and civil society groups involved more with 
humanitarian than traditional disarmament causes. They bypassed both the CD and 
the review and amendment process of the Convention on Certain Weapons (CCW51) 
to conclude the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997. Other agreements, such as a treaty banning 
the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes (fissban), were 
expected to follow; a negotiating mandate was adopted by the CD in 1995, but 
negotiations failed to get underway, amid frustration that the early post cold war 
52 invigoration of multilateral arms control has not been sustained. 
In considering Hampson's question about multilateral negotiations, one approach 
might have been a comparative analysis of the negotiating processes for these three 
examples of post cold war multilateral arms control. However, though the Ottawa 
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Process and Mine Ban Treaty have been well documented, there is a paucity of 
published research and analysis on the CWC and CTBT negotiations, and what exists 
is much less detailed; so before a non-superficial comparative analysis can be made 
of these three negotiations, it is necessary to conduct more in-depth research into the 
CTBT and CWC. 53 As discussed below in relation to the methodology of participant- 
observation, I was well placed to conduct primary research on the CTBT, thereby 
filling part of this gap in international relations scholarship. Moreover, the CTBT 
conforms to a number of conditions for which single case studies are acknowledged 
to be a preferred strategy: notably, in depth investigation of `how and why' questions; 
contemporary phenomena; and where there are inadequate or seriously asymmetric 
data-bases among potential targets for comparison. 54 
Having decided to put a single treaty at the heart of this thesis, the processes of 
negotiations on the issues of scope, verification and entry into force are treated 
separately. Certain variables, such as the negotiating forum, structure, rules and 
participants, were essentially fixed across the CTB negotiations, but the three issues 
presented very different challenges and, as the study discusses, convergence was 
achieved rather differently in each case. Though care must be taken not to infer 
inappropriately from the particular to the general, the characteristics of the CTBT 
case allow for some interesting comparisons to be made of the different negotiating 
dynamics and outcomes across these three issue areas in the one set of treaty 
ss negotiations. 
The second methodological decision was to base the thesis on my own empirical 
research obtained through participant-observation. The formal negotiations took place 
at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the auspices of the CD, and structured 
through an Ad Hoc Nuclear Test Ban Committee and two working groups, on 
verification and legal and institutional issues. By the rules of the CD, the committee 
and working group meetings were closed to nongovernmental observers. During that 
period, governments made on-the-record public statements at CD plenaries or through 
national debates or press conferences. 56 In April-May 1995, the NPT Review and 
Extension Conference in New York provided an intense and dramatic negotiating 
medium, at which linkages between the CTBT negotiations and the NPT 
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commitments were an important subtext in many interactions and in the final 
outcome. 57 
I was in a position to conduct first-hand, original research, since I attended the CD 
with the aim of pushing for a strong, comprehensive test ban and preventing another 
limited treaty being passed off as a CTBT. 58 Once in Geneva, I decided to explore 
the issue more deeply in order to learn more about the possibilities and limitations of 
multilateral arms control. My role as a participant-observer is consistent with Robert 
Cox's argument that "all theories have a perspective"59 but also raises ethical, 
methodological and political challenges, explored as part of the development of post- 
positivist theory in the social sciences, most notably in feminist research. When the 
researcher is at the same time a participant in the events being researched, it is 
particularly important to acknowledge and question the relationship and interaction 
between observation, participation and research. 60 Feminist and reflectivist theories 
have specifically challenged traditional assumptions about research objectivity and 
the researcher/researched relationship. Indeed, they go further, arguing that research 
reports that include no statement about the researcher's own experience and 
perspective should be distrusted, along with traditional notions of objectivity, 
represented as a rationalist construct that serves to underpin the assumptions of the 
dominant paradigm and exclude or marginalise alternative realities experienced by 
actors consigned by the dominant paradigm to the periphery. 61 
In reporting on the CTB negotiations, I was neither a direct insider to the 
negotiations, nor `just' an observer. 62 In general, I sought to have impact on the 
negotiations, either by directly persuading diplomats and officials to take up my ideas 
or those of other NGOs or states, or through work with NGOs in the most relevant 
countries. I also assisted some diplomats with formulating ideas, or occasionally in 
writing a statement or working paper. The basic act of observing and reporting, fed 
back into the negotiations through emails and publications, may also have affected 
the positions of states and therefore the conduct of the negotiations in ways I did not 
intend or of which I was not aware. 63 Research based on observer-participation also 
has implications when providing notes and references. The researcher may herself be 
the source of primary references, for her own study and for those of others (where it 
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is important to be aware of the dangers of creating a self-referential or feedback 
loop) . 
64 
I kept detailed notes of meetings with all the major negotiators during the CTBT 
negotiations from January 1994 to August 1996, many of which I emailed to 
nongovernmental organisations and other interested individuals. In order to check 
information and flesh out my weekly email reports on the CTBT negotiations to other 
NGOs, my research involved a number of different strategies, from one-to-one 
meetings with diplomats to close scrutiny of working papers, statements, and other 
relevant documents. 65 1 deliberately chose to discuss the negotiations with diplomats 
and scientists from all groupings and political positions, but that did not completely 
avoid mistakes or bias. I was conscious of an informal process of natural selection, 
since some interlocutors were not very forthcoming, either from caution or because 
they knew less about the negotiations than I did. 6 Some diplomats regarded 
meetings with me as opportunities to test their assessment of negotiations against my 
perceptions. Some, with greater or lesser subtlety, tried to pump me for information 
about other participants or groups. This was especially noticeable when meeting with 
the NWS, India, Israel and Pakistan, whose concerns about their interests and rivals 
was higher than that of the middle powers or nonaligned. 7 Evaluating the 
information from my meetings with diplomats and officials necessitated the 
development of `researcher's intuition', to identify whether negative or equivocal 
replies indicated that the information was false, unknown, or sensitive, and to gauge 
the nuances behind some affirmatives. As I became more knowledgeable and more 
diplomats came to trust me with insider information, vigilance against inadvertently 
breaching confidentiality was especially important 68 Where possible, external 
references have been used to corroborate information and observations, but in the 
case of direct observation or where conversations with negotiators were off the 
record, as most were, the observer-participants' own experience, recorded as 
truthfully as possible, may be taken as a reliable reference. 
The working papers, of which there were more than 340, comprised ideas, arguments, 
data and proposals put forward by delegations or officials, as well as draft language 
on articles and the early draft texts. They were not only invaluable as a record of a 
particular government's position, but also provided fascinating insights into perceived 
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national interests and the relative levels of engagement by different governments. 
Although it would have been difficult to document and analyse the development of 
conflicts and convergence solely on the basis of the working papers and formal 
statements, they provided detail and evidence with which to understand and evaluate 
the anecdotal and oral information provided in my meetings with the delegates. 
During the intense final months of negotiations from May 1996, many diplomats 
would make a point of ensuring that I was immediately informed of developments, 
while at the same time checking whether my intelligence corresponded with their 
own. I would make myself easily accessible by waiting long hours outside working 
group or committee meetings for delegates to emerge for a break or refreshments. 
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My informal emails and weekly reports have provided one kind of record of the 
negotiations and their political context - in effect, a diary as events unfolded. These 
emails were intended to provide as accurate information as possible, but were also 
sent to test ban advocates with suggestions for how to influence their governments to 
ensure that the negotiations proceeded towards our preferred outcome of a genuinely 
comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, without thresholds or conditions. From the 
middle of the first year, partly in response to requests from diplomats and government 
officials, I began to publish more formal reports. 70 
While the CTBT was being negotiated, I focused primarily on observing and 
reporting on developments and working with diplomats, officials and other NGOs. 
Once the treaty was concluded I began to formulate some hypotheses and research 
other arms control and multilateral negotiations, by way of comparison. Partly 
through necessity (full time job) and partly from choice I did not write the thesis 
immediately after the CTBT was adopted by the United Nations in 1996. In view of 
the politically charged and conflictual endgame, I considered it important to allow 
time to see how the finished treaty would `weather', although I have kept the South 
Asian tests and ratification difficulties per se outside the purview of this thesis. In any 
empirical study of this kind, it is important to acknowledge and, if possible, 
compensate for the fact that information is mediated through the perspectives and 
interests of the players, who may at the same time be seeking to manipulate outcomes 
by means of selective transmission of certain kinds of information, especially to a 
participant-observer providing real time reporting that may influence other states' 
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perceptions. As time elapses, the sensitivity of some issues is reduced. Interviews 
conducted after the conclusion of negotiations were used both to check the accuracy 
of information gained contemporaneously and elicit reminiscences and retrospective 
analysis from major players in order to shed light on hidden parts of the negotiations. 
Anecdotal information and recollections may nevertheless be incomplete or contain 
inaccurate information, and as such carry a methodological note of caution. 71 Finally, 
I sought to test and substantiate the analysis through interviews conducted between 
1999 and 2002 with some of the most important ambassadors. 72 
Thesis Outline 
This thesis on the dynamics of multilateral anus control negotiations is organised in 
nine chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the issues and questions that will be 
addressed, outlined three approaches to multilateralism, and discussed the research 
methodology. 
Chapter 2 opens with a brief discussion of the concepts of distributive and integrative 
convergence, and then considers the principal actors in the negotiations, state and 
nonstate. Post cold war developments in theories of civil society are considered, 
including the relevance of epistemic communities and norm entrepreneurs in 
diffusing knowledge and norms and shaping expectations. To facilitate understanding 
of the role of power, interests and expectations in this study of nuclear arms control, 
the states participating in the CD are demarcated in terms of nuclear capabilities and 
aspirations. This section goes beyond the classic nonproliferation distinction made 
between the NWS and NNWS, and considers states with de facto nuclear weapons or 
programmes, as well as `non nuclear weapon' parties to the NPT with nuclear 
weapons ambitions or sufficient technological capabilities to constitute an insurance 
programme, or who may host on their territory nuclear weapons as part of an alliance 
arrangement, as in the case of NATO members. The chapter considers the 
negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament, and its structure and rules, and 
ends with discussion of multilateral negotiations as a process for regime formation, 
the relevance of power in negotiations, and a range of negotiating strategies and 
tactics used by participants to obstruct or facilitate convergence. 
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To place the case study in its wider political context, Chapter 3 offers a synopsis of 
nuclear arms control from the mid-1950s to 1989, with particular emphasis on the 
earlier, thwarted attempts to achieve a total and comprehensive nuclear test ban, and 
the political impact of civil society's interactive role in informing and amplifying 
fluctuations in public concern about nuclear weapons and testing. 
Chapter 4 looks at the `prenegotiation' phase from 1990 until the commencement of 
the CTBT negotiations in January 1994, with particular emphasis on the role of 
transnational civil society in bringing the NWS to the negotiating table, using a 
toolbox of public, legislative and diplomatic strategies to foster a sense of urgency 
and exert leverage for a CTBT, as the 1995 date for deciding on the fate of the NPT 
drew near. The chapter explores the different pressures that led three of the NWS to 
enact testing moratoria, which acted as a transitional confidence-building bridge to 
facilitate the opening of test ban negotiations. 
Chapter 5 gives a chronologically based narrative of the CD negotiations on the 
CTBT from 1994-1996, highlighting the major issues and events and giving context 
to the next three chapters, which provide detailed analysis of the politics, negotiating 
dynamics and actions that contributed to the outcomes on scope, verification and 
entry into force. 
Chapter 6 examines the process by which the scope article was shaped, given 
meaning and adopted, showing that convergence was determined neither through 
multilateral interstate negotiations in Geneva, nor in P-5 minilateral negotiations, as 
had been expected. It explores how the decision was shaped by civil society 
strategies, in which two factors predominated: the political effect on French and US 
decision-making of the swift and hostile public reaction to the resumption of French 
testing; and the role of epistemic actors and norm entrepreneurs in providing 
technically relevant solution-oriented information to the White House and key CD 
delegations, which undermined the case for a low yield threshold and overturned 
China's strategy to obtain a provision for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. 
Chapter 7 illustrates the differences between the negotiations on an international 
monitoring system (IMS) and on-site inspections (OSI) and national technical means 
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(NTM). While government scientists took on epistemic roles of knowledge-diffusing 
and norm-building, civil society had little or no involvement in the verification 
negotiations. Unlike the rest of the CTBT, only the IMS negotiations bore any 
resemblance to Ruggie's principles for multilateralism, with reciprocity, shared 
responsibilities and benefits, and nondiscrimination. The negotiations on inspections 
and NTM pitted politically sensitive national concerns about sovereignty (and the 
concomitant risk of cheating) against intrusion (and the facilitation of spying), but the 
chapter shows how problems and concerns were mitigated in the negotiations by 
more conciliatory political relations, mutual trade-offs, and the interplay of more 
states in the multilateral environment. 
Chapter 8 provides insight into the conflicting intentions and intransigence that 
characterised negotiations on entry into force, now widely viewed as the treaty's 
Achilles' heel. Anecdotal evidence supplements the analysis of how the competing 
expectations of some major players with regard to the role, function and benefits of 
multilateral arms control and the CTBT interacted to undermine the security 
objectives of the majority. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by drawing out the major findings, first considering 
how a state's interests in nuclear weapons influenced its expectations and negotiating 
posture, then summarising the processes and factors most relevant for explaining how 
they were brought to convergence, with assessment of the regime quality of the 
agreements reached. The separate consideration of the negotiations on scope, 
verification and entry into force enabled the complex interaction of factors that have 
been underrepresented in other studies to be analysed more fully. The chapter 
discusses how different kinds of convergence were achieved through the interplay not 
only of power and interests, but factors such as norms and regime values, knowledge 
and ideas, civil society engagement, issue-based alliances, and the level of domestic 
and international political attention and support. The thesis concludes that realist and 
neorealist approaches are limited by their failure to distinguish between distributive 
and integrative convergence, while new multilateralism fails to address why states 
persistently engage in distributive bargaining when integrative convergence would 
provide greater mutual benefits. 
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the Plutonium Coordinator. Having an interest in the outcome of research does not, however, equate 
with bias, or, for that matter, distortion or misreporting. I was conscious of there being different 
perspectives on states' positions, motivations, strategies and interactions, and I tried to understand 
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deceive. After falling into a trap at least once, early on, when I discovered too late that I had been 
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Agency (which was semi-paralysed, under constant threat by that time of being folded into the State 
Department, which did eventually happen, in 1999), the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and 
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publication Nuclear Proliferation News was supplanted by a monthly journal, Disarmament 
Diplomacy, under the same editor, Sean Howard. The combination of regularly updated summaries of 
the CTBT negotiations and statements made in Geneva with Howard's well-selected, abbreviated 
compilations of international security developments proved irresistible to diplomats and officials with 
little time to trawl through masses of cables and news reports. The mailing list was extended to include 
many UN Missions in New York and officials in defence and foreign ministries in around 40 countries. 
NGOs, some of whom it later transpired forwarded them to officials in their government, continued to 
receive email updates on a weekly basis (or more frequently, as events warranted), rising to daily 
reports during the highly charged endgame stand-off with India. 
71 Hampson, 1995, p 21. 
n Tapes were made of interviews with: Victor Slipchenko, Vienna, October 8,1999; Arundhati Ghose, 
New Delhi, February 20,2000; Sha Zukang, Beijing, October 13,2000; Stephen Ledogar, New York, 
November 5,2000; Grigori Berdennikov, Vienna, July 17,2001; Jaap Ramaker, Vienna, July 16, 
2001; and Sir Michael Weston, June 11,2002. Permission was given for these interviews to be taped 
for background and corroboration purposes, and the thesis does not therefore use direct quotes from 
them. The interviews were granted on the basis that the tapes would not be transcribed or published, 
but they can be made available for examination purposes if required, on a confidential basis. At times I 
have also (as part of my job) been able to follow up informally (untaped conversations) to clarify 
certain issues with some of the key ambassadors or other CTBT diplomats. None of the 
contemporaneous interviews and conversations undertaken during the negotiations were taped, for 
reasons of confidentiality and diplomacy, although I retained contemporaneous notes and emails based 
on information gained through such conversations. 
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Chapter Two 
Multilateralism and Nuclear Diplomacy 
In January 1994, at the start of the test ban negotiations in the Conference on 
Disarmament, John Holum, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (ACDA), stated: "The CD is the only multilateral forum to address global 
arms control and disarmament issues on a continuing basis. Its membership covers 
every region of the globe and reflects a wide range of concerns and interests. We 
have all come to accept the CD as both a market place of ideas and a place where 
nations get down to practical business and conclude the agreements that enhance 
international security". ' Such a ringing endorsement glossed over the structural 
features and political divisions that made it possible for the United States and others 
to block CD negotiations on the CTBT for decades. 
In the UN system, including the CD, multilateral negotiations are assumed to be 
conducted among a number of states with asymmetric power and interests. Depending 
on the circumstances, other bodies, such as intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) 
and NGOs may also participate, but usually only as observers. In considering nuclear 
diplomacy, Stephen Krasner's list of causal factors for regime formation offer a 
useful point of departure. In addition to power and interests, he identifies: diffuse 
norms and principles; usage and custom; and knowledge. This chapter incorporates 
Krasner's factors in laying the conceptual groundwork for the thesis, with 
consideration of the actors and their strategies and tactics and the forum and its 
structure and rules. 
Seeking Convergence 
Multilateral arms control is usefully characterised as a mixed-motive interaction to 
resolve cooperation problems, where parties have both shared and conflicting 
interests. As discussed in Chapter 1, realism assumes that negotiated outcomes will 
result in gains and losses being divided among the parties according to their relative 
power. Such agreements, based on apportioning benefits and constraints, usually 
through mechanisms of power or concession trading, are known as distributive. At 
one extreme, a hegemon or powerful actor might impose a settlement, which the rest 
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are obliged to accept. Although the solution may involve a division of gains and 
losses, this kind of unilaterally-imposed fiat does not really qualify as convergence. 
Of more relevance for multilateralism is "imposed convergence", when an actor or 
dominant group determine the parameters or specifics of a solution to a particular 
cooperation problem. They may conduct distributive negotiations within the 
privileged group, but others have little say in the outcome. This does not necessarily 
mean it is to other states' detriment or that they must be coerced into accepting. The 
issue may come down to the perceived level of importance of the interests: are they 
direct or indirect; strategically crucial or marginal? An imposed convergence will be 
accepted by other actors if the tangible or regime benefits are considered to be greater 
than the alternative of getting no agreement 3 
In what passed for cold-war multilateralism, it was normal practice for the United 
States and Soviet Union (sometimes also with the United Kingdom) to negotiate 
between themselves on a treaty text that satisfied their own interests first and 
foremost; they then presented it to other states for adoption. While there may have 
been some room for minor adjustments to provide additional incentives to bring 
target states on board, as happened in the case of the NPT, the majority were expected 
to take it or face isolation or other kinds of sanctions and pressure. During the CTBT 
negotiations, the P-5 minilateral negotiations epitomised the NWS' assumptions that 
on issues relating most closely to their nuclear capabilities or privileges, such as 
scope and inspections, the priority task was to agree amongst themselves, following 
which they expected to be able to impose their preferred outcome on the remaining 
states. Though this was also the expectation of many NNWS, who had experienced 
imposed agreements in other diplomatic contexts, the actuality was rather different, as 
the following chapters show. 
A second type of convergence is brought about through multilateral distributive 
bargaining in which participants regard the payoff structure as fixed or at least 
relatively inflexible; agreement is promoted through various bargaining techniques, 
including concession trading and the manipulation of text and meaning. While very 
common in multilateral negotiations and capable of delivering mutual or regime 
benefits, this kind of `managed convergence' frequently results in lowest common 
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denominator agreements where differences are split or the more powerful receive 
greater benefits. 
For much of the cold war, the most influential approach for considering the 
intersections between cooperation, interdependence and the pursuit of self interest 
was game theory, which produced interesting insights about cold war arms control 
and bilateral nuclear deterrence. Even when given depth to illuminate more complex 
scenarios through the incorporation of multilevel games, iteration, anticipated payoff 
structures, mutual adjustment of perception and decisionmaking over time, and 
consideration of potential long term benefits (the so-called "shadow of the future"), 
game theoretic approaches have proved less well suited to cooperation scenarios with 
multiple players. In particular, the necessarily parsimonious assumptions of 
rationality and usual binary choice between cooperation and defection oversimplify 
cooperation complexities and suppress the role of variables that may be crucial to an 
actual outcome. 4 With these reservations, Prisoners' Dilemma and Rousseau's 
Staghunt have been shown to have relevance for mixed motive negotiations, 
highlighting how in certain interactions where there is a common interest in 
cooperating, one or more actors are nonetheless likely to take actions on the basis of 
narrow perceptions of self-interest that result in a detrimental outcome for everyone. 5 
It is not necessary for the purposes of this thesis to explore the practices and critiques 
of game theory in any detail, but two consequences of its influence are relevant for 
this study of convergence in multilateral negotiations. Game theory assumes that 
actors' decision-making is rational, that interests are essentially fixed and in 
competition, and that there is a known or bounded payoff structure with shared or at 
least similar perceptions of the rules and choices. As James Sebenius has noted, such 
assumptions foster adversarial interactions and suppress important factors like 
players' perceptions, uncertainty, learning and change. 6 Such premises restrict 
consideration to how to divide the pie (distributive convergence). A more mutually 
advantageous solution, however, may lie in integrative convergence, which requires 
negotiators to consider how the pie itself can be enlarged or changed. Some or all of 
the negotiators could even decide to go and bake a different pie and share that 
? instead. 
39 
Integrative bargaining became associated with the negotiation-analytic approach of 
Duncan Luce, Howard Raiffa and Thomas Schelling8, and was defined by Richard 
Walton and Robert McKersie as a problem-solving approach that seeks to expand or 
change the zone of possible agreement and so present a different range of options for 
convergence than first appear to be on the table. 9 Recent theorists have associated 
integrative convergence with the cognitive and communications strategies of civil 
society and epistemic actors, who seek to change how actors view the problem or 
perceive the value and achievability of potential solutions. 1° In contrast to the zero- 
sum assumptions of distributive convergence, integrative convergence does not 
regard expectations and interests as fixed, but as factors that can be manipulated or 
altered by teaching or recasting knowledge, values, norms and ideas. In the next 
section, I expand on Chapter 1's brief introduction to civil society, and consider its 
relevance for understanding multilateral convergence. 
Knowledge, Norms and Ideas: Post Cold War Concepts of Civil Society 
Civil society, and its variants `global civil society' and `transnational civil society', 
enjoyed a revival in the 1990s, as theorists sought to understand the "widening 
influence of private citizens in national policymaking and in the conduct of 
international relationships". " In accordance with intellectual culture and political 
standpoint, the concepts are employed with shades of significantly different 
meaning. 12 Traditionally, Marxism used the term to describe institutions and relations 
regarded as autonomous from state institutions, including trade unions, voluntary 
organisations, churches, and even households and businesses. 13 Such depictions have 
been overtaken by post cold war analyses, which found them too broad to be a useful 
basis for understanding the ways in which civil society works in the late 20'h and 
early 21 " centuries. 
Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor are representative of an influential 
school associated with the London School of Economics, which sees civil society as 
global, with ethical and normative attributes: "the existence of a social sphere... 
above and beyond national, regional or local societies... something to do with the 
infrastructure that is needed for the spread of democracy and development: the 
growth of professional organisations, consumer organisations, and interest groups that 
span many countries.. .,, 
14 M. J. Peterson prefers the term "international civil society", 
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on the basis that "countries and national borders remain real. "5 Acknowledging 
Peterson's argument, but preferring a term that does not just imply links between and 
among nations, but emphasises "the border-crossing nature of the links", 16 I follow 
Ann Florin's definition and use of "transnational civil society". As this CTBT study 
illustrates, civil society engagement on security issues is still far from global: some 
parts of the world are seriously underrepresented in international negotiations, 
including nongovernmental activities; related to this, assumptions made by the 
`global civil society' theorists about an international convergence of normative 
understandings are shown to be premature. 
Though civil society references are now mainstream, focus in the United Nations and 
elsewhere has long been on NGOs. Usually thought of as nonprofit `businesses' or 
`charities', the UN definition of NGO encompasses also private businesses 
established for profit and their related industrial associations. Though the concept of 
civil society is still under discussion, it is now more usual to treat the role of 
industrial or commercial players in influencing national and international outcomes as 
an analytical category distinct from civil society. 17 Consideration of the roles and 
strategies of US chemical and pharmaceutical industries during negotiations to ban 
chemical weapons and strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BWC) reinforces the argument for making a conceptual distinction between 
industrial and civil society actors, even though both may be formally classified as 
nongovernmental by some institutions. 18 Although the normative claims associated 
with some conceptualisations are left open for analysis, the concept of civil society 
used in this thesis also excludes nongovernmental and nonstate actors who seek 
political change through violent and militarised means, such as guerrillas, terrorists, 
and freedom-fighters. 19 This distinction is not based simply on a value judgement, but 
has important conceptual underpinnings. In particular, such nonstate actors' use of 
violence is the antithesis of common understandings of `civil', epitomised by the 
usual antonymic juxtaposition of civil and military and the historical association of 
civil society with "the cultivation of a set of social and political virtues" such as 
"civility, trust [and] tolerance". 20 In other words, civil society comprises nonstate 
actors and includes NGOs, but not all nonstate actors or organisations classified as 
NGOs under current UN rules are part of civil society. 
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Accepting as part of the operative definition of civil society the exclusion of 
militarised violence as a strategy or tactic does not entail any normative assumptions 
of a positive, democratising and progressive role for civil society, in opposition to the 
state. Such a role may be desirable, but if made intrinsic to the definition of civil 
society, as implied in much of the work of the global civil society theorists, 21 it 
misleadingly closes off lines of inquiry and analysis. Depending on the specific goals 
and strategies under consideration, civil society, according to the understanding 
adopted here, may be progressive or retrogressive; it may seek emancipatory 
outcomes or harness its energies to resist change or promote outcomes that would 
stabilise the status quo. Civil society does not always oppose government policies or 
challenge the state; some civil society actors may organise to reinforce the policies of 
particular governments or opposition parties. 2 
To return to Florini's useful definition, transnational civil society may be regarded as 
encompassing NGOs, informal associations and loose coalitions, "forming... 
connections across national borders and inserting themselves into a wide range of 
decision-making processes on issues from international security to human rights to 
the environment"23 Two other concepts that are relevant to consideration of the role 
of civil society in bringing about the CTBT must be introduced here: Peter Haas' 
"epistemic communities"; and the concept of "norm entrepreneurs" developed by 
Ethan Nadelmann and Richard Price. 
From the 1940s onwards, the role of scientists was particularly important with regard 
to the test ban case, as highlighted by Emanuel Adler in his study of the development 
of nuclear arms control during the cold war. Adler's analysis supported concept of 
epistemic community, defined as "a network of professionals with recognised 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy. 
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area' . 24 With regard to nuclear arms 
control, Adler notes, however, "[T]hey were one community, yet they were 
everywhere: dispersed among government bureaux, research organisations and 
laboratories, profit and nonprofit organisations, university research centres, and think- 
s. "25 Epistemic communities intersect with but are not subsumed into civil 
society. 26 
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Scientists continued to play varied roles in post cold war nuclear arms control as well, 
but my analysis of the CTBT suggests that though the concept of epistemic 
communities has proved useful in highlighting the role of experts and specialists, it 
does not adequately account for the complexity of expert engagement in multilateral 
negotiations. As part of this thesis, careful attention has been devoted to the different 
parts played by experts and actors with specialist knowledge and authority. These 
roles and the influence of epistemic actors on facilitating convergence and fostering 
norms and knowledge will be considered in more detail in the following chapters on 
prenegotiations and the dynamics of convergence with regard to scope, verification 
and entry into force. In Chapter 9, problems for Haas' theory arising from the CTB 
study will be discussed, together with consideration of the contribution of epistemic 
actors to the processes of convergence. 
Where Haas developed the concept of epistemic communities to highlight how 
cognitive authority is deployed to shape outcomes, Nadelmann coined the term 
"transnational moral entrepreneur" for actors and groups that mobilise public opinion 
and political support for "moral" objectives in order to build prohibition regimes that 
involve "intrasocietal interactions as well as interstate relations". 27 Using examples 
ranging from slavery to drug trafficking and prostitution, Nadelmann identified four 
stages of prohibition regime formation. At first, the targeted activity is accepted or at 
least regarded as legitimate under certain conditions or for certain groups; during the 
second stage the activity comes to be redefined as a problem (and often an evil); by 
the third stage, opponents are agitating for the suppression and criminalisation of the 
activity by all states; and if they are successful, the fourth stage sees the establishment 
and development of a global prohibition regime. The second and third stages in 
particular are marked by the growth and organised influence of moral entrepreneurs. 
Usually originating within civil society, and often associated with particular religious, 
political or humanitarian views, these moral entrepreneurs engage transnationally to 
mobilise public opinion and political support, and lobby governments within their 
own countries and abroad . 
28 Nadelmann made only a passing reference to regimes 
dealing with weapons of mass destruction, and it was left to Richard Price to consider 
how Nadelmann's argument might apply to a weapons prohibition regime. Looking 
at the case of landmines, Price goes beyond Nadelmann's emphasis on morality and 
focuses on the role of nongovernmental experts and organisers in promoting 
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particular norms in order to influence governments by changing the environment and 
payoff matrix within which they make their political calculations. 29 Price prefers the 
term "norm entrepreneurs", arguing that these experts and organisers become 
influential by using their ability to "engage the policy process and engage in moral 
proselytising through persuasion". 30 As such, Price also differentiates the role of 
norm entrepreneurs from the "authoritative claims of scientific knowledge" of 
epistemic communities, to whom "governments turn for knowledge in times of 
uncertainty' . 3! In adopting the concept of norm entrepreneurs, this thesis accepts as 
useful Price's refinement of Nadelmann's original theory. 
Civil society organisations, networks and actors may be constituted nationally, 
regionally or internationally, and may take a variety of forms. Though realists and 
many analysts of arms control and international security ignore or dismiss civil 
society, neoliberals and new multilateralists have incorporated the agency of nonstate 
actors in their theorising. They disagree about the nature, mechanisms and 
significance of civil society's influence on national and international decisions and 
events, however, and little has been done to develop criteria for assessing the impact 
and effectiveness of civil society. Keith Krause has noted the problems inherent in 
trying to assess the power of diverse nonstate actors using the measurements of state 
power. In his analysis of norm building in the recent case of the UN Programme of 
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, Krause suggests that influence can be exercised directly, as input into a 
particular outcome, or indirectly, through the structural power associated with agenda 
setting and the structuring of the debate. 32 In evaluating the effectiveness (or 
otherwise) of civil society, it is necessary to define the issue, context and nature of the 
influence under consideration, as well as the level on which NGO influence is alleged 
to be exercised. 3 One approach, suggested by Krause, is to divide the utility and 
impact of civil society actors into effective output, such as media coverage, and effect 
on outcome, such as agenda setting, policy formation and decisionmaking. Another 
approach is to consider "voluntaristic"34 power, measured in terms of constructing 
political will, shaping perceptions and through them, state interests. Recognising the 
difficulties in attributing causality and measuring the influence and impact of specific 
actors in negotiations, this thesis focuses on states' expectations and interests, regime 
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principles and norms, and how these are identified, shaped and embedded through the 
strategies and actions of different types of civil society actors. 
This brief discussion of civil society has only brushed the surface of a growing area 
of relevance for international relations. My intention here was to introduce the 
concepts and debates that are most relevant for this thesis on multilateral negotiations, 
and we turn now to consider the principal legal unit in security negotiations: states. 
States and Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control 
The UN system, by legal and diplomatic convention, is state-centric. 5 In the CD and 
the United Nations as a whole, states are treated as sovereign, legal entities, 
abstracted from the politics and identities of governments and nations. This accords 
with the rational actor model of states shared by realists and neoliberals. Realists, 
however, view territorially sovereign states as the significant actors in international 
relations, with nonstate actors such as corporations, NGOs and intergovernmental 
institutions accorded, at best, a peripheral or secondary role. For neoliberals the state 
is a very significant actor, but its power is mediated by various other actors and 
factors. New multilateralism challenges this rationalist view of states, 36 and instead 
portrays them as "conditional entities" , 
37 which theory and diplomacy need to 
conceptualise not as consistent units, but as representative institutions "constantly 
subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction" by social and 
political actors, through elections, coups, or other forms of governmental change. 8 
In view of the complexities inherent in multilateral negotiations among large 
numbers, and the institutionalised assumptions of formal international diplomacy 
structured around interstate relations, it has been necessary to adopt certain 
conventions to facilitate narrative coherence and readability. A country's name is 
widely accepted as a convenient shorthand to denote the policies, positions and 
interactions of leaders and negotiators. The country's delegation and diplomats are 
taken to represent the policies of the recognised states behind whose name-plates they 
sit. UN recognition and sovereign status are contingent on certain criteria, however. 
In one example, when the CTBT negotiations commenced in 1994, the referent 
`Yugoslavia' applied to a disintegrating federation with a politically contested 
identity. Despite retaining the name-plate signifying formal membership of the CD, 
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the UN system did not permit anyone to represent Yugoslavia and participate in CD 
deliberations, including the test ban negotiations. 
Utilising the diplomatic conventions of nomenclature, as I have done, does not imply 
adoption of the unified rational actor model. For the purposes of this thesis, a 
country's name, such as `the United States' or `India', is used as a collective-noun 
referent to the administration in power at the time under consideration. If an 
administration is changed, through election or some less democratic process, the 
state's objectives and strategies may correspondingly change. This was clearly 
demonstrated when Jacques Chirac took power after the French elections of May 
1995. Even a general election campaign - especially if it is close fought - can have a 
significant effect on a government's policy, as illustrated in India in the year leading 
up to the election victory of the pro-nuclear Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in mid- 
1996. The degree to which a state's objectives and posture change depends in large 
part on the magnitude of the political differences between the outgoing and incoming 
administrations. If the distinctions are relatively weak, a change of party or 
government may have minimal effect on foreign policy. A coup or the election of a 
party with political and ideological precepts that are fundamentally different from 
those of the preceding government can result in a very significant shift in foreign 
policy or negotiating posture. 
Power struggles among the multiple domestic actors, agencies and pressure groups 
(bureaucratic, diplomatic, civil, military or political) may also shift foreign policies 
over time, altering a state's negotiating positions. 9 Whilst it is not the purpose of this 
thesis to examine how different domestic actors and agencies interact in determining 
foreign policy, some consideration is given to domestic/intemational/transboundary 
interactive processes, including strategies and influence from other states and actors 
associated with civil society. 40 It is important to recognise that there is seldom a one- 
way linear process from determination of a state's policy and position to instructions 
from capitals and implementation by diplomats in the field. Though charged with the 
task of carrying out instructions, there is a frequently-observed feedback loop 
between the perceptions and diplomacy of practitioners in the forum and the decision- 
making processes at home. 
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Multilateralism assumes some level of asymmetry among states; nor is it necessary 
that all participants possess the weapons in question. In the case of landmines, 
possession was diffused among a wide group of states from all regions and political 
groupings. 41 In other multilateral disarmament or arms control negotiations, such as 
the BWC and the CWC, the weapons under question may be possessed by a small 
subset rather than a majority of states. Nevertheless, the participants would all claim a 
security interest in the outcome of the negotiations. What distinguishes these 
examples of asymmetric possession from the case of nuclear weapons is that there 
existed no differential international legal bar on possession or development of the 
weapons prior to the relevant treaty negotiations. National and economic resources, 
threat assessments, public or policymakers' preferences, or some other set of 
conditions or factors determined whether one state rather than another developed 
biological or chemical weapons; but given the appropriate conditions, any of them 
could have legally chosen to do so up to the point of concluding and signing the 
prohibition treaty. 42 The implications for nuclear arms control of the differentiation 
made in the NPT between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states will 
be considered below. 
The terms bilateral, trilateral, and plurilateral convey the sense of negotiations among 
a certain number of parties with direct interests. Multilateral arms control coordinates 
agreement among a more diverse international collection of parties, including some 
who have no (or negligible) possession of the weapons concerned. Many diplomats 
and a growing number of scholars also employ the term `plurilateral', used to 
describe negotiations among states that all possess the weapons under consideration, 
because it enables a further useful distinction to be made, especially in relation to 
arms control. An example would be nuclear arms negotiations held solely among the 
nuclear weapon states. 43 This distinguishing of plurilateral from multilateral 
negotiations should not be confused with Miles Kahler's concept of "minilateral" 
collaboration among powerful states within multilateral institutions or processes, 
which the thesis considers in relation to P-5 sidebar negotiations 44 
Krasner put self-interest first in his list of causal factors for regime formation, and the 
relationship between weapons possession, interests and a state's engagement and 
leverage in multilateral arms control is an important consideration for this thesis. The 
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fundamental division in nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations is 
between states that have nuclear weapons and those that do not. The following section 
examines these demarcations and considers a number of subsets in between. 
Nuclear Capabilities and Interests 
As noted in the introduction, five countries are defined as `nuclear weapon states' 
under Article IX. 3 of the NPT: Britain, China, France, Russia (as successor to the 
Soviet Union) and the United States. These five are also the permanent members of 
the UN Security Council, a coincidence that is politically problematic and, as India's 
nuclear debate has indicated, may be a proliferation driver for some countries 45 
Though some NWS have at time appeared ambivalent about the linkage, they are 
enhanced by the power, status and symbolism of their role as permanent members of 
the Security Council and collaborate together as the P-5 in parallel with their 
interactions as NWS. The congruent roles therefore have implications for the P-5 
interactions in defence and security relations, with each other and with other states, as 
the CTBT study illustrates on several levels 46 
Three states possess nuclear weapons programmes outside the NPT - India, Israel and 
Pakistan. In May 1998, India and Pakistan carried out a number of underground 
nuclear test explosions, thereby fully abandoning any pretence of `nuclear ambiguity', 
a form of neither-confirm-nor-deny doctrine that had enabled the two South Asian 
states to pursue nuclear programmes while also joining with nonaligned NNWS when 
it suited 47 Following the tests, India declared itself a nuclear weapon state 48 Though 
it is not disputed that India possesses nuclear weapons, its self-declaration does not 
alter the fact that India remains thirty years outside the NPT's legally recognised 
definition of a nuclear weapon state. This thesis reserves the term `nuclear weapon 
state' (and the abbreviation NWS) for the P-5 only. Although the negotiations took 
place before India and Pakistan openly declared themselves, the commonly heard 
term `threshold state' had ceased to be appropriate by 1994. Israel, as far as is 
known, passed beyond nuclear capability into actual possession of nuclear weapons 
as early as 1970 49 To distinguish these three states from the defined NWS while 
acknowledging that they have passed beyond the threshold of just having nuclear 
weapon capabilities, I refer to them as de facto nuclear weapon possessors (D-3). 
48 
Clumping the rest together as NNWS enhances readability, but closer analysis shows 
that there are at least four kinds of NNWS: aspirants with nuclear ambitions and 
suspected clandestine programmes; nuclear insurance states with sophisticated levels 
of nuclear technology; nuclear allies; and the genuinely non nuclear weapon states, 
which do not turn to nuclear deterrence for their defence and have no technically 
relevant capabilities to develop nuclear weapons now or in the future. 5° 
The `nuclear aspirants' are NPT parties that are persistently suspected or have been 
proved to have been pursuing nuclear weapon programmes in violation of their treaty 
obligations. During the CTBT negotiations four states were generally included in this 
category: Iraq, North Korea, Iran and Libya. 51 Iraq and North Korea have been well 
documented; despite its protestations to the contrary, Iran was also believed to be 
"actively engaged in seeking nuclear weapons". 52 At time of writing, Iran played the 
game by formally meeting the IAEA's basic inspection requirements. After the 
discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme in 1991, NPT parties determined 
to strengthen the safeguards arrangements, though they lacked the political will to 
address the contradictions in Article IV that Iraq, Iran and others played off against 
their Articles II and III NPT obligations. Negotiated as Part 11 of the IAEA's 
Programme to Strengthen the Effectiveness and Improve the Efficiency of Safeguards 
(known as Programme 93+2), an Additional Protocol was concluded in 1997 and 
states were strongly encouraged (but not legally required) to adopt it on top of their 
bilateral comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA (INFCIRC/153) 
required under the NPT's Article III. The Additional Protocol was intended to give 
the IAEA better tools to detect undeclared activities, including the right to documents 
and information covering the whole nuclear fuel cycle and more extensive access, 
including to sites not formally declared as nuclear fuel cycle related facilities. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the classification of a state as a nuclear aspirant does not of 
itself imply acceptance or proof that these states are actually pursuing nuclear weapon 
programmes. It does, however, reflect a general and persistent international concern 
that they are not in conformity and compliance with their obligations as NNWS, and 
that their nuclear ambitions affect their postures and strategies on nonproliferation 
and arms control questions. 
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The `nuclear insurance states' are NPT parties regarded by the IAEA as NNWS in 
good standing, but they have declared capabilities and materials that potentially make 
nuclear weapons a feasible option, should they want to exercise it in the future. These 
are the small number of NPT states parties that have developed sufficient production 
capacity for plutonium and/or highly-enriched uranium and have the technology to 
build and deliver nuclear weapons. Countries regarded as having nuclear insurance 
capabilities include: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
South Africa and Taiwan. Unlike the nuclear aspirants, the nuclear insurance states 
are believed to subject all their nuclear fuel cycle facilities to IAEA safeguards and 
are not thought to have current nuclear weapon programmes or ambitions. If their 
political or security environments altered significantly, it is believed that they have 
hedged their bets sufficiently to be able to make nuclear weapons in a relatively short 
period of time. 3 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which could have retained their 
nuclear weapons as successor NWS to the Soviet Union, might be included in this 
category, but on balance are not. 54 
Finally, nuclear allies are NNWS in alliance agreements with NWS that entail a 
degree of joint military policies and planning encompassing nuclear weapon use. 
Some, but not all, have nuclear weapons on their territory. Nuclear allies accept the 
concept of nuclear deterrence, which differentiates them from NNWS with no nuclear 
umbrella, particularly members of regional nuclear weapon free zone agreements. 
That alliances such as NATO and the US-Japan Security Compact influence the 
policies of their NNWS members is borne out in voting on nuclear issues in the UN 
First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), " and is important to 
consider in relation to the CTBT negotiations. 
These nuclear weapon related subsets are not mutually exclusive. Japan and 
Germany, for example, participate in nuclear alliances but have also developed 
capabilities that warrant their classification as nuclear insurance states. The examples 
of Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, as well as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, 
show that the categories are not fixed, and it is possible to move from one to another, 
in accordance with changes in policies and capabilities. A wider subset on the nuclear 
spectrum that became central to the CTBT's entry into force (see chapter 8) 
comprises those states defined by the IAEA as possessing nuclear power or research 
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reactors. This includes the P-5, D-3, nuclear aspirants and nuclear insurance states, 
some but not all nuclear allies and a handful of other NNWS. 
It has been important to classify these distinctions between the declared NWS and the 
various subsets on the spectrum towards NNWS because it is relevant to this thesis to 
consider the relationship between nuclear interests and the expectations, aims, 
postures and strategies of different states in the CTBT negotiations. I now turn to 
consider the structure and rules of the negotiating forum, the Conference on 
Disarmament, two aspects of which had particular bearing on the CTBT outcome: the 
rule of consensus and the group system. 
The Conference on Disarmament 
On August 10,1993, after years of fruitless discussions, the CD was finally in a 
position to give its ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a negotiating mandate. 
The decision stated that "as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of 
the international community" the CD was the appropriate forum for negotiating a 
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For much of its history, the CD and its predecessors have been plagued by persistent 
problems of participation, management and decision-making. To understand why, it 
is useful to consider its genealogy. The CD is the successor to various Geneva-based 
arms control bodies dating back to 1960.57 It took the name by which it is known 
today, the Conference on Disarmament, in 1984. According to Inga Thorsson, 
Sweden's ambassador to the first multilateral UN Special Session on Disarmament 
(UNSSOD I) in 1978, "the very idea that international security and disarmament are 
of direct interest to all nations, and that collective action is required, was founded by 
the Hague Conferences. "58 UNSSOD I was an important watershed in the history of 
multilateral disarmament efforts. The consensus final document stated: "[T]he nuclear 
weapon states have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together 
with other militarily significant states, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is 
therefore important to secure their active participation. "59 To this end, UNSSOD I 
gave permanent establishment to the Geneva Conference, including new rules of 
procedure. In setting out its terms of reference, paragraph 120 specified that the CD 
would: conduct its work by consensus; adopt its own rules of procedure; adopt its 
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own agenda taking into account the recommendations made to it by the General 
Assembly and members' proposals; submit reports to the General Assembly at least 
once a year; and permit open public access to observe its plenary meetings, unless 
otherwise decided. 60 
The CD is regarded as an autonomous body, although it has a close relationship with 
the United Nations. The CD meets on UN premises, is serviced by UN personnel, and 
its budget is included in the UN budget. The Secretary-General of the CD is 
appointed directly by the UN Secretary-General and acts as his personal 
representative. The CD takes into account UN General Assembly resolutions on 
disarmament, especially where consensus has been obtained. As the final phase of the 
CTBT negotiations revealed, it is also taken for granted that the CD should transmit 
the texts of any treaties or agreements to the General Assembly to be formally 
adopted and then opened for signature. The US-Soviet co-chairs of its predecessors 
were replaced with a presidency that rotated among the CD member states every four 
weeks in alphabetical order. France joined in 1979, followed, a year later, by the 
People's Republic of China, bringing the membership to forty. 61 As a result of the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and political changes in a number of Eastern 
European countries, by the time the CD opened negotiations in 1994, its membership 
stood at 38, with Yugoslavia forbidden to occupy its seat. 62 In June 1996, a long- 
awaited induction of 23 new members was finally agreed, bringing the membership 
formally to 61 63 
Consensus 
The CD is a multilateral body of rival regional and international powers that must, 
according to Rule 18 of its rules of procedure, "conduct its work and adopt its 
decisions by consensus. "M The CD interprets Rule 18 as conferring the power of veto 
on every member. 65 Objectors to a decision are not obliged to give their reasons for 
opposing. The realist justification for retaining the CD rule of consensus is that states 
cannot be expected to accept the application of arms control or disarmament 
constraints unless they have first agreed to them. Since any restraints on military 
capabilities affects considerations of national security and sovereignty, which realists 
privilege above other matters, each state must directly consent to them through 
participating in consensus. Neoliberals would emphasise that consensus promotes a 
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sense of shared responsibility in the process of arms control and therefore of joint 
ownership in the decisions, thereby enhancing confidence, compliance and 
implementation. As the US Senate rejection of CTBT ratification in 1999 
demonstrated, the second does not necessarily flow from the first. In multilateral 
conferences with a specific objective and timeframe, consensus is more likely to 
produce frenetic endgame negotiations, sometimes requiring that the clock be 
`stopped' 66 Alternatively, consensus may foster managed convergence on the basis 
of bland compromise, lowest common denominator or excessively qualified 
agreements. 67 
The CD interpretation of consensus is more rigid than it needs to be. Consensus could 
be interpreted and applied in ways that promoted shared responsibility for decision- 
making without the `hostage-taking' implications of requiring unanimity for each and 
every decision. As civil society groups working with consensus have long known, 
there must be effective procedures for the groups to manage decision-making and for 
the individuals in the group to register their views of support, opposition or 
acquiescence in an accountable manner. Rule 18 is currently interpreted as requiring 
that even the agenda, programme of work, presidential statements, and the 
establishment and chairs for ad hoc committees require consensus of the tightest kind. 
The procedures for registering views other than agreement are woefully inadequate. 
One consequence of this is that the consensus rule is manipulated for a variety of 
purposes. Instead of being used to enable inclusive agreement, it is as likely to be 
employed by regional or political adversaries to play games against each another, 
allowing individual governments to deadlock the forum's work by exerting linkages 
between issues or agreements that may have little intrinsic connection at all. The 
rotating presidency and Bureau (comprising the past, current and next presidents, the 
group coordinators and China) and the system by which CD members organise 
themselves into three formal groups are supposed to manage the flow of information, 
exchange of views and decision taking. Instead, however, the structure of decision- 
making in the CD makes it very easy for objectors to hide behind others and avoid 
justifying their positions. 
The rule of consensus, insisted on by the superpowers to ensure that they could not be 
outvoted by lesser states, can give any delegation the formal power to prevent work 
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ever getting started. 68 In practice, consensus still serves the interests of the major 
powers and a logjam is allowed to persist only when the dominant CD members are 
content to permit a continuing impasse (regardless of their public relations statements 
to the contrary). If a veto is exerted by lesser delegations when the major powers have 
decided they want to negotiate, behind-the-scenes pressure or chequebook diplomacy 
will be used to shift the offending log. In an example of this from the early days of 
the CTB negotiations, the United States leaned swiftly on the British delegation to lift 
its opposition to the nomination of Mexico's controversial ambassador, Miguel Märin 
Bosch, to chair the Nuclear Test Ban Committee. Washington wanted no 
embarrassing delay to the negotiations that President Clinton had publicly endorsed. 
In effect then, under its nondiscriminatory exterior, the rule of consensus hides 
informal rules of thumb concerning not just the degree of positive agreement required 
(as opposed to abstaining acquiescence), but which of the parties are most important 
and must be included. 69 
The CD's Group System 
Intended to manage and facilitate CD proceedings, CD members have for decades 
been organised into three groups, with China as a `group of one'. As can be seen from 
their names, the groups represent cold war political affiliations, outdated even at the 
time of the CTB negotiations: The Group of Western States and Others; the Group of 
Eastern European States and Others; and the G-21 Group of Non-Aligned States and 
Others. 7° These are subsets of groupings found in wider multilateral fora and the 
United Nations. 7' Since the cold war there has been some transferring of group 
alliances in the CD. 72 
The CTBT negotiations exposed the degree to which the group system had already 
become dysfunctional, with little relevance except for procedural ritual. The G-21 
issued joint but generally declaratory statements on issues of substance, unlike the 
Western Group, which - with three NWS among its number - did little more than 
coordinate procedural decisions. The Eastern European Group seldom met, unless to 
nominate a candidate for one of the posts. The contradictions inherent in having two 
of the de facto nuclear weapon possessors in the G-21 were illustrated on several 
occasions during the CTBT negotiations. G-21 statements tended towards rhetoric 
and the reiteration of principles, often harking back to UNSSOD I. If they tried to 
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address real disarmament prospects and practicalities, the G-21 faced failure. For 
example, in the final year of negotiations members of the G-21 sought to push 
collectively for preambular language identifying the treaty's objectives as including 
an end to the modernisation and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. India 
refused to work with the rest of the G-21 on this, as it had its own strategy with the P- 
5 to play out. Without India, the G-21 initiative had little chance of engaging the P-5. 
Additionally, the nonaligned states' poor coordination and divisions over the 1995 
NPT Review and Extension Conference spilled over into the CD, as did the NPT 
outcome in general, discussed in later chapters. 
Ideas have been put forward for alternative arrangements, such as having similarly- 
sized regional groupings for allocating offices and posts, and relying on issue-based 
groupings for managing substantive decision taking. 73 Some regional alliances have 
been growing in influence since the end of the cold war. The European Union, for 
example, often determines its collective decisions in advance of Western Group 
discussions, to the irritation of middle powers consigned to a minority within the 
group, such as Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. US power is such that 
Washington is usually consulted beforehand by the EU, while Turkey and the 
Republic of Korea normally vote with the United States. During the CTBT, such joint 
EU decisionmaking was not much in evidence on issues of substance, but the EU 
exerted regional influence to ensure the appointment of the Netherlands ambassador, 
Jaap Ramaker (against the rival claims of Australia's Richard Starr), first to chair one 
of the working groups of the Nuclear Test Ban Committee in 1995, and then to chair 
the Committee itself for the final year of negotiations. It was clear at the time that 
France was primarily responsible for using the EU to ensure that Australia was kept 
out of any key post. 74 Within the NAM, too, regional groups such as the League of 
Arab States or the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) can coordinate policy 
to influence the larger grouping, as both did during the NPT conferences of 1995 and 
2000. Regional `like-minded' groups in the G-21 did not develop during the CTBT 
negotiations, though informal alliances between nonaligned and western regime- 
builders were sometimes helpful. 
As the CD's genealogy shows, the consensus rule and other procedures had their 
origins in the major powers' interests. They wanted to ensure structural control as 
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well as political dominance, and the CD's procedures reflect these objectives rather 
than any multilateralist ideals of sovereign equality. Additionally, the rules that allow 
the NGOs to observe (not participate) are the most restrictive in the entire UN system. 
The formal system of groups in the CD no longer represents relevant political and 
security interests sufficiently to operate as an efficient mechanism for managing 
decisionmaking. For any given arms control issue on the CD's agenda, group 
affiliation provides only a superficial and misleading indication of particular states' 
interests and postures. Despite these deficiencies, there is great resistance to change, 
as evidenced from the diplomatic outcry that greeted the 1999 Tokyo Forum's 
recommendation that the CD should "revise its procedures, update its work 
programme and carry out purposeful work, or suspend its operations". 75 
Multilateral Negotiations as a Process of Regime Formation 
Early theorists of multilateralism drew a distinction between multilateral institutions, 
such as the CD, and the institution of multilateralism. Though the institution of 
multilateralism may manifest itself as concrete organisations, it is - in language 
straight out of regime theory - "grounded in and appeals to the less formal, less 
codified habits, practices, ideas, and norms of international society". 76 Expanding a 
little on Ruggie, multilateralism may be conceptualised as: i) an organising principle, 
architecture or conceptual framework; ii) an organisation or institution; or iii) an 
activity or process. In focusing on the dynamics of the CTBT negotiations, this thesis 
is most interested in multilateralism as a process for drawing states with different 
interests together in a norm-based regime. 
Multilateral negotiations may be conducted for single issues or specific agreements. 
Regimes, however, are more likely to be developed around issue-areas. 77 TWO 
questions arise: first, what is the relationship between a treaty and a regime; and 
second, can there be single-issue regimes? It might be said that the multilateral 
negotiations constituted a mechanism for forming and formalising a `test ban regime'. 
The treaty negotiations were thus a means of institutionalising the norms and 
principles banning nuclear testing, codifying the imperative, regulatory and 
constraining rules for such a regime, and establishing, where necessary, reciprocal 
confidence-building and verification arrangements. Such a view appears consistent 
with Krasner's definition, but it also risks turning every treaty into a regime. 
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Consider the nuclear nonproliferation regime, a term sometimes used as if it were 
interchangeable with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT underpins the regime, 
but the process of regime formation started earlier, and has continued to draw in 
elements not contained in the treaty itself, such as voluntary arrangements among 
nuclear suppliers to control the export of sensitive materials and technologies. 78 A 
single treaty79 or agreement can help found and promote regime formation, but should 
not be assumed to constitute the regime. Indeed, one of the original claims of regime 
theory was that regimes embedded patterns of cooperative behaviour that were 
broader than either a particular international organisation or formal legal rules and 
requirements. 80 The NPT, once it entered into force, reinforced the principles, norms 
and requirements that underpinned it, thereby formalising the establishment of a 
wider nonproliferation regime that drew in more states over time. The NPT enshrined 
the concept of further disarmament measures, including the CTBT, and provided for 
multilateral review meetings among states parties. As the nonproliferation regime 
grew stronger and more comprehensive, it helped to create national and international 
confidence for further multilateral arms control negotiations. This affected not only 
nuclear weapons, but came to be extended to chemical and biological weapons, as the 
concept of a nonproliferation regime was widened to incorporate the nonproliferation 
of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 81 
Rather than the founding instrument for its own test ban regime, is it better to 
consider the CTBT as one among several measures for reinforcing the 
, nonproliferation regime? 
Certainly, the CTBT is associated with "strengthening the 
regime". 82 The problem with this formulation is that a central feature in the CTBT 
negotiations was the tension between two rather different, politically significant 
views about the role and purpose of the CTBT for national and international security. 
The expectations and negotiating postures of many states were profoundly influenced 
by whether they viewed the CTBT as a stand-alone, single issue treaty founding its 
own test ban regime, as a component of the existing nonproliferation regime, or as a 
step towards a desired disarmament regime. As the statements of India and some of 
the NWS showed, how disarmament related to nonproliferation and whether it was 
regarded as already inherent in the established nonproliferation regime or something 
separate requiring a distinct approach, were deeply contested questions with critical 
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impact on the CTBT negotiations. 83 Accordingly, the problem of whether there can be 
single issue regimes comes down to political context, not definition. 
Bargaining Power and Convergence Strategies and Tactics 
In one of the few comparative studies on multilateral negotiations to include arms 
control, Fen Hampson identified a number of relevant factors, noting similarities and 
differences among the case studies. These were: crises, defined as "sudden events or 
situations that threaten core values and beliefs of decisionmakers"; the effectiveness 
or absence of "entrepreneural leadership"; the identification of "focal points and 
simple solutions"; "issue decomposition and sequencing" (the process of unpacking a 
complex objective into simpler components or incremental steps); and compliance 
and verification mechanisms. Hampson also argued that in multilateralism it was 
essential to reduce uncertainty and complexity and to simplify the negotiating process 
by means of cross-cutting or bridging coalitions. M Some of these variables relate to 
the macro negotiating context, comparable to Krasner's factors for regime formation, 
while others address negotiating strategies, tactics or even tools. This chapter opened 
by considering types of convergence, and before we can move on to look at the test 
ban case in detail, it is necessary to consider bargaining power and negotiating 
`skills', strategies and tactics. 
Power in shaping outcomes 
Power can be conceptualised in several ways: as attributive, `absolute' power, 
deriving from military and economic capabilities 85; as systemic or relational power, 
where what matters is the distributive pattern of military and economic power in the 
system86; as charismatic power, associated with leadership and individual personality; 
or as issue-based, bargaining power. The relationship between attributive power and 
nuclear interests is not as simple as the congruity of the P-5 with the NWS might 
suggest. Nuclear weapons in the cold war were developed to demonstrate and 
consolidate military power and political status, but in the post cold war era, countries 
are as likely to seek nuclear weapons to compensate for inadequate military power 
and political interests; by similar reasoning, declining military and economic powers 
such as Britain, France and Russia, cling onto nuclear weapons in part because being 
a nuclear power ensures that they continue to be treated as major powers. 
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In focusing on how states with different interests reach convergence, it is the role of 
issue-based, bargaining power in shaping outcomes that interests us most. Attributive 
power and relational power may be components in the construction of issue-based 
power, but when considering negotiations it is important to maintain conceptual 
distinctions. Issue-based power is generally associated with controlling outcomes. 
According to Keohane and Nye, this is "the ability of an actor to get others to do 
something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor)", 87 
while Barry Buzan means much the same thing when he writes of "control power". 
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These two definitions are about power used to influence other actors. A third relates 
power to ability to affect the structure of the interaction, what Krasner identifies as 
the capacity to effect changes in the payoff matrix 89 Similarly, Buzan refers to 
"interaction capacity", which he defined as having systemic importance as an 
"absolute quality of technological and societal capabilities across the system". 
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When negotiators are described as having `bargaining power', often what is meant is 
that they are successful in deploying their resources and capabilities, either to change 
other actors' perceptions of what constitute acceptable gains or losses or to change 
the zone of possible agreements to integrate preferred options that had not previously 
been included as possibilities. Similarly, states with poor technological and 
diplomatic resources and capabilities (which is frequently but not always associated 
with having low attributive power) could be said to have low interactive capacity, 
contributing to low issue-based power and marginalisation. By focussing on what 
actors do, rather than on what they are or have, these concepts force us to look at the 
dynamics in different ways, and are especially useful for understanding how actors 
with less attributive power, such as middle powers or civil society, are able to punch 
above their weight in influencing convergence outcomes, 
Convergence Strategies and Tactics 
This final section relates some convergence strategies with common tactics used by 
state and nonstate actors. The list draws on Johan Kaufmann's analysis of 
multilateralism in the North-South context, 91 but Kaufmann's observations on 
obstructive tactics have been greatly expanded and refined as a result of my 
observatioon of the CTBT negotiations. In particular, since the thesis seeks to 
explain how states with different expectations and interests were brought into 
convergence, it is important to go beyond Kaufmann's observations on obstructive 
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tactics to prevent, disrupt and delay negotiations, and recognise also the ways in 
which tactics can be employed to control, shape and facilitate agreement. 
Convergence strategies and tactics may be employed by parties with direct interests in 
bargaining with other directly interested parties, or by third parties or civil society, 
whose interests may be personal (such as enhancing status) or political (as in regime- 
building or strengthening security through cooperation). 
Negotiating tactics are related to strategies and can be grouped accordingly. On the 
side of obstruction, are strategies of delay, defection and concealment, such as 
"quicksand", as tried by China over scope and verification, when its representatives 
repeatedly demanded debates and expert studies on definitions and technologies. 
Another example is "slipstreaming", employed by Israel, with respect to the United 
States, and Pakistan behind China. Two commonly-used defection tactics are 
"moving the goalposts" (shifting from achievable to unrealisable benefits) and "best 
versus good", a version of moving the goalposts employed by China and India, both 
of whom insisted on linkages inappropriate for this context, such as `peaceful uses' or 
`timetable for disarmament', that provoked suspicion that their real objective was to 
be able to justify defection without losing too much face. As discussed in Chapters 6 
and 8 and the conclusion, while China deployed a number of best-versus-good 
demands early on, it dropped them when it decided not to defect from the treaty; by 
contrast, India only put forward its best-versus-good demands in the final year, but 
relied on them until the end, when it defected. 
Linkage is a two-edged sword that may be used positively or negatively. An example 
of the latter is the coercive "hostage-taking" tactic seen when Russia, China or the 
United States pronounced a particular issue a "treaty-breaker". Linkage can also 
contribute towards distributive convergence, for example through concession 
trading92, which has been included among the bridging strategies of mediation, third- 
party bridging and bridge building. Cognitive strategies are associated with 
integrative convergence and often initiated by civil society. Knowledge and norms 
may be shaped and diffused to reframe an issue, and change the payoff structure and 
zone of possible agreement. Other cognitive tactics include "stepladder", where new 
information helps negotiators surmount a problem, and "unpacking", in which 
complex issues are disaggregated, similar to what Hampson called "issue 
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decomposition and sequencing" 93 It should be noted that different tactics are often 
employed at the same time, and that the boundaries between constructive and 
obstructive tactics are not clear cut, and can depend on the interests and preferences 
of both the user and the perceiver. The following list, which concludes Chapter 2, is 
intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. 
Delaying tactics: 
" Waiting for Godot - insist on waiting interminably for the time to become ripe 
" Quicksand - bog the proposal down in questions, objections or the search for 
definitions, or demand an inquiry or further expert consultations. 
" Ping-Pong - have the initiative referred to another forum and, if possible, shunt it 
back and forth between competing bodies for as long as possible. 
Concealment 
" Hide and Seek - conceal real objectives in high-minded rhetoric or a mass of 
technical data and extraneous detail. 
" Slipstreaming - conceal your own preferences and coast behind another 
delegation, allowing it to take the flack and responsibility. 
" Fronting -a form of collaborative slipstreaming, in which one delegation adopts a 
position that is stronger than its own interests would require, enabling others to 
benefit by coasting in its wake. 
" Two-Faced - pretend to support a proposal that you actually oppose; this may 
also involve manipulating (or just allowing) another country to oppose openly and 
be left carrying the responsibility and stigma. 94 
Defection tactics 
" Moving the Goalposts - whatever is achievable becomes by definition inadequate: 
the objective or required standards are moved further away to ensure that 
agreement is rendered more inaccessible. 
" Best versus Good - rejection of adequate or useful agreements on the grounds that 
they do not match up with some grander but less accessible ideal. 
Linkage 
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" Linkage - tie progress or agreement on one issue with achievement of agreement 
or gains on another issue (a favourite CD pastime). 
" Hostage-taking - coercively present a contested point or resolution in your favour 
as a make or break issue for the whole negotiations - associated with claims that a 
particular issue is a `treaty breaker'. 
Bridging and Trading 
Concession-trading -a process of trade-off and bargaining with issues that may be 
directly connected or, in substance terms, unrelated, with players making concessions 
to win favourable compromises from others. 
Mediation - when a third party or parties help to facilitate agreement by enabling 
antagonists to address underlying causes of disagreement. 
Third party bridging - in which a third party or middle powers facilitate agreement by 
exploring solutions midway between the extremes and identifying and fostering 
concessions that bring antagonistic parties closer together. 
Bridge-building - in which one or more of the antagonistic parties are prepared to 
concede or modify demands to promote convergence. 
Cognitive tactics 
Norm-shaping - often associated with the strategies of civil society rather than states, 
in which the problem is stigmatised and the pay-off matrix itself is changed or 
redefined. 95 
Reframing - in which the problem is recast in more positive, less adversarial terms, 
offering an integrative solution with mutual gains. 96 
Step-ladder - deployment of new, often technical, information to enable parties to 
surmount obstacles (or to perceive them from a different vantage point) 97 
Unpacking - in which a problem is disaggregated or separated into its constituent 
parts to facilitate incremental agreement or progress. 
In multilateral organisations such as the CD, consensus or the use of linkage or other 
obstructive tactics can result in long periods of stalemate. If an important issue 
becomes deadlocked, states can - in extreme circumstances - choose to perform a 
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high risk `bypass operation', as Australia did in taking the CTBT text to the UN 
General Assembly in September 1996. 
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Chapter Three 
Cold War Arms Control: the Thwarted Test Ban 
Following the detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, arms control developed, as the 
Baruch Plan succinctly stated "to make a choice between the quick and the dead. "' 
This chapter provides an essential historial background, with consideration of the 
relationship between efforts to achieve a nuclear test ban treaty and the development 
of cold war arms control between 1954 - when India's prime minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, and the Japanese Parliament made separate calls for a nuclear test ban - and 
1989, when the Berlin Wall was brought down. In addition to addressing the political 
context, dominated by the US-Soviet nuclear arms race, I consider the political 
impact of civil society's interactive role in informing and amplifying fluctuations in 
public concern about nuclear weapons, testing and peace. 
The devastation and horrors of World War II prompted a renewal of interest in 
multilateralism as a mechanism for building "Collective security, resulting in the 
establishment of the United Nations and its various associated institutions and, on a 
regional basis, institutions such as the European Economic Community (now the 
European Union)? Nuclear weapons developed a public visibility not generally 
accorded other weapons3, largely as a consequence of the dramatic devastation of the 
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. 
Between the early calls for a CTBT in 1954 through to the opening of multilateral 
CTBT negotiations in Geneva in 1994, four phases may be identified: 
" Settling for the Partial Test Ban Treaty, from the mid 1950s to 1963, when 
the United States, Soviet Union and Britain abandoned the search for a 
comprehensive test ban treaty, but agreed to ban testing in the atmosphere, 
underwater and outer space, leaving underground testing unregulated. During 
this period the first anti-nuclear movements were born, involving professional 
experts (mainly physicians and scientists) and citizens at the grassroots. 
Studies of this period have also identified a decisive role for epistemic 
communities. 4 
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" Nonproliferation, arms control and testing talks, covering the period 1964 
to 1980, during which concepts of strategic deterrence and arms control 
dominated policy thinking in Washington. This was a wilderness time for test 
ban advocates, as proliferation and the arms race were addressed by 
governments through detente and the NPT, the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Treaties (SALT I and II), and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This 
period was one of cold war superpower diplomacy, with diminished public 
interest in nuclear issues: two interim agreements set testing thresholds, but 
trilateral (US-UK-USSR) talks on banning underground testing failed. 
" Cold war brinkmanship and public opposition, from 1981 to 1989. This 
was a decade in which deteriorating strategic relations between the United 
States and Soviet Union led to nuclear weapons becoming highly salient 
public and political issues in Europe and the United States. Civil society 
engagement was transformed during this period: traditional single-issue 
politics were challenged, stimulating the rise of democratic (anti-communist 
and anti-capitalist), environmental, feminist and anti-nuclear actors, linking 
Western movements with dissident civil society actors demanding greater 
democracy in the Soviet bloc. Nuclear testing was at best a marginal issue, 
clinging to the coat-tails of broader anti-nuclear campaigns; but some direct 
action, combined with diplomatic strategies in which NGOs worked with 
NNWS, were employed to keep the goal of a CTBT alive. 
" Disintegration, realignment and renewed multilateralism, 1990-1994. As 
a consequence of a pincer movement between public campaigning and 
legislative strategies, first Russia, then France and the United States declared 
moratoria on testing. In effect, this may be treated as the "prenegotiation" 
phase for the CTBT, as diplomatic strategies between nonstate actors and 
NNWS increased political pressure to bring the NWS to the negotiating table. 
This period will be addressed in chapter 4. 
Looking at the first three periods in turn, Chapter 3 considers the major political and 
diplomatic events relating to multilateral nuclear arms control and initiatives to curb 
nuclear testing, focusing on the actions and influence of civil society actors as well as 
states. 
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Settling for the Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1949-1963 
Already established peace-oriented organisations, such as the Nobel-prize-winning 
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, and the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) began protesting 
against nuclear weapons soon after the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945, but received little attention. Scientists involved in the Manhattan 
Project raised questions about ethics and control, and in 1945 some of them founded 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. " These scientists were some of the earliest 
nongovernmental actors to put together information on the risks of nuclear 
proliferation and the health and environmental dangers from nuclear testing. 
The Soviet Union conducted its first atomic explosion in 1949. This was followed by 
a thermonuclear weapon test in 1953, just one year later than the United States, 
causing consternation in the West. Britain joined the nuclear club with an 
atmospheric explosion at Monte Bello, in Australia's backyard, on October 3,1952. 
International attention was drawn when a US hydrogen bomb test, conducted on 
March 1,1954 and codenamed `Bravo', produced a much greater yield than 
anticipated (about 15 megatonnes). 7 The huge blast vaporised two atolls in the 
Pacific Bikini Islands and contaminated nearby islanders. It also caused severe 
radiation sickness and at least one death among Japanese fishermen on a nearby tuna 
trawler, the misnamed "Lucky Dragon", provoking protests in the Japanese 
parliament, which called for a suspension of nuclear testing. On April 2,1954, Prime 
Minister Nehru of India called for an immediate "standstill agreement" on nuclear 
testing. Nehru's proposal for a test ban was submitted for consideration to the UN 
Disarmament Commission on July 29,1954, and from then on a CTB was a 
consistent demand from the growing number of developing countries that formed the 
Movement of Non-Aligned States, of which Nehru became a leading light. 8 
Revealing the ambivalence of policymakers towards nuclear weapons, the mid 1950s 
witnessed a flurry of disarmament initiatives, even as the arms race began to take 
hold. Britain, together with France, put forward a three-stage plan for nuclear 
disarmament in June 1954. The Soviet Union submitted similar proposals in May 
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1955, which it followed by inaugurating a moratorium on nuclear testing in June 
1957, later extended by Nikita Khrushchev, on condition that no other country 
tested .9 By 1957, as Britain conducted its first hydrogen bomb test, nuclear testing 
had become "a burning public issue", 10 with women's groups, scientists and doctors 
at the forefront of raising public awareness of the dangers of radioactive fallout. 
Additionally, new peace groups were formed specifically to address nuclear weapons 
and testing. Of these, the most important in the West were the US Women's Strike 
for Peace, the US Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, the international Pugwash 
Conferences of scientists1 1, and the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND). Together with doctors and dentists, who were concerned about discoveries of 
strontium 90 and other radioactive isotopes in children's teeth in the United States 
and Europe, scientists were prominent in efforts to lobby against nuclear testing, 
using their professional expertise and standing to raise awareness. 12 At the same 
time, grassroots initiatives such as the Women's Strike for Peace, SANE and CND 
organised rallies, petitions and public protest demonstrations in major cities. In 
Britain, CND marches from London to Britain's main nuclear production facility at 
Aldermaston in 1958 and, subsequently, from Aldermaston to London, attracted tens 
of thousands of supporters and were given significant media coverage. Through 
demonstrations and local organising, these public campaigns sought to influence 
government policy by raising public concern and fostering direct contact with 
legislative representatives. Sections of the Women's Strike for Peace and CND also 
formed direct action wings, prepared to break trespass laws at nuclear test sites and 
facilities, with activists willing to go to prison to highlight the urgency of opposing 
nuclear weapons and testing. 13 
The Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik Ion October 4,1957, together with its tests of 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), shook US confidence. 14 Soon after, 
President Eisenhower announced that he too favoured a nuclear test ban. 
Acknowledging growing public concern about testing, he cited radioactive fallout and 
the need to curb the nuclear arms race. 15 Eisenhower offered the Soviet Union a two 
year moratorium on nuclear testing, combined with a halt in the production of fissile 
materials for weapons purposes. The Soviet Union then backtracked from its earlier 
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offers and accused Washington of seeking to freeze a status quo in which the United 
States retained superior nuclear weapon capabilities. 16 
Eisenhower persisted, proposing a joint study on verification. The `Conference of 
Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on 
Suspension of Nuclear Tests' was subsequently convened from July 1 to August 21, 
1958 in Geneva. It involved scientists from the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, 
Canada, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania. The Experts' advisory report 
proposed a verification system based on four technologies - seismic, radio, acoustic 
and sensors to detect "radioactive debris" - along with on-site inspection of 
unidentified and suspicious events, saying that this combination of verification 
approaches would be able to "detect and identify nuclear explosions, including low 
yield explosions (1-5 kt)". 17 In order to get this far, however, Eisenhower had found 
it necessary to go beyond the advice he was receiving from test ban opponents at the 
Livermore and Los Alamos nuclear laboratories18 and establish in 1957 a "President's 
Science Advisory Committee" (PSAC) , comprising scientists who were independent 
of the nuclear bureaucracy. Unlike the laboratory advisers, PSAC, chaired by MIT 
president James Killian'9, advised Eisenhower that a test ban could be adequately 
verified and would be in the best interest of the United States. ° 
Receiving support from both Khrushchev and the British Prime Minister, Harold 
Macmillan, Eisenhower then initiated tripartite talks - the Conference on the 
Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests - which opened on October 31,1958, with 
the objective of a total ban on nuclear tests. 21 In response, the US nuclear weapon 
scientists mobilised greater opposition, putting Eisenhower under pressure with data 
from a series of underground tests on evasion scenarios, codenamed "Hardtack". 
Carried out under Edward Teller's auspices, the new information was released in 
1959 and undermined the Geneva Experts' report by highlighting ingenious ways in 
which the signals from underground nuclear tests could be concealed or minimised. 22 
By 1960, convinced by the Hardtack data of the difficulties in verifying a 
comprehensive ban, the Eisenhower Administration offered a partial ban based on 
what they considered to be verifiable by remote sensing and national technical 
means. 23 However, in May 1960, the "U-2 incident" in which a US reconnaissance 
flight was shot down over Russian territory, led to US-Soviet counter accusations, 
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causing the Summit Conference in Paris to collapse. 24 As international conditions 
deteriorated, the test ban talks went on hold. 
Begun under a Republican President, the negotiations proceeded with John F. 
Kennedy, who took over from Eisenhower in January 1961. Initially he got nowhere, 
as first the United States and then the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing after 
France conducted its first atmospheric test in 1960. After September 1961 and 
throughout 1962, the USSR exploded an estimated 93 atmospheric tests, and the 
United States 39. During that time the US nuclear establishment also experimented 
with 67 underground explosions, while Britain and the USSR each conducted 2.25 
Relations between Washington and Moscow deteriorated in a pervasive atmosphere 
of mistrust and recrimination that reflected and contributed to the construction of the 
Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Hampson credits the intensification of public opinion and international pressure for a 
test ban with forcing a reformulation of US policy. 26 Although the trilateral Geneva 
meetings had fallen apart, the US, Britain and Soviet Union sponsored the creation in 
Geneva of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which consisted of 
five NATO countries, five Warsaw Pact nations and eight states from the self-defined 
nonaligned, neutral group. 27 France, though invited, did not attend. The ENDC 
started discussing a nuclear test ban in March 1962. Led by Sweden and India, the 
nonaligned countries attempted to find a compromise. 28 With Kennedy taking a more 
active role, Britain and the United States initiated a draft treaty on April 18 29 The 
Soviets then reiterated their November 1961 proposal, and in August 1962, Britain 
and the United States tabled draft partial test ban treaties banning explosions that 
would spread radioactive contamination beyond the territorial limits of the state. 30 
These inconclusive ping-pong talks might have continued, despite mounting public 
anger about the frenzy of atmospheric testing being conducted on both sides. The 
"shared danger" of the Cuban Missile Crisis supplied the "shock" that forced the 
protagonists back to the negotiating table. 31 During the 1962 UN General Assembly, 
a high profile debate was held on nuclear testing. Thirty-seven NNWS, including the 
eight nonaligned members of the ENDC, called for atmospheric testing to be halted 
by January 1,1963, and a comprehensive or limited treaty accompanied by an interim 
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moratorium on underground testing. Britain and the United States sponsored a 
second resolution, calling for a CTBT with international verification or, alternatively, 
a limited, partial test ban covering the atmosphere, underwater and outer space 32 
When talks resumed in Geneva in early 1963, they got nowhere, as both US and 
Soviet representatives lobbied the nonaligned delegates to support their positions on 
inspections. Moreover, as the prospect of a comprehensive ban looked more serious, 
opposition intensified in Washington, spearheaded by the Senate's Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who expressed support for 
continuation of a vigorous programme of nuclear testing and attacked the idea that a 
CTB could be verified. At the same time, however, the Senate was "showered with 
letters, phone-calls and petitions" calling for an end to testing 33 Tripartite 
negotiations were suggested in April 1963. Kennedy then cancelled three nuclear tests 
and made positive overtures to the USSR in what became known as his "peace- 
speech" at the American University in June34 (although their conciliatory effect was 
dented by his "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech later that month). 5 With the UK playing 
an important bridging role, tripartite negotiations commenced in Moscow on July 15. 
At various times, Kennedy, Khrushchev and Macmillan had all said that they wanted 
a comprehensive test ban, although the United States at different times had submitted 
three proposals for partial bans to get around the verification problems stressed by its 
nuclear establishment experts. When their representatives met in Moscow, it was 
decided to put the verification issues aside and settle for a three-environment ban. 
Importantly, this gave the nuclear scientists unlimited license to experiment with their 
newly-discovered underground testing technologies. After five years of on-off 
negotiations, on August 5,1963, the three governments signed the Treaty Banning 
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, also 
36 known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). 
The PTBT entered into force on October 10,1963. International verification was not 
part of the agreement, which would rely on national intelligence and technical means 
for monitoring compliance. No mention was made of a verifiable threshold for 
underground testing, which had been so much a part of discussions in the late 1950s. 
Nor was there any mention of a moratorium on underground testing pending 
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agreement on verification. Weakly echoed in Article I, only the preamble referred 
directly to a comprehensive test ban: "Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all 
test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations 
to this en4 and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by 
radioactive substances... " 
Now Testing Went Underground 
Despite the personal commitment of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Macmillan and 
Khrushchev, the test ban negotiations were subject to fluctuating relationships and the 
rivalry and mistrust of cold war politics. The negotiations were dominated by conflict 
and muddle over verification, fuelled principally by scientists in the US nuclear 
weapon laboratories who devised complex evasion scenarios that fed American 
anxiety about the possibility of Soviet cheating. The Soviet Union, for its part, 
suspected that American insistence on elaborate, intrusive verification masked an 
espionage objective. In effect, the Americans wanted to make sure the Soviets could 
not cheat and the Soviets wanted to stop the Americans spying. In that conflict lay a 
core dilemma that was to be replayed many times, with a different cast, in test ban 
and other arms control negotiations: the payoff between adequate and bearable 
intrusion. 37 
The Cuban Missile Crisis, combined with the ability of Kennedy and Khrushchev to 
respond to that narrow escape with better mutual respect and communication on 
nuclear and security issues, shocked the nuclear powers into trying to lock down 
some form of test ban in 1963. While all three governments had to contend with 
opposition to a test ban from special military and laboratory interests, this was a 
particular problem for Eisenhower. The role of the US nuclear weapon laboratories, 
particularly a small coterie around Edward Teller and Albert Latter, was significant in 
derailing the chance of agreement following the 1958 Geneva Experts' Report. After 
the U-2 incident, Khrushchev was also more vulnerable to test ban opponents in the 
Soviet military and the nuclear laboratories. 8 
Kennedy became determined to solve the test ban impasse and devoted more attention 
to this subject than Eisenhower. Although it later became clear that the US nuclear 
weapon scientists with their "big hole obsession" about evasion and decoupling 
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scenarios had greatly exaggerated what the Soviet Union might gain from cheating 
with underground testing, 39 ratification politics ensured that even Kennedy could not 
afford to ignore the laboratories and sign a comprehensive test ban in 1963. Though 
he himself appeared less worried by the technical weight of their information, 
recognising that this too represented politics and special interests, Kennedy 
understood that Teller's arguments could sway senators, and he needed a two-thirds 
majority for ratification of the treaty. 40 Kennedy had further domestic difficulties. On 
realising that the President was really determined to achieve the CTBT, some senators 
and the JCS had come out in opposition to the 1962 draft under consideration. 
However, recognising that the PTBT had wide popular support in the aftermath of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, the Joint Chiefs pushed for additional resources and safeguards 
rather than seeking to block ratification. 
Backed by the nuclear establishment, the safeguards were intended to ensure that the 
test ban would not erode support for the nuclear weapons programmes and 
laboratories. They also tied the US Government into Senate-supported commitments 
that would make it difficult to follow the PTBT with any further nuclear arms control 
or test restraints, at least for the near future. The safeguards, which Kennedy 
accepted, were presented as insurance against treaty violations, abrogation or the 
discovery of Soviet superiority, as follows: 
"1) The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground 
nuclear test programs...; 
2) The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs...; 
3) The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly 
nuclear tests in the atmosphere...; and 
4) The improvement of our capability... to monitor the terms of the treaty, to 
detect violations, and to maintain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, 
capabilities, and achievements. "41 
These early strategies of test ban opponents in the laboratories, and the political 
solution of imposing safeguards to protect - and increase - resources to the nuclear 
laboratories and their weapons programmes were closely mirrored when two later US 
administrations tried to negotiate a CTBT, in 1977-80 and again in 1994-96. In 
accepting a partial test ban and in conceding to pressure from the JCS for the 
programme of underground testing to be intensified, Kennedy ensured the 
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laboratories' support and achieved a quick and smooth ratification of the treaty. He 
also enabled the nuclear weaponeers to consolidate their power base and resources, 
which enhanced their ability to drive the nuclear arms race. 
The PTBT was an early success for nonproliferation and environmental protection, 
but by the time it was agreed, it did nothing for disarmament. Both superpowers were 
becoming concerned about new countries getting nuclear weapons. 2 From 
contemporary accounts it is clear that a compelling domestic argument on the 
American side was that US superiority in nuclear weapons development was more 
likely to be maintained under a test ban, whereas the USSR might catch up if testing 
continued unabated. Moreover, the volume of Soviet tests in 1961-2 shook American 
confidence in the US lead in nuclear weapon development 43 
A strong case has been made for treating Eisenhower's PSAC as an "epistemic 
community" of liberal nuclear scientists interested in promoting arms control. 
44 It 
undoubtedly acted as a counterweight to the strident pro-testing claims of certain 
nuclear establishment scientists, but cutting across the governmental, bureaucratic, 
academic and nongovernmental sectors, Eisenhower's PSAC exerted influence in part 
because it eschewed the radical, progressive demands of the disarmament lobby. 
Sharing values associated with the diplomatic control and management of 
proliferation and the nuclear relationship between the United States and Soviet Union, 
PSAC was more effective in narrowing the zone of perceived viable agreements on 
disarmament than in refraining the agenda of the military/nuclear establishment, and 
so helped to establish the norms of arms control at the expense of disarmament. 
When the PTBT was agreed in 1963, it was hailed as a victory, but contained an 
important element of defeat and some bitter lessons for disarmament advocates. 
Although most of the NGOs had called unequivocally for a comprehensive test ban, 
much of their public and political appeal had focused on the harm from radioactive 
fallout to public health. The PTBT banned testing in the atmosphere, outer space and 
underwater, thereby reducing the risks to public health and the environment. It also 
removed the visible reminder of the nuclear arms race. After 1963, nuclear testing 
continued out of sight, still fuelling the qualitative arms race with new and advanced 
weapons systems. The PTBT might have enshrined the objective of the 
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"discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", but much of 
the driving force to achieve a comprehensive ban was dissipated once testing had 
gone underground. 
Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Testing Talks, 1964-1980 
The bitter rivalry and brinkmanship that characterised strategic relations between the 
US and Soviet blocs in the 1950s until the Cuban Missile Crisis was succeeded by a 
period of relative accommodation, combined with joint efforts to promote 
nonproliferation. US-Soviet detente continued for most of the 1970s, during which 
time US security policy was dominated by theories of balance of power, deterrence 
and arms control. Although there were vigorous peace movements in the United 
States and elsewhere, they focused on the Vietnam45 War, not nuclear weapons. 
This period has been extensively covered in international relations literature, 
dominated by the perspectives, power and perceived interests of the superpowers 46 
To do justice to the various different treatments of this period of the cold war would 
fill several books. For the purposes of this thesis, I focus on developments relating to 
multilateral arms control and nuclear testing, not only from the perspective of the 
major powers, but also through the perceptive lens of one of the most noted 
nonaligned critics of superpower-dominated arms control, Alva Myrdal, Sweden's 
ambassador in Geneva from 1962-1966 and Minister for Disarmament, 1966-1973. 
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
The NPT, which had its origins in resolutions from Ireland and Sweden to the UN 
General Assembly in 1961, was concluded in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.7 
Sweden's approach focused on the voluntary and regional seif-organisation of 
nuclear-free states and explicitly required the NWS to discontinue nuclear testing. 48 
But it was the Irish proposal, with the primary aim of making it impossible for 
additional countries to join the nuclear club, that became the main basis for debate 
and negotiations in the ENDC. 49 
Years passed without progress, the fault of the United States and Soviet Union, 
according to Myrdal, who noted: "Confident of their power, [the superpowers] 
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attempted to hold unrestricted rights to possess, deploy, and develop nuclear arms 
quantitatively and qualitatively, while showing overbearing disregard for the three 
minor nuclear weapon powers, and resolutely closing the options for all other nations 
to go nuclear". 50 India, which by that time had a significant nuclear programme of its 
own underway, put forward a proposal for a UN agenda item on nonproliferation in 
1964, and then joined forces with Sweden to demand an integrated approach to 
nonproliferation, including "some other measures affecting directly the nuclear 
weapons capability of the nuclear powers". 51 This was supported by the eight 
nonaligned members on the ENDC. After China joined the nuclear club, and "to 
retain the initiative", according to Myrdal, the United States and Soviet Union 
coordinated submission of their own draft treaties to the General Assembly in 1965, 
based on the Irish approach, which drew distinctions between the obligations on 
nations possessing nuclear weapons and those without 52 There followed further 
negotiations in the ENDC and debates in the General Assembly, in which some of the 
other countries pushed hard for the treaty to contain disarmament-related 
commitments, such as a CTBT, a cut-off of fissile material production for weapons 
purposes, and support for regional nuclear weapon free zones. 
In August 1967, the United States and Soviet Union again submitted identical draft 
treaties to the ENDC, superseding the previous drafts of 1965.3 The new drafts were 
hardly more welcome to the NNWS, who made further proposals linking the NPT to 
nuclear disarmament and the process of arms control. In January 1968, the 
superpowers tabled revised (and still identical) draft treaties at the ENDC, 
incorporating a number of the NNWS' concerns, though in watered down language. 
A special session of the General Assembly was held in April 1968, at which the 
United States and Soviet Union jointly tabled their draft treaty. 54 The draft contained 
a preambular reference recalling the PTBT pledge to seek the discontinuance of 
nuclear tests. Reflecting some of the NNWS concerns, the superpowers had also 
revised the Article IV provision on "peaceful uses of nuclear energy", included a new 
Article V on "peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNE) and a new Article VII on nuclear 
weapon free zones. A rather vague commitment to disarmament appeared in a new 
Article VI. This final bilateral draft was debated and slightly amended by the ENDC 
members, and then adopted by the General Assembly just three months later, on June 
12,1968. 
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With 187 states parties in 2002, what does the NPT show about multilateral regime- 
building? Though the ENDC played a significant role in ensuring that the NPT would 
link disarmament with nonproliferation, the superpowers maintained overall control 
by tabling identical treaty drafts and, finally, a joint draft treaty. One immediate 
consequence of the inequalities noted by Myrdal and others was that a number of 
important countries (Argentina, Brazil, France, India and several African states) 
abstained on the UN resolution recommending adoption of the NPT in June 1968, and 
- in a move that was to be echoed 28 years later with the CTBT - India stated its 
refusal to join the NPT, on the grounds that it was discriminatory. Myrdal herself 
castigated the NPT as a "grossly discriminatory treaty", citing a lack of balance 
between obligations and benefits for the NNWS. ss 
Though the NPT is widely accepted as the cornerstone of the multilateral 
nonproliferation regime, and Ruggie cited it as a notable success for multilateralism56, 
in both its negotiations and implementation it fails to meet at least two of Ruggie's 
principles of multilaterralism: indivisibility and nondiscrimination. The requirements 
on the five defined in the treaty as "nuclear weapon states" were rather different from 
the obligations imposed on the rest, whose only option in joining the NPT would be 
as a non nuclear weapon state. Only the NNWS were subject to mandatory IAEA 
safeguards and inspections on their nuclear facilities to verify their compliance with 
their NPT obligations. While it can be argued that the discrimination between nuclear 
weapon possessors and the rest is mitigated by the Article VI disarmament 
commitment, 57 that would require substantial progress in implementing Article VI, 
which has not been the case over the past 35 years. Article IV, interpreted by many 
non nuclear weapon parties to the treaty as promising technology assistance in 
developing and using nuclear energy, may be considered an example of diffuse 
reciprocity. Certainly it served as an incentive to bring NNWS into the treaty early 
on, but has lost much of its incentive value - and, in view of demonstrated abuses, its 
credibility - in recent years. " 
Detente and Arms Control 
Opening with entry into force of the NPT, the 1970s was a decade of detente, 
appearing to vindicate theories of bipolar stability, popular in the late 1950s and early 
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1960s. 59 Nuclear arms control was dominated by bilateral negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 60 The two largest NWS began to recognise the 
need to show they were making some effort to curb their own spiralling arms race; 
not just to give greater credibility to the NPT, which they were encouraging others to 
join, but also because of the consequences of an uncontrolled arms race for their own 
economies and national security. Early in the 1970s they developed a linked offence- 
defence approach to arms control, exemplified by two closely related US-Soviet 
treaties, the ABM Treaty, which enshrined the concept of deterrence based on mutual 
vulnerability, and the SALT I Interim Agreement, the first to limit strategic nuclear 
weapons. The two treaties were designed as a package and entered into force together 
in 1972. During this time, the two governments entered into negotiations on SALT 
II. 
In 1974 and 1976, two bilateral treaties limiting the yield of underground nuclear test 
explosions to 150 kt were also concluded, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) in 
1974 and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). John Edmonds, who 
led the UK delegation at the later trilateral talks, characterised the contribution of 
these two treaties as "negative. Their prohibition of tests yielding 150 kt imposed no 
serious limitation on further nuclear weapons development by the two 
superpowers. "61 Myrdal was even more damning, calling the TTBT a "disgraceful 
conspiracy between the two superpowers". 62 It was a sham, intended to present the 
public with an image of restraint and of commitment to arms control, when it actually 
"strangles all attempts to reach international agreements on a total ban". 63 The 
scepticism of these two senior diplomats was shared by many others, including 
Jimmy Carter, who chose not to push for ratification when he took over the US 
presidency in 1976. Carter criticised the TTBT threshold as too high to provide a 
genuine restraint on weapons development, and preferred to use his political capital in 
trying to get a CTBT. 64 Less criticism was levelled at the PNET, signed two years 
later. Critics of arms control were prepared to view this as a useful confidence- 
building measure, providing exchange of data and inspections at proposed sites for 
PNE. 65 
By the end of the 1970s, detente was failing and though SALT 11 was signed in 1979, 
it never entered into force. The deterioration in relations was due to a mix of 
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geostrategic and political factors, which included the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
the Soviet veto blocking UN Security Council action in support of the United States 
during the months long "hostage crisis" at the US embassy in Tehran following the 
ousting of the US-supported Shah of Iran, the Soviet deployment of SS20s, and 
NATO's "dual track" response of deploying intermediate range nuclear forces in 
Europe. Such events and tensions played into the hands of hawks and contributed to 
the election victory of President Ronald Reagan in 1980.66 
Tripartite Testing Talks, 1977-1980 
After the TTBT was concluded, the Soviet Union submitted a draft CTBT to the UN 
General Assembly in 1975. Reacting to criticism from Britain and the United States 
that its draft was inadequate, particularly on the issues of verification and PNE, 
Moscow tabled a revised treaty in February 1977, eliciting a more positive response 
from the newly-elected President Carter, who had made the CTBT a major plank of 
his election platform 67 Following preliminary discussions, tripartite talks were 
established between Britain, (under Prime Minister James Callaghan), the Soviet 
Union (General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev) and the United States (President Jimmy 
Carter) in 1977.68 
When the second round of meetings resumed at the UK Mission in Geneva on the 25`h 
anniversary of the first UK nuclear test, 69 the negotiations began in earnest. Edmonds 
describes three "differences of principle" in the opening positions of Moscow, on the 
one hand, and Washington and London, on the other: i) the level of intrusion required 
for verifying a comprehensive test ban; ii) PNEs, which the Soviet Union did not 
want banned; and iii) the Soviet demand that the treaty should not come into force 
until France and China acceded. 70 During the first year the talks made progress: 
Moscow was willing to include a moratorium (but not an outright ban) on PNE, and 
moved closer to the US-UK position on verification, while the United States slightly 
modified its stance on on-site inspections. 
The prospect that a CTBT might become possible concentrated minds in Washington. 
Rather than opposing outright, test-ban opponents in the Department of Energy, 
laboratories and the JCS reprised the verification arguments that had served so well in 
the past. Claiming that the verification under consideration would be inadequate to 
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prevent or detect Soviet cheating at low yields, they pressed for a new, lower 
threshold instead of a comprehensive ban. With support from their British 
counterparts, the US nuclear laboratories also asserted that they needed periodic 
nuclear tests for the safety and reliability of stockpiled nuclear weapons. 7' Carter tried 
to appease his domestic opponents by proposing a comprehensive test ban of five 
years' duration, hoping that this would begin to embed the norm. Intensified pressure 
from the US military and nuclear establishments forced Carter to reduce this to three 
years' and require further Senate ratification before renewal. In addition, he was 
inveigled into permitting low yield underground testing up to 100 lbs, for nuclear 
triggers and "to keep weapon scientists up-to-date". 72 Carter's appeasement, 
described by the US House Armed Services Committee as "the worst of both the 
political and military worlds", was derided by all sides. The British were 
disappointed, the Russians cynical, and there was media speculation that the three 
year duration was designed to free the hands of the next president. 73 Carter therefore 
lost the initiative and time ran out on the talks. Margaret Thatcher replaced Callaghan 
as Britain's Prime Minister in May 1979, with a very different set of priorities and 
interests. 74 The talks limped on, but Carter subsequently became mired in the Iranian 
hostage crisis, which sealed his fate. On the election of Ronald Reagan in November 
1980, the United States requested that the tripartite testing talks be suspended. They 
were never resumed, and in 1982, the Reagan administration formally pulled out. 
Good Intentions Lacking Authority 
Both the PTBT and the NPT enshrined the objective of a total ban on nuclear testing, 
but the United States and Soviet Union maintained the dogmas that had characterised 
their positions during the PTBT negotiations. Washington wanted `adequate' 
verification, which was always defined higher than Moscow could accept as 
`bearable'. Meanwhile, Moscow held the CTB at bay by contending that testing was 
only part of the relationship and that the nuclear arms race needed to be addressed as 
a whole. The two testing treaties signed in the 1970s, the TTBT and the PNET, 
played the relationship game but were widely viewed as a public relations exercise, to 
divert attention from the failure of the two superpowers to achieve more important 
agreements on strategic arms limitations. 
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In view of Carter's sincere desire for a CTBT, supported with enthusiasm by 
Callaghan and (more warily) by Brezhnev, why did the tripartite negotiations of 
1977-1980 fail? Familiar to analysts of the earlier CTB negotiations from 1958-63 
was the opposition of the military and nuclear establishments in the United States, 
centred around the JCS and the nuclear laboratories, with their bureaucratic 
representation in the Department of Energy. In addition to casting doubt on the 
verifiability of a CTBT, an argument that had worked well in creating obstacles 
twenty years earlier, the nuclear establishment added a further claim: that the United 
States needed to continue testing in order to maintain the reliability of its nuclear 
arsenal. This new requirement was designed to appeal to pro-defence conservatives in 
Congress, and was bolstered by the claim that Soviet weapons would not erode as fast 
as US weapons. 75 Carter's vacillation on a short-duration test ban further undermined 
the negotiations. 
The argument from the US and British laboratories for continued testing for safety 
and reliability represented their own fears about their own future security and special 
interests (jobs, resources, and challenging work to attract and retain elite scientists). 
Carter received opposite advice from three very senior, former nuclear weapon 
scientists, who argued that non-explosive testing could assure the continued 
operability of the existing arsenal, providing there was no intent to change (i. e. 
modernise) designs. 76 Though he was himself under pressure from the UK's nuclear 
elite, Callaghan tried to persuade Carter not to concede to the nuclear establishment 
advisers. 77 By accepting the safety and reliability claims rather than mounting a 
challenge to their political premise, Carter's failure contributed to the erosion of the 
nuclear disarmament objective contained in the original concept of the CTBT. Once 
again, the technological arguments of epistemic actors with political interests hostile 
to the formation of a test ban regime had been selectively - and largely successfully - 
deployed as rationale for opposing the President's preference for a comprehensive 
test ban treaty. 78 Although it is tempting to conclude that the Soviet military action in 
Afghanistan and the US hostage stand-off with Iran caused the collapse of the 
tripartite testing talks, even Kissinger noted that "opponents of the goals of the CTB 
were able to slow things to a standstill well before Afghanistan and Tehran". 79 
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Cold War Brinkmanship, 1981 to 1989 
The period from 1981 to 1989 spanned from the cold war's depths to its ending. 
Despite his best intentions, Carter had proved unable to sustain any significant 
challenge to the dominance of the nuclear weapons lobby in US strategic decision- 
making and presided over NATO's decision to deploy 464 single-warhead ground 
launched cruise missiles in five European countries, and 108 Pershing II ballistic 
missiles in West Germany. 80 The dual track decision, so called because deployment 
was coupled with calls for negotiations with the Soviet Union, reflected growing 
concern among European members of NATO that their interests were being squeezed 
between changing American nuclear doctrines and the emergence of a condominium 
arising from the bilateral arms control relationship with the Soviet Union pursued 
through the 1970s. 8' 
Reagan's election complicated the Europeans' dual track strategy. Eager, he said, to 
consign the Soviet Union to the "ashcan of history", Reagan started his presidency 
bent on confrontation with the "Evil Empire" and determined to modernise US 
nuclear capabilities. 82 US strategic doctrine shifted towards prevailing in a `limited' 
nuclear war, in which nuclear tactics could be envisaged as part of a wider conflict 
without automatically escalating into all-out mutual annihilation. 83 Such notions, 
combined with the deployment of the intermediate range Cruise and Pershing II 
missiles in Europe, with a `first use' capability more suited to warfighting than 
deterrence, contributed to the dramatic rise of the peace movements in the 1980s. 
European governments found themselves even more squeezed in a US-Soviet game 
of diplomatic combat and counter-accusation, fuelled by Reagan's zealous anti- 
communism. 
Nuclear deterrence doctrines had gone some way towards reconciling public opinion 
to nuclear weapons since 1963 as they emphasised that the purpose and role of 
nuclear weapons was to prevent nuclear war. Talk of `limited' nuclear war wrecked 
that uneasy complacency, and proved to be profoundly unpopular. NATO tried to win 
round public opinion in 1981 by proposing a "zero option" - the elimination of all 
intermediate nuclear forces from Europe. 84 In March 1983, Reagan launched the 
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) -a programme of missile defences meant to protect 
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the United States from a Soviet attack and thereby escape the contradictions of 
nuclear deterrence and the dilemmas of mutual vulnerability. 85 SDI - soon ridiculed 
as "Star Wars" - was attacked from all sides as technologically infeasible and 
politically destabilising. 86 Lawrence Freedman argues that as reality diminished 
Reagan's hopes for protection from nuclear war through defences, the President 
became more open to arms control, "the last option for an escape from mutual assured 
destruction". 87 
Be that as it may, the crucial turning point occurred when Mikhail Gorbachev took 
the helm of the Soviet Communist Party in 1985. Badly bogged down in Afghanistan, 
beset by growing social and economic crises across the Soviet bloc, Gorbachev 
undertook a programme of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (reconstruction), 
which included significant concessions in nuclear arms control. In a speech on 
January 15,1986, he offered a plan for total nuclear disarmament. Nine months later, 
at the US-Soviet summit in Reykjavik, Gorbachev and Reagan "began to outbid each 
other" in visions of how to remove the nuclear threat through disarmament. 88 As their 
bureaucracies scrambled to prevent such "utopianism" from gaining a hold, NATO 
was confronted with an unanticipated Soviet acceptance of its "zero option". The 
direct outcome of the Reykjavik Summit was the intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty, which was made possible not only because of the two leaders' apparent desire 
to see progress in disarmament and arms control, but because, under Gorbachev, the 
Soviet Union was more willing to accept intrusive verification. 
The deployment of the new generation of missiles had provoked a volcanic eruption 
of antinuclear activism throughout Europe. There was a dramatic increase in the 
membership of established anti-nuclear organisations such as CND, but even more 
significantly, new kinds of peace movements and civil society engagement 
developed, fusing feminist and environmentalist concerns 89 In the United States too, 
anti-nuclear opposition was mobilised in response to growing fears of nuclear war as 
US-Russian relations deteriorated. 90 Despite the upsurge of protests, however, little 
attention was on nuclear testing, and hopes for CTB negotiations continued to be 
thwarted. 91 One tragic incident briefly returned nuclear testing to the international 
headlines in 1985. The environmental organisation Greenpeace, which had 
campaigned against nuclear testing since 1971, was preparing to lead an anti-nuclear 
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flotilla to the French nuclear test site in the South Pacific, when French secret service 
agents bombed its flagship, the Rainbow Warrior, in Auckland Harbour on July 10, 
killing a photographer, Fernando Perreira. 92 
Greenpeace had planned a pincer action to draw attention to nuclear testing by 
combining direct action and diplomatic pressure. Its diplomatic strategy was based on 
the NPT's preambular commitment to the discontinuance of nuclear testing and made 
use of the fact that this was one of the priority issues raised by the NNWS at the five- 
yearly review conferences of the NPT. Utilising lobbying and media strategies, 
Greenpeace planned to prevent consensus on the final document of the Third NPT 
Review Conference in July 1985, unless the nuclear weapon states agreed to negotiate 
a CTBT. They managed to make allies among NPT parties, especially the nonaligned 
states, but failed in their bid to get a binding commitment on a test ban. 93 Despite this 
diplomatic defeat, test ban advocates were rewarded when Gorbachev declared a 
moratorium on Soviet testing on August 5,1985. The moratorium was both a bid for 
international public opinion at the height of the stand-off over the intermediate 
nuclear forces in Europe, and a response to nonaligned and nongovernmental 
pressure. These included appeals from the Five Continent Peace Initiative, 
coordinated by Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), an NGO whose 
membership consisted of democratically elected representatives from parliaments and 
legislatures around the world, and the recently formed International Physicians for the 
94 Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) 
The Soviet moratorium lasted 19 months, despite receiving no positive response from 
the other nuclear weapon states. During this time, the Democratic majority in the US 
House of Representatives attempted to exert pressure on the Reagan administration 
with an initiative to cut off funding for nuclear tests above a1 kt threshold. Once 
again, however, scepticism about the verifiability of a CTBT was marshalled on 
behalf of intelligence advisers and Republican opponents to explain and justify the 
failure of the tripartite testing talks. To discredit these familiar - but unsubstantiated - 
claims of non-verifiability, scientists from a Washington-based environmental 
organisation, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) proposed a joint 
verification experiment with the Soviet Academy of Sciences (SAS). Despite official 
Reagan administration opposition, supporters in the State Department made it 
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possible for scientists from the United States and Soviet Union to meet, plan, and 
carry out the placement of seismic stations around the Nevada test site and 
Semipalatinsk, in Kazakhstan. The Soviet participants enjoyed the support of 
Gorbachev, but had to contend with resistance from the Foreign and Defence 
Ministries. 5 
The joint experiments lasted for 14 months. Making use of control chemical 
explosions of 10-20 tons and a small, local earthquake, they showed that regional 
monitoring could detect a de-coupled (masked) I kt explosion and distinguish 
between similarly located earthquakes and explosions. Whilst the project was credited 
with assisting Gorbachev to win the support needed to extend the Soviet moratorium 
in 1986, the initial US impact was on Congressional attempts to build verification 
confidence for ratifying the much-maligned TTBT and PNET. Most importantly, the 
project flushed out a number of contradictions in the positions of US test ban 
opponents, causing the Reagan administration to spin between welcoming the 
pressure on the Soviets to engage in cooperative verification to portraying 
Gorbachev's support for the project as an attempt to "confuse the domestic debate 
about the need for American nuclear testing" and to "promote an inequitable and 
unverifiable ban on nuclear testing". 96 
Although the nuclear laboratories again sought to use science to blindside the 
politicians into rejecting a CTBT, they were no longer able to rely on verification 
arguments to do the job. The belief of many Americans that verification was 
apolitical and that the scientists from the national laboratories were simply providing 
neutral facts and assessments had begun to give way to greater awareness of the 
manipulative potential of science. This awareness gradually combined to give greater 
confidence in verification technology. Losing verification as their main fear-inciter, 
the laboratories starting pushing more on arguments related to the safety and 
reliability of the nuclear arsenal. Though they were successful in intimidating some 
non-scientist policymakers, the safety and reliability arguments were more obviously 
politicised from the beginning, and therefore less effective than verification 
arguments had proved to be in the earlier attempts to block a CTBT. Applauded for 
their attempts to bridge the confidence gap on verification, the NRDC-SAS 
experiments had diminished the potency of the politics of verification. 7 
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Under pressure from his own military and nuclear establishments, and having failed 
to get significant political gains from the Soviet moratorium, Gorbachev resumed 
testing in February 1987, after the first US test of the year. Shortly thereafter, the 
Soviet nuclear weapon programme ran into trouble from Kazakh nationalists, newly 
active as Soviet hegemony began to fracture. Following two Soviet tests at the 
Semipalatinsk `Polygon' test site in February 1989 that had vented unexpected 
amounts of radioactive gases, Olzhas Suleimenov, a popular Kazakh poet, launched 
the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement with the avowed aim of shutting the largest 
Soviet test site down. 98 The choice of name deliberately made links with American 
opponents of nuclear testing who demonstrated each year at the Nevada Test Site. 
After initiating his movement, Suleimenov recruited local doctors and nationalists 
and also made contact with international NGOs, notably IPPNW, Greenpeace and the 
Western Shoshone Nation (whose tribal lands known as Newe Segobia lay at the 
centre of the site in Nevada used for US and British testing). During 1989-1990, the 
Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement held meetings and demonstrations in several 
Kazakh and Russian cities, conducted epidemiological research, and released a series 
of filmed documentaries which mixed medical science and harrowing pictures of 
deformed and brain-damaged children. Suleimenov's tactics are widely credited with 
forcing the Soviet government to cancel 11 out of 18 scheduled tests in 1989. In May 
1990, the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement and IPPNW jointly organised an 
International Citizen's Congress for a Nuclear Test Ban, attracting 600 Soviet and 
international participants to Semipalatinsk, where rallies were held with thousands of 
local people. The Kazakh movement against testing grew, incorporating the 
populations of villages adjacent to the test site, as well as politicians and businesses in 
the towns. As its control of the Soviet republics slipped, Moscow cancelled more 
planned tests and announced that the Semipalatinsk site would be closed by 1993. 
The Soviet military began preparing to conduct further underground explosions at 
their Arctic test site on Novaya Zemlya. 99 
Nuclear testing, disarmament and nonproliferation 
Nuclear testing is not essential for basic nuclear weapon acquisition, but it contributes 
to the development of militarily reliable nuclear forces, modernised nuclear weapon 
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systems, and sophisticated methods of delivery, including multiple independently 
targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV). A test ban was therefore linked with calls for 
nuclear disarmament from very early on. Although the major environmental and 
health impacts are thought to derive from atmospheric and underwater testing, banned 
in 1963 (and finally halted in 198010°), concerns about radioactive contamination and 
health and environmental harm have continued to play an important role in mobilising 
public opinion for a test ban. In the absence of further direct nuclear weapon use since 
1945, testing has supplied a significant symbolic component of the fear and 
opprobrium attached to the concept of nuclear weapon use since the mid-1950s. 101 
This means that moral appeals from civil society and NNWS as well as security and 
legal102 arguments against nuclear weapons have played a significant role in keeping 
nuclear disarmament on the agenda. However, networks of epistemic actors based 
primarily in the United States helped to shift the emphasis of test ban efforts from 
disarmament to arms control, at the same time providing arguments to counteract the 
nuclear establishment's claims that a test ban was unverifiable. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9,1989 is viewed as the defining moment 
for the end of the cold war. But in relation to arms control, the pivotal date was 
December 8,1987, when the INF Treaty was signed by Reagan and Gorbachev in 
Washington. This treaty, which eliminated a whole category of modern nuclear 
weapons, was an important departure from past arms control approaches. It was billed 
by Reagan and Thatcher as a victory for their policy of "negotiating from strength", 
but the reality is more complex. The INF Treaty, though itself bilateral, presaged the 
end of bipolarity, and was largely the product of resurgent civil society engagement in 
nuclear and security concerns, combined with political change in the Soviet Union 
and a Europe-wide loss of confidence in the concepts of nuclear security and strategic 
deterrence. Intentionally making people-to-people contacts with Eastern Europe to 
counteract the propaganda of dehumanising enemy images, the Western peace 
movements helped widen the cracks in Soviet society that had become more 
persistent with the rise of Solidarity in Poland. 103 
The achievement of the INF Treaty and the dissolution of the blocs were the 
consequence of political and structural forces and the growth of a multistranded and 
more confident civil society activism. Strategies that amplified and integrated normal 
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emotional responses such as fear of nuclear war with intellectually credible steps to 
reduce the risks and remove the causes of the threat simultaneously challenged the 
military deployments and political systems and undermined the rationalist dichotomy 
that held reason and emotion as adversarial components in a zero-sum security 
dilemma. The effects were felt by authoritarian governments from Eastern Europe to 
the Philippines. 
Compounding the difficulties in assessing the impact of civil society on political 
transformation, influential (mostly realist) analysts have preferred to represent public 
actions as naive and "uninformed", portraying their effect on political changes and 
security decisions as unanticipated by-products rather than the consequence of 
intentional and thoughtful (if seldom unitary) strategies. 104 Jeffrey Knopfs "three and 
three" analysis offers a richer and more nuanced explanation for how the INF treaty 
came about than the `negotiations from strength' paradigm of the realists. Knopf 
recognises the intentionality of civil society and argues that in addition to domestic 
civil society pressure on governments, three different forms of transboundary 
interaction were influential in achieving the outcome - transnational, among civil 
societies; transgovernmental, between government officials; and cross-level, 
involving a complex interplay of links between government actors on one side and 
domestic actors on the other. 105 
The next chapter, which addresses the 1990-1994 period characterised by cold war 
disintegration and renewed interest in multilateralism, will give more detailed 
consideration to the roles of transnational civil society transboundary actions to bring 
the major powers to the negotiating table. 
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noted that Moscow condemned this as "no more than a pretext for sabotaging the CTB negotiations", 
while Time Magazine reasoned that "the Administration wants to keep on testing America's nuclear 
warheads". The United States, supported by Britain, blocked all attempts to work on a test ban at the 
Conference on Disarmament, which since 1978 had put the CTBT at the top of its agenda. See 
Edmonds, 1994, p 380. 
92 Prior to the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior, Greenpeace had directed attention at the human cost of 
nuclear testing by evacuating (at their request) Rongelap islanders, victims of 1950s atmospheric 
testing in the Marshall Islands, to a safer, less contaminated site. Afterwards, to raise attention in 
Europe, Greenpeace flew a hot air balloon over East and West Berlin, demanding a halt to nuclear 
testing. Greenpeace, which had started in Canada in 1971 as (according to some of its employees) a 
"boys' sailing club with a conscience", was one of the few organisations to maintain a focus against 
nuclear testing during the 1970s and 1980s. It had an early success when in 1971 it successfully roused 
public opposition to US proposals to conduct nuclear testing at Amchitka, an island bird sanctuary in 
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the Aleutians, off the coast of Alaska. Two years later, as Australia and New Zealand were taking 
France to the International Court of Justice, seeking a halt to French testing on grounds of 
environmental damage from radioactive fallout on their territory, using the "polluter pays" principle, 
Greenpeace sailors challenged the exclusion zone placed around the French nuclear test sites in the 
South Pacific. They were arrested and beaten up by French commandos, but managed to send pictures 
around the world. Simultaneously, Tahitian campaigners for independence gained high profile support 
from a group of influential French writers and politicians who organised the Bataillon de la Paix 
(Peace Batallion) to oppose nuclear testing and demand a debate on French nuclear policy. The 
specific point put to the ICJ was never adjudicated: France, which tried to have the cases thrown out, 
took the decision to cease atmospheric testing when the ICJ decided to proceed. The Court by majority 
vote on December 20,1974, discontinued the cases on the grounds that they were "without object" 
since France had announced the termination of its atmospheric testing programme. While formally 
defying the World Court and attempting to brazen out the bad international publicity arising from their 
actions towards Tahiti-Polynesia and Greenpeace, France effectively conceded, and announced to the 
UN General Assembly in November 1973 that it would move its testing programme underground. 
This initiative can be regarded as an early example of the pincer approach, combining 
legal/diplomatic/legislative initiatives with public awareness/direct action campaigning in order to 
comer a reluctant government into complying with the objective, in this case an end to atmospheric 
tests in the Pacific. However, once French testing lost its visibility by going underground, public 
concern fell away, making it harder for organisations such as Greenpeace to sustain their support for 
the test ban's disarmament objectives. See Michael Szabo, Making Waves: The Greenpeace New 
Zealand Story (Auckland: Reed Books, 1992), pp 28-35 and pp 109-143. 
97 The President of the Conference, Ambassador Mohammed Shaker of Egypt, managed to bypass 
Greenpeace's strategy with the unusual but effective tactic of obtaining consensus for a compromise 
document that reflected views rather than enshrining actual agreements. 
94 Where PGA was worldwide, and worked particularly with nonaligned governments, IPPNW had 
been founded by American and Russian physicians at the height of the Euromissile crisis, in an attempt 
to bring the leaders of their respective governments to their senses. IPPNW's authority rested on the 
physicians' scientific and medical assessment of nuclear testing and the effects of the use of nuclear 
weapons, nuclear war and nuclear winter. They also conveyed moral authority, derived from the 
traditional respect that doctors command and from their bilateral efforts to transcend the cold war 
political culture and appeal to the common cause of humankind's survival, a point emphasised when 
they were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985. Nevertheless, IPPNW's campaign strategies were 
often more public-movement oriented than elite. 
95 The scientists and advocates who became involved in the joint verification project had a range of 
motives. From the US side, some saw it as a way to undermine the technical arguments used to mask 
political opposition to the CTBT; Thomas Cochran, a prime mover from NRDC, together with Frank 
von Hippel of the Federation of American Scientists, viewed the project as a way of confronting the 
inconsistencies in US and Soviet approaches to verification and to show the effectiveness of 
verification capabilities; others were primarily interested in the scientific opportunity enabling civilian 
seismologists to test new developments in equipment, data interpretation and measuring assumptions; 
some, such as NRDC lawyer Jacob Scherr, saw the project in terms of confidence building and 
challenging enemy perceptions. The driving force from the Soviet side, Evgeny Velikhov, vice 
president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, believed the joint verification project could demonstrate 
the sincerity of Soviet disarmament proposals and have impact on the domestic American debate by 
showing Soviet openness and cooperation. This summary of the NRDC-SAS independent joint 
verification experiments derives primarily from Gallagher, 1999, pp 196-205. 
" Though noting that "the NRDC-SAS joint monitoring project was the most innovative move in the 
politics of test ban verification [but] it failed to have an immediate impact on US policy... " Gallagher 
quotes one of Richard Perle's assistants as admitting that NRDC "wanted to prove that a CTB is 
verifiable, while we'd made verification into the main public objection to a CTB". Gallagher, 1999, pp 
200-204. 
" The Washington Post, for example, carried this assessment: "No more could governments pretend 
that a [CTBT] would be unverifiable... NRDC has given hope ... by showing that 
determined private 
citizens can lead even superpower governments out of the deadly traps they fashion for themselves. " 
Robert Park, "Bold Plan", Washington Post, January 22,1989, quoted in Gallagher, 1999, p 203. After 
the INF Treaty was signed, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to conduct official Joint 
Verification Experiments (JVE), using hydrodynamic methods and seismology. 
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98 Suleimenov launched his campaign using a televised literary award to condemn the radioactive 
contamination from the nuclear `Polygon' and call on the viewers to march to the centre of Almaty. 
His spontaneous demonstration was joined by tens of thousands of Kazakhs. As subsequent events 
have shown, he also had political ambitions and saw the testing issue as a way to mobilise Kazakh 
nationalism, using raised awareness of the health and environmental damage from nuclear testing to 
foster outrage and fuel opposition to the Soviet military presence and political system. Author's 
conversation with Suleimenov's aide, St. Petersburg, June 24,1999. 
" Much of this section is derived from contemporaneous notes of meetings between the author and 
members of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement. I participated in the 1990 Citizen's Congress. See 
also Peter Zheutlin, "Nuclear victims of the world unite", The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
(September, 1990); "Testing decision on Semipalatinsk by Kazakhstan", Soviet Weekly, January 10, 
1991; and Vladimir Iakimets and Olzhas Suleimenov, "New tests mean new nukes", The Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists (October 1992). 
10° As already noted, Australia and New Zealand initiated a case against France in the International 
Court of Justice in 1973, citing environmental damage and the precautionary principle, but also 
arguing that the PTBT prohibition on atmospheric testing had become an established norm with legal 
force equivalent to common law, regardless of whether France had formally acceded to the treaty. I 
am grateful to Nicholas Sims for clarifying this point for me. As a consequence of such pressure, 
France ceased conducting atmospheric nuclear tests in 1974. China, which has also not acceded to the 
PTBT, halted atmospheric testing in 1980. 
101 The relationship between revulsion against nuclear weapons and opposition to nuclear testing has 
not been adequately explored. Nuclear weapons were not always stigmatised as uniquely horrific and 
qualitatively different from other kinds of weapons capable of killing large numbers of people. 
Initially, governments and militaries regarded nuclear weapons as just another, albeit extremely 
powerful weapon to consider for their arsenals. As the US discussion of the possible use of nuclear 
weapons in Korea and against China in the 1950s suggests, nuclear weapons and their use were not 
then imbued with the unique moral taboo and political attributes that are now viewed as underpinning 
deterrence theory. The change came about in the mid-1950s, simultaneous with the mobilisation of 
public movements against nuclear testing after the Bravo test in 1954. Further study would be needed 
to assess whether this was synchronicity at work or whether there was a more direct relation between 
the acceleration of opposition to the radioactive damage and fallout from atmospheric tests after 1954 
and the progressive stigmatisation of nuclear weapon possession and use. When nuclear testing went 
underground after the PTBT, it was very difficult to sustain civil society interest in banning nuclear 
weapons, although by this time the taboo on use had become embedded, perhaps as a result of 
emotions stirred by the awful proximity of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. See, for 
example, Prawitz, 1995, pp 5-12. 
102 The legal arguments have principally derived from the NPT. Since July 1996, the International 
Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which originated in 
an NGO initiative and campaign lasting several years, has strengthened the legal basis for arguments 
against the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. Although the Advisory Opinion of the Court was 
ambiguous and equivocal in a number of respects, it has been used to bolster calls from NNWS and 
NGOs for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The International Association of Lawyers Against 
Nuclear Arms (IALANA), the International Peace Bureau (IPB) and the International Physicians for 
the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), The World Court Project on Nuclear Weapons and 
International Law, (Northampton MA: Aletheia Press, 1993), and International Court of Justice 
Reports 1996, p 225. [Reported for July 8,1996, General List No. 95]. The full decision, 
documentation and dissenting decisions also formed the Annex to Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Note by the 
Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly A/51218, October 15,1996. See also: Opinion 
of Judge C. G. Weeramantry in the International Court of Justice, "The Illegality of Nuclear 
Weapons", (ICJ Reports, 1996) pp 429-555. 
103 Freedman noted Soviet ambivalence towards the new peace movements, whose demands in many 
ways "required more of the Soviet Union than the United States", though that did not protect them 
from conservative and government smears portraying them as pro-Soviet. Freedman, 1989, pp 401. 
Certainly, the German peace movement, END and Greenham women made a conscious effort to hold 
all sides to the same standards, advocating the dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO, calling 
for the removal of Soviet as well as American and British nuclear weapons, and challenging the 
oppressive Soviet system in the name of women's rights, and political and intellectual freedom. 
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104 The political intentionality of civil society is often downplayed. For example, Freedman 
acknowledged the impact of the peace movements in "encouraging moves to ease the East-West 
confrontation through arms control, and in illuminating many of the problems associated with the logic 
of nuclear deterrence", but characterised these as "indirect influences". Freedman, 1989, p 402. In 
another example, Philip Bobbin wrote of the widespread disillusionment with strategic deterrence in 
the 1980s: "This disenchantment was by no means confined to uninformed national publics who felt 
threatened by menacing technologies, buffeted by international political crises, and impressed either by 
apocalyptic claims or by well-advertised panaceas. National security elites also felt a 
disillusionment... " Philip Bobbitt, "Assessing Alternative Nuclear Strategies", in Bobbitt, Freedman 
and Treverton, 1989, p 428. 
105 Knopf also argues that alliance politics within NATO added a third dimension to the conventionally 
understood two level domestic/international policy interaction. Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Beyond two-level 
games: domestic-international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiation", 
International Organization 47: 4 (1993) pp 599-628. 
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Chapter Four 
Bringing States to the Negotiating Table: 
Civil Society and the Construction of Political Will 
On October 2,1992, President George Bush signed into law a bill mandating a nine- 
month moratorium on US nuclear tests and requiring the government to seek to 
conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty by September 1996. Undertaken in the 
teeth of opposition from President Bush and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, the US 
moratorium was "a fascinating story of Senate politics and procedures ", enabled by 
an extraordinary alignment of forces and driven by civil society strategists and 
activists. ' The US moratorium, which joined a moratorium on French nuclear testing 
undertaken by President Francois Mitterrand in April 1992 and a Russian moratorium 
initiated by Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1991, paved the way 
for the UN General Assembly's annual CTBT resolution to be adopted without a vote 
for the first time. 2 The consensus resolution served as a multilateral instruction to the 
Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a test ban treaty. The CD agreed a mandate 
to negotiate in August 1993 and began negotiating in earnest in January 1994. 
By mandating a pause in testing and setting a target date for the CTBT, the 
moratorium that President Bush signed played an important, arguably a causal role in 
bringing the parties to the formal negotiating table 16 months later. For realist regime 
theorists, this sequence of events would have been initiated because the hegemonic 
power, the United States, adapted to the post cold war strategic environment by 
downgrading its reliance on nuclear weapons. As part of its nuclear policy shift, the 
United States decided that its security interests would now be served by a 
multilaterally negotiated nuclear test ban, and so took appropriate measures to ensure 
that the issue was given priority and prominence on the international arms control 
agenda. This explanation looks good but is not right. Not only did the president and 
his administration3 remain adamant opponents of the CTBT in concept and practice, 
but influential Republicans in the US Senate maneoevred to prevent the treaty's 
ratification after 1996. Moreover, Bush's son, on gaining the presidency in 2001, has 
reversed the logic and reinstituted traditional Republican opposition to the test ban. 
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To explain what shaped and drove the US policy shift, we have to look beyond the 
confines of realism. 
Even as he signed, George Bush declared that the provision limiting US nuclear tests 
was "highly objectionable" and complained that it "unwisely restrict[ed]" tests 
necessary "to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent' .4 Bush's Defence 
Secretary, Dick Cheney, and his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, had 
actively lobbied against the moratorium. Though agreeing in July 1992 to limit the 
annual number of US tests to six, the administration had made no effort to reconsider 
the opposition to a CTBT cemented by the Reagan administration when it formally 
withdrew from the trilateral CTB talks in 1982.5 Their opposition to a CTBT was 
maintained despite the post cold war changes in the strategic environment and the 
French and Russian moratoria. Britain, which had for three decades conducted its 
nuclear tests in cooperation with the US Department of Energy at the test site in 
Nevada, also made clear its opposition to the moratorium .6 Earlier, at the Fourth NPT 
Review Conference in 1990, the United States, supported by Britain until the very last 
minute, was willing to see the Conference collapse without a Final Document rather 
than agree to a one-sentence commitment to negotiate a CTBT. 
The US moratorium was a pivotal moment in moving the world towards CTBT 
negotiations. But far from reflecting a change in government policy or posture, the 
moratorium was actually forced on a very reluctant president by the legislative action 
of test ban advocates in the US Senate and House, who had attached amendments for 
a nine month moratorium to the Fiscal Year (FY) 1993 Energy and Water 
Development Appropriations Act. 7 As will be discussed below, this legislative action 
was to a large extent designed and organised by pro-CTBT pressure groups. In 
seeking to understand how it came about, Chapter 4 focuses on the civil society 
drivers and shapers that brought the major parties to the CTBT negotiating table.. - 
Prenegotiations 
In general, by the time arms control negotiations formally open, much has already 
been decided: the parties and forum, agenda, mandate, rules of procedure and so on. 
Even before these practical questions are negotiated, the principal parties have to 
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come to some kind of common understanding that there is a problem that cannot be 
resolved unilaterally, by means of national action. This diagnostic and bridge- 
building period of transition from ignorance, low salience or conflict about a problem 
to willingness to negotiate may either be viewed as the first stage of negotiations or as 
a distinct phase prior to the actual negotiations, that is, "prenegotiations". 8 
Theories of prenegotiations, defined by William Zartman as a "purposive period of 
transition that enables parties to move from conflicting perceptions and behaviours 
(unilateral attempts at solutions) to cooperative perceptions and behaviours"9 have 
tended to focus primarily on governmental and intergovernmental processes. 
Theorists have identified different phases of prenegotiations and negotiations. 
Zartman, for example, focused on three: identification and diagnosis of a problem; 
consideration of options; and commitment to negotiate. 1° Brian Tomlin expanded this 
to five: problem identification; the search for options; commitment to negotiate made 
by at least one party, marking the shift from "whether to negotiate to what will be 
negotiated"; communication and discussion, principally to determine the structure, 
boundaries, participation and agenda; and, finally, the agreement to negotiate. " As 
Janice Stein pointed out, however, the sequencing of prenegotiations is not fixed, but 
context-dependent. 12 
In the case of the CTBT, the standard approaches for considering prenegotiations are 
of limited usefulness. As outlined in Chapter 3, the identification and diagnosis of the 
problem - framed in disarmament, health and environmental terms - dates back to the 
1950s. There then followed some four decades, during which the NWS, especially the 
United States and Soviet Union, played political football with the idea of a CTBT, 
while civil society actors and non nuclear weapon states continued to push for a 
treaty, at times appearing to get one or other of the main protagonists to commit to 
negotiations. Negotiations framed in terms of a CTB objective were undertaken on at 
least three occasions, but only the last, from 1994-1996, was able to finalise a treaty 
text that banned nuclear tests comprehensively. The first set of negotiations resulted 
in the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the second in the aborted tripartite testing talks of 
1977-1980. For the CTBT, therefore, the concept of prenegotiations must either be 
elongated beyond current theoretical parameters, or adapted. Moreover, the majority 
of analyses on negotiations and prenegotiations emphasise institutional processes and 
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bargaining. They miss a crucial component: the role played by independent experts 
and nongovernmental actors in resetting the agenda, reframing the issues and norms, 
coordinating actions among non nuclear weapon states, and mobilising public opinion 
to capture the attention of political decisionmakers. 
Since the US adoption of the testing moratorium was an important factor in the events 
leading up to the CTBT negotiations, it is important to ask what caused US Senators 
and Congressional Representatives to take up the issue of a nuclear test ban in the 
early 1990s? How and why did they force the moratorium through despite Republican 
attempts to trade it away for other benefits? The French moratorium, which took the 
world by surprise, gave impetus and encouragement to the advocates of a US 
moratorium. But what had induced Mitterrand to initiate France's first ever 
moratorium since French testing began in 1960? Mitterrand, who had presided over 
dozens of nuclear tests in the South Pacific, for years ignoring the protests of 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Pacific Island Peoples, had brazened it out 
when French Secret Service agents were exposed as responsible for the July 1985 
bombing of the Rainbow Warrior. Moreover, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, 
France was by no means an enthusiastic negotiator during the early stages of the 
CTBT negotiations, suggesting some level of policy conflict or confusion between 
the moratorium decision and its consequences. The French moratorium itself 
followed on the heels of the Russian moratorium. Secretary-General Gorbachev had 
initiated a moratorium in 1985, which had lasted 19 months without any reciprocal 
action by any of the other NWS. Why did he try again in 1990? What were the 
shapers that brought about these three moratorium decisions, and how were the 
moratoria related to wider policy objectives? 
Putting Testing Back on the Agenda 
The priority for test ban advocates in the early 1990s was to ratchet up public and 
political interest in a nuclear test ban in order to exert pressure on the nuclear testing 
states. The period of 1990-1991 was characterised by the interplay of three 
diplomatic and direct action strategies involving the nonaligned NNWS and NGOs: i) 
utilising the political commitment to a CTBT enshrined in the NPT to exert pressure 
through the Fourth NPT Review Conference, spearheaded by Mexico, with support 
from several nonaligned countries and NGOs, including Greenpeace, PGA and 
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IPPNW; ii) direct action, mostly carried out by Greenpeace at the major nuclear test 
sites and symbolic locations in the NWS; and iii) convening an Amendment 
Conference to the PTBT (an initiative of PGA), in partnership with key nonaligned 
countries, notably Mexico, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela. 13 
A CTB Warning Shot Across the NPT Bow 
Updating the strategy pushed by Greenpeace in 1985, a number of nonaligned states, 
led by Mexico, refused to accept any final document of the 1990 NPT Review 
Conference that did not contain a clear commitment by the NWS to negotiate a 
CTBT. Russia supported this, but with all other issues agreed, Britain and the United 
States held out against the CTBT. The Conference went down to the wire in the early 
hours of September 15. The Conference President, Oswaldo de Rivero of Peru, 
stopped the clock, hoping private negotiations among a group of 16 parties would 
reach agreement. 14 The Chair of the drafting committee, Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of 
Sweden obtained widespread support for a compromise text. The United States 
insisted on adding a further paragraph that, in effect, nullified the compromise text's 
call for early bilateral and multilateral action. This asserted the primacy of "step-by- 
step negotiations" between the two superpowers on intermediate limitations on 
testing "leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing 
as part of an effective disarmament process. " This time, by contrast with what had 
occurred in 1985, Mexico, led by its CD ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch, resisted 
all pressure to concede beyond the compromises already contained in the President's 
paragraph. Even Britain caved in and accepted the compromise text during the early 
hours of the morning, but the United States held out. 15 With both the United States 
and Mexico refusing to give in, the Review Conference collapsed, amid mutual 
recrimination. The nonaligned strategy had been encouraged and strongly supported 
by test ban advocates among the NGOs attending the review conference, notably 
PGA and Greenpeace. This divided them from many nonproliferation/arms control 
NGOs, who criticised Mexico, arguing that its point had been made and Marin Bosch 
should have conceded to prevent the loss of hard-won agreements on safeguards, 
inspections and nuclear smuggling. 16 As later transpired, however, Mexico's refusal 
to give in at the end sent a very important warning shot about the CTBT across the 
bows of Western diplomats who were already strategising for indefinite extension of 
the NPT in 1995. 
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Making the Test Sites Publicly Visible 
After a few years of relative inactivity on nuclear issues following the events of 1985, 
Greenpeace got back into its stride in the late 1980s with a plan to highlight testing at 
Novaya Zemlya, Nevada and Moruroa17 and make the remote sites more visible as 
part of a strategy to raise public awareness and exert political pressure. The 
environmental organisation launched a converted trawler as the new Rainbow 
Warrior, pledging to resume its initiating high profile campaigning for a CTBT, 
together with a new campaign for "nuclear free seas". Riding a popular crest of a 
wave and capitalising on growing public concern about protecting the environment, 
Greenpeace decided to avoid confrontations about national security and nuclear 
disarmament angle and to highlight instead the scale of the international 
environmental and human rights problems associated with nuclear testing. This 
strategy was particularly important for France, which exhibited the countervailing 
tendencies of a growing environmental consciousness combined with a general 
national consensus on nuclear defence policy. 
Successive direct actions were planned at the US/British, Soviet and French sites. ' 8 In 
October 1990, the MV Greenpeace and its crew were arrested by the KGB after 
landing four campaigners with radiation detectors on the North Island of Novaya 
Zemlya. After hiking to nearby test shafts, the campaigners measured extraordinarily 
high levels of environmental radioactivity before being arrested. The ship and its 
crew were detained for nearly a week, generating worldwide press coverage, during 
which Boris Yeltsin called on President Gorbachev to end nuclear testing. On 
October 18,1990, shortly after the Greenpeace campaigners had been deported, the 
Soviet Union carried out its planned nuclear explosion at Novaya Zemlya. Because of 
the Greenpeace-generated interest, including publication of the contamination levels 
the crew had measured, the Soviet test was followed by a storm of criticism at the 
United Nations and in the international media. That turned out to be the last Soviet 
test. One year later, Gorbachev announced a unilateral moratorium. 
A month later, in November 1990, Greenpeace put the spotlight on Anglo-American 
testing, with simultaneous actions in London and Nevada to draw attention to a 
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planned British nuclear test. In London, Greenpeace made the front pages of several 
UK tabloids and gained worldwide press coverage with an iconic photograph of 
climbers hanging above the Thames with a huge banner suspended from Tower 
Bridge that demanded "Stop UK Nuclear Tests". At the same time, four activists, 
including three British women, hiked onto the Nevada Test Site. Hiking, camping 
and avoiding detection for three days, they turned up on military cameras at the 
ground zero site for the British test, codenamed Houston, forcing the explosion to be 
halted six minutes before detonation. They were eventually arrested and the test went 
ahead some hours later, but the action had caused significant publicity in Britain and 
embarrassment to the US and British authorities. 19 As media coverage indicated that 
the majority of British people were not aware that nuclear testing was still being 
conducted by the MoD, other disarmament activists used the Greenpeace publicity to 
boost their anti-nuclear actions around Britain. 
A month later Greenpeace returned to the French test site at Moruroa with the 
Rainbow Warrior. Having chosen to focus attention on the `soft' issues of 
environmental contamination and human rights, where there was more hope of 
eroding French support for nuclear testing than a confontation about the `force de 
frappe', Greenpeace published a compilation of personal testimonies from Maohi 
witnesses and workers involved in the French nuclear testing programme in the South 
Pacific, with information on accidents, health effects and environmental problems 
that appeared to be linked with the tests. 20 Film and data from a French cultural hero, 
Commander Jacques Cousteau, were employed to raise questions about the site's 
fragility and present evidence suggesting that radioactive plutonium and caesium 
were already leaking into the surrounding oceans. With public fanfare, Greenpeace 
applied to the French government for permission to take samples "to quantify present 
and short to medium term releases of radioactivity from the underground nuclear 
explosions at Moruroa and Fangataufa' . 21 When, as expected, their request was 
ignored, Greenpeace went ahead with its sampling mission as a form of nonviolent 
direct action, with media on board to record every move. As anticipated, members of 
the crew and some scientists were arrested for breaching the 12 mile exclusion zone, 
but managed to smuggle out some of their samples of lagoon water and fauna? The 
arrests and subsequent deportations received worldwide media coverage, with 
significant - and largely positive - reporting in France. Analysis of the samples 
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revealed radioactive contamination. Though the levels were not particularly 
significant, there were traces of plutonium - enough for Greenpeace to publish in 
September 1991 and challenge the French government to permit an independent 
international study of the Moruroa and Fangataufa test sites to determine the rate of 
failure of containment from the nuclear blasts. Vowing to keep taking scientists to 
Moruroa until nuclear testing was halted and a full and open study of the 
environmental situation could be undertaken, Greenpeace prepared to return the 
following year. 23 
Parliamentarians and NGOs: the PTBT Amendment Conference 
In January 1991, the PTBT Amendment Conference was held at the United Nations 
in New York over the strong opposition of the governments of Britain and the United 
States. This Conference, which took three years of civil society and NNWS 
partnership to convene, was the brainchild of PGA's coordinator, Aaron Tovish. 
Drawing on the provisions in the treaty's Article 11.1, Tovish managed by August 
1988 to persuade six states (Mexico, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and 
Venezuela) to table a proposal for amending the PTBT to cover all environments, 
which would have transformed the treaty into a CTBT. Over the next two years, 
PGA worked on gathering signatures from one third of the parties to the treaty, 
thereby obliging the three PTBT depositary governments, Britain, the United States 
and the Soviet Union, to convene a conference to consider the proposed amendment. 
This Conference was held from January 4 to 18,1991, chaired by All Alatas, 
ambassador of Indonesia. In conjunction with it, Greenpeace and a Las Vegas-based 
NGO, American Peace Test, organised a conference in Las Vegas for information 
exchange and networking, followed by a mass trespass on the test site, resulting in 
750 arrests, but not a lot of publicity. 24 
Representatives of the key NGOs, including PGA, the Nevada-Semipalatinsk 
Movement, Greenpeace and IPPNW, addressed the delegates to the PTBT 
Amendment Conference, along with representatives of indigenous people affected by 
nuclear testing from the Pacific, Kazakh and Western Shoshone nations. The United 
States and Britain had made it clear that they would veto any amendment banning 
underground testing, so a compromise amendment was proposed, enabling Ali Alatas 
to keep the issue on the diplomatic agenda, with the possibility of reconvening the 
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PTBT Amendment Conference at some time in the future. Since the second 
amendment was procedural, it could not be vetoed, and was carried by 74 votes to 2 
(Britain and the United States), with 19 abstentions (mainly NATO). 
At the time, neither the demonstrations nor the Amendment Conference received 
much media coverage because of the imminence of the Gulf War. 25 However, the 
device of keeping the Conference potentially alive acted as an important lever which 
Alatas and his nonaligned colleagues wielded shrewdly over the coming 36 months. 26 
Moreover, the NGOs used the strategy and Conference as an opportunity to present 
up-to-date arguments and research on the feasibility of a CTBT, including its 
verifiability. The amendment, for example, included a proposal for a verification 
protocol, which had been drawn up by the Verification Technology Information 
Centre (VERTIC), a London-based NGO that coordinated scientific and expert 
research and opinion on arms control and environmental verification issues. 7 Such 
information was an important resource for NNWS diplomats and officials in 
countering the verification pessimism of the nuclear weapon states during the next 
few years. 
From Heightened Awareness to Moratoria 
Greenpeace's strategic objectives, in carrying out high profile direct actions at the 
US/British, Soviet and French sites, were to make underground nuclear testing more 
visible, put the demand for a CTBT back on the public and political agenda, and 
ratchet up pressure on the NWS. While supporting the PGA initiative on amending 
the PTBT, Greenpeace placed less overt emphasis on strategic concerns or the nuclear 
arms race, instead seeking to raise public awareness by highlighting the health and 
environmental dangers of nuclear testing. 28 Though there were many other civil 
society pressure groups opposed to nuclear testing and weapons, Greenpeace's 
strength in the 1980s and early 1990s was its international reach, with campaigners in 
many countries, and its ability to coordinate large actions quickly, with high level 
technical resources, including ships and state-of-the-art communication. It was one 
of the first NGOs working on disarmament and environmental issues to play the 
media at its own game. They understood the importance of timing, constructed 
images and media friendly approaches, and were more adept than most at using 
personal stories and political messages. 29 Where Hampson and others have identified 
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that crisis or exogenous shock can play an important role in precipitating policy 
changes, Greenpeace was at the forefront among civil society actors in recognising 
that direct action and publicity could be used to generate a perception of crisis or to 
politicise a situation into a crisis for target audiences or policymakers. The 
cumulative effect of the actions of Greenpeace and others against nuclear testing 
during 1989-1991 fostered a sense of environmental crisis and urgency that played 
into the political concerns of a number of governments. 
The first major breakthrough came on October 5,1991, when President Gorbachev 
declared a moratorium on Soviet testing. The Soviet moratorium made virtue of 
necessity, because the growing power of the Kazakh nationalists and the Nevada- 
Semipalatinsk Movement had already effectively halted testing at Semipalatinsk. The 
announcement of a one year French moratorium on April 8,1992 came as more of a 
surprise, not least to the French military and Atomic Energy Commission, who had 
already put the drilling platforms in place for the 1992 programme of tests at 
Moruroa. 30 
Three levels of interacting civil society pressure appear to have contributed to 
President Mitterrand's decision. Most immediately, the March 1992 regional 
elections had gone badly for the Socialist Party and marked the first significant 
success for les Verts, the French Green Party, which garnered almost 15 percent of 
the vote. The Greens had listed a nuclear test ban high in their political platform of 
environmental priorities. They had also been instrumental in the January 1992 launch 
of a "European Campaign for a Moratorium on French Nuclear Tests in the Pacific" 
by a coalition of French ecologists and peace activists, members of the European 
Parliament, and the Protestant and Catholic Churches of France and other European 
countries. 1 During the French election campaign, Greenpeace had published more 
information on radioactive leakage from Moruroa, and the Rainbow Warrior had 
returned in late 1991/early 1992 to take more samples at the Pacific test range. Since 
official permission for this sampling was again denied, Greenpeace was able to attract 
further international - and French - publicity as its boat was again blocked by the 
French military. Polls suggest that Greenpeace and others were successfully eroding 
public confidence in French statements about the environmental safety of its testing 
programme, thereby increasing pressure of the French government. 32 
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At the same time, Mitterrand was undoubtedly reassessing French policy after the 
cold war, as evidenced by the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from the 
Plateau d'Albion, the cancellation of the Hades programme, and the announcement 
on June 3,1992 that France would join the NPT. In announcing the moratorium on 
nuclear testing, Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy also alluded to the necessity to stop 
the massive build up and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. 3 Was the moratorium a 
reflection of a desire to halt nuclear testing or a political manoeuvre designed to get 
the Greens off his back? Mitterrand's own statement just days after the moratorium 
was announced was revealing: "If the other nuclear powers are stubborn, France will 
have to continue to assure its defence. It will regret the lost opportunity. It will have 
done its duty. "34 This suggests that Mitterrand calculated that temporarily suspending 
the tests would allow France to take the moral high ground, address some of its 
problems at the Pacific test site, and meet a key objective of the environmentalists. In 
a political climate dominated by the Conservative Party in Britain and the 
Republicans in the United States, there was every reason to assume that the other 
governments would carry on testing. France could then resume when ready, with the 
moratorium conferring political gains with little or no military cost. 
At the time, there were also grounds for believing that the Russian moratorium would 
not hold for long. A leaked memo dated February 27,1992 revealed that Boris 
Yeltsin, who had taken over from Gorbachev at the end of 1991 as the head of the 
newly formed Russian Federation, was preparing to breach Gorbachev's moratorium 
and resume testing at Novaya Zemlya. After NGOs, including Greenpeace, IPPNW, 
the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement and a growing number of Russian 
environmentalists, protested and turned up the heat, Yeltsin backed down, and in the 
end declared that Russia would extend Gorbachev's moratorium. 5 Whatever the 
original intentions of Mitterrand and Yeltsin, they became locked into their respective 
moratoria when President Bush in October 1992 signed a bill mandating the United 
States to adhere to a nine month moratorium and pursue negotiations aimed at 
completing a CTBT by September 30,1996. 
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The US Moratorium: Legislative Strategy and Public Pressure 
The impetus behind the moratorium came from Senator Mark Hatfield, a liberal 
Republican from Oregon who had co-sponsored the "Freeze" resolutions with Senator 
Edward Kennedy in the 1980s. He teamed up with a conservative Democrat, James 
Exon, who had reportedly been shocked by the devastation he saw during a visit to 
the Nevada Test Site in 1991. The French moratorium gave impetus to Hatfield's 
initiative, enabling him to recruit 53 co-sponsors, the most important of whom was 
the Senate Majority Leader, George Mitchell. Meanwhile, the Bush administration 
tried to carry on business as usual, detonating a test on April 30,1992, three weeks 
after the French moratorium was announced. 
As civil society erupted with criticism and petitions, the House Majority Leader, 
Richard Gephardt, and a first term Representative, Mike Kopetski, responded by 
introducing the "Nuclear Testing Moratorium Bill" (HR 3636), which quickly gained 
216 co-sponsors in support of a one year moratorium. Hatfield's initial draft 
legislation was attached to the Senate Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year (FY) 
2003. Hatfield, Exon and Mitchell entered into negotiations to get conservative 
backers. Talks with Sam Nunn, the influential Chair of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee resulted in modifications to allow for a limited number of safety tests, and 
the White House successfully lobbied for language to allow the United States to 
resume testing if any other country conducted a test 36 In a farsighted and shrewd 
parliamentary move, Hatfield duplicated the moratorium provision as an amendment 
to the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill. This proved vital, for in the House- 
Senate conference committee on the Defense Authorization Bill Nunn suddenly 
pulled back his support for the moratorium provision, which consequently fell. By 
contrast, Hatfield, the ranking member on the Senate Appropriations Committee, was 
able to ensure that the provision survived the Energy and Water Appropriations 
House-Senate Conference Committee. Cheney and Scowcroft lobbied the Senate, 
urging them to vote against the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment, but in vain. 37 
After a tough round of negotiations and trade-offs, amid intensive lobbying from 
`inside the Beltway' arms controllers, a massive grassroots campaign of letter writing 
to Congressional representatives and op-eds in local papers, the test moratorium 
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amendment was passed by the Senate on September 13,1992 by a margin of 55 to 40. 
On September 24, the House of Representatives adopted the same amendment by 224 
to 151. Elsewhere in the Bill were `pork barrel' provisions giving jobs and money to 
Republican regions that were important to George Bush in this election year. Of 
particular note was the $4.5 billion supercollider project in the president's home state 
of Texas. 38 Without a line item veto, Bush had Hobson's choice of either signing the 
Bill with the moratorium or vetoing the whole package. Britain, dependent on the US 
test site, had no say, although the MoD, which had at least three further nuclear tests 
designed and planned, lobbied hard in Washington to prevent the moratorium. With 
his eyes on his domestic agenda and Texas pork, George Bush ignored British 
protests. Making clear that he did not support a test ban, he signed the Bill on October 
2,1992. The Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment mandated a 9-month moratorium, 
with the possibility of seeking approval for up to 15 tests before September 30,1996 
(of which Britain could conduct one per year (up to a maximum of three) if the 
president determined that it would be in US national interests). 9 Significantly, 
despite the French and Russian moratoria and evidence that pressure was mounting 
for a test ban, Bush took no steps to provide for a test-ban readiness programme. A 
triumph for legislative strategy, the moratorium was not expected to last. 
From Moratoria to Negotiating Mandate 
When Bill Clinton was elected president he was expected to support a CTBT, a 
measure which he had advocated as a presidential candidate 40 Three important test- 
ban related issues came up for decision during his first year: proposals for a threshold 
of one kiloton, extension of the moratorium, and discussion of ways to limit the 
binding duration of any treaty. 
In February 1993, Robert Bell, Director for Arms Control at the National Security 
Council, advocated that the CTBT should have a1 kt threshold. He argued that "no- 
one was supporting continuation of the moratorium imposed by the Hatfield- 
Mitchell-Exon legislation after the expiration of the nine-month period in June 
1993' . 41 Lake initiated a mid-level interagency review lasting several months, with a 
Principals' meeting involving senior officials scheduled for May 14. The British 
nuclear establishment and MoD, in close collaboration with their opposite numbers in 
the Pentagon and the US nuclear laboratories, mounted a well-orchestrated offensive 
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against the moratorium. Arms controllers in London and Washington responded with 
a bill sponsored by Representative Mike Kopetski aimed at making Britain pay the 
full costs of its testing, including the environmental clean-up. 42 
At the first Principals' meeting of the US interagency process to consider whether to 
continue the moratorium, only Thomas Graham Jr., a senior official at the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), argued in favour. Ambassador Graham, 
who led US efforts to obtain indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, argued that "the 
tests were not necessary and should not jeopardise NPT extension". 43 The newly 
appointed Secretary for Energy, Hazel O'Leary, surprised the other Principals by 
insisting on a postponement of the decision until she could receive full briefings from 
the nuclear laboratories and other interested parties connected with her department. 
O'Leary heard arguments for and against conducting the full 15 tests. The nuclear 
laboratory officials from Los Alamos, Sandia and Livermore were mostly in favour, 
and cited safety and reliability, test ban readiness, Anglo-American relations, and 
future ratification considerations. " Others, such as Frank von Hippel, who later 
became Clinton's science advisor, maintained that no further safety tests were 
needed, although he supported allowing hydronuclear experiments (HNE) up to 4 lbs 
(1.8 kg). 45 O'Leary concluded that, notwithstanding the desires of some in the 
nuclear establishment, further nuclear tests were not actually needed for stockpile 
safety and reliability. When the Principals reconvened in late May, they were 
divided: Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
argued that a "deal" had been made in Congress to allow 15 tests; Graham and 
O'Leary pushed to extend the moratorium; and Colin Powell, head of the Joint 
Chiefs, sat on the fence 46 
During these few months in 1993, civil society had not been idle. When by April- 
May it looked as if the transgovernmental collaboration between US Pentagon and 
UK MoD opponents of the CTBT would be successful, NGOs on both sides of the 
Atlantic mobilised letter-writing campaigns to the President and Congressional 
representatives supporting the moratorium and opposing the I kt threshold idea. In 
particular, Washington arms controllers provided technical information and assisted 
the Senators at the forefront of the Nuclear Testing Moratorium legislation to 
organise almost 200 letters from their congressional colleagues. They obtained a poll 
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rating of 72 percent of US public opinion in favour of continuing the moratorium. 
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR, a US affiliate of IPPNW), Greenpeace and 
others put pro-CTBT ads into major US newspapers, including one that admonished a 
saxophone-playing Clinton: "Don't Blow it Bill' . 47 In Britain, activists from the Test 
Ban Action Group (T-BAG), an unofficial network of anti-nuclear organisations and 
ex-peace-camp feminists, handed out anti-testing leaflets at stations and town centres. 
They also worked with Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs to highlight the MoD's 
lobbying activities against the moratorium in Washington and to put pressure on the 
government through parliamentary questions and early day motions (EDM). When 
the Washington Post published news of the US administration's internal debates on 
April 30, British and US civil society moved into overdrive, with letters to the Prime 
Minister and President from church leaders and dignitaries, a slew of newspaper 
editorials, and a barrage of information to Congressional representatives who, in turn, 
lobbied Clinton. 48 
With the US interagency process unable to come to a clear decision, Clinton's 
National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, consulted senior politicians, receiving 
their assurance that there would be Congressional support for extending the 
moratorium. On July 3,1993, Clinton announced that the US moratorium would be 
extended, taking Britain with it. As noted above, his decision trapped Russia and 
France into their moratoria too. 
Although Beijing never joined the moratoria, it was severely embarrassed in October 
1993 when VERTIC successfully predicted the timing and location of China's next 
nuclear test. Using satellite imagery and seismic monitoring hooked up to a couple of 
laptop computers, VERTIC published details of the Chinese test within a few hours 
of its occurrence. The Chinese government initially tried to pass it off as an 
earthquake, but within 24 hours was forced into admitting the test, which gave rise to 
public and diplomatic condemnation around the world. VERTIC's coup had two 
positive outcomes. Occurring just as the UN met in New York for the First 
Committee, VERTIC's action showed how a small NGO could successfully detect 
and locate an underground test, giving reassurance and credibility to the concept of 
verifying a total test ban. Secondly, China began for the first time to announce its 
tests. From then until the CTBT was signed, China conducted about two tests per 
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year, but avoided' similar embarrassment by releasing their own government 
announcements to the media. 49 
Changing Minds and Policies: Evaluating Civil Society's Role 
Prenegotiations literature refers to the usefulness of a `bridge' or temporary 
suspension of conflict behaviour, such as a ceasefire, in bringing conflicting parties to 
the negotiating table. 50 To the extent that nuclear testing may be regarded as `conflict 
behaviour', the moratoria provided such a bridge towards the CTBT. Using 
Zartman's words, taken collectively, the moratoria may be seen as a "temporary 
mechanism that provides for the change itself on a transitional and provisional basis" 
- in effect, a "downpayment on confidence". 
s' 
As noted earlier, evaluating the impact of civil society actions on security and arms 
control decisionmaking can be difficult. 52 There may be vested interests in ignoring 
or downplaying the intentionality and influence of civil society actors, either because 
governments want to dishearten their opponents and discourage nongovernmental 
challenges to state authority, or because to admit that players without formal power 
may substantially shape state interests contradicts dominant theories of how the world 
works. For alternative political reasons, there may also be vested interests in inflating 
the role of pressure groups. As norms are shaped and embedded, governments 
themselves will adapt, adopt and internalise those norms, perceptions and arguments. 
Civil society is at its most successful when the norms or policies it has been 
advocating cease to appear controversial or challenging. Once a tipping point has 
been reached or norms have become embedded, political shifts or policy changes take 
on a quality of inevitability, generally obscuring the shaping role of nonstate actors. 
How, then, can the political influence of civil society be measured? 
When seeking to assess the relevance of civil society strategies, the recollections of 
government officials can be useful indicators. In this regard, my interviews with 
ambassadors and the recently published memoirs of Ambassador Thomas Graham, 
who headed the US delegation to the NPT and participated in many of the interagency 
meetings on the CTBT, provide some evidence to corroborate several of the claims 
made in this chapter. Another, though less reliable, measure of civil society 
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effectiveness is its tangible output, such as media coverage and numbers of letters or 
calls to governments from members of the public or their parliamentary or 
congressional representatives. Such indicators may be the result of the mobilising 
work of NGOs and help to gauge levels of public concern. High levels of output, 
however, do not always translate into effective influence on outcome. 
Demonstrations, for example, can be useful in promoting local attention and fostering 
NGO links and enthusiasm, but to have any impact on national policy and 
decisionmaking, they usually need to be large, inspirational and well-timed. The 
PTBT Amendment Conference and Greenpeace's related activities, including mass 
arrests, could be viewed as successful examples of parliamentary and civil society 
mobilisation; marred, however, by infelicitous (but unforeseeable) timing, as the Gulf 
War started in January 1991, the PTBT Conference and related actions had very little 
direct impact on the decisions of the weapon states. 53 
Another factor to take into consideration when evaluating the impact of civil society 
strategies and actions is that it may take time and interaction with other events or 
developments before the full effect is recognised. In addition, actions deemed 
invisible, ineffective or unsuccessful at the time may trigger or contribute to a cascade 
that over the longer term causes the desired policy change. For example, though the 
PTBT Amendment Conference appeared at the time to have been practically 
invisible, and Mexico provoked great hostility in some quarters for the part it played 
in the failure of the 1990 NPT Review Conference by refusing to give in over the 
CTBT, both these strategies were important in piling pressure on the NWS for a 
CTBT. 
Caveats notwithstanding, some criteria need to be developed for assessing civil 
society strategies and impact. First, we can consider whether the target leaders or 
governments acted in accordance with civil society demands. If they did, did they 
have a pre-existing preference for the policy in question? If no, what factors changed 
the policy? Was there a sudden perception of crisis or urgency, and if so, were the 
causes exogenous (a nuclear accident, for example) or were there changes in how an 
issue came to be viewed? If the latter, had the change been stimulated by the 
dissemination of information, reframing of the issue or recasting of the implications 
in, for example, moral, environmental or security terms? Did the issue become 
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relevant in electoral politics, and if so, had civil society played a role in setting that 
agenda and putting it into the election arena? 
In the French elections of early 1992 and the US elections of late 1992, nuclear 
testing was made an issue by the Greens and Democrats, respectively, in both cases 
with demonstrable pressure from civil society and parliamentarians or legislators. In 
the French case, there is no evidence that Mitterrand had any policy preference for a 
testing moratorium before the Greens received such a high showing in the March 
1992 polls. On the contrary, despite being leader of the Socialist Party, Mitterrand, as 
president, had appeared unworried by years of international criticism over French 
testing. 
In the United States, the Bush administration's antipathy towards the moratorium and 
a CTBT was well documented. The moratorium did not change the Republican view 
of the CTBT, but forced the policy change by means of the mobilisation of public 
opinion on the one hand and construction of a strategic partnership between epistemic 
actors, norm entrepreneurs and a few key congressional arms controllers in the United 
States. Together, these two approaches persuaded the Democrat majority in both 
Houses of Congress to exercise their "broad set of legitimate means to block, divert, 
or alter foreign policy initiatives "S4 and force the initial nine month moratorium and 
CTBT target date on an unwilling President Bush. The success of this legislative 
strategy was impressive, but by coercing opponents to accept the political change 
without changing the normative matrix may have contributed to the ideological 
campaign that some Republicans continued to wage against the CTBT, resulting in 
the US failure to ratify in 1999 and the virulent opposition shown to the treaty by the 
administration of George W. Bush after 2001.55 
With regard to the Soviet moratorium, Gorbachev had certainly been willing to 
undertake a moratorium from August 1985 to February 1987, but there is no evidence 
that he planned to declare another one in 1991, so soon after the earlier initiative had 
failed. Although the publicity harnessed by Greenpeace's action (and particularly the 
embarrassing allegations of high levels of radioactive contamination found at Novaya 
Zemlya) undoubtedly helped, the major credit for the testing moratorium belongs 
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with the shrewd mobilisation and strategies of the Kazakh Nevada-Semipalatinsk 
Movement, described in Chapter 3.56 
To sum up, this chapter argues that the two most significant political components of 
the prenegotiation period were the enacting of testing moratoria and the diplomatic 
pressure exerted through the increasingly time-urgent linkage between the NPT's 
extension decision and that treaty's commitment nearly 25 years earlier to a CTBT. In 
both cases, civil society played a crucial role using a mix of strategies to promote 
public awareness and concern and reframe the problem in environmental and security 
terms. The testing moratoria were essentially shaped by domestic decisionmaking. 
The dynamics in each case were different. Gorbachev made virtue out of a necessity 
dictated by the effectiveness of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement's nationalist- 
environmentalist insistence on the closure of the Semipalatinsk test site (and the 
greater expense and poorer conditions of testing at Novaya Zemlya). Mitterrand 
sought to buy off a political challenge from the Green Party by dressing in more 
environmentally friendly clothes. And in the United States, a combination of public 
mobilisation and legislative strategies imposed the initial moratorium on a 
Republican president and enabled his Democratic successor to sustain it, despite 
strong pressure from both the British government and the Pentagon. 
Once the United States had come out in favour of a CTBT, it pulled the rest of the 
NWS along. These observations accord with Hampson's analysis of the 
prenegotiation phase in cold war bilateral arms control, in which "US willingness to 
begin negotiations has been affected by the emergence of strong public and 
congressional pressures in support of arms control' . 57 There is considerably less 
evidence in this case study to support Hampson's identification of "crisis or 
impending crisis"58 as a trigger for negotiations. The only crisis-type trigger was the 
one deliberately manufactured by the NNWS and NGOs when they explicitly linked 
the achievement of a CTBT with the decision to extend the NPT in 1995. For this to 
work, transnational civil society pursued a strategy of working with the NNWS, while 
US NGOs exerted pressure in Washington, and diplomats such as Ambassador 
Graham ensured that wider nonproliferation considerations would be taken into 
account in interagency discussions on the CTBT and testing moratorium. 
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This chapter, which made the case that civil society actors played crucial roles in 
constructing the political conditions and will for the NWS to agree to commence 
CTBT negotiations, concludes the first part of the thesis. Having now provided a 
theoretical, historical and political context, it is time to consider the 1994-96 CTBT 
negotiations in detail. 
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Chapter Five 
The Process of Negotiations, 1994-1996: 
from Mandate to Signature 
Bolstered by the continuing moratoria on testing by France, Russia and the United 
States, and President Clinton's active support for the Congressionally mandated 
requirement on the United States to negotiate a test ban by September 1996, the 
Conference on Disarmament finally reached agreement to give its ad hoc Committee 
on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate. The decision, adopted on August 10, 
1993, stated: "Convinced that, to contribute effectively to the prevention of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear 
disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security, 
a CTB should be universal and internationally and effectively verifiable ". ' 
After more than 20 years of the nuclear test ban sitting impotently in first place of the 
`decalogue' of priority tasks bequeathed from the first UN Special Session on 
Disarmament in 1978 (and CD agenda derived from it)2, the CTBT finally found 
itself at the head of the arms control queue. 
To provide context for the next three chapters' detailed analyses of the negotiations 
on scope, verification and entry into force, Chapter 5 gives a chronologically 
structured narrative of the CTBT negotiations. In providing an overview showing the 
various phases and identifying the major events and decisions, this chapter considers 
broader political influences on the negotiating dynamics, particularly the important 
relationship between the CTBT and the extension decision facing NPT parties in 
April-May 1995, and elections and policy changes in certain key states. 
Adopting a Negotiating Mandate 
Accomplished under the auspices of Yoshitomo Tanaka, Japan's ambassador to the 
CD, the specifics of the negotiating mandate were the subject of intersessional 
discussions among CD members in and around the UN First Committee. Based 
largely on a bilateral draft circulated by Russia and the United States, and agreed 
among the P-5, the negotiating mandate underlined that the CTBT was to have both a 
disarmament purpose and a role in nonproliferation, and specified the establishment 
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of at least two working groups, for verification and for legal and institutional issues. 
Having been agreed in 1993, it was formally adopted at the first plenary meeting of 
the CD in January 1994, and (amended slightly, with regard to reporting dates) early 
in the CD sessions of 1995 and 1996. 
MANDATE FOR AN AD HOC COMMITTEE4 
Under Agenda Item 1 
'Nuclear Test Ban' 
[first adopted at the 666' Plenary meeting of the CD on 25 January 1994, 
CD/1238] 
In the exercise of its responsibilities as the sole multilateral 
disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, the 
Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee 
under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban', and to give priority to 
its work. 
The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate 
Intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to 
the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to 
the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of 
international peace and security. 
Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account 
all existing proposals and future initiatives, as well as the work of the Ad 
Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative 
Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Conference requests 
the Ad Hoc Committee to establish the necessary working groups in order to 
carry forward effectively this negotiating mandate; these should include at 
least two working groups, one on verification and one on legal and 
institutional issues, which should be established In the Initial stage of the 
negotiation, and any others which the Committee may subsequently decide 
upon. 
The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament 
on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1994 session. 
1994: The "Year of the Questionnaire" 
The political link between the test ban and the 1995 NPT extension decision shaped 
the postures of some delegations from the very first day. The first Chair of the ad hoc 
committee was Miguel Marin Bosch, ambassador of Mexico, who had been 
nominated by the G-21. His appointment was initially held up due to opposition from 
the British delegation, who regarded him as too radical on nuclear disarmament 
issues, and held him responsible for the failure of the 1990 NPT Review Conference. 5 
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The G-21, most of whom had supported Mexico's demand that the NPT Review 
document must contain a commitment to negotiate a CTBT, refused to nominate an 
alternative candidate. As a consequence, Britain's tactic backfired when its 
ambassador, Sir Michael Weston, came under pressure from the United States and 
other members of the Western Group to withdraw the UK objections and let the 
negotiations to get off to a positive start. With France its only ally, Britain caved in 
after a week of intensive arm twisting, and Marin Bosch was affirmed as Chair. 
Structurally, the CTBT proceeded along familiar diplomatic lines. Two working 
groups were convened in accordance with the mandate, and during the course of 
negotiations, the working group Chairs appointed various Friends of the Chair to 
coordinate specific aspects of the work. Responsibilities were allocated among the 
delegations according to expertise and regional representation, as follows. 
Nuclear Test Ban Committee Chair: Miguel Marin Bosch (Mexico, G-21) 
Working Group I on Verification 
Chair: Wolfgang Hoffmann (Germany, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on Seismic Verification: Ajit Kumar (India, G-21) 
Friend of the Chair on Non-Seismic Verification: Peter Marshall (UK, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on On-Site Inspections: Victor Slipchenko (Russia, Eastern European 
Group) 
Friend of the Chair on Transparency: Bertil Roth (Sweden, in transition from G-21 to 
Western Group) 
Working Group 2 on Legal and Institutional Issues 
Chair: Ludwik Dembinski (Poland, Eastern European Group) 
Friend of the Chair on Entry into Force: Alessandro Vattani (Italy, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on Organisation: Roberto Jaguaribe (Brazil, G-21) 
Opening Positions: Target Dates 
Differences over timing were immediately revealed as the major states put forward 
their opening positions. The G-21, which argued that substantial groundwork had 
been covered in the work of the Nuclear Test Ban Committee and the Group of 
Scientific Experts over the previous two decades, called for a CTBT by the end of 
1994. Taking the view that the proximity of the NPT extension decision had been a 
prime factor in bringing the NWS to the negotiating table, a number of nonaligned 
delegations and middle powers were prepared to compromise on treaty and 
verification detail in order to ensure that the CTBT was locked down before that 
leverage date passed into history. Some hoped to be able to hold the signing 
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ceremony at the United Nations in New York at the same time as the NPT Review 
and Extension Conference, scheduled to run for four weeks from April 19,1995. 
Though careful to avoid any formal link with the NPT, advocates of indefinite 
extension of the NPT such as the United States, Russia and a substantial number of 
their allies were also willing to see the CTBT concluded or substantially agreed by 
then to create a positive climate for the NPT Conference. 
Britain, France and China wanted a much slower timetable. France's strategy was 
driven by the objective of ensuring that the major political decisions relating to 
nuclear testing would be delayed until after the French General Election in May 1995. 
A new administration was expected, to replace the long-running presidency of 
Francois Mitterrand, and the nuclear establishment wanted to hold open its options, 
believing that further nuclear explosions would be necessary before a test ban entered 
into force. China was continuing to conduct nuclear tests, indicating that its nuclear 
and military establishments were not yet ready to stop. On October 5,1993, after 
being publicly embarrassed by VERTIC's exposure of the first Chinese nuclear 
explosion after the moratora, Beijing had issued a statement committing itself to a 
CTBT "no later than 1996". 6 During the negotiations, China's delegation repeatedly 
complained of being rushed, and frequently reiterated the 1996 target date to make 
clear that this meant no earlier than 1996.7 
Britain had no comparable reason for delay, other than the MoD's deep unhappiness 
about the US moratorium forcing a premature halt to Britain's nuclear testing and an 
apparent Conservative antipathy to the idea of a CTBT. Sir Michael Weston gave the 
UK's view of the CTBT-NPT relationship at the CD's first plenary of January 1994: 
"The prospect of indefinite extension of the NPT will be an important factor in 
convincing us that we can confidently move towards the conclusion of a CTBT. " 8 
France's ambassador, Gerard trrera echoed this: "A satisfactory result [on the 
extension of the NPT] would confirm our participation in negotiations on a test ban. 
On the other hand, failure to extend the NPT [indefinitely] could put in doubt our 
commitment to a CTBT'. 9 Thus Britain and France aimed to undermine the link the 
nonaligned countries were making between conclusion of a CTBT and extension of 
the NPT by reversing it. 
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Opening Positions: Substance and Approach 
As the NWS set out their opening positions, the middle powers sought to provide 
information and clarify the major issues and options. Sweden and Australia, both long 
time test ban advocates, circulated papers intended to build on the long years of 
prenegotiations. 10 Though the nonaligned delegates wanted a CTBT to be concluded 
by the end of the year, the main priority for others was to lay down the technical and 
political basis for the nuclear test ban. From the beginning, the core issues of scope 
and verification were the main areas of debate, but scope negotiations as such were 
tightly locked up in the exclusive P-5 meetings, with little or no multilateral input. 
Entry into force was barely addressed, with most delegations assuming it would fall 
into place near the end. By half way through the first year of negotiations, there was 
little agreement about what kind of instrument the CTBT should be. Outside the P-5 
meetings, most energy was devoted to the least politically contentious issue, the 
development of the international monitoring system (IMS). While the scientists 
attached to the larger delegations argued about the technologies most suitable and 
cost-effective for verifying a test ban, the diplomats sketched out the range of options 
for the basic treaty articles. 
Knowing that the treaty's scope was the principal issue in the P-5 meetings, other 
states sought at least to get their positions put on record. Despite so-called peaceful 
nuclear explosions being enshrined in the NPT's Article V 25 years earlier and 
advocated for some time by various NWS and even several nonaligned states, the tide 
had turned against PNEs. 11 The June 1993 version of Sweden's draft test ban treaty 
called for a prohibition not only of all nuclear weapon test explosions but of all 
nuclear explosions. 12 China, the main delegation opposed to prohibiting PNEs, 
argued that the CTBT should cover only military explosions and should not hamper 
the use of nuclear explosions for civilian projects. Russia took an ambiguous stance. 
Even as scientists from the Ministry of Atomic Affairs (Minatom) provided technical 
information and arguments to Beijing to reinforce China's advocacy of PNEs, the 
official diplomatic position was that Moscow "would not oppose consensus" on this 
issue. In the early stage of negotiations, Iran and Algeria continued to express interest 
in keeping the option of PNEs on the table for further discussion. 
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The British delegation raised the question of safety tests, insisting that it might be 
necessary at some time in the future for the declared NWS to conduct tests to ensure 
the safety and reliability of weapons in their arsenals. Britain argued that requests to 
conduct safety tests should be considered on a special case basis and would have to 
be carefully defined, meet rigorous criteria, and be monitored by the CTBT's 
implementing authority to ensure that the testing was solely for the purposes stated. 
Attaching itself to Britain's position on safety testing, France argued for the NWS to 
retain the option to conduct a safety test every five or ten years. 
Sweden and Germany spearheaded a proposal for the scope prohibition to specify 
preparing to carry out nuclear explosions, as well as prohibiting the actual nuclear 
tests. Their arguments were initially supported by many G-21 and some other 
Western delegations, who saw a ban on preparations as a way to amplify the 
verification regime beyond the task of monitoring after the event. They wanted to 
enable governments to take preventive action if field preparations such as mining and 
drilling were detected. Others, including the United States, Britain, Russia, France 
and Australia, argued that "preparations" would be difficult to define and distinguish 
from legitimate activities, and would add considerable expense and complications to 
the verification requirements. 
A further set of scope-related problems also began to emerge, concerning low yield 
and hydronuclear tests, laboratory experiments and simulations. These issues formed 
the major part of the agenda for the P-5 sidebar negotiations, but until NGO analyses 
were circulated, many other delegations were unaware of the technology or the 
implications if such activities were omitted or included. As will be examined in more 
detail in the next chapter, four of the NWS were seeking a P-5 agreement to permit 
testing up to a certain threshold. Since this would have been unacceptable to the 
majority of negotiators, the P-5 aimed to embed their mutual acceptance of a so- 
called "safety threshold" above zero in generalised terms which had established legal 
precedents, for example in the PTBT. Their intention was to avoid any definition of 
nuclear explosions which would remove their margin of ambiguity. Beijing took a 
different tack, wanting "in depth" discussions to define the terms in the CTBT "in 
light of today's reality and possible future situation". China raised concerns that 
"there should be no loopholes or ambiguities which will give rise to different 
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interpretations, misunderstandings and disputes in the future". Deliberately echoing 
nonaligned states' concerns that the CTBT should not become another partial test 
ban, China suggested that it should "prohibit, at any place and in any environment, 
any nuclear weapon test explosion of any form which releases nuclear energy". 13 
China's desire to examine definitions in precise detail was perceived as a quicksand 
tactic, intended to bog down the negotiations until China's weaponeers had conducted 
enough explosions or until a clear decision was made on whether to join a CTBT. 
Moreover, there were concerns that the defining process could either legitimise 
everything outside those specifications or, alternatively, tighten the restrictions 
beyond what the P-5 would be prepared to accept. In their first working paper, the G- 
21 placed markers against the CTBT being used merely as a nonproliferation device 
that would permit the P-5 to continue developing and improving their arsenals, but 
was equivocal on the question of PNEs. "The objective of a CTBT should not be to 
aggravate or perpetuate imbalance and discrimination. Accordingly, the scope of a 
nuclear test ban also should be directed to the prevention of both the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons and of the improvement of existing ones. Therefore, a CTBT should 
not be seen merely as a non-proliferation agreement but an agreement that can 
contribute to nuclear disarmament. The ban should be comprehensive and not have a 
certain threshold. No tests should be carried out under the pretext for safety 
purposes.... The treaty should not contain any provision that could be interpreted as 
restricting the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. s14 
P-5 Dynamics 
In accordance with the usual practice of the Atlantic alliance, Britain and the United 
States had presented a (fairly) common front against the Soviet Union in the test ban 
talks that had taken place during the periods 1958-63 and 1977-80. Not so in 1994: in 
the first year of negotiations the P-5 dynamic could be characterised as 2: 2: 1 
(US/Russia: Britain/France: China). For the first 15 months of negotiations, there was 
a visible US-Russian alliance on many issues that was significantly more constructive 
than the positions of the Anglo-French collaboration. 
Wanting to be seen to take a positive lead, the United States made a strong opening 
statement to the CD. Washington's commitment was further illustrated by President 
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Clinton's announcement on March 15 that the moratorium on testing would be 
extended to at least September 1995.15 Russia's position was close to that of the 
United States on most issues, but the Russian delegation kept a lower profile during 
the negotiations, providing technical support in verification discussions and supplying 
Friends of the Chair, but making few national demands, except in the confines of the 
P-5 meetings. 
France also took an initially low profile in the substantive negotiations, tending to 
slipstream behind the positions of Britain and others, and concentrating on its strategy 
of delay. Although President Mitterrand continued to back the CTBT, his serious 
illness and the Presidential elections scheduled for 1995 meant that in nuclear policy 
terms he was a lame duck. The French delegation, headed by the shrewd pro-nuclear 
diplomat Gerard Errera, clearly saw its role as holding off agreement on a CTBT until 
the new government could make its own determination of France's security interests. 
By alphabetical rotation, France was president of the CD when it opened in January, 
and so Errera did not join Britain, Russia and the United States in making a major 
public policy statement on the CTBT at the start. Though France shared Britain's 
reservations about Märin Bosch, Errera's holding of the CD presidency muted any 
overt opposition, leaving Sir Michael to oppose Mdrin Bosch's appointment in virtual 
isolation. Errera was reported to be a forceful participant within the context of the P-S 
meetings, which were soon convened on a regular basis and carried on throughout the 
negotiations. These meetings rotated among the P-5 Missions (usually on Tuesdays), 
although additional meetings could be convened at other times or at short notice. 
The UK delegation made some constructive contributions, especially in the 
verification negotiations, but exhibited much more political reluctance than either the 
Americans or Russians. Britain's refusal to commit formally to a moratorium, 
despite the fact that it could not conduct any nuclear tests as a result of the US 
moratorium putting the Nevada Test Site under wraps, was indicative of the 
government's lack of enthusiasm for the CTBT. Britain gave the impression of going 
along because it had to. Its MoD and nuclear establishment had been deeply 
inconvenienced by the abrupt termination of their testing plans as a result of the US 
moratorium imposed in October 1992. At least three further tests for Trident 
warheads had been scheduled, and one (planned for November 1992) had already 
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been prepared. The MoD did its utmost to lobby for the moratorium to be lifted in 
July 1993 to allow for a few additional tests. They came close to success, but in the 
end President Clinton went with the advice of test ban advocates who warned that 
lifting the moratorium, even temporarily, would send the wrong signals and could 
endanger the start of the CTBT negotiations. From its beginning statement through to 
the conflict over entry into force in the final months of 1996, Britain's proposals were 
designed to protect its own nuclear weapons programme and ensure that the CTBT 
performed a primarily nonproliferation objective of preventing the emergence of new 
nuclear powers without jeopardising Britain's own reliance on nuclear weapons. 
Though the idea has been firmly dismissed by Sir Michael, the British delegation's 
negotiating style on political issues gave rise to much speculation that it was getting 
its own back on the Americans by `fronting' for others: first, assisting France in 
ensuring the treaty would be delayed beyond 1995; and, later, for Russia and others 
over entry into force. 16 
China hoed its own singular furrow, periodically appealing to the G-21 with rhetoric 
about nondiscrimination and inalienable rights to peaceful uses, which should not 
therefore be interfered with when prohibiting weapons-related activities. China was 
particularly solitary during the first part of 1994, under Ambassador Hou Zhitong. 
His first public statement on the CD was not made until late March. '7 Suddenly, in 
June, seven more working papers were tabled, undoubtedly linked with China's 
realisation that its positions might not otherwise be incorporated sufficiently in a 
rolling or Chair's text. 18 The papers came on the heels of criticism from other CD 
members after China had conducted a further underground nuclear weapon test on 
June 10. China also responded by echoing the statement it made after conducting its 
October 5,1993 nuclear explosion. Stressing that it "understands" the concerns of 
the NNWS and underlining its "great restraint" in conducting nuclear tests, China 
reiterated that the CTBT was to be a step towards "the complete prohibition and total 
destruction of nuclear weapons". It departed from the earlier statement in stating only 
that China "supports the idea that the negotiations should result in a treaty no later 
than 1996, giving rise to speculation that China was still hedging its bets on the 
CTBT. 19 
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Thwarting an Early Chair's Text 
During May 1994, Marin Bosch made the assessment that to achieve a treaty by April 
1995, as the G-21 continued to advocate, negotiations had to begin on a draft text 
during the final part of the 1994 session. This had been the expectation of many 
delegations when negotiations began in January. Accordingly, he began to put 
together a Chair's draft text, intending to table it before the second part of the session 
ended on July 1. The timing was chosen so that the CD delegations could get their 
government's instructions and be ready to negotiate in the final part of the session. By 
putting down a `clean' draft text, without any square brackets indicating alternative 
language, Marin Bosch had intended to accelerate the negotiations by freeing the 
delegations from possessiveness over particular brackets and directing their attention 
to the main questions. Before the Chair's draft could see any light of day, however, 
Britain, France and China had declared themselves utterly opposed to the very 
concept of a Chair's text at this time. ° 
Sir Michael Weston declared (somewhat intemperately, according to eyewitness 
reports) that a Marin Bosch text would be consigned to the waste paper basket and be 
taken no more seriously than the Swedish and Australian drafts. ' Worried that his 
strategy of delaying the conclusion of the treaty until after the French elections would 
be upset if Marin Bosch's text turned out to be a good basis for accelerating the 
negotiations, Errera's opposition was particularly vociferous. He accused the Chair of 
attempting to pre-empt the negotiations, and whipped up anxiety over what he dubbed 
Marin Bosch's "vision text". Although the United States said it preferred to see the 
content of the Chair's draft before taking a position, Errera's threats to pull out of the 
negotiations if presented with (in his own words) a ': fait accompli" made a number of 
delegations very nervous. By the third week of June, the Anglo-French opposition 
had caused the chairs of the two working groups and some ten other delegations to 
express concern that a Chair's unbracketed text would be premature and 
counterproductive. To the Mexican delegation's surprise, this group comprised not 
only EU allies of Britain and France, but included G-21 members Pakistan, Indonesia 
and Algeria. Faced with such opposition, Marin Bosch jettisoned the idea of 
presenting a Chair's draft and instead asked the CD Secretariat to compile a list of the 
options and proposals so far discussed. 
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Up to this point, there had been a relatively cosy atmosphere in the negotiations, with 
positive talk and generous efforts to bring everyone's concerns on board. The United 
States had made it a policy priority to try to keep the P-5 together and talking, and 
Germany made a point of not criticising French positions which it disliked. 2 Marfn 
Bosch was concerned that in view of the French and Chinese interests in delaying 
conclusion, these attempts to keep everyone together would sacrifice a timely treaty. 
Moreover, in common with most of the G-21, he feared that an unfinished CTBT 
would be allowed to fall off the disarmament agenda if the NWS managed to extend 
the NPT without it. His strategy was partly designed to provoke an early 
confrontation and clarification of objectives. He had calculated that there would be 
opposition from France, Britain and China, but he concluded that since they would 
come under pressure whenever this stage was reached, it was better to force the crisis 
early. In his view, all the relevant questions had been canvassed and discussed, and it 
was now time to start hard negotiations on draft treaty text. 
The strategy failed, in part because Marin Bosch failed to explain his reasoning and 
intentions early enough to his allies and, most importantly, to the Chairs of the 
working groups, to ensure that he had their support. By the time he undertook 
consultations with other delegations, there had been a week of rumours and intense 
speculation about the nature of his "vision text". As a result of corridor lobbying from 
Errera, France's anxiety at being boxed into a corner had elicited concern (and some 
sympathy). Several argued that instead of tabling a clean text, Marin Bosch should 
issue a substantially cleaned-up, streamlined text, retaining some of the most 
contested options in brackets. This would have met the objective of focusing and 
clarifying the negotiations and distinguishing the crucial areas of debate, and would 
have been more likely to gain support, including from the working group Chairs, 
serving to isolate those whose primary objective was to delay the negotiating process 
until a time more suited to their individual political needs. In the end, faced with the 
determination of France and China (abetted by Britain) to ensure that the treaty could 
not possibly be concluded before 1996, Marin Bosch dropped his attempt to table a 
draft text and settled for a compendium of proposals from the two working groups. 
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The First Rolling Text 
In response to suggestions from the US delegation for sorting the proposals into 
categories reflecting the levels of discussion and support, the working groups refined 
the compilations and added treaty-formulated language, placing alternative proposals 
and wording in square brackets. By the end of the 1994 session, this unwieldy 93 
pages had become what many diplomats were calling a "rolling text' . 23 
On legal and institutional issues, Working Group 2 had produced substantially clean 
"category 1" text, with very few brackets, on the following standard treaty articles: 
Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions; 
Settlement of Disputes; Privileges and Immunities; Signature; Ratification; 
Accession; Depositary; Status of the Protocol(s) and Annex(es); and Authentic Texts. 
On its "category 2" text, WG. 2 had organised the main options for scope, the 
implementing organisation, entry into force, duration and withdrawal and review of 
the treaty. 
Working Group 1 on Verification had covered a great deal of ground, but its text was 
still a compilation of technical and political proposals and options, much of it not yet 
developed into treaty language. At root, it was hampered by continuing disagreements 
over how fully defined the verification requirements should be. By this point, 
candidate technologies for supplementing the envisaged seismic network included: 
radionuclide sensors (for particulates and/or noble gases); hydroacoustic; infrasound; 
satellites; optical; and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) monitoring. 4 There were 
differences over which networks should be incorporated into the implementing 
organisation and the international data centre (IDC) and paid for by States parties, and 
which should be provided through national or multinational technical means. In 
general, Russia, which was very worried about costs and favoured what it called an 
"evolutionary approach", proposed that national technical means be used to 
supplement the basic seismic and radionuclide networks already broadly agreed. 
While many nonaligned states appeared initially to support this pragmatic approach, a 
handful of others, particularly Pakistan and India, joined China in opposing the 
incorporation and legitimation of NTM. 
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Although the outgoing ambassador for the Netherlands, Iiendrik Wagenmakers, 
rather disparagingly described 1994 in the CD as the "year of the questionnaire", 25 
others portrayed the first year as one of diligent preparations, aimed at laying a 
careful, thorough foundation for the treaty. Certainly, 1994 was characterised by 
experts and questionnaires revisiting all the fundamental concepts of verifying a 
nuclear test ban, but there was a lack of focus in much of the technical work. 26 The 
failure of the Chair's attempt to force a prioritisation of the political decisions with a 
draft text had two important consequences. On the positive side, expert papers and 
working group discussions became more tightly focused in an attempt to bring a 
rolling text out of the plethora of written and verbal proposals, resulting in the 
summer session being the most constructive and relevant of 1994. Furthermore, 
Marin Bosch's initiative had flushed out into the open proposals and positions which 
were being kept back for tactical reasons. Thus, states known to have particular 
interests but which had hitherto provided a low key presence, notably China and 
Israel, began issuing numerous working papers with specific proposals to ensure their 
inclusion in the rolling text. China, in particular, began to engage more directly in the 
multilateral negotiations, a factor largely credited to the replacement of Hou Zhitong 
by Sha Zukang, a Beijing official who was far more confident with the complexities 
of the test ban's technical issues, and who had the political authority and linguistic 
fluency in English to hold his own, whether among the P-5 or with middle power and 
civil society critics of Chinese positions. 
The defeat of the Chair's text was a pivotal moment, ensuring that a CTBT would not 
be concluded before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. From then on 
the target date was accepted as September 1996, as contained in the 1992 US Senate 
Bill that first mandated the testing moratorium. 27 There was a further important 
consequence, unrecognised by the P-5 until many months later. Losing the pre-NPT 
target date also meant losing whatever opportunity might have existed to get tacit 
nonaligned support for a low threshold permitting sub-kiloton hydronuclear 
experiments. Similarly stymied were those who had favoured the concept of a CTBT 
as a primarily political and norm-building instrument, with a simplified verification 
system backed up by NTM; from August 1994 on, it was clear that the treaty would 
not be concluded unless it met stringent technical and compliance criteria. 
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1995: Testing and Tidying 
The second year of negotiations was heavily influenced by political events. Chief 
among these was the NPT extension decision and affirmation by NPT parties of the 
target date of 1996 for the CTBT; and changes of government or other political 
processes affecting decisionmaking in some of the key countries regarding the role of 
nuclear weapons and capabilities, resulting in France resuming testing for one final 
series and India undertaking preparations which were detected, sparking a 
nationalistic media debate across South Asia. China, meanwhile, doggedly continued 
its testing programme, but appeared more engaged in the detail and progress of the 
negotiations. In Geneva, the Nuclear Test Ban Committee, chaired in the second year 
by Polish diplomat Ludwik Dembinski, from the nominal Eastern European group, 
busied itself with tidying up the 93 pages of text it had inherited. 
As before, two working groups were established. Following a dispute within the 
Western Group, during which France vetoed Australia's candidacy (reportedly 
viewing the Antipodeans as too actively anti-nuclear), the Dutch ambassador, Jaap 
Ramaker, was made Chair of Working Group 2 on Legal and Institutional Issues. 
With some of its key ambassadors due to leave the CD during the year, the G-21 had 
difficulty proposing a candidate to chair Working Group 1 on Verification. India was 
clearly one of the few delegations with sufficient expertise and a track record of 
contributions during the previous year, but the Indian delegation declined. Though 
overstretch of its diplomatic resources was cited as the reason, this was not generally 
believed: a number of diplomats privately speculated that India wanted to avoid 
becoming too close to the process of negotiations because it was still holding open its 
options to distance itself from the treaty. As it became obvious that India would not 
be persuaded to chair WG. 1, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity among members 
of the G-21 and Western Group, notably Mexico, Morocco, Canada, Germany, and 
Japan. To avoid delaying the start of the CTBT negotiations, the G-21 agreed to 
support Sweden, which had been a G-21 member until 1993 and was not yet admitted 
into the Western Group, despite recently becoming a member of the EU. 
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The structure of formal negotiations and appointments for 1995 showed the growing 
dominance of Western experts in managing the CTBT negotiations: 
Nuclear Test Ban Committee Chair: Ludwik Dembinski (Poland, Eastern 
European Group) 
Working Group I on Verification 
Chair: Lars Norberg (Sweden, ex-G-21, not yet accepted into Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on Technical Verification: Peter Marshall (UK, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on International Monitoring System: Patrick Cole (Australia, Western 
Group) 
Friend of the Chair on International Data Centre: Ralph Alewine (USA, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on OSI - consultation, clarification and trigger: Klaus Arnhold (Germany, 
Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on OSI - access provisions, time-lines: Victor Slipchenko (Russia, 
Eastern European Group) 
Friend of the Chair on OSI - reports, follow up, sanctions: Hamid Baidi-Nejad (Iran, G-21) 
Friend of the Chair on Transparency and Confidence-Building: Richard Ekwall (Sweden, in 
transition from G-21 to Western Group) 
Working Group 2 on Legal and Institutional Issues 
Chair: Jaap Ramaker (Netherlands, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on Entry into Force: Stephan Keller (Germany, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on Implementing Organisation: Aj it Kumar (India, G-21) 
Organisation team 29: Magda Bauta Solis (Cuba, G-21); Donald Sinclair (Canada, Western 
Group); and Navtej Singh Sarna (India, G-21). 
Thwarted in its bid to chair WG. 2, Australia aimed to make an impact with several 
important contributions early in 1995. First, Ambassador Richard Starr called for the 
pace of the test ban talks to be accelerated by focusing on six outstanding `clusters' of 
issues: scope; verification; organisation; entry into force; review and amendments; 
and duration and withdrawal. He then tabled a draft text on scope, which rapidly 
gained adherents from all sides, including the United States. This prohibited "any 
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" and was widely 
viewed as a front-runner for attracting consensus, even by some who were not yet 
ready to abandon their own preferences. 29 
Opting Out of the 10-year Opt-Out 
Seeking to provide impetus to the second year's negotiations, the Deputy Director of 
ACDA, Ralph Earle, announced at the first plenary of 1995 that the United States had 
dropped its proposal for a ten year `opt-out' provision. 0 This provision, introduced 
in late August for inclusion in the article relating to review of the treaty, would allow 
a comparatively easy procedure for withdrawal from the treaty at the first review 
conference, ten years after entry into force. The language was not tied to national 
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security or the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons, although the US delegation 
justified the opt-out provision in those terms. The opt-out concept, which echoed 
Carter's attempts to appease test ban opponents during the 1977-80 tripartite test-ban 
talks with a CTBT of only five (then three31) years duration, was immediately 
condemned from all sides, most vociferously by Washington's major allies. 
Opponents raised concerns that such an easy opt-out option trivialised commitment to 
the treaty, its credibility and duration, and would have negative consequences for the 
arms control and non-proliferation regimes as a whole. Even the US delegation 
appeared ambivalent, feeding speculation that this unpopular proposal was the 
outcome of an internal power struggle between pro- and anti- CTBT forces among 
Washington's competing agencies, with the Pentagon desirous of holding open the 
option to conduct tests in the future. 
During the intersessional period of the CD in late 1994, when many governments and 
diplomats continued informal negotiations and politicking on the CTBT in New 
York, at the UN First Committee, a number of nonaligned states and US allies put 
Washington under pressure about the easy opt-out proposal, while the NGOs and 
think-tanks ran their own campaigns to get it withdrawn. 2 The Campaign for the 
NPT33, whose support for indefinite extension of the NPT gave it access and 
influence with the Clinton administration, used the CTBT-NPT relationship as an 
effective lever. Underlining the importance of the CTBT to the US government's goal 
of indefinite extension, they had made withdrawal of the easy opt-out provision a 
high priority, and strongly backed a zero yield scope. 34 
Though Earle's announcement of the US withdrawal of the opt-out proposal was 
widely welcomed, some expressed scepticism about Washington's real intentions. 
Marfn Bosch characterised the opt-out provision as a white elephant: "you take a 
white elephant into the living room, everyone groans; you take the white elephant out 
again and everyone cheers you as if you have accomplished something wonderful . 3S 
Marin Bosch was not the only one to view the timing of this proposal and its 
withdrawal as a not-very-subtle deployment of a bargaining chip, intended both to 
gain credit in the run-up to the NPT conference and to distract attention from what 
many perceived to be the US' real interests in keeping LINE. Though the United 
States had hoped its gesture would boost the negotiations, the impact was short 
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lived. 36 Its fellow negotiators pocketed the concession and moved on. Negotiations 
then progressed rather slowly between January and April 1995, with a determined but 
plodding concentration on verification, especially the IMS. 
NPT Agreements and Testing 
At the CD's final plenary before the NPT Conference in April 1995, Britain 
announced its withdrawal of the bracketed language referring to exceptions (for 
safety tests) and endorsed the front-running scope text proposed by Australia in 
March 1995 37 Timed to boost the chances of indefinite extension of the NPT, 
Britain's withdrawal was coordinated with France. 8 When the two European NWS 
dropped their bid for exceptional safety tests, it was widely assumed that they had 
received some kind of assurance from the United States and Russia that HNE or even 
low yield tests would be exempted from the treaty's core prohibition. As a 
consequence, in view of the stated US and British support for the Australian scope 
text, more of the G-21 began expressing distrust for Australia's proposal, portraying 
it as a camouflage for low threshold testing. 
Their concerns were reasonable since the real question under debate in the P-5 
sidebar negotiations was how high a threshold could be established under the rubric 
of a comprehensive test ban (without losing the NNWS' support). The P-S were 
united by the dominant objective of retaining their nuclear weapons programmes 
under a CTBT. They competed against each other, however, over the thresholds to be 
permitted or prohibited. Asymmetric in their research resources and technological 
development, each of the P-5 sought a threshold that would provide least constraint to 
their own research options. Their decisions were complicated by two other 
motivations: firstly, while wishing to maximise their own options under the CTBT, 
the P-5 were also keen that others should not gain relative advantage; secondly, there 
was no point in a treaty that the NNWS and civil society would reject. The United 
States, in particular, was aware that a too-obvious threshold test ban treaty would not 
be acceptable. 
The relationship drawn between achievement of a CTBT and the credibility and 
sustainability of the NPT was a major factor in preventing the P-5 from making an 
internal deal on a threshold. Moreover, in view of the civil society driven politics that 
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had brought the United States to the negotiating table, it was unsurprising that the US 
position most clearly reflected the necessity to maintain the NNWS' and NGOs' 
support. After an internal debate in 1993 over a low threshold treaty set at 1 kt, the 
Clinton administration had come down in favour of a comprehensive ban , 
39 but 
designated "zero" as the "one-point-safety" 40 margin of 4 lb (1.8 kg) fission yield. 
After some initial bargaining with numbers in the first few months of 1994, persistent 
reports indicated that Russia wanted exemption under the treaty to test up to at least 
10 t of fission release. The UK favoured a level of around 100 lb. (45 kg), but France 
required a much higher threshold of over 100 - 300 t. China refused to enter the 
numbers game, having proposed a `no-yield scope' that would cover all military 
explosions "which release nuclear energy". Nevertheless, it was an open secret that if 
thresholds were to be agreed at all, China would favour something at the higher end, 
perhaps around 500 t 41 
The CTBT, which had been a major cause of contention in past NPT review 
conferences and the principal factor in the failure of the Fourth Review Conference in 
1990, was a focus of considerable discussion but not a stumbling block to consensus 
at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Although a large number of states 
took the opportunity to emphasise their opposition to thresholds or PNEs, comments 
on the CTB negotiations were generally very positive, with only one serious division 
(over PNE). 42 Several states, including CD members Argentina, Nigeria and, more 
surprisingly, Australia and Sweden, still called for the CTBT to be concluded in 
1995. They were joined by two of the more active applicants for CD membership, 
New Zealand and Norway. By contrast, a document issued by the NAM gave no 
target date for the treaty, and a number of NAM countries, including Mexico, shifted 
the deadline for CTBT conclusion to 1996. Their reasons were pragmatic: they no 
longer saw any chance of getting a treaty in 1995; considered that pinning the P-5 
down to 1996 was achievable and would be taken more seriously; and wanted a 
consensus statement in the NPT Conference as a politically binding multilateral 
commitment that would lock the P-5 into their various national statements supporting 
43 conclusion by 1996. 
PNE discussions took place in Main Committee III44, designated primarily for 
consideration of Article IV's provision on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article 
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V, also discussed in this Committee, contained a lengthy provision for making "the 
potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions" available to 
NNWS that China was determined to exploit 45 To undermine China's rationale for 
PNE, which relied on both Article V and Article IV's promise of an "inalienable 
right... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes without discrimination... " Australia gained the support of 41 countries for 
its working paper on PNE. The paper's sponsors cut across group lines, engaging 
nonaligned states as well as Western and Eastern Europeans. The paper proposed 
language to be included in the final document of the NPT Conference to the effect 
that the potential benefits from PNE had not been demonstrated and that there were 
serious concerns about the environmental consequences and implications for nuclear 
nonproliferation. To reassure states that wanted to make certain that any diminution 
of Article V would not affect the general principles enshrined in Article IV, the PNE 
paper contained the rider that "a ban on all kinds of nuclear explosions [does] not 
constitute a detriment to the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy" . 46 
Isolated on this issue, China found it difficult to argue for the deletion of the 
offending paragraphs or for substantial amendments, as the paper had been very 
cleverly drafted as a series of factual statements. It noted, for example, that the IAEA 
had received no request for consideration of PNE services and that no state party had 
an active programme for PNEs. China managed to insist that the final rider be 
removed and that there should be additional wording that the CD should "take this 
situation and future developments" into account. Russia, still exhibiting some 
ambivalence on the question of PNEs, joined consensus and did not impose any 
brackets around any PNE language, but reserved the right to raise the issue at a later 
stage. Despite China's obvious discomfort and Russia's belatedly expressed 
reservation, the three paragraphs on Article V in the report of Main Committee III 
were accepted by consensus and passed to the Drafting Committee. 47 
After the decisions on extending the NPT and strengthening its review process had 
been adopted on the penultimate day of the Review Conference, attempts to win 
consensus on the Final Declaration encompassing the review of the treaty 
deteriorated, chiefly over the issue of nuclear disarmament. In the end, to the 
immense frustration of many NPT parties, the Conference closed without adopting a 
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Final Declaration. Despite the fact that three-quarters of the Drafting Committee's 
text - essentially everything in the reports from Committees II and III - had received 
consensus agreement, they were formally lost. The President of the Conference, 
Jayantha Dhanapala, ascribed the failure to two principal causes: poor management of 
Main Committee I by its Chair and the consequent failure to agree large parts of its 
review of Article VI48; and intransigence from the P-5, once they had achieved their 
objective of extending the treaty indefinitely. 49 
On the penultimate day of the Conference, the NPT had been indefinitely extended as 
part of a package of interlinked decisions taken without a vote. These included 
decisions on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament and Strengthening the review of the treaty, and a resolution on the 
Middle East. With reference to the CTBT, Paragraph 4 (a) of the Principles and 
Objectives provided a target date of "no later than 1996" and stressed that the NWS 
"should exercise utmost restraint" pending the CTBT's entry into force. S° No mention 
was made of PNEs or Article V. The details of the statements and discussions related 
to nuclear testing at the NPT had far less impact on the CTBT negotiations, however, 
than the divisive politics of the NPT Conference and the perceived loss of the NPT's 
restraining leverage on the nuclear weapon states once the decision on indefinite 
extension was safely in the bag. 
France Breaks its Moratorium 
The NPT extension decision overshadowed the CTBT negotiations in 1995. In the 
preceding months the mood was of nervous anticipation. Following the indefinite 
extension decision a number of states revealed their true cards, with negative and 
positive consequences. As discussed above, France and China had been working to 
instructions to keep the pace slow. France's priority had been to evade any 
commitments which might tie the hands of the incoming president before the May 
1995 elections. China, still testing and developing, wanted to avoid being squeezed 
by an early conclusion of the treaty. The US policy of keeping the P-5 together 
enabled France and China to dictate the pace, although it must be acknowledged that 
other reluctant states were slipstreaming in their wake, particularly (as began to 
emerge more openly) India. 
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The ink was barely dry on the NPT agreements when China exploded a nuclear bomb 
in the range of 85-110 kt at its test site at Lop Nor, Xinjiang Province, on May 15.51 
That China waited until after the NPT Conference had concluded was claimed by a 
senior P-5 delegate to have been solely due to the efforts of P-5 diplomats, as China's 
military decisionmakers - thinking chiefly of terrestrial conditions and weather - had 
planned the test for early May. 52 Although some countries attending the UN 
Disarmament Commission (UNDC) meeting gave ritualistic expressions of regret, it 
was left to NGOs to condemn the explosion as inconsistent with the NPT obligations 
and the Principles and Objectives' commitment to use "utmost restraint". 
France's newly installed president, Jacques Chirac, waited a bare month before 
announcing on June 13 that France would resume nuclear testing to conduct up to 
eight explosions between September 1,1995 and May 31,1996. Chirac's statement 
pledged that these would be the last tests conducted by France, and that he would sign 
the CTBT, if concluded, in 1996. Despite these assurances, the prospect of more 
French nuclear explosions in the South Pacific ignited public anger and protests 
across much of the world, and created a political backlash in the Pacific. The loudest 
opposition was heard from those that had backed indefinite extension, notably 
Australia, South Africa and Japan. EU solidarity kept the European governments 
practically mute, though civil society in Germany and Sweden led initiatives to 
boycott French goods. 53 
Nonaligned states' reaction merged with the anger some felt about the NPT outcome. 
Iran's ambassador, Sirous Nassen, remarked that the P-5's concerns to achieve their 
preferred NPT extension outcome had served as a greater deterrent to nuclear testing 
than the moratoria. He reminded the CD that there had been two views at the NPT 
Conference: that indefinite extension would promote a climate of confidence, which 
would lead to nuclear disarmament; or that indefinite extension would allow the NWS 
to pursue their own agendas and objectives with even greater freedom. It was clear 
from his remarks (and the related comments of other nonaligned representatives) that 
the French and Chinese tests were seen to exemplify the latter view. 54 Rather 
ironically, as India continued to reject the NPT, Ambassador Satish Chandra of India 
made a statement on behalf of the G-21 in which he expressed the deep concern of 
nonaligned parties to the NPT that the French and Chinese tests "run counter to the 
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decisions adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference... and jeopardise the 
credibility of the NPT regime. "55 Addressing the CTBT negotiations directly, the G- 
21 statement continued: "Conducting or intending to conduct nuclear weapon tests 
over and above the substantial number of tests already conducted raises serious 
questions about the nuclear weapon states' real intentions with regard to continued 
development of nuclear weapons. Recent reports about discussions among the nuclear 
weapon states on a threshold for a test ban have also given rise to deep concern... the 
CTBT should be an instrument against both horizontal and vertical nuclear 
proliferation and should effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament. To admit low- 
yield nuclear testing or to permit testing below a certain threshold by using any 
technique would defeat such purposes... No tests should be allowed for any reason or 
justification including the so-called safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons and 
perfecting the techniques to further develop nuclear weapons. The ban should be 
"s6 comprehensive. 
By this time, the major aspects of the P-S negotiations on what they termed `activities 
not prohibited' (ANP) had been exposed and discussed in Nuclear Proliferation 
News, in which I provided all CD delegations and their governments with detailed, 
fortnightly summaries of the CTBT negotiations. It was in part due to this exposure 
that the G-21 statement explicitly challenged the legitimacy of the private P-5 
negotiations on scope and thresholds. The G-21 wanted all aspects of the CTBT to be 
multilaterally negotiated in the CD, and called on the NTB Chair to take "appropriate 
measures to ensure that negotiations are held for a clear understanding on the scope of 
the future CTBT. "57 The G-21 statement was ignored by the P-5 and relations 
between the nonaligned CD members and the NWS continued to deteriorate. In June 
1995, at the request of the G-21, Working Group 2 held a session devoted to basic 
obligations. India and Indonesia put in proposals to tighten up the CTBT scope. 
Indonesia sought to ban all nuclear testing, including laboratory tests and 
simulations. 58 India aimed to define a nuclear explosion. 59 
Largely due to the timing of China's first test of 1995 and President Chirac's 
termination of the French moratorium, a sense of betrayal and frustration pervaded 
the CD session of May 29 to July 7. Meetings were characterised by rancorous 
exchanges between some of the NWS and key delegations from the Western group 
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and G-21 6° One senior US diplomat called the polarisation and hostility a "post-NPT 
hangover" and predicted that it would improve over the summer. 61 He was right; the 
first clear political breakthrough of the CTB negotiations occurred during August, as 
the result of French tactical manoeuvres, a dramatic resurgence of civil society 
protests against nuclear testing, and Clinton's decision to take the moral and political 
high ground on scope. 
Breakthrough on Zero Yield 
On August 10, as described in greater detail in Chapter 6, Errera unexpectedly 
informed the CD of France's acceptance of the Australian text, claiming that this 
proved the falsity of criticisms that the resumption of French nuclear testing would 
harm the negotiations. 62 The next day, President Clinton announced his decision "to 
negotiate a true zero yield comprehensive test ban' . 63 Clinton's decision was the 
outcome of weeks and months of interagency deliberations and civil society lobbying. 
It was understood in Washington to be the breakthrough decision to give up HNE that 
the test ban advocates had been working so hard for. By linking this announcement 
on zero yield with a renewal of US approval of the Australian scope text, and by 
exactly quoting the relevant part of that text as "any nuclear weapons test explosion, 
or any other nuclear explosion", the Clinton administration placed on the record its 
reinterpretation of the Australian text to exclude low yield or hydronuclear testing. 
At the same time, to appease critics in Congress and the nuclear laboratories, Clinton 
specified six conditions for the United States to join a CTBT, referred to as 
"safeguards", covering stockpile stewardship; the maintenance of modern, well 
financed nuclear laboratories; the retention of a continued `basic capability' to resume 
nuclear testing; continuation of research and development programmes to improve 
treaty monitoring and operations; continuing resources and development in 
intelligence gathering and information relating to nuclear arsenals and related nuclear 
programmes worldwide. The sixth safeguard, repeated in his speech, was that the 
United States President would "be prepared, in consultation with Congress" to 
exercise its right under the treaty article covering withdrawal on grounds of "supreme 
national interests"64 and conduct whatever testing was required in the event that "I 
were informed by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy - and advised by 
the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of the DOE's nuclear weapons 
laboratories and the Commander of the US Strategic Command - that a high level of 
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confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapons type which the two 
Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be 
certified". 65 The last qualification, allowing "supreme national interests" to be 
interpreted in terms of the assessed function and condition of the US nuclear arsenal, 
resembled France's argument that the CTBT must be compatible with the continuing 
reliability of the French nuclear arsenal, a justification which underpinned France's 
explanation for conducting a further series of tests. The other conditions very closely 
echoed the safeguards which the nuclear weapon laboratories and the Pentagon had 
extracted from President Kennedy more than thirty years earlier. 
A number of CD members pushed Russia and China for their agreement, but to no 
avail. Referring to China's early advocacy of a `no-yield' scope, Australia called on 
China to "reaffirm its 1994 commitment to zero yield", but received no response. 
London gave an ambiguous reaffirmation of the Australian text on August 17 and, on 
September 14, just before the end of the CD, Britain formally announced its 
acceptance of the zero yield decision, underlining also its reliance on the conditions 
specified by France and the United States for joining the CTBT, including the 
understanding with regard to supreme national interests. 66 
Gains, Losses and Shifts in 1995 
The major gains in the second year of the CTBT negotiations were on scope, 
verification and duration of the treaty. First, the US dropped its ten year opt-out; then 
the UK and France withdrew their demand for exceptions for safety tests; and finally, 
three of the NWS abandoned their arguments for a threshold to cover hydronuclear 
and low yield testing. As the French negotiating posture shifted markedly from 
`delay' to `facilitate', Russia's became more obdurate than anticipated. Complaining 
that Russia had not been "properly consulted", the CD delegation was overtly hostile 
to the zero yield decision. 67 One senior official characterised it as "the end of the 
CTBT", and said he feared that Russia would not be able to maintain its arsenal 
properly under zero yield conditions. 8 Expressing concern that British nuclear 
options would be more constrained by the zero yield decision than originally 
anticipated, some UK officials also complained about a lack of consultation from 
their ally the United States. 69 
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At the same time, British diplomats commented on China's silence over the zero 
yield decision and speculated openly that Beijing would cause problems by insisting 
on verification to the zero level, which the scientists overseeing the international 
monitoring system had deemed to be infeasible. 70 Though these fears proved to be 
unfounded, there was much in China's negotiating posture to cause observers to 
wonder, as I noted at the time, "when China will begin negotiating the same treaty as 
the rest of the CD"-. 7' With the exception of Pakistan, an ally on political rather than 
substantive grounds, China was alone in still demanding PNEs, paragraphs on the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and a stated relationship with other treaties (assumed 
to be for the purposes of invoking the legality of PNEs enshrined in Article V of the 
NPT). China also continued to take a substantially different position from the 
converging majority on many aspects of verification, including satellites. Beijing's 
reservations on the use of national technical means were shared by a number of 
nonaligned countries, but the strongly held positions of China and Pakistan gave most 
concern, as they reinforced each other in their denial of any possibility of 
supplementing the IMS with NTM, while at the same time arguing that the 
monitoring system would be inadequate without additional technologies. 
During 1995, the IMS had been substantially finalised, with near agreement on the 
seismic network and on three complementary technologies: hydroacoustic, infrasound 
and radiation monitoring. Other technologies had not been ruled out, but the IMS 
was regarded as almost finalised. During the year, the diplomats and their technical 
advisers had considered the range of possibilities and had decided to design the IMS 
based on a base-line criterion of one kiloton TNT-equivalent-explosion. This meant 
assuring the highest level of detection and identification for explosions of one kiloton 
or more, and was chosen with cost effectiveness in mind. The scientists had assured 
the diplomats that the synergistic interaction between the various verification means 
would actually ensure detection well below I kt. This was intended to give 
verification confidence, as a potential violator would face significant (and not easily 
calculable) risks of detection at much lower levels. The case was made that if any 
state sought to argue that a zero yield treaty required zero to be the baseline criterion 
for monitoring and detection, the technical and financial requirements for verifying 
the treaty would become overly expensive and technically infeasible. 
153 
France's nuclear tests, the first of which was conducted on September 5, caused loud 
condemnations around the world. 72 Within the CD, however, the criticisms were 
rather muted. France had been at pains to signal that its intention was not to upset the 
negotiations. The resumption was characterised as a "final series", the number of 
tests was specified as "up to eight", and the date by which they would be finished was 
announced - May 31,1996.73 Whether as part of France's strategy or in response to 
pressure from worldwide protests, Chirac softened the effect of the first test by 
indicating that fewer than eight tests might be conducted, finishing somewhat earlier 
than May. 74 Whether or not France had actually triggered the zero yield breakthrough 
or engaged in pre-emptive timing with regard to the Clinton decision, it appeared 
happy to be cast as progressive and constructive. On other issues, too, including 
verification and on-site inspections, France became more active in putting forward 
pragmatic initiatives to promote compromise. This did not mean that France would 
forego its dominant interests as a NWS. Far from it, the decision to test, as Errera 
frequently stressed, enabled France to meet the demands of its weaponeers and 
defence department within the context of the CTBT, still regarded primarily as a 
nonproliferation measure for curbing the nuclear ambitions of India, Pakistan, and 
others. 75 
Zero Yield Aftermath 
After the zero yield decision, Russia began to cause greater concern than during the 
first 18 months of negotiations. Previously, in the principal issues relevant to the 
CTBT and NPT, Russia had taken positions close to those of the United States. 
During 1994 and the first part of 1995, Geneva diplomats frequently referred to the 
`P-4', indicating that the United States, Russia, Britain and France were broadly in 
the same camp. Moreover, it was noted that in the CTBT context, US relations with 
Russia seemed generally closer and more compatible than US relations with either 
Britain or France. Nor did the Russian diplomats seem to object to this 
characterisation of their relationship with the United States as partners rather than 
rivals. Outside the CTBT, however, there was a growing push to expand NATO to 
include former Warsaw Pact countries. The possibility that NATO nuclear weapons 
could be deployed up to Russia's borders, despite assurances from US Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher that there was "no intention, no plan and no need to station 
nuclear weapons on the territory of any new members", fuelled a resurgence of 
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Russian anxieties about maintaining their own nuclear arsenal. 6 NATO expansion 
and the growing US debate about missile defence also fed the nationalist factions 
within the Duma and undermined those in Yeltsin's administration who were positive 
advocates of arms control measures like the CTBT, such as his foreign minister, 
Andrei Kozyrev. 77 
Whether due to the zero yield decision, the politics of the NPT extension, the shift in 
French policy, or a combination of exogenous political influences, the summer of 
1995 heralded changes in the dynamics of the P-5 minilateral negotiations. As noted 
above, the alliances among the P-5 from January 1994 to April 1995 could be 
characterised as 2: 2: 1 (US/Russia: Britain/France: China). After August 1995, 
France moved into a more constructive posture on many issues, including verification 
and entry into force, bringing it closer to the United States, which still tried to be "out 
front pulling"; Russia shifted into a less cooperative posture, digging its heels in on a 
number of minor questions, refusing to endorse the zero yield fait accompli and 
siding with China on several verification-related issues; Britain's posture remained 
schizophrenic, continuing to provide constructive leadership on verification issues, 
but following a less than cooperative track within the P-5, especially over entry into 
force, happy to let Russia, China, and others (such as Pakistan and Egypt) slipstream 
behind the UK's stringent proposals. 
By the end of 1995, the CD was struggling with a 97-page rolling text with more than 
1200 pairs of brackets, indicating disputed text. 78 Much of the technical work was 
accomplished, but heavy political clouds were massing on the horizon. The winter of 
1995 witnessed two events that carried ominous seeds of destruction towards the 
CTBT: accusations that India was preparing to conduct a nuclear test in Rajasthan 
(and counter-accusations about US spying and lying); and a US Department of 
Energy announcement about starting subcritical tests in Nevada. 
India Prepares to Test 
India's nuclear weapon programme came under the spotlight as a US Intelligence 
report was leaked to the press in December, giving information of probable nuclear 
test preparations at the site at Pokharan where India had conducted a nuclear 
explosion in 1974.79 After several days of intense media speculation in India and the 
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United States, India's Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, sought to put the matter 
to rest by categorically denying that India was preparing to conduct a nuclear test. 80 
Embarrassed, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, ordered the work to be halted. It later 
transpired that Rao had authorised the preparations in Rajasthan to appease the 
weaponeers (and their advocates among a close and influential coterie of strategic 
analysts and pundits), but had not yet given permission for any tests to be conducted. 
Information about what really happened did not emerge for some years81, and opinion 
among CD delegations in the winter of 1995-96 was divided about whether to believe 
the American reports or the Indian denials. The accusations touched off a public 
debate in India, fanned by a hotly contested election campaign, in which opposition to 
a CTB (and the NPT), the retention of a fully flexible nuclear weapon option, and the 
right to conduct nuclear explosions came to be equated with Indian independence and 
status by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 82 
DOE Announces US Subcritical Tests 
From the beginning of negotiations, some nonaligned negotiators had expressed the 
fear that the nuclear powers might use technological advances to circumvent the 
purpose of a CTBT. Miguel Märin Bosch, freed of the restraints he'd carried as NTB 
Committee Chair in 1994, stated the case thus: "Testing by explosions has lost much 
of its value [at least for Russia and the United States]... because of scientific and 
technological advances in the field of computer simulation and so-called laboratory 
experiments. Hence their unilateral moratoriums and hence also their call for a 
CTBT. What is occurring now with regard to nuclear testing, is no different from 
what has been happening in the disarmament field for years: the technologically more 
advanced nations reach a point where they can discard a certain weapon or weapon- 
related activity and then they move to ban that weapon or activity for the rest of the 
world through a multilateral treaty. 43 
Pakistan's ambassador, Munir Akram, quoted Märin Bosch's analysis back to the CD 
in August 1995, as he condemned the assertions made by France (in justifying 
breaking its moratorium) and the United States (when committing itself to the zero 
yield scope). Pakistan objected that "the assertions of the nuclear weapon states that a 
CTBT cannot prejudice the operational credibility and reliability of their nuclear 
weapons arsenals are... incompatible with the original objectives of a comprehensive 
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test ban treaty. s84 Notwithstanding Akram's complaints, the concerns of many CTBT 
negotiators had been considerably allayed by the zero yield decision. To reinstall 
public and NNWS confidence that had been shaken by the French testing decision 
had been an important objective of Clinton's zero yield announcement, which was 
also intended to end the P-5 wrangling on `activities not prohibited'. 
It was ironic, then, that the DOE in November 1995 revived the NNWS' scepticism 
with a bald announcement that the United States would be commencing in June 1996 
a programme of subcritical tests on nuclear warhead components. " The 
announcement, which even acknowledged that the tests would contain small 
quantities of weapons grade plutonium, was so clumsily managed that it caused 
speculation among Washington insiders that it was a sabotage attempt, engineered by 
opponents of the treaty in the US laboratories. The US ambassador in Geneva did his 
best to reassure CD members in private, but the effect of the announcement was to 
dissipate much of the positive political glow from the zero yield victory of the 
previous summer and erode confidence in the significance of the zero yield decision 
on nuclear weapon modernisation. 86 
1996: Conflict and Chaos as Negotiations are Finalised 
The 50`' UN General Assembly adopted the annual CTBT resolution without a vote, 
giving a political boost to the final phase of negotiations. The resolution called for 
the negotiations to be concluded as "a task of the highest priority", and urged the CD 
to complete the final text of the treaty not later than June 30.87 As delegations 
reconvened in Geneva in January 1996, three issues dominated the final stage of the 
CTBT negotiations: 
" whether the treaty should include language explicitly ruling out the qualitative 
development of nuclear weapons (related to the broader question of how the CTBT 
should be linked with the wider goal of nuclear disarmament); 
" how difficult the conditions for triggering an on-site inspection should be, and 
whether national technical means were permissible as evidence backing an OSI 
request; and 
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" what conditions would have to be met before the CTBT could enter into force - 
particularly whether to specify in some way that the signature and ratification of 
certain countries would be required. 
Underlying these three issues were deep divisions between the interests of the P-5, the 
D-3 and the NNWS. In the aftermath of the US decision to base scope on zero yield 
and the French decision to conduct a final series of tests to ready its laboratories for 
maintaining the French arsenal without nuclear testing, the P-5 dynamic had shifted. 
For India and China, who had entered the negotiations in 1994 without having taken 
definite political decisions to sign up to the CTBT, 1996 was crunch-time, when this 
challenge could no longer be avoided or delayed. As described below, China chose to 
commit to the multilateral treaty it had participated in negotiating, and so sought 
compromise solutions to its outstanding problems over scope and verification. India, 
for its part, decided to defect. Using a combination of linkage, hide-and-seek, and 
best-versus-good tactics, India laid the groundwork for evoking the moral high 
ground as it rejected the CTBT in order to comply with domestic pressures to keep its 
nuclear options open. 
On June 17,1996, the pool of formal negotiators was dramatically increased from 38 
to 61, as the CD finally managed to get consensus for its long-awaited enlargement. 88 
This meant that Israel, one of the D-3 targets of the treaty, was able to participate 
formally in the negotiations, just in time for some difficult decisions on areas with 
particular sensitivity for Middle Eastern states, including on-site inspections and the 
executive council, including regional allocations and decisionmaking processes. 89 
Configuring the Endgame 
Faced with more than 1,200 brackets in the rolling text, it was clear that the CD 
would have to change the form and conduct of its negotiating processes if it wanted to 
conclude the treaty by the end of 1996. There was again an attempt by Australia to 
have its highly competent and committed CD ambassador, Richard Starr, nominated 
to chair the final year of negotiations. His nomination was supported by a number of 
other delegations, nonaligned as well as Western, who felt that successful finalisation 
of the treaty would require strong leadership, capable of standing up to the NWS and 
other difficult delegations. Despite adopting a more constructive approach in the 
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second half of the negotiations, France objected to the Australian candidacy even 
more strongly than the year before and manipulated the EU to throw its weight behind 
the previous year's chair of Working Group 2, Jaap Ramaker. 90 France's rejection of 
Starr in late 1994 because he was too active on behalf of the test ban (at a time when 
France's strategy was for delay), appeared to have been exacerbated during 1995 by 
Australia's strongly expressed opposition to the resumption of French testing in the 
Pacific. Although many others, including the United States and Britain, would have 
been happy to see Australia chair the NTB Committee in 1996, they considered it 
counterproductive to try to override the French hostility, and were, in fact, quite 
comfortable with the choice of Ramaker, who was regarded as a known quantity and 
a "safe pair of hands' . 91 
Between January and May 1996, Ramaker convened the two working groups and 
appointed several Friends of the Chair for the key issues. After May, the working 
groups were suspended and Ramaker coordinated the negotiations directly, retaining 
some of the Friends of the Chair as `moderators'. Once again, Western 
representatives dominated the decisionmaking processes, particularly on technical 
issues, as illustrated in the structure of negotiations for 1996: 
Nuclear Test Ban Committee Chair: Jaap Ramaker (Netherlands, Western 
Group) 
Working Group I on Verification 
Chair. Grigori Berdennikov (Russia, Eastern European Group) 
Friend of the Chair on Technical Verification: Peter Marshall (UK, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on On-Site Inspections: Mark Moher (Canada, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on IMS: Patrick Cole (Australia, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on IDC: Ralph Alewine (USA, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on Associated Measures, transparency and confidence-building: Richard 
Ekwall (Sweden - recently admitted to Western Group) 
Working Group 2 on Legal and Institutional Issues 
Chair: Mounir Zahran (Egypt, G-21) 
Friend of the Chair on the Executive Council: Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi (Morocco, G-21) 
Friend of the Chair on Entry into Force: Antonio de Icaza (Mexico, G-21) 
Friend of the Chair on Funding: Yukiya Amano (Japan, Western Group) 
Friend of the Chair on Preamble: Marshall Brown (USA, Western Group) 
After May 1996, the working groups were suspended, but the following people were 
retained to coordinate continuing negotiations on specific issues: 
Preamble and Review: Mounir Zahran (Egypt, G-21) 
Host Country Agreement: Stephen Ledogar (USA, Western Group) 
Preparatory Commission: Wolfgang Hoffmann (Germany, Western Group) 
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[subsequently, Don Sinclair (Canada, Western Group)]92 
CTBTO: Nacer Benjelloun-Touimi (Morocco, G-21) 
IMS: Richard Starr (Australia, Western Group) 
Three statements to the CD plenary during the first week of 1996, from the United 
States, India and Pakistan, kicked off the session by representing the principal themes 
and issues of contention in the endgame. To the relief of many, France ceased testing 
by the end of January, having conducted six of the originally announced eight 
explosions. As a mark of its commitment to the CTBT, France also pledged to 
dismantle its Pacific test sites at Moruroa and Fangataufa. 
John Holum, the Director of ACDA, read a statement from President Clinton 
reiterating the CTBT's promise of "a true-zero-yield comprehensive test ban treaty 
that will endure for all time" and pledging the "full and energetic support of the 
United States to conclude promptly a treaty so long sought and so long denied". In a 
statement some viewed as an attempt to recover the ground gained by the zero yield 
decision in 1995 and then lost a few months later by the ineptly handled DOE 
announcement regarding future subcritical testing, Holum emphasised the real 
constraints which a CTBT would impose on the US weapons programmes, stressing 
that the NWS would not be able to pursue new or advanced nuclear weapon 
technologies and that the test ban would "sustain today's trend toward smaller nuclear 
arsenals with shrinking roles in national defenses. , 93 Despite Holum's assurances, 
the DOE's announcement about conducting subcritical tests fuelled critical statements 
during the first weeks of the 1996 session, most notably from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
and Egypt and added grist to the mill of India's nuclear strategists 94 
India: Raising the Stakes or Moving the Goalposts? 
For many years India had managed to hold two contradictory positions with regard to 
nuclear weapons: as a nonaligned movement leader it had been at the forefront of 
calls for nuclear disarmament; as a regional power, it had developed a nuclear 
weapon programme whose options, combined with ambiguity about sophistication 
and weaponisation, provided a `recessed deterrent' and nationalistically perceived 
status at relatively low cost. The test ban threatened the precarious balance between 
these postures. India was being forced to decide whether it would give up its nuclear 
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option, a position perceived as allowing China's NWS superiority to be 
institutionalised permanently; or, alternatively, whether it should move beyond 
ambiguity by testing, displaying its nuclear prowess and overtly weaponising. 95 
During late 1995, India seemed to come to its decision, with disastrous consequences 
for the test ban treaty, as the following section describes. 
US intelligence reports on nuclear test preparations at Pokharan during the winter 
intersessional period had provoked expressions of concern and demands for 
explanations from India in the CD and elsewhere. 96 India's response was a defiant 
statement to the CD plenary and the submission of three working papers within the 
first 10 days of the 1996 session. Obliquely referring to the subcritical tests and 
castigating the NPT extension as "legitimising the possession of nuclear weapons by 
a few states and their possible use as a currency of power", India's Ambassador, 
Arundhati Ghose, who had replaced Satish Chandra the previous summer, remarked 
dryly that 1996 would be "a testing time for all of us' . 97 India's proposals linked the 
treaty's preamble and entry into force with commitment to a timetable for nuclear 
disarmament, and also contained explicit language on preventing qualitative 
developments or advanced new weapons systems. 98 The proposal linking entry into 
force with nuclear disarmament, to be accomplished within ten years (specified), was 
viewed with particular consternation, even by nonaligned colleagues who also 
supported nuclear disarmament. 99 
That India would push for language on a timetable for nuclear disarmament was not 
unexpected. Atal Behari Vajpayee, at that time a Member of Parliament and included 
on the Indian delegation to the UN First Committee in October 1995, had made an 
uncompromising, if at times contradictory, statement arguing that the indefinite 
extension of the NPT - "a major, if flawed, disarmament treaty" - had "legitimised 
for all time" the nuclear arsenals of the P-5. He continued: "Developing new 
warheads or refining existing ones after a CTBT is in place, using innovative 
technology, would be as contrary to the spirit of CTBT [sic] as the NPT is to the spirit 
of nonproliferation. " Arguing that the CTBT should be "an integral step in the 
process of nuclear disarmament". Vajpayee stated that the test ban's scope should 
cover "complete cessation of nuclear tests by all states in all environments and for all 
time" and that the treaty must "contain a binding commitment to take further 
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measures, within an agreed time-frame, towards the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons"10° 
CD negotiators had therefore expected India to propose strong disarmament language 
for the preamble, where it would have received support from the rest of the G-21. 
Instead, and to the surprise of the G-21, India sought to attach the nuclear 
disarmament timeframe as a condition of CTBT entry into force. India's employment 
of linkage with high minded rhetoric on disarmament (a combination of game- 
changing tactics and hide-and-seek), was deemed by many to be the first clear sign 
that India wanted a get-out clause. Although India's representatives insisted that the 
proposals and target dates were negotiable, it appeared that, in mounting its challenge 
in this way, India was deliberately creating conditions to justify rejecting the treaty 
later on. India's assumed objective of keeping its nuclear option open was barely 
concealed, and became a topic of corridor discussion in Geneva. 101 
Critical Adjustment: Russia, Pakistan et al 
Other states also adjusted their positions early in 1996. Russia's statement surprised 
the American delegation, which had grown accustomed during the early negotiations 
to a cooperative, even quiescent Russian partner. Drawing attention to perceived 
anomalies in the verification system, an issue that had become more important to 
Russia after the zero yield decision, Berdennikov demanded "identical transparency" 
and "equal terms for monitoring existing nuclear test sites". He restated Russia's 
long held positions on the necessity for an entry into force provision strict enough to 
contain the P-5 and D-3, and on on-site inspections and the use of "national 
monitoring facilities", where Russia wanted greater restrictions "to avoid abuse" than 
the United States favoured. Most notably, Berdennikov's statement opened with a 
political overview in which he accused the NATO expansion plans of "poisoning the 
whole international climate" including arms control. He also took issue with India's 
attempts to link the CTBT to a timetable for disarmament, saying that such a position 
made work to conclude the CTBT substantially more difficult. He castigated those, 
with specific reference to India, who had likened the indefinite extension of the NPT 
with indefinite possession of nuclear weapons, saying "the indefinite extension of the 
NPT is not some sort of licence for the perpetual ownership of nuclear weapons for 
anyone at all"102 
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Algeria, Indonesia and Pakistan made early and detailed policy statements. Algeria 
for the first time publicly stated its opposition to PNE, as well as referring to the 
necessity (within the constraints of verification) to leave no room for the qualitative 
or quantitative development of nuclear arsenals. 103 In a statement that emphasised the 
CTBT's purpose to cap the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
Indonesia formally gave its support to the Australian scope text from March 9 1995. 
Unlike some of its G-21 colleagues, Indonesia's statement did not explicitly mention 
subcritical testing, although its continuing concerns about laboratory testing could be 
inferred. 104 Like India, Pakistan underlined the relationship between nuclear 
disarmament and the CTBT. In a clear reference to the US subcritical testing 
programme, Ambassador Munir Akram criticised attempts to continue upgrading 
nuclear weapons, warning that "the treaty we build [here] must not be such that it will 
transform those who supported the CTBT in the past into its opponents. " Pakistan 
wanted the CTBT scope to have "no exceptions ... for any reason". The statement 
also went into detail on other issues, notably underlining Pakistan's opposition to 
national technical means. '°5 
Western NNWS were also quick to press their arguments for accelerated progress. 
Australia, Japan, and Sweden all made early statements. Japan stressed that the goal 
of a CTBT by autumn 1996 would require a clean text during the second session, 
necessitating agreement on the substance of the treaty by March. Despite such 
urging, the NTB Committee and Friends of the Chair settled into a routine of 
meetings and consultations, which did not appear to clear many brackets from the 
heavily laden rolling text. The P-5 meetings intensified in frequency and content, as 
the diplomats from the NWS attempted to put together a package by trading key 
positions and issues amongst themselves. In February, seeking to step up the 
negotiations by demonstrating possible solutions and areas of convergence, Iran and 
Australia each tabled a clean draft or `model' text. 
Draft Treaties from Iran and Australia 
That Australia was preparing to offer a draft treaty, as it had done in the final year of 
CWC negotiations, was an open secret in Geneva. But the delegation was very 
discreet about what its `model' text would contain, and some of its Western 
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colleagues were offended by Australia's failure to consult. By contrast, few outside 
the G-21 realised that Iran had also been preparing a draft treaty text. To the evident 
dismay of Australia, Iran got there first. Presenting his delegation's draft, the Iranian 
Foreign Minister Dr Ali Akbar Velayati, stressed that the purpose was to help the CD 
"to perceive a middle ground -a package... which may constitute a compromise 
amongst the various and, at times, contradictory positions. "106 The draft was warmly 
welcomed by many nonaligned delegations, although none of them had wanted to 
join as co-sponsors, as Iran had originally sought. India and Pakistan, however, 
criticised Iran within the G-21 group (but not publicly), arguing that the Iranian draft 
gave legitimacy to the Australian draft text, which both delegations had been gearing 
up to reject as soon as it was tabled. 
A week later, Michael Costello, Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, emphasised the urgency of moving toward conclusion, and offered 
his delegation's model treaty to "demonstrate tangibly that a CTBT... is indeed within 
reach". ' 07 Although they had been expecting Australia's initiative, the reception of 
the text by Western group colleagues was at best ambivalent. Some expressed 
concern that the drafts could complicate the solutions that the Chairs and their Friends 
were trying to hammer out. Surprised by the moderation and pragmatism of Iran's 
draft, Ledogar privately remarked that on many issues he liked Iran's better than 
Australia's. His view was echoed by others, including the British and French. 108 
Publicly, the Australian draft was damned by faint praise. France "welcomed the 
initiative that Australia, following Iran, has taken" and said that the "complete and 
consistent" solutions showed that the goal of concluding the CTBT by the target date 
was not beyond reach. 109 Russia said Iran and Australia's efforts "showed sincere 
intent to help in the negotiationss110 and the United States commended both drafts for 
demonstrating "the extent to which there is already widespread agreement". 111 
Both drafts synthesised the areas already substantially agreed. There were also noted 
similarities in their conceptual approach to resolving some of the most difficult issues 
such as entry into force, on-site inspections, and the composition of the executive 
council. This "near coincidence" was noted by Ambassador Sirous Nassen, using the 
tabling of Australia's draft as an occasion to remind the CD that Iran's initiative had 
been equally comprehensive, and earlier. 112 
164 
The fundamental difference between the two was on scope. Australia reproduced its 
own working paper on scope, originated in March 1995, with the understanding of 
zero yield adopted by the US, France and the UK in August. ' 13 Iran's draft 
reintroduced the prohibition against all nuclear weapon tests, despite Indonesia's 
withdrawal earlier that month of its June 1995 proposal on this. 114 Although insisting 
that it did not itself favour PNEs, Iran offered a previously unconsidered approach on 
this, seeking to give the Conference of States Parties responsibility for considering a 
specific request for conducting a PNE "in exceptional circumstances and in the case 
that the real benefit of nuclear explosions for the sole purpose of purely peaceful 
scientific research and civilian applications are demonstrated... "' The Australian 
model unequivocally banned all nuclear explosions, making no distinction between 
military and non-military purposes. 
With regard to the preamble, Iran retained a commitment to nuclear disarmament in a 
timebound framework, which Australia eschewed in favour of NPT-related language 
referring to a "systematic process" leading to nuclear disarmament. For entry into 
force, both attempted to balance early implementation of the treaty with its political 
credibility. Each proposed that entry into force should be based on accession by a 
particular list of states that included inter alia the P-5, India, Israel and Pakistan, but 
with a mechanism to prevent any particular country on the list being able to block the 
treaty or hold it hostage. Australia proposed ratification by all CD members plus 
observers, with a waiver conference after two years. Iran proposed ratification by at 
least 65 of the 68 States on the IAEA list of countries with nuclear technologies. 
On OSI both proposed a two phase process with quick access for the first, less 
intrusive phase, and a more rigorous decisionmaking procedure for any subsequent, 
fuller inspection. Australia permitted any kind of information to be used to back an 
OSI request, but also considered ways of making national technical information more 
accessible to the international community to meet nonaligned states' concerns about 
bias. Iran would base an OSI request solely on data from the IMS, but left a small 
opening for NTM as supplementary information. 
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Many diplomats expressed gratification (and some surprise) that both texts were 
conceptually so similar. While some worried that the texts would narrow the Chair's 
room to manoeuvre, rather than assist him, China, India and Pakistan made the 
strongest objections, insisting that the drafts must not be allowed to pre-empt the 
rolling text. 116 Although Australia was disappointed with the reception to its draft 
text and the fact that it was not sufficiently distinguished from Iran's initiative, both 
drafts were generally welcomed as a useful, perhaps even necessary, mechanism to 
pave the way for a Chair's text. Having let the Iranian and Australian drafts test the 
waters, Ramaker decided not to introduce a clean Chair's draft text at this point. 
Choosing instead what he characterised as a two-stage process, on March 28 Ramaker 
tabled a working paper with an "Outline of a draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty". 117 
March 28: Chair's 'Outline' 
The Chair's outline was structured as a treaty, with a preamble and 17 articles, but it 
had not been cleaned of brackets. Where states' individual proposals were hard 
fought, such as on scope, Ramaker presented the heavily-bracketed rolling text, 
together with an indication of a clean formulation that had attracted wide support, in 
this case the Australian text. In other cases, such as the composition of the Executive 
Council, the working paper offered text developed by a Friend of the Chair after 
consultations with the delegations. Four bracketed articles were put at the end, 
covering China's proposals on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, PNEs, security 
assurances and the relation of the treaty to other international agreements. By this 
time, China's proposal on PNEs was opposed altogether; other articles, such as 
security assurances, may have been supported in principle by many among the 
nonaligned, but not within the context of the CTBT. By attaching them onto his 
Outline Paper in this way, Ramaker provided a strong indicator of the general view 
that these proposals should not remain in the treaty, while at the same time meeting 
China's insistence that its decision on these issues could not be pre-empted by others. 
In his statement to the final meeting of the Nuclear Test Ban Committee before the 
Spring break, Ramaker highlighted six outstanding issues: the preamble; scope; the 
composition of the Executive Council; some of the functions of the international data 
centre (IDC), particularly the level of information and analysis it should provide to 
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states parties; on-site inspections; and entry into force. He gave the Committee the 
six weeks of the intersessional break to consider the structure and various options. ' 18 
Two weeks after the CD resumed in mid-May, Ramaker tabled a clean draft treaty. 119 
May 28: Chair's First Draft 
On May 23, the day after Ramaker announced that he would shortly be tabling a draft 
treaty from the Chair, Munir Akram warned that "A treaty which descends from 
heaven or elsewhere may arrest rather than accelerate our negotiations and the 
fulfilment of our deadline". Pakistan's protests were joined by India, Russia and 
China. Ramaker sought to reassure those delegations by stressing that his draft was to 
facilitate "the last and final stage of negotiations". 120 As it turned out, the Chair's text 
was neither rejected nor called premature when it was presented on May 28,1996. 
Despite the reluctance of some, there was a shared recognition that if the CD was to 
make the target date identified in the UN General Assembly resolution 50/65, then the 
Chair could not delay any longer in putting down a clean draft text. 
A few diplomats complained that the draft overly represented the "Western 
perspective", while at the same time the United States and Britain grumbled that the 
verification provisions leaned too far towards the positions of G-21 states. India 
raised vociferous objections that none of its positions had been incorporated, while 
other nonaligned countries welcomed provisions which they felt could provide some 
leverage to keep the NWS up to their obligations, though they admitted the language 
was not as strong as they would have liked. 121 
Two particular issues took centre stage as a result of the Chair's text: entry into force 
and on-site inspections. During the next month, meetings of the NTB Committee 
went late into the night, but without achieving much. Mounir Zahran of Egypt, 
coordinating negotiations on the preamble, managed to obtain agreement for India's 
proposal that the Review Conference should also ensure that the objectives and 
purposes of the preamble were being realised. That was the only language proposed 
by India in January that was accepted into the treaty. The Western diplomats had 
dismissed India's proposal regarding a timetable for nuclear disarmament as a tactic 
to prepare the ground for refusing to sign, and so barely engaged with attempts by 
India and others to strengthen the preambular commitment to nuclear disarmament 
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and the prevention of qualitative improvements or development of advanced new 
nuclear weapon systems. Giving credence to the Western assumptions, India 
appeared unwilling to work with its nonaligned colleagues to strengthen the treaty's 
preamble by confronting France, Britain and the United States with a coordinated 
proposal (it was assumed that Russia and China would go along with any reasonable 
language on the preamble). India's distancing itself from G-21 initiatives in this way 
confirmed the view that New Delhi was less interested in getting a "good treaty" than 
in pandering to a strident sector of domestic opinion that wanted India to demonstrate 
its nuclear capability and keep its nuclear options open. Although thirteen G-21 
delegations managed to unite on a four-paragraph proposal on preambular objectives 
and aspirations by the last week of June, they could accomplish little without either 
India's engagement or support from moderate Western states, who remained on the 
sidelines on this issue. 122 
The May 28 draft treaty caused a significant shift in the negotiations. Although no 
formal decision was ever taken to replace the rolling text, Ramaker's text became the 
focus of work from then on. Despite his assurance that the draft had not been tabled 
with a "take it or leave it attitude", multilateral negotiations ceased to play a relevant 
role after the end of May. Under his auspices as Chair, Ramaker instead convened 
some fifteen key states to discuss the most dillicult issues. The group included the P- 
5, India, Israel and Pakistan, and ambassadors from Japan, Mexico, Egypt, Morocco, 
Germany, Canada, Indonesia and Australia, most of which had acted as moderators or 
Friends of the Chair on the major issues. 
On-site inspections and the related question of national technical means had been 
categorised as `treaty-breakers' by the US and China, a term used to signify that the 
country in question would reject the treaty if it did not get what its national policy had 
determined as necessary. These two issues therefore became the main focus of the P- 
5's side-bar meetings. For others, the entry into force of the treaty had begun to cause 
anxiety, especially in light of the strident, largely pro-nuclear media debate in India. 
Britain, China and Russia were presenting their demand for a provision that would 
bind the "five plus three" declared and undeclared nuclear weapon states, as non- 
negotiable. The United States was preoccupied with ensuring that inspections would 
not be subjected to too-rigorous conditions, and despite the size of its delegation 
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appeared unable to keep its eye on any other ball. Although Washington would have 
preferred a more flexible provision on entry into force, and France had come round to 
this position, both failed to pay sufficient attention to the hostage-taking dangers of 
an overly stringent article until too late. Though Ramaker had intended his draft text 
to replace the rolling text as the basis for the final phase of negotiations, he had not 
expected to be locked into the draft's language so fully or so quickly. This 
miscalculation was most acutely problematic with respect to entry into force. 
Under severe political pressure from Britain and Russia, and believing Russian threats 
to reject the Chair's draft text, unless the entry-into-force provision met the stringent 
P-5+D-3 formula, Ramaker had inserted an informal British suggestion on entry into 
force into his May 28 draft text. The British formula, one of many that the delegation 
had suggested but not formally proposed, made entry into force contingent on 
signature and ratification by 37 countries listed as providing either a primary seismic 
station or a radionuclide laboratory to the IMS. As will be discussed more fully in 
chapter 8, Ramaker intended this paragraph as a holding article, anticipating further 
intensive negotiations that would result in a less stringent, modified requirement. 
Unfortunately, the reactions of Russia and India escalated the debate over entry into 
force in opposing directions. First, Berdennikov declared that he was satisfied with 
the stringent entry into force article and regarded it as final. Soon after, as two 
additional countries made a nonsense of the list provision by adding stations to the 
IMS, India denounced the pressure that it felt was being exerted by some of the P-5 
and announced that it would withdraw its seismic stations. Given the hard work put in 
by one part of the British delegation to gain acceptance and participation for the IMS, 
it was sadly ironic that the incorporation of Britain's badly considered entry into force 
tactic resulted in India withdrawing its stations from the IMS altogether. 123 
June 20: The Die Is Cast 
The majority of negotiators disliked the strict, hostage-taking entry into force 
approach, but they seemed incapable of preventing its inexorable slide into the final 
treaty. Although speculation regarding India's intentions and tactics had been high 
throughout 1996, many CD members now regard June 20 as a turning point that 
sealed the treaty's fate. In the morning, Ambassador Ghose gave a speech in the CD 
plenary, in which she underlined India's conditions for joining the CTBT in terms of 
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timebound disarmament commitments. She also conveyed an unmistakable warning 
that India was preparing to exercise its veto unless the entry into force provision was 
made less specific. Secondly, a late night session of the NTB Committee convened 
under the auspices of Antonio de Icaza, the Mexican ambassador responsible for 
entry into force, turned sour following a bitter exchange between Sir Michael Weston 
and Arundhati Ghose, in which Weston asserted that India was "wriggling on the end 
of a hook". As tempers frayed, Weston also offended Japan and Germany, who 
opposed the stringent list-based entry into force requirement, telling them that since 
the CTBT was essentially a nonproliferation measure aimed at the P-5 and D-3, their 
role was only to pay for it. 124 The discussion that ensued seemed to poison the entire 
debate over entry into force and further served to personalise and polarise the 
divisions between key protagonists. Ramaker had that day tabled a working paper on 
entry into force containing a complicated, four-stage process which he had hoped 
would appease Britain, China and Russia, while removing the risk of a permanent 
Indian veto on the treaty. In a tragedy of timing, his proposal fell victim to June 20's 
poisoned negotiating environment, and was barely considered. 125 
The United States, though among those who disliked the strict provision, preferring a 
condition based on ratification by the P-5 plus a simple number of other states, had 
been prepared to use it as a bargaining chip. During the P-5 sidebar negotiations, the 
US delegation indicated that it would support Russia and China's demands in return 
for greater Russian and Chinese flexibility over on-site inspections, which 
Washington had characterised as a `treaty-breaking' issue. Failing to get agreement 
on this P-5 package, the United States shifted again, publicly opposing the list of 37 
just as India withdrew its IMS stations. But the fact that the United States had first 
underestimated the entry into force issue and then been prepared to bargain with it 
undermined any belated hope that the US delegation would rally support for an 
alternative proposal. 
Ghose's statement to the CD on June 20 was a superb example of diplomatic judo, 
manipulating fact, perception and threat to create an impression of the inevitability of 
the throw. She positioned India for defection, distracting attention from her country's 
nuclear ambitions by focusing on the failure of the NWS to disarm or reduce their 
core reliance on nuclear weapons; then she couched India's familiar linkage 
170 
arguments in terms of national security, so that New Delhi's justifications for 
rejecting the CTBT could be cast as a response to threat and the fault of others, 
principally the NWS. Ghose's statement set the scene for India's subsequent actions, 
and it is illuminating to consider in more detail the words and phrases she actually 
employed. 
After quoting from the CTBT's negotiating mandate, Ghose asserted: "India has 
participated actively and constructively in the negotiations. We have put forward a 
number of proposals, consistent with the mandate adopted by the CD. These 
proposals are aimed at ensuring that the CTBT must be a truly comprehensive treaty, 
that is, a treaty which bans all nuclear testing without leaving any loopholes that 
would permit nuclear weapon states to continue refining and developing their nuclear 
arsenals at their test sites and in their laboratories. Through these proposals we have 
underscored the importance of placing the CTBT in a disarmament framework, as 
part of a step-by-step process aimed at achieving the complete elimination of all 
nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. "126 Expressing India's 
disappointment with how negotiations had developed, Ghose called the scope 
"narrow" and said it "does not fulfil the mandated requirement of a comprehensive 
ban"; it was, rather, only a "nuclear-weapon-test-explosion-ban treaty". The 
preambular references to disarmament were too weak and "cannot meet our 
concerns". She listed ways in which the CTBT failed to dent the NWS' reliance on 
nuclear weapons, including the nuclear testing carried out by France and China 
during the negotiations "justified as essential for national security and for permitting 
completion of work on new designs and gathering of data to enable computer 
simulation and modelling to preserve and refine capabilities into the distant future. " 
Ghose concluded her section on the treaty's shortcomings with the following 
denunciation of the draft text, signalling India's intention to defect: "The CTBT that 
we see emerging appears to be shaped more by the technological preferences of the 
nuclear weapon states rather than the imperatives of nuclear disarmament. This was 
not the CTBT that India envisaged in 1954. This cannot be the CTBT that India can 
be expected to accept. " 
A further paragraph drew comparisons with the NPT as a discriminatory and 
unacceptable treaty regime. Ghose then reiterated her criticism of the CTBT, 
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declaring: "India... cannot subscribe to it in its present form. "127 Finally, addressing 
Article XIV, she castigated the use of the entry into force provision to exert improper 
pressure on India to accede to the CTBT, and made it clear that India "would not 
accept any language in the treaty text which would affect our sovereign right to 
decide in the light of our supreme national interest, whether we should or should not 
accede to such a treaty. " 128 
One problem with India's declaration of intended defection was that it removed any 
incentive for the other negotiators to engage with India's demands. This was 
particularly true of the P-5, with whom India wanted to engage. By placing itself 
essentially outside the business of finalising the treaty text, India weakened whatever 
leverage the G-21 might have had in trying to get stronger disarmament commitments 
into the preamble. Rather than opening up opportunities for renegotiating the entry- 
into-force provision, the events of June 20 effectively closed them off. Ramaker was 
faced with pressure from Russia and the UK, supported by China, Pakistan and 
others, who continued to insist that the stringent provision must remain. Instead of 
deploying their greater numbers into effective pressure on behalf of the argument that 
facilitating early entry into force would be important for embedding the norm against 
testing and strengthening the regime's ability to constrain non-adherents, the NNWS 
appeared to abandon the interests of international security. When de Icaza asked if 
they could accept the stringent entry into force requirement, a chorus of delegations 
affirmed that though they didn't like it, they could live with the list. With the pressure 
coming only from the NWS, and with a number of other issues still to be resolved, 
Ramaker decided not to expend more capital in reopening negotiations on entry into 
force. ' 29 
June 28: `Final' Text 
On June 28, the last day of the CD's second session, Ramaker tabled his revised 
version of the May 28 Chair's text, this time telling the NTB Committee that 
negotiations had been concluded. 130 Despite misgivings about the implications of 
Article XIV on entry into force, the Clinton administration decided in early July to 
support Ramaker's text as it was, hoping to deter any further negotiations, which they 
feared could cause the treaty to unravel. The United States therefore secured public 
declarations of support from Britain, France, Russia, Indonesia and others when 
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Ramaker tabled a further draft treaty on June 28, and announced that it was the final 
text. 
When the CD resumed negotiations on July 29, the atmosphere was tense. Since the 
list based on IMS stations no longer served the purpose of tying India in, a 
combination of the IAEA's list of nuclear capable states and the newly-enlarged CD 
was chosen as the basis for entry into force. This formula resulted in a list of 44 
states, including the P-5, India, Israel and Pakistan, whose accession was made a 
binding condition of the treaty taking legal effect. This stringent condition, which 
rendered the treaty vulnerable to hostage-taking politicking, was softened only by the 
offer of a conference - which Ramaker explicitly characterised as not a waiver 
conference - which could be convened a few years after the date of the treaty being 
opened for signature. 131 
India's strong criticisms of the emerging treaty had been echoed by Pakistan, Egypt, 
Iran and Nigeria. Though the P-5 were less worried about others defecting, there was 
a dangerous contradiction in their tactic of ignoring India while at the same time 
making its accession a binding precondition for the treaty's entry into force. India's 
sense of grievance and isolation was further exacerbated when, notwithstanding its 
position against any reopening of the treaty, the US agreed to China's demand for 
further discussions on the decisionmaking procedure for OSI. Having finally 
conceded on PNEs132, the issue of on-site inspections was a make or break issue for 
China. Under pressure from its allies, and with China's signature on the treaty 
hanging in the balance, the US conceded its hardline position and accepted a 
decision-making majority of "at least 30 affirmative votes" of members of the 
executive council as necessary before an inspection could go ahead. 133 China, which 
had continued to conduct a small number of nuclear tests throughout the negotiations, 
conducted its 45th explosion on July 29,1996, and announced that from July 30 it 
would start a moratorium. 134 
The US-Chinese decision on inspections was presented together with some 
procedural modifications in Ramaker's final text in working paper 330/Rev. 2 on 
August 14. The last minute agreement may have secured China's signature, but India 
was furious that the June 28 text was amended at China's behest while no-one was 
173 
prepared to address India's own proposals on disarmament and entry into force. India 
interpreted this as a concession granted solely because China was a nuclear power, 
whereas India's needs and proposals were ignored because India was not. As such, 
this message fuelled hostility towards the CTBT throughout India, where the 
endgame negotiations were followed daily in the national press. 135 Other nonaligned 
countries had also tried to reopen negotiations on the preamble and entry into force, 
but were told that negotiations were closed. Frustrated at their inability to get 
stronger commitments in the CTBT preamble, 28 of the 30 nonaligned states in the 
CD proposed a "Programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons", 
intending this to be a basis for discussions in an ad hoc committee on nuclear 
disarmament. 136 
Although this narrative has concentrated on the major events and decisions of the 
1994-96 negotiations, it would not be complete without a brief explanation of how 
some of the less fundamental, but contested issues that are not addressed in the 
detailed chapters on scope, verification and entry into force were resolved. 
The Preamble 
Ramaker's treaty preamble changed little from his first draft, although the G-21 had 
made a last ditch, unsuccessful attempt to strengthen the treaty's objectives in this 
section. The preamble is the repository of the treaty-maker's political aspirations. It 
may become the display case for concepts that underpin the treaty, a storage site for 
ideas that were dropped from the body of the text, or a bland assertion of general 
principles that offend no-one. With the three western nuclear powers rejecting 
anything stronger, bland assertions won the day. 
The nonaligned states had wanted the CTBT preamble to enshrine commitment to the 
concept of a timetable for nuclear disarmament and reflect the treaty's role in curbing 
vertical as well as horizontal proliferation. They were unsuccessful. The preamble 
opened by welcoming recent arms reduction measures and quoting from the 
negotiating mandate. Coordinated by Mexico, and delayed by attempts to persuade 
India to negotiate on a joint proposal, 13 G-21 states submitted a late amendment 
proposal for the preamble that would assert that the CTBT "should end the 
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons" and be "an 
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indispensable step towards the larger goal of a nuclear weapon free world". 137 The 
Western nuclear powers accepted some compromise language brokered by Australia 
and Ramaker, but made it clear that they would not negotiate on strengthening the 
preamble unless India gave a commitment to sign the treaty. 138 
Rejecting any mention of curbing nuclear weapon development as an objective or 
aspiration of the treaty, the P-5 were prepared to allow the preamble to refer to 
"constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and 
ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons" as a 
consequence of the treaty. They also agreed to a preambular paragraph using 
language from the NPT decisions adopted in 1995, recognising the CTBT as a 
"meaningful step in the realisation of a systematic process to achieve nuclear 
disarmament". France adamantly opposed Cuba's proposals linking nuclear testing to 
environmental harm, perhaps fearing that formalising such linkage could make it 
possible for the NWS to be sued by communities downwind of or otherwise affected 
by their nuclear testing over the years. The nonaligned had to be satisfied with a 
reversed linkage noting that the treaty "could contribute to the protection of the 
environment". 139 
The CTBT Organisation (CTBTO) 140 
Although there had been an early bid by the IAEA, supported chiefly by Sweden, to 
be given the additional responsibilities of implementing and verifying the CTBT, 
consensus emerged relatively smoothly for an independent organisation - the CTBTO 
- to be established in Vienna, independent from but co-located with the IAEA, and 
empowered to cooperate with the IAEA and other international organisations to 
"utilise expertise and resources, as appropriate, to maximise cost efficiencies". 141 it 
was then agreed that the CTBTO would comprise a Conference of States Parties, 
expected to meet annually, an Executive Council, and a Technical Secretariat headed 
by a Director-General. 
The 51 seats (increased from the 45 originally proposed, following pressure from 
African and European delegations) were allocated from six regions: 10 seats from 
Africa; 7 from Eastern Europe; 9 from Latin America; 7 from the Middle East and 
South Asia; 10 from North America and Western Europe; and 8 from South-East 
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Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. The regions differ from the UN's traditionally 
recognised five regions, and provoked some objections, notably from Middle Eastern 
countries, who did not want Israel counted within their region. Israel, for its part, 
feared being excluded from taking up a seat on the Council, while the P-5 (echoed by 
the D-3) wanted permanent seats on a council that might sit in judgment on them. A 
formula for seat allocation was agreed whereby one seat per region would be 
allocated by alphabetical rotation; one third of the seats per region would take into 
account certain criteria, including political and security interests, relevant nuclear 
capabilities, IMS facilities and expertise, and budgetary contribution to the CTBTO; 
the rest would be decided regionally by either election or rotation. The formula was 
intended to provide equitable regional participation, ensure that no state could be 
permanently excluded, and give states which regarded themselves as treaty targets or 
major players the assurance of continuous seats on the council, while avoiding the 
political and discriminatory overtones of giving "permanent" seats to the P-5 or D-3. 
Bypassing India's Veto 
When Ramaker sought consensus in the NTB Committee for the August 14 treaty 
text, India carried out its threat to veto the draft treaty. Omitting the treaty text, 
Ramaker managed to persuade India to allow the report to be transmitted from the 
Committee to the CD on August 16. In addition to the standard description of 
activities, personnel and documentation related to the Committee, the report 
contained interpretations and assurances from the Chair on several issues in the draft 
treaty. For the benefit of India, he clarified that Article XIV on entry into force did 
not impinge on a state's sovereign rights and that measures which could be 
undertaken to accelerate the ratification process did not mean UN Security Council 
sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. For Iran, which had objected to 
Israel's inclusion in the Middle East region, he clarified the CTBT-specific relevance 
of the six-region basis for determining the composition of the Executive Council. To 
reassure those concerned about possible abuses of national technical means and on- 
site inspections, Ramaker made statements on the record regarding the limitation of 
inspections to the treaty's subject matter and various safeguards in the treaty against 
the violation of a state's sovereignty and potential abuse of national technical means. 
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Unusually, the report also contained a summary of some 18 statements of position on 
the CTBT. These statements ranged from the generally supportive (Australia, on 
behalf of 39 mostly Western and Eastern European states, including the P-5, Israel 
and four G-21 states; further separate statements from China, Canada, Kenya and 
Belgium), through critical but not opposed (G-21 members Egypt, Mexico, Brazil, 
Algeria, Cuba, Colombia, Viet Nam, Pakistan, Peru), with two countries expressing 
opposition (India and Iran). 142 Notably, though Iran shared various G-21 states' 
criticisms of the treaty's inadequacies with regard to disarmament, national technical 
means, and the regional composition of the Executive Committee, its opposition to 
attaching the draft treaty text to the NTB Committee report seemed to rest chiefly on 
the view that the negotiations had not been properly concluded. Stating that "the 
appalling fact here is that failure could be avoided" and that the remaining issues 
could be resolved, Iran tried unsuccessfully to propose further amendments. 143 
India continued to refuse to allow the treaty text to be attached in any way, even 
though the report now clearly stated that there had been no consensus. In a last ditch 
attempt to undermine the credibility of the treaty, India, supported by Iran ostensibly 
on procedural grounds, 144 then also blocked transmission of the NTB Committee's 
report to the UN General Assembly, even though the treaty text was not attached. 
There was a sudden, panicked flurry of activity from Western states, who had not 
anticipated this final obstacle from India. 145 Some sought to assure India that it would 
not be coerced into signing the treaty as long as it did not block its transmission to the 
General Assembly, a doomed strategy of appeasement, according to Pakistan's 
Ambassador Munir Akram. 146 
Nothing worked, and with a graceful speech thanking his colleagues, Ramaker 
handed responsibility for the treaty to the CD when he presented the NTB Committee 
Report on August 20.147 The only other speakers at that plenary were Ghose and 
Akram, underlining how the fate of the CTBT had become hostage to South Asian 
politics and regional rivalries. Ghose elaborated India's by-now excruciatingly 
familiar arguments against the treaty. To these were added self-justifications for 
vetoing not only the treaty text, but adoption of the NTB Committee report as well, 
and claims that the CD "has no text of a CTBT to recommend to the General 
Assembly at this time". 148 With every appearance of enjoyment, Akram attacked 
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India for "hypocrisy" and said: "Today the mask of the smiling Buddha has been torn 
off, revealing the face of the goddess of war. The leaders of our neighbour have 
proclaimed that they will keep their nuclear options open, that they reserve the right 
to conduct nuclear tests; that they will go ahead with their short- and medium-range 
missile programmes. "149 
After several unsuccessful attempts to persuade India and Iran to allow the NTB 
Report to be adopted by the CD and transmitted to the United Nations, the CD met 
for its August 22 plenary, rife with rumours and tense with anxiety and expectation. 
In a statement brimming with anger, Richard Starr announced Australia's intention 
"to work with friends of the CTBT to fulfil the goal of the 50th General Assembly of 
a completed text, endorsed and ready for signature by the 51st Assembly this year. " 
He pointed out that the report they were all arguing about was "a report shorn of a 
text... despite an overwhelming majority willing to accept the text, despite 
perceptions of [its] imperfections". ' 50 A few hours later in New York, the Australian 
Ambassador to the United Nations in New York, Richard Butler, requested the UN 
Secretary-General to arrange for the General Assembly to convene in plenary on 
September 9 to take action on the CTBT, pursuant to UN resolution 50/65 (December 
12,1995). 151 Australia followed this up with a resolution initially co-sponsored by 
some 50 states, to adopt the CTBT as contained in A/50/1027.132 By means of a late 
manoeuvre carried out by Belgium in the closing moments of the August 22 plenary, 
the draft treaty text was turned into an official CD document. 153 India's main 
objection to the NTB Committee report was therefore thwarted when Australia 
requested that this CD document be given status as a UN document, and attached to 
the resolution proposing its adoption by the General Assembly. 154 Although there 
had been widespread support for the CD to transmit the draft treaty to the General 
Assembly, many nonaligned countries expressed anger and dismay when Australia 
took the initiative to bypass the CD's veto, apparently viewing the action as a 
violation of the CD's independence, autonomy and rules of procedure. 
The United Nations Adopts the Treaty 
On September 9, with 127 co-sponsors, Australia's resolution to adopt the CD as 
finalised in Geneva was put to the UN General Assembly. Almost all the statements 
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made during the next two days were in support of the treaty, although many also 
spoke of its flaws. Criticism focused on four main features: concern that the treaty 
did not adequately prohibit non-explosive testing or prevent qualitative development; 
the need for more progress on nuclear disarmament, with references to the G-28 
programme of action, timebound framework, and the July 1996 advisory opinion of 
the International Court of Justice on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'55; 
concern about the treaty's entry into force, including prophetic fears that its rigidity 
"virtually guaranteed indefinite hibernations1S6; and the distribution of Executive 
Council seats, complaints about which were mainly a vehicle for some of the Arab 
countries to object to Israel being part of the Middle East and South Asia region. A 
significant number of nonaligned states also expressed concern that this particular 
bypassing of the CD should not set a precedent and should not be allowed to 
undermine the CD in any way. 
Pakistan supported the resolution, but explained that it would not sign the treaty until 
its regional situation warranted. ' 57 India argued that the negotiations had been 
"skewed" and the treaty would "only succeed in perpetuating a discriminatory status 
quo". 158 Prior to the UN debate, there had been real concerns that India or Iran might 
try to amend the treaty, and in fact India initially submitted a resolution containing 
amendments to the treaty's preamble, scope, and Article XIV on entry into force. 159 
The co-sponsorship of the CTBT resolution by more than two-thirds of the UN 
membership ensured that any amendment strategies were abandoned. When the vote 
was taken at 4 p. m. on September 10, the CTBT was endorsed by 158 votes to 3. 
India, Bhutan and Libya voted against. 160 There were 5 abstentions: Tanzania, Cuba, 
Syria, Lebanon, Mauritius. Libya and the abstainers explained their position in terms 
of dissatisfaction with the negotiating process and objections to Israel's inclusion in 
the Middle East region. Additionally, 19 countries were counted as absent. 161 Ghose 
gave a final, angry statement, declaring "that India will never sign this unequal 
Treaty, not now, nor later. As long as this text contains this article [XIV]... this Treaty 
will never enter into force. , 162 
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September 24: Open for Signature 
Opening the CTBT for signature at the United Nations on September 24, UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali saluted the citizens and those who had 
"struggled for so long to achieve this treaty. s163 He spoke of the "constant and 
passionate flow of petitions, appeals, and support from the peoples of the world, " and 
appealed to all signatory states to ensure that they conformed with the purpose of the 
treaty. 
Calling the treaty "the longest sought, hardest-fought prize in arms control history", 
US President Bill Clinton was the first to sign, using the pen with which John F. 
Kennedy had signed the PTBT in 1963. Clinton described the CTBT as "a giant step 
forward" that would "help prevent the nuclear powers from developing more 
advanced and dangerous weapons. "TM Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeni 
Primakov, said the treaty "would stimulate a gradual transition to nuclear 
disarmament. " He also warned: "Testing of a nuclear explosive device by any 
country before the treaty enters into force will cardinally change the international 
situation, greatly prejudice the treaty itself, and may compel many countries to revise 
their attitude to it X165 Foreign Minister Qian Qichen reiterated China's view that a 
CTBT was "only a first step in the entire process of comprehensive nuclear 
disarmament" and called for all the major nuclear powers to renounce their policies of 
nuclear deterrence, commit to no first use of nuclear weapons and give legally 
binding undertakings not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon 
countries. China also advocated the withdrawal of nuclear weapons to the home 
territory of the NWS themselves and pressed for the commencement of negotiations 
leading to a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of 
nuclear weapons. 166 The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Herv6 de Charette, 
called the CTBT a "major turning point in the world's strategic balances" and said it 
opened the way to "a more stable, safer world which will cease to be haunted by the 
twin dangers of the nuclear arms race and the proliferation of these weapons. "167 
Britain's Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Riflcind, was notably less enthusiastic in his 
comments, remarking that the CTBT showed that "we can, by acting with 
determination and by making sacrifices, reap the benefits of the end of the Cold 
War. 9168 
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By the end of the first week, some 70 countries had signed the CTBT, including Israel 
and Iran. By March 7,1997, when Geneva handed the treaty over to Vienna, the host 
city for the CTBTO, the test ban treaty had 142 signatories. 
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Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, 
NPT/CONF. 1995/32 (Part I), (New York: United Nations, 1995). 
s' Jonathan Mirsky, "Neighbours condemn Chinese nuclear test", The Times, May 16,2001; and Ian 
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objective of the indefinite extension" of the NPT, and that "it was not only the moratorium that kept 
nuclear tests at bay but that the concerns about the outcome of the NPT Conference also served as a 
very essential deterrence to nuclear testing. " Sirous Nasseri, June 15,1995, CD/PV. 708. 
ss Satish Chandra, Ambassador of India, speaking on behalf of the G-21, June 29,1995, CD/PV. 710. 
Ibid. (phrasing as in original) 
57 Ibid. 
sa Indonesia, Working Paper, Draft Article on Scope, June 29,1995, CD/NTB/WP. 243. 
59 India, Working Paper, Draft Article on Scope, June 29,1995, CD/NTB/WP. 244 60 Widespread anger and civil society reaction to the French and Chinese testing decisions, especially 
in Japan and Australia, put pressure on both these governments to make stronger public statements of 
condemnation than the normally polite diplomatic expressions of regret. In the CD, this caused (or was 
used to justify) a public deterioration of relations, on the one hand, between the French and Australian 
delegations, and, on the other, between the Chinese and Japanese. Seeking to deflect criticism and 
embarrass Japan for taking a "moralistic" stance, the Chinese ambassador resorted to reminding the 
Japanese ambassador of warcrimes committed by Japan on China during the 1930s and 1940s. For 
various national expressions condemning the French and Chinese tests, see the verbatim records of the 
CD for the periods June 1 to July 6,1995 (CD/PV. 706 to CD/PV. 71 1) and August 3 to September 21 
(CD/PV. 712 to CD/PV. 719). See especially Sha Zukang, September 5,1995, CD/PV. 717). 
61 Conversation (off the record) with the author, Geneva, June 1995, quoted in Rebecca Johnson, 
ACRONYM 7 (September 1995) p 65. 
62 Gerard $rrera, August 10,1995, CD/PV. 713. France's acceptance of the Australian scope 
formulation was not immediately associated with zero yield, but assumed to mean that it had dropped 
its demand for a threshold of up to 300 t and would abide by whatever decision the P-S could agree on 
"activities not prohibited". According to the recollections of a senior French official, (in off the record 
conversations with the author in November 2000), since Britain and the United States had already 
endorsed the Australian text, while continuing to wrangle within the P-S sidebar negotiations about 
threshold levels, France's statement was not intended to mean that it was abandoning the option of 
conducting very low yield hydronuclear tests. 
63 Statement by President William J. Clinton, August 11,1995, reproduced in CD/1340, August 17, 
1995; and Fact Sheet: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Safeguards, The White House, Office of the 
Press Secretary, August If, 1995. 
6` Article IX in the finalised CTBT states that the treaty is of unlimited duration, but "Each State Party 
shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides 
that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme 
interests. " 
65 Clinton, August 11,1995. 
66 Sir Michael Weston, September 14,1995, CD/PV. 718. 
67 President Boris Yeltsin of Russia stood beside Bill Clinton when the US President announced on 
October 23 that the two leaders supported a fully comprehensive, true zero yield test ban treaty, but 
when this was reported, Russian diplomats attending the UN First Committee made a point of 
emphasising that Yeltsin did not himself speak in favour of that position. On the basis of the Clinton 
announcement, I wrote in ACRONYM 8, which was just going to press, that Russia had come on board 
the zero yield decision. See Rebecca Johnson, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Now or Never, 
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Chapter Six 
Scope: What Kind of Test Ban? 
When Bill Clinton announced that Russia had finally climbed on board the 
interpretation of the CTB's scope and basic obligations that the US President had 
himself unilaterally decided eight months earlier in August 1995, he declared: "We 
have all agreed to go with the so-called Australian language which is a strict zero 
yield comprehensive test ban treaty. That is the only kind of treaty that can give the 
people of the world the certainty that they really are seeing the end of the nuclear age 
of the big weapons. "1 
The scope of a treaty determines the basic obligations and what will be prohibited or 
permitted. Because of the history and past politics of failed efforts to obtain a 
comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, the scope negotiations were invested with 
particular expectations and concerns. At the beginning of negotiations a zero yield 
interpretation was barely on the table. Even the most passionate test ban advocates 
regarded it as probably out of reach. More than any other aspect of the treaty, the 
process of achieving convergence on scope exposed the deep perceptual, political and 
ideological differences between those who advocated the CTBT as a component of 
arms control or nonproliferation and those for whom the most important function of 
the test ban was as a step towards nuclear disarmament. 
The competing strategies on scope exposed the underlying conflicts between 
dominant policyshapers in the NWS, declared and de-facto, with their continuing 
interest in nuclear weapons; the Western middle powers and arms control advocates 
in various governments and civil society, whose primary political and security interest 
in the CTBT was as an impediment to horizontal proliferation and any future nuclear 
arms race; and the more radical approach of nuclear disarmament advocates among 
the nonaligned states and civil society. Notwithstanding the importance of the issue 
and competing interests, this chapter shows that the multilateral negotiating arena in 
Geneva was practically irrelevant in bringing about the scope outcome. The nuclear 
weapon states sought to sew up the scope in minilateral P-5 meetings, closed to the 
rest of the CD. The P-5 negotiations were characteristic of mixed motive bargaining 
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where the conflicting interests among the dominant states ultimately obstructed 
achievement of a solution that would have enhanced the common objective shared by 
all the NWS, namely their desire to retain the right and capabilities to maintain and, 
ideally, continue to develop their nuclear arsenals. Because of their asymmetrical 
technological capabilities and political rivalries, they competed with each other over 
which activities to exempt from the treaty - safety tests, so-called peaceful nuclear 
explosions and, most acutely, hydronuclear tests above certain thresholds - and so 
failed to achieve a treaty scope that would have optimised their shared interests. 
Considering in chronological order the negotiations on safety tests, 
hydronuclear experiments and PNE, this chapter examines the processes by 
which the P-5 became mired in their minilateral negotiations on scope and the 
factors that contributed to the achievement of a more disarmament-directed 
outcome than would have been anticipated in view of the dominant military and 
political interests of the major nuclear weapon players. 
Opening Positions: Banning Which Bangs? 
The United States opened with an early statement of intent: "The treaty should 
constitute a comprehensive ban. It should not be a threshold treaty; rather it should 
focus on nuclear weapons explosions" and prohibit "any nuclear weapon test 
explosion, or any other nuclear explosion", language derived from the PTBT. 2 Russia 
could see no reason why the basic obligations did not simply reprise the "time-tested 
language" of the PTBT, adding "underground" to the list of prohibited environments 
in that treaty. Although Russia denied corridor suspicions that it was seeking to find a 
loophole for above-ground, contained or laboratory testing the denials did not allay 
all suspicions. 3 An early reference to nuclear tests "which are not dual-purpose in 
nature" 4 was also open to suspicion that Moscow wanted to keep its options open on 
PNE. As shown below, such suspicions were not unfounded, as Minatom officials 
and Russian diplomats gave contradictory signals on these issues. 
Britain underlined that the objective was nonproliferation: "The United Kingdom 
Government continues to attach importance to the role of nuclear weapons for the 
preservation of our security now and in the future. But we recognise also that the need 
to ensure effective measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
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destruction has increased... For us, a successful outcome will mean the conclusion of 
a treaty which makes a real contribution to non-proliferation by interposing a 
substantial obstacle in the process of developing nuclear weapons" s Britain was 
prepared to base the treaty's scope on the PTBT language, but was more interested in 
securing provisions for conducting occasional tests under the rubric of maintaining 
the "safety and reliability" of weapons in its arsenal. Weeks later, the British 
delegation tabled a proposal to allow nuclear explosions to be carried out in 
exceptional circumstances to test the safety of nuclear weapons, a position endorsed 
shortly thereafter by France. Undoubtedly, the UK envisaged this provision as 
applying onto to the P-S and not the D-3, although the proposal was not explicit 6 For 
fifteen months, the two European NWS persisted in arguing for the right to conduct 
safety tests every five or ten years. They encountered widespread opposition that 
included the United States, Russia7 and China, all the non nuclear countries, and 
British and international arms control and disarmament NGOs. 
France explicitly emphasised that the CTBT was to be "a treaty to prohibit nuclear 
tests, not a treaty to prohibit nuclear arms", and insisted that it should not harm 
France's force de frappe and the safety of its nuclear weapons. France said it 
favoured a comprehensive treaty provided it was universal and verifiable, and with 
the understanding that deterrent capabilities should be able to be maintained through 
technological advances, including "the acquisition of simulation capabilities". 8 Since 
France would acquire simulation capabilities only through testing, its early statement 
of this military objective indicated that it was determined to achieve either the safety 
tests provision, or a high threshold, or that it would break the moratorium and test 
before the CTBT became politically locked in. 
China's first major statement to the CD called for "strict, precise, and clear-cut texts", 
with "no loopholes or ambiguities which will give rise to different interpretations, 
misunderstandings and disputes in the future. "9 Concerned that the more 
technologically advanced weapon states would benefit from loopholes for "further 
development and improvement of nuclear weapons", China pushed for more in depth 
negotiations on definition and scope than any of the other NWS wanted. 10 Beijing, 
which has never signed the PTBT, rejected using its scope as a basis for the CTBT, 
insisting on newer, clearer language: "instead of copying the texts of some 
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agreements of the 1960s and 70s, we should arrive at definitions and provisions in 
true conformity with the purpose of the CTBT, in light of today's reality and possible 
future situations"" On several issues, China's approach diverged from the other four 
NWS. To the annoyance of Japan and the NATO states, China introduced its familiar 
position on no first use into the CTBT negotiations. Its proposed language for the 
basic obligations did not cover PNE, but included legally binding security assurances 
from the NWS to NNWS party to the treaty and an undertaking by the NWS not to be 
the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. 12 Warning that the CTBT "should 
not become another partial test ban or a merely restrictive treaty". Hou proposed that 
"it should prohibit, at any place and in any environment, any nuclear weapon test 
explosion of any form which releases nuclear energy". 13 The other NWS viewed 
such statements as either public relations, made with an eye on the non nuclear 
weapon states, especially from the G-21, or as indicating that China was still 
considering whether to join the CTBT or not. By opening its position with goalposts 
rather far from where the Western states were playing, China - like India, later on - 
was laying `best versus good' groundwork in the event that it would refuse to join the 
finished treaty. 
The P-5 bandied about the term `comprehensive', but, as noted in Chapter 5, the 
focus of the secretive P-5 meetings was `activities not prohibited' (ANP) - i. e. types 
of nuclear explosions or tests that one or other of the NWS wanted to exempt from 
the scope prohibitions. Before turning to separate consideration of the negotiations 
and outcomes on ANP, three additional proposals relating to the treaty's scope need 
to be introduced: banning preparations to test; closing the test sites; and banning 
laboratory testing. 
Sweden, wanted the CTBT to serve "two purposes, nuclear disarmament and non- 
proliferation", and proposed a scope provision based on the PTBT language for a 
"total ban on all nuclear explosions, i. e. also so-called peaceful nuclear explosions", 
prohibiting "to cause, encourage, assist in, permit or prepare nuclear explosions". 14 
The controversial inclusion of a prohibition on preparing to test was based on the 
reasoning that the CTBT should deter would-be violators and not only detect actual 
violations after the fact. Sweden's ambassador, Lars Norberg, noted that it would be 
difficult to define and verify preparations for a nuclear test, but argued that it is 
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"logical in this context to include at least direct preparations leading up to a nuclear 
test". 15 Germany swiftly endorsed Sweden's position on preparations, saying that the 
scope of the treaty should not only comprise the actual nuclear explosions, but 
"should also include preparatory or assisting activities directly preceding nuclear 
explosions". 16 From then on, it was Germany rather than Sweden that made the 
running on behalf of preparations, trying as late as February 1996 to include the 
investigation of "concerns regarding apparently imminent non-compliance" into the 
treaty sections on consultation and clarification and on the powers and functions of 
the executive council. '? Although Germany and Sweden were unsuccessful in their 
bid to incorporate preparations, their diplomats considered it useful to have raised 
preparations as a matter of serious concern, as this would be reflected in the 
negotiating record and may be invoked if the need arose in the future. 
The G-21 were most vocal that the CTBT should be a functional step towards nuclear 
disarmament. They wanted to ensure that the NWS would not get away with 
delivering another threshold or partial test ban again. To minimise this likelihood, 
some argued that the test sites should be closed altogether, an approach supported by 
disarmament NGOs. Iran proposed the closure of the existing nuclear weapon test 
sites and destruction of testing equipment as a surer way of preventing as well as 
prohibiting nuclear testing than the Swedish-German position on preparations. '8 
Unspoken, of course, was Iran's worry that including preparations in the scope would 
require a provision for intrusive inspections that some would prefer to avoid! Iran's 
proposal for closing the test sites was endorsed by Algeria, Indonesia, Ukraine, 
Nigeria and Pakistan, and received the backing of several more, including Mexico, 
Brazil and Cuba; India also expressed interest. The United States fronted for most of 
the P-5 when it opposed, on the grounds that the test sites were also research 
laboratories. Though the ideal of closing the test sites was supported by a wider 
swathe of NNWS and NGOs, they worried that the US position would make it 
impossible to implement. The proposal's supporters did not push very hard, so no 
text on the closure of the test sites ever made its way into the rolling text. 
The G-21 put in a number of joint papers on the purposes and objectives of the treaty. 
On scope, they unanimously opposed any thresholds or safety tests. 19 Arguing that 
"comprehensive coverage is needed to prevent vertical proliferation of nuclear 
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weapons in the future", Indonesia had also put down markers in February 1994 that 
the scope of the CTBT should "cover peaceful nuclear explosions as well as testings 
Indonesia carried forward these arguments [sic] through supercomputer simulation' . 
2Ö 
with a formal proposal to prohibit any nuclear weapon testing activity, whether 
explosive or not 2' Though supported by many G-21 colleagues, this position was 
dismissed by the Western delegations as impractical, and some accused Indonesia of 
political posturing. 2 
In the compilation of text from the two working groups that was appended as an 
annex to the report of the Nuclear Test Ban Committee in September 1994, there 
were two paragraphs of contested language on scope. A further six paragraphs from 
China on the subject of the "peaceful use of nuclear energy and peaceful nuclear 
explosions" were opposed in their entirety by almost all the other delegations. As can 
be seen from the heavily bracketed paragraph below, every scope proposal and even 
much of the punctuation had been contested by one or more delegations: 
[1. Each [State Party] [of the Parties to this Treaty] undertakes [to 
prohibit, and to prevent, and] not to carry out, [at any place and] [in any 
environment, ] any nuclear weapon test [explosion] [which releases 
nuclear energy] [in any form or any type], or any [other] [peaceful] 
nuclear [test] [explosion], [and undertakes to prohibit and prevent any 
such nuclear explosion] at any place [under [or beyond] its jurisdiction or 
control] [, with the exception of any explosions which may be authorized 
in exceptional circumstances] [. J [: ] 
[(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or 
under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or 
(b) underground. ] 
2. Each [State Party] [of the Parties to this Treaty] undertakes, 
furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, [assisting, ] [preparing, ] 
[permitting, ] or [in any way] participating in, [the carrying out anywhere 
of] any [nuclear [test] [explosion] referred to in paragraph I of this 
Article] [nuclear weapon test [explosion] [as referred to in paragraph I of 
this Article] or any] [other] [peaceful] [nuclear explosion] [, which would 
take place in any of the environments described in paragraph 1 of this 
Article]. ]23 
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In order to explore the dynamics of collaboration and conflict among the P-5 and the 
role of the non nuclear weapon states and civil society, the rest of this chapter will 
focus mainly on the conduct and outcome of negotiations on the three major ANP 
options: safety tests, advocated by Britain and France; peaceful nuclear explosions, 
sought by China; and low yield, hydronuclear experiments, which were desired by all 
five, but with different requirements in terms of size. 24 
The Franco-British Alliance on Safety Tests 
The demand by Britain and France for safety tests, though widely opposed, found its 
way into the 1994 rolling text on scope as a rider "with the exception of any 
explosions which may be authorised in exceptional circumstances". The principal 
argument relied on by British and French diplomats was that the United States and 
Russia had larger arsenals and more diverse nuclear weapons systems; consequently 
they had the option of retiring weapons whose reliability had come under question. 
Britain and France saw themselves as lacking such flexibility, and so wanted the test 
ban treaty to allow the possibility of testing if "needed". Between the two states, 
however, there were differences of view regarding the purpose of such tests. British 
representatives spoke of the necessity for tests to enable safety improvements to a 
design to be tested. 23 France appeared more interested in testing to ensure the 
reliability of an existing design. The NNWS unanimously opposed having such 
explicit exceptions in the treaty. While the majority argued pragmatically that it 
would be impossible to verify that such tests were not being used for the purposes of 
developing or modernising nuclear weapon designs, some, along with a number of 
NGOs, rejected the premise on which the Franco-British proposal was based. The G- 
21 specifically ruled out safety tests, and both India and Pakistan made individual 
statements saying, in effect, that weapons whose safety was in doubt should be 
eliminated. 26 A number of NNWS also held that if the CTBT were properly viewed 
in the context of Article VI of the NPT, one consequence should indeed be to force 
the P-5 to give up their reliance on nuclear weapons faster than they would otherwise 
do. Such a consequence was to be welcomed, not circumvented. The United States, 
Russia and China opposed a routine provision for safety tests in the treaty, preferring 
their alternative approaches on ANP. The United States, in particular, thought it 
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would cause unnecessary complications and might be used (by others than Britain and 
France of course) for cheating. 
British NGOs led the opposition, prompted by two conflicting concerns: first, that the 
UK government was not really serious about safety tests, but using the proposal as a 
means of slowing down the negotiations, either because of its general opposition to 
the CTBT or to assist France; or, alternatively, that Britain and France really intended 
to hold out for safety tests, and would thereby jeopardise the CTBT. NGOs worked 
with Labour MPs to raise questions in parliament about the British position, the 
responses to which revealed confusion in the Conservative government. In June 1994, 
for example, replying on behalf of the MoD to a question from Labour MP Harry 
Cohen, Defence Procurement Minister Jonathan Aitken said that the British 
government would "look for a verifiable and effective prohibition of all nuclear tests, 
with the aim of making a contribution to our international non-proliferation 
objectives". Acknowledging that a "minimal programme of nuclear testing" had 
"previously" been important, Aitken added "we now aim to use and develop 
alternative technologies". 27 When this was reported as a shift in Britain's attitude, Sir 
Michael Weston denied that there was any policy change and said that the UK still 
wanted the CD to consider the possibility of the treaty having a provision for testing 
in exceptional circumstances. 28 A week later Baroness Chalker, Minister of State for 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, added to the confusion by insisting that "we 
never made a demand that safety tests should be excluded from the treaty" . 29 
One explanation for the mixed messages was that British policy-makers had decided 
to do without safety tests but were continuing to protect the position as a delaying 
tactic - either to maintain bargaining leverage or to assist French weaponeers who 
hoped to be free to test after the May 1995 elections. 0 With no friends on this issue, 
Britain and France were put under considerable pressure, especially from Western 
colleagues, to allow the deletion of their bracketed text on exceptions for safety tests 
from the compilation of WG. II language and proposals. The two NWS continued to 
resist, insisting on August 12,1994 that the option go forward into the rolling text. 
Britain and France finally withdrew the proposal on April 6,1995, at the very last CD 
plenary before the opening of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in New 
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York, thus confirming the widespread suspicion that their demand for safety tests had 
been a delaying tactic. Making a point of sounding as if he was responding to the 
views of other delegations, despite having ignored their appeals throughout the 
previous twelve months, Sir Michael Weston announced that Britain had decided to 
withdraw from the rolling text its language on "exceptional tests" and would support 
the general scope formulation tabled by Australia in March. 31 France indicated that it 
would not oppose the deletion of the bracketed text, but carefully refrained from 
making any direct comment on the Australian text 32 In what was interpreted as a 
reference to the P-5 discussions over HNE, Weston stressed that the "scope article in 
the treaty should not be interpreted as prohibiting the United Kingdom, in common 
with the other nuclear weapon states, from fulfilling its responsibilities to maintain 
the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons". 33 
Low Yields and Competing Thresholds 
While Britain and France were pushing for safety tests, the United States had an 
explicitly stated position that the CTBT should be comprehensive and not a 
"threshold treaty"34. Contrary to the impression this was intended to give, it was 
widely known in US policy circles that Washington was working with a definition of 
zero yield that allowed weapons-related hydronuclear experiments below 1.8 kg 35 
Early in the negotiations, two kinds of objections to ENE were raised. Western 
NNWS argued that they would create verification difficulties, as it would be 
impossible to distinguish between tests at such low yield without very intrusive 
verification. The verification argument cut both ways, however, and zero yield 
opponents could turn the regime-builders' argument against them by insisting that to 
have confidence in a zero yield scope would require a very complex, intrusive 
verification system. The second substantive objection to EINEs was that they would 
enable the weapon states to circumvent the disarmament purpose of the CTBT. 
Nonetheless, many NNWS and NGOs initially turned a blind eye to TINE for the sake 
of achieving early agreement on the CTBT, which they feared would be impossible if 
EINE were challenged. 
Tree of the other NWS - Russia, Britain and France - also wanted to be able to 
conduct FINE, but complicated matters by setting their sights on higher yields than 
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the United States advocated, to levels that might better be described as low yield 
nuclear explosions. Furthermore, China put forward a public position opposing LINE 
and advocating a scope text that would prohibit any explosion-derived release of 
nuclear energy, while at the same time arguing within the P-5 discussions that if there 
were to be any threshold at all, it should be much higher than the United States 
advocated - in the region of 500 tonnes or more 36 
The genesis of the US position can be found in the early 1990s, when the nuclear 
weapons scientists argued unsuccessfully for the proposed test ban treaty to prohibit 
only nuclear explosions with a fission yield of more than I kt. Rejecting the 1 kt 
argument, the Clinton administration accepted advice that `zero' for the purposes of 
the CTBT should in practice be 1.8 kg. 37 This threshold was defined as the maximum 
for "one-point safety tests", based on a calculation of maximum permissible explosive 
yield if an accident caused the high explosive encasing the nuclear pit to detonate at 
one point 38 A successful one-point safety test should release only a very small fission 
yield. If the test fails, however, the yield could be large, from tonnes to even a few 
kilotonnes. 39 Designated "the whoops factor", the risks associated with 
malfunctioning TINE added to the potential compliance ambiguities that worried 
treaty advocates and complicated verification considerations. If the United States' 1.8 
kg threshold were used as a marker, how would a failed one-point safety test be 
distinguished from an intentional nuclear test explosion? 
Ambivalence hardens into Opposition 
As noted earlier, the NNWS were ambivalent about HNE. In principle, the preference 
was for the CTBT to eliminate modernisation possibilities as much as possible. In 
practice, many NNWS representatives, including Marin Bosch, who chaired the NTB 
Committee in 1994, initially accepted the view of those scientists who considered 
HNEs to be of only marginal benefit for significant qualitative design improvements. 
They reasoned that as long as the threshold was not set at tens of tonnes or above or 
formalised in any way in the treaty text, allowing ambiguity around the concept of 
zero yield was an acceptable price to pay to get a CTBT locked in place before April 
1995. Indonesia and some of the other G-21 disagreed, but were too marginalised to 
do more than make statements opposing lINE and laboratory testing. Additionally, 
many were persuaded by Australia's view that verifying a strict prohibition of I-INE 
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would be overly expensive and intrusive, placing an unnecessarily high burden on the 
CTBT's organisation. 
Three developments eroded the calculations on which the earlier pragmatic approach 
had been based: Acronym's revelations about the thresholds being discussed among 
the P-5; analyses from reputable nongovernmental scientists showing the level of new 
development, refinement or modernisation that would be possible with TINE even at 
the US `one point safety' threshold; and the realisation that conclusion of the CTBT 
before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference would not be feasible. 
The willingness of the NNWS to collude with the P-44° argument that negotiations on 
definitions (diplomatic code for addressing INNE) would seriously complicate and 
delay the treaty rested on the hope of concluding a CTBT before April 1995. When 
the CD recessed, with a 93-page bracketed compendium of proposals after the French 
and British succeeded in sidelining Marfn Bosch's draft treaty text in July 1994, this 
target date no longer looked feasible. 41 A preparatory committee (PrepCom) meeting 
of NPT parties followed in late September, the penultimate PrepCom before the 1995 
Review and Extension Conference. In a meeting characterised by bad temper and 
intransigence, the nonaligned states highlighted the CTBT as a major priority in 
judging NWS compliance with Article VI. 42 Warning that the NWS might not honour 
the commitment to negotiate a CTBT if the leverage was lost after the NPT 
Conference, Iran suggested that the PTBT should be amended to ban underground 
testing "pending finalisation of the CTBT' . 43 The pragmatic optimism of the 
nonaligned states during the first year of the test ban talks was clearly dissolving. As 
their frustration over the NWS' complacency bubbled over to the 1994 UN First 
Committee, Mexico and several other NNWS began to reassess their position on 
TINE. By the time an article appeared in the December 1994 issue of The Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists stating that "leading figures among the non-nuclear weapon 
states would rather have a comprehensive ban that allows hydronuclear experiments 
than no ban at all", it was no longer true as 
As the negotiations progressed, information leaking from the P-5 meetings suggested 
that there was confusion among the NWS' own experts over distinctions between 
HNEs, subcritical tests and hydrodynamic experiments (TIDE). The other NWS were 
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openly sceptical of the US position equating zero with 1.8 kg, viewing it as an 
arbitrary yield to enable the more sophisticated US laboratories to maintain their 
technological lead over the others. Faced with technical confusion and conflict over 
whether allowing HNE would harm or facilitate establishment of a norm against 
nuclear testing, civil society called in the experts. During 1994 and 1995, SIPRI and 
NRDC each produced analyses of the technical issues relating to the CTBT, including 
critiques of the technical justification for TINE and the political objectives and 
implications of the US position. 45 These reports were transmitted to the Geneva 
negotiators and foreign ministries in the key countries, where they challenged the 
official line from the NWS scientists and came to influence some of the positions and 
arguments put forward by delegations. 
While the timing disappointment created the space for questioning HNEs, Acronym's 
information on the negotiations and the expert technical analyses created a kind of 
epistemic feedback loop that fuelled further questions and suspicions. By bringing the 
P-5 debates on thresholds into the public arena, Acronym highlighted their internal 
divisions and intentions; the scientists responded by analysing the capabilities that 
different thresholds could sustain; Acronym fed these analyses back to Geneva, where 
they fuelled opposition from the NNWS and demands for clarification and 
transparency. The possibility for a norm-based rather than expert-dependent decision 
opened up when it became obvious that the epistemic actors were themselves divided. 
Some nuclear scientists and officials claimed HNE were necessary for safety testing. 
Other scientists and technical experts took the view that the utility of very low yield 
INNE was marginal. Still others argued that even at very low yields, conducting actual 
nuclear explosions would provide data useful for refining nuclear weapons, including 
analysing criticality and equation-of-state measurements. 6 Particularly compelling, 
especially for Western-oriented NNWS, were the arguments of Dr Annette Schaper 
that lINE would provide data that with appropriate computer software could aid 
horizontal proliferation among states not party to the NPT. Epitomising the 
transgovernmental character of many epistemic actors, Schaper was a nuclear 
physicist with the Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, who frequently appeared as an 
adviser on Germany's NTB delegation in Geneva, and also collaborated on SIPRI 
research reports. 
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The engagement of epistemic actors sharpened the debate but did not offer an easy 
way out. Among the P-5, there was suspicion that equating 1.8 kg with a safety 
margin masked US intentions to obtain militarily significant and useful data at that 
threshold which the other NWS, with lesser technical capabilities, could not, thereby 
keeping the US ahead of the rest. Russia, the United States, Britain and Israel had 
conducted HNE, and many assumed that France had the technical facilities and 
capabilities, even if it may not have used HNE extensively in the past 47 That some of 
these countries sought HNE at thresholds much higher than 1.8 kg suggested an 
insecurity concerning their levels of technological expertise 48 The secrecy 
surrounding the Chinese nuclear programme was too great for anything but 
speculation; on the basis of Beijing's ambivalent position regarding HNEs, it was 
assumed that China did not have a well-developed TINE capability, if any. A 
published account by a member of the Chinese delegation has since provided 
information that during the P-5 meetings in March 1994, Ambassador Hou argued 
that since LINE would produce a nuclear yield, albeit very small, they were "indeed 
nuclear explosions and should be prohibited". 49 Colonel Zou's account confirms that 
Beijing did not have confidence in its expertise to conduct TINE and feared that the 
US criterion would widen the technical gap between China and the other weapon 
states. China subsequently inserted scope language into the draft rolling text covering 
"any nuclear weapon test explosion of any form which releases nuclear energy' . 5° 
By April 1995, as the P-5 discussions leaked further into the open, the figures under 
discussion became clearer. As reported by NRDC, Russia and France were seeking to 
retain the ability to conduct nuclear explosions with a yield between 10 t and 200 t, 
while Britain wanted around 100 lbs (45 kg). 5' Russia was actually interested in the 
lower level, around 10 t, on grounds that they "were no less defensible than 100 kg 
explosions and just as difficult to detect or distinguish from lower-yield tests by 
means of the international monitoring system". 52 France wanted anything from 100- 
300 1L 53 
Bringing the wrangling among the P-5 over HNE into the open was a deliberate 
strategy by test ban advocates, and was made possible by the combined efforts of a 
small number of epistemic actors and norm entrepreneurs. 54 It worked: pressure 
intensified on Washington policymakers, as a growing number of delegations began 
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to emphasise that the CTBT must be "nondiscriminatory", diplomatic code for 
opposing differential privileges for the NWS, as had been codified in the NPT. Early 
in the new year, Marin Bosch, freed from the constraints of his position as NTB 
Committee Chair, warned about technological advances and FINE subverting the 
disarmament objective of the CTBT: "What is happening now with regard to nuclear 
testing is no different from what has been happening in the disarmament field for 
years: the technologically more advanced nations reach a point where they can 
discard a certain weapon or weapon-related activity and then they move to ban that 
weapon or activity for the rest of the world through a multilateral treaty... "" Such 
concerns were strongly endorsed by many, as the G-21 became more vocal against 
allowing the nuclear powers to conduct tests that would enable them to continue to 
develop and modernise their nuclear weapons. Egypt and Iran were particularly 
concerned by the widely-distributed assessment by some NGO scientists that Israel 
already possessed HNE capabilities and would benefit from an TINE provision in the 
56 CTBT. 
During 1994, the difficulties of verifying at very low yields had been evoked as part 
of a strategy to accommodate LINE. From January 1995, verification doubts became 
an effective weapon against accepting HNEs. More diplomats started echoing the 
arguments of civil society experts that permitting hydronuclear testing would 
complicate verification and risk compliance ambiguities and challenges that could 
weaken or discredit the operation of the treaty. 57 As it became clear in 1995 that 
acceptance of HNEs was far from a done deal, a battle between nongovernmental 
scientists and US government scientists and officials began to be fought in journals, 
conferences and Washington policy circles. Scientists and speakers from both sides 
held meetings and visited Geneva to lobby various delegations, while I ensured that 
the best of the critical articles and analyses were distributed among the negotiators. 
The NRDC report from physicists Thomas Cochran and Christopher Paine was 
particularly influential. Publicly disagreeing with the US characterisation of IHNEs as 
solely to assure the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons, Cochran and Paine 
provided arguments and evidence that the tests "indisputably constitute nuclear 
weapon test explosions". 58 According to NRDC's assessment, nuclear yields of just a 
few tons would be of significant value to a proliferator, and at higher levels would 
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increase in their value for the NWS: "At nuclear yields of 100-200 tons, fusion 
phenomena can be investigated, allowing partial yield verification of the performance 
of new boosted-fission weapons, including new designs for the `primary' or 
triggering component of much more powerful two-stage thermonuclear weapons. "59 
They concluded: "Since the marginal value of hydronuclear and other low yield tests 
for insuring the safety and reliability of existing stockpiled weapons is small in 
comparison to their associated verification complexities and proliferation risks, such 
tests should be explicitly banned under the CTBT. s6o The NRDC arguments echoed 
the November 1994 "JASON" report on Stockpile Stewardship61 and prefigured the 
August 1995 JASON report on nuclear testing, on which Clinton based his decision 
to drop the US claim for HNE, discussed below. Cochran and Paine went further and 
proposed treaty language for an Article I scope provision that would explicitly 
encompass a ban on HNE. 62 
For the Geneva negotiators, France's nuclear testing announcement in June 1995, just 
after the NPT had been indefinitely extended, was compounded by rumours that the 
Pentagon had renewed its demand for a test ban threshold of 500 t. These rumours 
were given credence by information from American NGOs and a statement by US 
Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, who publicly acknowledged that yields from 
zero through "a few pounds" to "even several hundred tons" were being considered 
within a reopened debate in the Clinton administration. 3 Moreover, despite Perry 
stressing that the United States did not plan to break its moratorium and that no 
decisions had yet been taken on whether to advocate a threshold or not, transnational 
civil society raised concerns about a possible resumption of testing by the United 
States. 64 In Washington, Tom Graham, who had led the US delegation at the NPT 
Review and Extension Conference, also waded in, arguing that adoption of such a 
threshold would be "a serious breach of trust". 65 Through Acronym, London-based 
NGOs also supplied the Geneva negotiators with information revealing that officials 
from the British MoD were supporting efforts by the Pentagon and US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to obtain a half kiloton threshold 66 
Although ACDA and the US Department of Energy opposed any 500 t or similar 
threshold, Director for Arms Control at the National Security Council Bob Bell and 
several important State Department officials backed the reasserted Pentagon demand 
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for a 500 t threshold. Bell, a prime mover in the earlier attempts to get US 
government agreement for a1 kt threshold, was reportedly frustrated with the 
inability of their P-5 partners to agree on the CTBT's scope (and ANP in particular) 
and saw a 500 t threshold as a way to end the wrangling. 67 In believing that a CTBT 
would be possible with such a threshold, Bell had misread the mood of the NNWS. 
Even in July 1994, when many NNWS were willing to accommodate I INE in order to 
make certain of the CTBT before the NPT extension decision, a 500 t threshold 
would have been difficult for them to swallow. By June 1995, that chance had gone 
completely. 
For much of 1995, the G-21 had been divided and ineffective. As Chair of the 
negotiations in 1994, Marin Bosch had managed to keep most of the nonaligned 
states on side. Yet his attempts to put forward an early draft text were thwarted in part 
because Errera was able to manipulate rivalry and suspicions among key G-21 
delegations, thereby dividing them against him. The nonaligned states had split into 
several factions in the run-up to the NPT Conference and their inability to unite in 
time behind a practical alternative to indefinite extension, such as a 25 year rolling 
extension, had contributed to the difficult dynamics at the Conference and afterwards 
in the CD. After the NPT extension, and as public anger at the French announcement 
and US threshold debates mounted, the G-21 pushed for a multilateral debate devoted 
to scope and basic obligations. The NTB Committee and Working Group 2 had held 
few multilateral discussions on scope because it was assumed that until the P-5 had 
come to their decision, there was little to talk about. In response to the G-21 demands 
and in view of the growing disquiet about US and French intentions, Ramaker 
decided to hold a full working group discussion on scope. His intention was to lift the 
issue away from its "privatisation" among the P-5 and reassert the multilateral 
responsibilities in the negotiations, and he made a point of encouraging the G-21 to 
participate. 
The session on scope was convened on June 27,1995. India and Indonesia both 
tabled proposals to define the scope so as to exclude lINEs and laboratory nuclear 
testing. Where Indonesia's draft text prohibited "any nuclear weapon test or any 
nuclear explosion", with the intention of ruling out nuclear weapons-related 
laboratory testing, whether explosive or not, 68 India had seized on the NRDC 
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approach and proposed draft text to define a nuclear explosion. Prior to taking this 
initiative, India's ambassador, Arundhati Ghose, had consulted with fellow members 
of the G-21, gaining some but not unanimous support for this proposal: 
"1. Each State Party undertakes to prohibit and to prevent, and not to 
carry out, any nuclear weapon explosion, or any other nuclear test 
explosion, or any release of nuclear energy caused by the assembly or 
compression of fissile or fusion material by chemical explosive or other 
means, at any place under or beyond its jurisdiction or control. 
2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, 
encouraging, assisting or in any way participating in the carrying out of 
"6' any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. 
British, Australian and German diplomats immediately derided India's proposal, 
which differed from the NRDC language in three significant respects. They pointed 
out that it would permit PNE, which India said it opposed, and prohibit inertial 
confinement fusion (ICF) experiments, which India was interested in developing. 
Furthermore, it would extend the obligation to areas beyond a state's jurisdiction or 
control, which would be impossible to implement. The Indian delegation offered to 
discuss revisions and invited others to explain their difficulties and help work out a 
more satisfactory text, but received no takers from Western delegations, who 
preferred the existing Australian formulation on scope. 70 Neither India nor Indonesia 
really expected their proposals to get anywhere, but they signalled a decisive break 
from the G-2 I's earlier acquiescence and added to the perception that the nonaligned 
were asserting themselves more forcefully in the negotiations. 
Though it did not result in any breakthrough in the negotiations, the June 27 debate 
on scope crystallised opposition to the notion of any kind of threshold. In my email 
despatch that week, I summed up the attitudes of key delegations and concluded that 
"if the NWS want a threshold ban they will have to conclude it among themselves 
outside the CD, but if they do that, it will fail to have a positive effect on the 
nonproliferation regime and could even be counterproductive; the only CTBT that 
will emerge from the CD now will be zero threshold... The NWS need to evaluate the 
whole proliferation picture and decide which they want more: a CTBT or continued 
testing. They will not now get both" 7' 
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The Push to Zero 
It is widely accepted that the crisis provoked by President Chirac's decision to resume 
French testing influenced the CTB negotiations. French diplomats have even claimed 
credit for bringing about the essential breakthrough on scope. 72 Before such a claim 
can be accepted, how the crisis over French testing came to play a constructive role, if 
it did, requires closer analysis. In relation to the French view that without simulation 
capabilities they could not join a CTBT, Chirac's go-ahead to test undoubtedly 
cleared the way for the treaty in terms of France's domestic policymaking process. 
Within the CD, the explanation for breaking the moratorium given by Errera on June 
15 cited these two reasons for conducting the further nuclear tests as if they were 
inextricably linked. In a long defence of Chirac's policy he argued that France had 
suspended its tests in April 1992 before completing some essential experiments and 
that further tests were needed to enhance simulation capabilities to ensure the safety 
and reliability of its weapons. Errera concluded his statement with the assertion that 
far from harming the CTBT, resuming testing confirmed France's commitment to the 
negotiations, for "this final series of tests is precisely to enable us to end our testing 
permanently... without resuming our tests we would not be in a position to adhere to 
[the CTBT] in 1996". 73 
The French decision had been communicated in advance to its allies among the P-5, 
who made little or no public comment. Errera's arguments also appeared persuasive 
for a number of Western NNWS, who limited any comments they made to mild 
expressions of regret or concern, while noting that Chirac had stated his intention to 
conclude the tests before May 1996 and be ready to sign the CTBT thereafter. 74 
Others, particularly from countries based in and around the Pacific, were more 
outspoken in their opposition, alluding particularly to the commitments recently 
undertaken in the NPT Conference. Japan called the French announcement a 
"betrayal of the trust that the non nuclear weapon states had in the nuclear weapon 
states". 75 New Zealand expressed "outrage" and rejected the argument that further 
tests were needed to ensure the safety of the French nuclear arsenal before the CTBT 
entered into force. 76 The Australian ambassador, Richard Starr, read statements on 
behalf of his own government and of the South Pacific Forum governments. These 
rejected Errera's assertion that the nuclear tests were consistent with the agreement on 
"utmost restraint" adopted unanimously by NPT parties six weeks earlier. Australia 
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also put its money where its mouth was and temporarily froze cooperation with 
France on defence-related matters. 77 Switzerland referred to the "moral 
incompatibility" between the resumption of nuclear tests and the NPT commitments 
undertaken at the recent conference, noting that "experts are not unanimous on the 
technical need to conduct tests in order to maintain the safety of [nuclear] 
weapons". 78 Mexico's new ambassador, Antonio de Icaza, noted that the proposal for 
adoption of an immediate moratorium on nuclear testing, tabled by his country during 
the NPT Conference, had not been accepted solely because of the opposition of 
"certain nuclear powers". Linking the French resumption of testing with China's test 
on May 15 and "the statement by a senior United States representative to the effect 
that his country might also resume testing", de Icaza warned that such developments 
"do not create a propitious climate" for implementing the NPT obligations. 79 France 
and the other weapon states, with indefinite extension of the NPT safely in the bag, 
did not seem to care. 
The close proximity between Chirac's decision to resume French testing and the 
reopened US interagency debate over higher thresholds greatly increased anxiety 
among the NNWS and hardened the positions of some nonaligned delegates. With 
Russia, China and Britain keeping quiet in the CD on both developments, conspiracy 
theories circulated in Geneva, whereby the P-5 would ratchet up the threat of a high 
threshold or pose the risk of another failure to achieve a CTBT in order to panic 
nonaligned negotiators into accepting a non-explicit TINE provision at a "more 
reasonable" level. 
During this time, the CD was a buzzing, paranoid hive of rumour, leaks and 
suspicions. Subsequent interviews suggest there was no conspiracy and little strategy 
among the US agencies or the NWS. 80 Even at the time there was no evidence 
beyond circumstance and coincidence to justify the conspiracy theories, which chiefly 
testified to the mood of hostility and negativity in the CD. Though Britain did not 
formally comment on the French and US developments, Lord Henley, UK 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence, provoked anger among British 
NGOs and Labour MPs when he refused to rule out further British tests if the United 
States lifted its moratorium. As for France breaking its moratorium and concerns that 
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this might derail the CTB negotiations: "it is entirely a matter for the French 
themselves to decide whether or not they wish to test". 81 
During late June, the debate over the purpose and scope of the CTBT ranged back and 
forth within the Clinton Administration. 82 Fearing that the prospect for a genuinely 
comprehensive test ban was slipping away, US NGOs had quickly mobilised. They 
circulated information showing that with a threshold of 500 t, not only hydronuclear 
experiments, but also `whisper-boost' tests and even the full yield field testing of 
mini- and micro-nuke designs could be conducted. They argued that such a threshold 
would keep the nuclear arms race going and encourage would-be proliferators. 83 The 
Physicians for Social Responsibility, NRDC and other Washington-based NGOs 
rallied a group of 24 Senators and 113 Representatives to sign letters urging Clinton 
to support a total, zero yield test ban. In a strategy that echoed Linus Pauling and 
Pugwash 35 years earlier, civil society utilised its grassroots networks to collect over 
35,000 letters and messages from all over the United States, which they despatched to 
the White House and the Department of Energy. 84 
Hazel O'Leary, Clinton's Energy Secretary, had already shown she was willing to 
challenge the US defence and nuclear weapon establishments when she hired arms 
controllers from NRDC, the Carnegie Endowment and other liberal think tanks to 
advise on issues relating to the nuclear laboratories and cooperative programmes with 
Russia. Not only was O'Leary viewed as a strong supporter of the test ban, but she 
had also demonstrated her commitment to more open government by releasing 
substantial documentation, hitherto classified, relating to health, safety, accidents, and 
information from health and environmental studies around US nuclear facilities. 85 In 
early 1995, O'Leary had commissioned the JASON Group - highly qualified experts 
from the US nuclear laboratories and scientific establishment who had previously 
written an influential report on stockpile stewardship86 - to do a further report, on 
nuclear testing. This second JASON Report, made public on August 4 during a 
Senate debate on HNE, concluded that low yield, sub-kiloton tests would be of 
marginal utility in ensuring stockpile safety. 87 Test ban advocates in the United 
States, Britain and Geneva made sure that the JASON Group's findings were widely 
distributed and reported outside of Washington policy circles, particularly to 
governments and media. The JASON Group's technical arguments reinforced 
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O'Leary and senior officials in both the DOE and ACDA in their opposition to the 
500 t threshold pushed by Bob Bell and the Pentagon. Moreover, even the nuclear 
laboratories were divided: some scientists wanted to be able to continue conducting 
nuclear explosive testing, but other divisions had vested interests in the high-funded 
projects contained in the stockpile stewardship programme that had been established 
in 1994 as an expensive payoff to the labs for giving up testing. 88 
Throughout July and early August 1995, test ban advocates had ensured that the 
White House was flooded with letters and emails from all over America, backed up 
by copious pro-test-ban editorials in dozens of local newspapers (deemed an 
important mechanism for influencing congressional representatives). The White 
House also received higher than usual levels of correspondence from members of the 
US Congress and from abroad, from other sectors of civil society, such as church 
groups and schools, and from US allies, particularly parliamentarians and retired, 
senior military officials. Faced with the greatest pressure exerted on a US President 
on nuclear issues since the 1980s, Clinton took the decision to back a zero yield 
CTBT. 
France was also under pressure, but not from the CD. It was clear that the French had 
strategised and prepared for opposition. Although Errera spiritedly defended his 
government against the criticisms in the CD, they were neither unexpected nor 
particularly hard hitting. What did take France by surprise was the international 
reaction outside governmental circles, as demonstrations disrupted French diplomatic 
residences and companies all over the world. 89 A French mission in Australia was set 
on fire (though Australian NGOs were quick to dissociate themselves and condemn 
the arson attack). Boycotts against French goods, especially wine, were started in 
several regions, not insignificantly affecting trade in the Pacific, parts of North 
America, and a number of major importers in Japan and Scandinavia. In news stories 
in France and around the world, crates of French wine were shown being poured 
down drains. Though Germany's government said little, German shoppers boycotted 
French goods in significant numbers. The boycotts were largely a spontaneous 
response by citizens, though they were encouraged by various national and 
international NGOs 90 
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Ten years after the Rainbow Warrior had been bombed by French secret service 
agents in Auckland harbour, a dramatic and violent boarding of Greenpeace's second 
Rainbow Warrior by French naval commandos near the Moruroa test site in July 
1995 was replayed and circulated around the world 91 Such sounds and images 
helped to galvanise public outrage against France and muster support for the 
consumer boycotts. By late summer 1995, French radio and television news and 
discussion programmes were carrying fraught interviews with farmers and wine 
producers on the issue. While most seemed to be unconcerned about the nuclear 
testing per se, they accused the government of not doing enough to mitigate the bad 
publicity and economic damage to French producers. 92 While it is not possible to 
identify which forms of protest were most effective, their combined effect reportedly 
caused Chirac to complain to an aide, "Why didn't someone tell me that this was the 
50`h anniversary of Hiroshima? "93 
The first indication of a shift in the French position came on August 9, in a Chicago 
radio interview with a French Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Yves Doutrieux, and 
the Australian ambassador to the United States, Don Russell. Doutrieux prematurely 
announced that France would accept the Australian scope text, as tabled in March 
1995. When asked if the French decision meant zero and if it ruled out hydronuclear 
testing, Doutrieux confirmed "zero . 94 The next day, Errera informed the CD that 
France envisaged a "truly comprehensive prohibition" and would endorse the 
Australian scope language prohibiting "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any 
other nuclear explosion". Having crossed this difficult line, Errera went on to tell his 
colleagues that a new approach to the negotiations was needed in order to achieve the 
goal of a CTBT by Autumn 1996.95 
The French announcement was followed just one day later, on August 11, by a speech 
from President Clinton, who committed the United States to "a true zero yield ban" 
on all nuclear explosions 96 With this decision, Clinton circumvented the 
disagreements over threshold and yield in his own administration and among the P-5, 
and he simultaneously boosted the CTBT talks in the CD, which had become bogged 
down and dispirited. At the same time, he sought to shore up support among 
Republicans and in the Pentagon and nuclear weapon laboratories by claiming that he 
considered "the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme 
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national interest of the United States" and committing to a programme of six 
safeguards, including a well financed long-term commitment to the `Science-Based 
Stockpile Stewardship' programme. 97 
Bypassed and Disgruntled: Reluctant P-5 Acquiescence 
British MoD officials were reportedly furious at having been sidelined by the United 
States (which engaged in no consultations, but informed the UK government just 
before Clinton's announcement on the zero yield) and by France, whose delaying 
tactics Britain had supported during the previous 18 months. Dependent on the US 
test site in Nevada, however, the British had no choice but to accede more or less 
gracefully. In September, therefore, Weston told the CD that having carefully studied 
the statements by Clinton and Errera he wanted now "to put on record my 
government's position that the CTBT should not permit any nuclear weapon test 
explosion involving any release of nuclear energy, no matter how small". Ike said that 
Britain attached the same conditions as the United States, related to the retention and 
maintenance of its nuclear stockpiles and design resources, and echoed the US's 
asserted connection between the safety and reliability of nuclear arsenals and supreme 
national interests. Twice emphasising that as a nuclear weapon state, Britain 
continued to bear responsibility for maintaining "the safety and reliability of our 
nuclear deterrent" Weston asserted that the CTBT "must not prevent us from 
fulfilling this responsibility". Now that Britain was with the virtuous, Weston could 
not resist challenging China and Russia to do likewise: "it would contribute greatly to 
the progress of the negotiations if those NWS who have not already done so would 
confirm that they share this view too". 99 
Russia, too, was furious about the zero yield decision, and took its anger out in the 
negotiations. Though President Yeltsin stood beside Clinton and nodded and smiled 
when the American President closed a summit meeting on October 23,1995 with the 
announcement that both supported a fully comprehensive, true zero yield test ban, it 
took another six months before Russia formally accepted that position-99 At a further 
summit in April 1996, Clinton again tried to include Russia when he said that "we 
have all agreed to go with the so-called Australian language which is a strict zero 
yield comprehensive test ban treaty. That is the only kind of treaty that can give the 
people of the world the certainty that they really are seeing the end of the nuclear age 
214 
of the big weapons". Yeltsin voiced agreement this time, mumbling that "all, to the 
very last one, agreed that this year we've got to sign the treaty on banning ... any size 
of test forever... "100 The position was subsequently formalised by Russia's 
ambassador to the CD on May 14,1996. Remarking, somewhat to the surprise of his 
diplomatic colleagues, that "the Russian delegation has always argued that this treaty 
should contain no threshold restrictions whatsoever", Berdennikov confirmed 
Moscow's support for the Australian scope on the understanding that it did not 
contradict the provisions of the 1963 PTBT and therefore extended the PTBT 
provisions to the underground environment. Accordingly, Russia accepted that "any 
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in any environment will 
be banned forever and without any `thresholds"'. 101 
In relation to this, Berdennikov added, Russia would need to conduct "nuclear 
stockpile maintenance activities". He listed five measures that closely resembled 
Clinton's August 1995 safeguards: implementation of a programme to ensure the 
safety and reliability of the Russian nuclear arsenal without conducting nuclear 
explosions; continued support and resources for Russia's research infrastructure and 
expertise; retention of a "basic potential" for renewing nuclear test explosions if need 
be; the continuation of activities aimed at improving capabilities in monitoring the 
nuclear test ban; and further improvement in information gathering and intelligence 
related to "possible concealed development of nuclear activities or other activities 
conducted by third countries that could be relevant for nuclear weapons purposes". 
The statement also contained a sixth condition, similar to that of the US, British and 
French assertions on supreme interests, that "if Russia's supreme interests are 
threatened, it will use its right to withdraw from the treaty in order to conduct all 
necessary tests which would be called for if there is no other possibility to establish 
the high level of safety or reliability of any of the key types of Russian nuclear 
weapons". 102 
By the end of March 1996, Beijing, which had appeared to sit on the fence, made 
virtue of necessity by reminding everyone that China had consistently advocated that 
the CTBT scope should exclude any threshold and welcoming that other countries 
had come around to this position. In view of the continuing resistance to defining a 
nuclear weapon test or explosion, and since there appeared now to be a common 
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understanding that the Australian scope formulation would be interpreted to mean 
zero yield, China agreed to withdraw the phrase "release of nuclear energy" from its 
scope proposal in the rolling text. At the same time Sha Zukang signalled a review of 
China's position on satellites and EMP. In making these concessions, he called for 
similar flexibility from others and reiterated China's requirement regarding PNE. 'o3 
An issue that many had regarded as a bargaining chip for China turned out to have 
been of deeper significance. How the PNE question was resolved forms the third 
section of this chapter. 
`Peaceful' Nuclear Explosions? 
China first raised the question of not prohibiting PNE in its structural outline paper in 
March 1994, insisting that nothing should obstruct the development and peaceful uses 
of science and technology. The PNE position was justified, like China's proposals for 
basic obligations on no first use and security assurances, in terms of what were 
presented as long-standing issues of principle, in this case the separation of military 
and peaceful uses. By early 1996, after Britain, France and the United States had 
formally given up their demands for safety tests and TINE, the widely held 
assessment that PNE were a bargaining counter had be reconsidered as China's 
position appeared to become ideologically entrenched. 
CD members were bemused to find China stubbornly hanging on to the demand, 
despite the strong and almost unanimous opposition to PNE, not only from its fellow 
NWS and their allies, but also from the majority of nonaligned states, with whom 
China traditionally emphasised common "third world" cause. Despite acknowledging 
that PNE had only been conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union and that 
these countries' experts had conflicting assessments on the economic and 
environmental impact, a senior Chinese general told the NTB Committee that "these 
differences are not sufficient to negate the potential technological benefits of PNE or 
to provide a good ground to ban PNE as a technology". 104 The kernel of China's case 
was summed up by Sha Zukang: "As a populous developing country with insufficient 
per capita energy and mineral resources, China cannot abandon forever any promising 
and potentially useful technology that may be suited to its economic needs. "105 
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Linking PNE with Development 
The history of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions is complex. During the 1950s 
and 1960s, the United States carried out its `Plowshares' programme of nuclear 
explosions for civilian purposes, but abandoned it in 1977, deeming that the costs and 
problems outweighed any benefits. The Soviet Union conducted more than a hundred 
explosions, mostly for large scale excavation and construction work, and for a time 
assessed the utility of PNE more positively. 106 At Soviet insistence, a right for non 
nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT to receive the "potential benefits from any 
peaceful applications of nuclear explosions" was included in Article V of the NPT in 
1968, though the language was ambiguous about whether anyone other than the 
defined NWS would be authorised to conduct PNE. 107 The USSR eventually gave up 
its programme in the 1980s, amid growing economic and environmental concerns, but 
Russia's position on PNE was from the beginning of the CTBT negotiations 
somewhat equivocal. 
As well as China, Iran and Algeria initially expressed concern that banning PNE 
might impede development for some states, but they stopped short of proposing that 
such explosions be permitted. Though they later seemed to have dropped the issue, 
Iran's draft treaty text of February 1996 contained a cleverly constructed provision 
that could have served as a potential loophole for PNE. Apart from these two G-21 
members, the non nuclear weapon states were overwhelmingly opposed to PNE, as 
were Britain, France and the United States. Due to its divisions, the March 1994 
working paper of the G-21, endorsed by India and Pakistan as well as Algeria and 
Iran, was decidedly ambiguous, stating that the CTBT should result "in the permanent 
banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground". 
The statement also specified that the treaty "should not contain any provision that 
could be interpreted as restricting the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes". 'os 
India complicated things for China by a clever tactical manoeuvre. To counter the 
fear expressed by many negotiators that PNE would provide a back door to nuclear 
proliferation, China had proposed that PNE be conducted only by the nuclear weapon 
states and under the strictest international control. India put forward an amendment 
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that included "States Parties which had conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion" 
among those who could carry out PNE. 109 India's intention appears to have been 
twofold. Firstly, the amendment was another tool in New Delhi's quest for `status' 
among the nuclear powers, consistent with its strategic objective of undercutting the 
exclusive definition contained in the NPT. Since India did not expect to win this 
recognition, its second purpose was to cause additional problems for China. Despite 
its close relations with China and probably concerned that India could benefit 
militarily from any PNE provision, Pakistan spoke explicitly against PNE, stating that 
"the so-called peaceful nuclear explosions contribute towards nuclear 
proliferation". " 0 
Almost isolated on PNE, China invoked international principle, citing the right to 
PNE in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Article V of the NPT. 111 Australia promptly led 
41 NPT parties to update (and in effect, repudiate) the Article V provision. 112 As 
described in Chapter 5, though Main Committee III (including, reluctantly, China) 
agreed to Australia's interpretation, the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference 
failed to adopt its final document. As a consequence, on the grounds that the Main 
Committee III interpretation had no force, China continued to evoke the NPT Article 
V provision and the various ritual endorsements of it that had appeared in the Report 
of the 1985 NPT Review Conference, insisting that as this was the last NPT 
Conference to adopt a final document, it must take precedence over any subsequent 
discussion on PNE. 
Thwarting Russian and Iranian Compromises 
As already noted, few appeared very concerned about China's advocacy of PNE 
during the first year of negotiations. By the end of 1995, however, there was growing 
concern that PNE meant more to China than an expendable bargaining chip, for 
Beijing continued to devote considerable resources and prestige to fighting for this 
provision against the almost unanimous opposition of the rest of the CD. 
Unexpectedly, in February 1996, China's solitary campaign for PNE was given a 
boost. First, Russia began circulating some ideas for a PNE provision based on the 
1977-1980 tripartite talks; then Iran's draft treaty, the scope text of which appeared to 
prohibit all explosions, included a procedure for considering and permitting PNE in 
exceptional circumstances. Russia's ideas, which were never formally proposed, were 
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for a treaty-endorsed moratorium on PNE until they could be conducted so as to 
preclude any military benefit. Iran's draft text gave the Conference of States Parties 
responsibility for considering "in exceptional circumstances and in the case that the 
real benefit of nuclear explosion [sic] for the sole purpose of purely peaceful 
scientific research and civilian applications are demonstrated... a specific request for 
conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion. " A PNE would only go ahead if four-fifths 
of the Conference of States Parties agreed, and with verification "to ensure that it will 
be conducted for purely peaceful purposes. "' 13 Assessing that this condition would 
never be met, several states which had hitherto opposed PNE expressed interest in the 
proposal. 
From the beginning, Russia's position on PNE had been equivocal. The Geneva 
delegation would neither fight for PNE nor speak out against them. They maintained 
the position that Russia would not obstruct consensus on banning PNE. At the same 
time, behind the scenes there was considerable cooperation between officials and 
scientists from Minatom and their Chinese counterparts, with Minatom providing 
extensive data to support China's claims that the option could be safe and 
economically viable for a developing country and that PNE could be distinguished 
from nuclear test explosions and not included in the total ban. 114 Russia's two-faced 
approach was no mere tactic, but the consequence of contending interests and 
attitudes between the foreign ministry and Minatom, with the defence ministry 
divided)'5 Russia's moratorium suggestions in early 1996, presented as an attempt to 
prevent PNE becoming a treaty-breaking issue, may also have been an attempt to 
appease Moscow's warring domestic interest groups. 
The considerable interest shown to the Iranian and Russian proposals for regulating 
but not prohibiting PNEs indicated that an unexpectedly large number of other states 
had come to fear that China was not going to back down. ' 16 What happened next 
reveals a significant difference between those among the NNWS who prioritised 
achieving an agreed outcome and those for whom the substance and content of the 
agreement was more important. The first group were prepared to accept any workable 
compromise, and so looked favourably on the Russian or Iranian suggestions. The 
second group, though some initially welcomed the compromises, were persuaded to 
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oppose them once they were shown that the Russian and Iranian solutions contained 
underlying threats to the regime and the wider, disarmament objectives of the CTBT. 
NGOs also underestimated the strength of China's position on PNEs, having viewed 
it as a hold-over from the 1960s that would never be taken seriously. ' 17 The generally 
positive diplomatic response given to the Iranian proposal for including PNE for 
consideration by the Conference of States Parties shocked opponents into action. 
Concerned that what was being considered in the Iranian-Russian approaches could 
seriously undermine the disarmament aspect of the CTBT, I devoted a larger than 
usual section of my February reporting to make the argument that any provision along 
the Russian-Iranian lines could be used to establish a right to conduct further research 
and experimentation on nuclear warhead design. Since the nuclear device used in a 
PNE is essentially indistinguishable from one which could be used as a bomb, 
proving that there would be no military benefit would be a very difficult task; hence 
both the Russian and Iranian suggestions could be construed as an invitation to 
nuclear physicists, laboratories and interested governments to set up design teams to 
develop ways to satisfy the requirement that no military benefit should be obtained. 
The right to unlimited laboratory research was implied in the requirement to 
demonstrate this claim in support of a PNE request. Moreover, under the treaty's 
founding principle of nondiscrimination, Iran's formulation appeared not to be 
limited to the P-5, but would extend to all states parties to research and develop 
nuclear devices for PNE. If so, it would contradict the NPT restrictions on NNWS; if 
not, it would enshrine and perpetuate nuclear research and development by the five 
NWS and any non-NPT member that became a state party to the CTBT. Questioned 
about what they intended, Iranian diplomats gave ambiguous responses, reiterating 
that the CTBT should be nondiscriminatory, but also in conformity with the NPT. 118 
I concluded my analysis of the Iranian PNE provision by stating "what started out as 
a seemingly benign way of making concessions to China while ensuring that PNE 
would never be conducted, may well turn out to be a life-saver for the nuclear weapon 
laboratories, reinforcing more strongly than ever the privileges of the nuclear weapon 
states, and setting in place a barrier which would make further restrictions on nuclear 
weapon development and production more difficult in any future negotiations. " 119 
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When Disarmament Diplomacy 2, containing this analysis, was distributed to the 
Geneva delegations and foreign ministries, it caused considerable debate, especially 
among delegations who had been previously active in opposing PNE, resulting in a 
flurry of behind-the-scenes discussions with senior diplomats. Subsequently, after 
having shown initial enthusiasm for Iran's ingenious approach, a growing number of 
NNWS, led by Japan, Mexico, Canada, Australia and Germany, came out in strong 
opposition to the Russian and Iranian proposals for dealing with PNE. Mexico's 
Deputy Foreign Minister, Sergio Gonzalez Galvez, for example, moved Mexico 
completely away from its initial interest in the Iranian position and reiterated its 
position that the CTBT should put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear 
weapons and that it should prevent the development of new nuclear weapons. 
Acknowledging China's argument that there may be some future reason why states 
would wish to reopen the question of PNE, Gonzalez instead suggested that the 
amendment process could offer a solution to the impasse. Mexico made the 
suggestion to ensure that the treaty's scope unequivocally prohibited PNEs, but if 
offered a sop to reassure China that "the absence of any mention of peaceful nuclear 
explosions does not in our view mean that this option is ruled out". 120 As it turned 
out, an amendment provision was indeed incorporated as part of the solution, but not 
for some months, as China was not yet ready to give in. 
Agreeing to the main provisions and understandings contained in the Australian scope 
proposal, now accepted by almost all the negotiating parties, Sha Zukang 
emphatically underlined China's continuing opposition to banning PNE. Echoing his 
earlier speech to the Olof Palme Centre in Sweden, 121 he evoked a series of 
arguments based on development principles and former treaties: "... as an important 
principle, any disarmament or arms control treaty should not hinder the development 
and application of science and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore it would 
be incorrect if [the] CTBT should ban PNE... As a populous and developing country 
with insufficient per capita energy and mineral resources, China cannot abandon 
forever any promising and potentially useful technology that may be suited to its 
economic needs. " Stressing that China shared and understood the concern over the 
possible misuse of PNE, Sha argued that the issue could be "solved by establishing a 
strict application and approval procedure and an effective international on-site 
monitoring mechanism for the whole process of PNE". 122 This was precisely what 
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the Iranian draft sought to do, but by the end of March, the majority of NNWS had 
been convinced that this provision could - intentionally or not - legitimise nuclear 
weapon research under the guise of PNE. With India's 1974 example in mind, few 
now wanted to take that risk in the CTBT. 
The Canadian-Chinese Solution 
China, which had been involved in consultations with both Russian and Iranian 
officials on the two possible solutions, next tried to obtain a PNE provision through a 
concession-trading package among the P-5. Sha proposed an additional Article II of 
the treaty in return for Chinese acceptance of the Australian language for Article I. 
China's proposed Article II would, "notwithstanding the provisions of Article I", 
offer the possibility of permitting PNE, providing that a Review Conference of States 
Parties agreed to this by consensus. 123 When news of this latest proposal was made 
public, it was again necessary for NGOs and NNWS to mobilise opposition, with the 
result that when Ramaker tabled his first Chair's draft treaty at the end of May 1996, 
it contained no provision for PNE. 
Nevertheless, information leaking from the P-5 negotiations suggested that the other 
NWS were still discussing a possible deal with China, to include an additional article 
or paragraph in the review section of the treaty providing for periodic review of the 
prohibition on PNE. Sha Zukang himself brought this into the open on June 6,1996, 
stating that "in order to facilitate the conclusion of the treaty within the time-frame as 
planned, the Chinese delegation is now ready to go along with a temporary ban on 
PNE". 124 In an informal proposal on June 18, China advocated a new Article II for 
the treaty, in which PNEs would be considered by the review conferences. If the 
parties agreed by consensus, then the conference of states parties would "immediately 
commence its work with a view to agreeing on arrangements for the possible 
approval and conduct of such explosions", intended to ensure that military benefits 
were precluded. 125 Though this went further than most delegations wanted, there was 
now a growing fear that Sha's delegation had little room to manoeuvre; it seemed that 
China had invested so much in the demand for PNE it might not be able to accept the 
treaty without some face-saving formula. Whatever may have been the original 
purpose underlying China's insistence on PNE, so much prestige had now been 
staked on retaining some form of this option that it had been elevated into a treaty- 
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breaker. 126 A formula needed to be found that would not compromise the test ban 
regime. Despite being one of the states that had all along declared an "allergy" to 
PNE, 127 Canada offered to work with China on the text and managed to come up with 
a modified version of the June 18 proposal that the rest of the countries opposed to 
PNE could live with. 128 
Most significantly, Canada won Chinese agreement to relocate the PNE reference 
from anywhere near the treaty's scope to Article VIII, which provided for reviews of 
the treaty. PNE would not be automatically considered at review conferences, as 
China had wanted, but could be considered on the basis of a request from a state 
party. If the review conference agreed by consensus, the next step would have to be 
recommending an amendment to the treaty. The recommendation would then have to 
be dealt with under the amendment procedures laid out in Article VII of the treaty, 
requiring consensus among all states parties at a specially convened Amendment 
Conference. The Canadian-Chinese text was accepted into the next Chair's draft and 
from there to the Review article of the final treaty, as follows: 
".... On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference 
shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of underground 
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference 
decides by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it 
shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to 
States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude 
any military benefits of such nuclear explosions. s129 
This is the only provision for PNE in the CTBT. The majority of states were able to 
accept it because, based on the Article I basic obligations, PNE are unequivocally 
prohibited. They can only be conducted if the treaty is amended at some time in the 
future. In fact, the Article VIII provision is more stringent than the normal 
amendment process, as it requires two stages of consensus: at a Review Conference 
and again in an Amendment Conference. The likelihood of amending the treaty to 
permit PNE is now so remote that the possibility should not be regarded as a 
justification for any research programmes by nuclear weapon laboratories. The 
Chinese-Canadian compromise met that desirable criterion in bargaining, sufficient 
ambiguity to allow China to interpret the ban on PNE as temporary, while the other 
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states parties remain reassured that the ban on PNE would be at least as permanent as 
the ban on nuclear test explosions. 
Much More than a Managed Compromise 
With the PNE difficulties finally resolved and India's alternative proposals ignored, 
the Chair's text reproduced the Australian formulation on scope, which became 
Article I of the final treaty: 
Article I: Basic Obligations 
1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any 
other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any 
place under its jurisdiction or control. 
2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in 
any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any 
other nuclear explosion. 130 
The decision to go to a zero yield interpretation on scope in August 1995 was the 
turning point in the whole CTBT negotiations. A zero yield treaty may have been the 
demand of the NGOs and many nonaligned states, but it was not in the opening 
positions of any of the NWS, and was regarded by most NNWS and analysts as 
unattainable. This chapter has shown that the outcome on scope cannot be 
satisfactorily explained in terms relating primarily to the power and interests of the 
dominant states or the diplomatic processes of interstate multilateral negotiations in 
Geneva. Zero yield became possible when civil society and non nuclear weapon 
states seized on the French resumption of testing, underscored the norm against 
nuclear testing and public antipathy towards nuclear weapons, and precipitated a 
political crisis for decisionmakers in the United States and France. 
Safety tests were a peripheral issue. As a delaying tactic, as some negotiators 
assumed, the value of the safety-test proposal was probably marginal. It may have 
started out as a genuine demand from the French and British weaponeers, in 
difficulties as a consequence of Mitterrand's moratorium and Britain's forced 
cessation due to the US moratorium respectively. Since neither Britain nor France 
viewed the CTBT as playing a role in disarmament, they had discounted the predicted 
opposition from the more marginalised non-aligned states, but appear also to have 
underestimated the opposition to a provision for safety tests among Western non- 
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nuclear weapon states. When the proposal clearly failed to fly, even with the rest of 
the P-5, the diplomats may have seen some utility in holding on for bargaining 
purposes; the high level of opposition from NNWS and NGOs may also have been 
perceived as increasing the value of their withdrawal, which was timed to gain 
political benefits just prior to the NPT Review and Extension Conference. 
China's insistence on PNEs proved more persistent than any had expected. The early 
diplomatic assessment that China's position on PNE was a bargaining counter, like its 
familiar ritual of trying to include a no first use commitment in the CTBT, appears to 
have been mistaken. But another explanation is possible. China may have initially put 
PNEs on the table as the first move in a best-versus-good strategy, much as India did 
when linking disarmament with entry into force. China's analysts would have known 
well before the commencement of negotiations that PNEs would be unacceptable to 
the majority of significant negotiators. By insisting on them, bolstered by the moral 
high ground of the NPT's commitment to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Articles 
IV and V, China could therefore retain an option to walk away from the treaty. Like 
India, China had not made a definite foreign policy decision to support the CTBT. 
Unlike New Delhi, however, Beijing decided some time during 1995 that it would be 
more in its interests to go along with a multilaterally negotiated test ban treaty than to 
stay outside. 131 But by the logic of negotiations and self-image, China could not 
concede too much or too early. It could not simply withdraw PNE or it ran the risk of 
losing face, so instead it sought to exact a high bargaining price. There is also 
evidence to suggest that in the process of presenting a convincing case in Geneva, 
China's negotiators had persuaded influential domestic interest groups that PNEs had 
an instrinsic economic or military value, which further complicated efforts to find an 
appropriate payoff in the endgame. 
Unlike safety tests and PNE, little of the pressure for zero yield was exerted in the CD 
negotiations per se, although one of the strongest regime-proponents - Australia - 
brokered the text that came to be given a zero yield interpretation. The impetus for 
zero yield came from civil society and the non-aligned states, most of whom were 
marginalised in the actual negotiations. The case for a zero yield treaty was based 
primarily on normative and epistemological grounds constructed and promoted by a 
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cadre of interconnected civil society actors, few of whom fit the traditional NGO 
mould. 
This crucial breakthrough on scope came about through policy shifts in the United 
States and France. In France, the domestic realignment was the result of the general 
election of May 1995. Chirac's decision to conduct a final series of underground 
tests diminished the French weaponeers' pressure for the treaty to allow testing at 
yields of several hundred tonnes, thereby undercutting the P-5 stand-off on 
thresholds, where France (and its ambassador, Gerard Errera) had been one of the 
strongest and most intransigent of the demandeurs for a threshold in excess of a 
hundred tonnes. Of equal importance, international outrage against the French tests 
created a powerful, indirect pressure that forced Paris to make concessions and play a 
more constructive role in the negotiations. 132 The US policy shift, by contrast, was 
heavily influenced by the direct actions and engagement of civil society and 
congressional representatives in a context where the major domestic agencies were 
divided. This created space for decision-makers to solicit and pay attention to 
epistemic arguments about the merits of HNE from scientists like the JASONS (who 
spanned the governmental and nongovernmental sectors) and from nongovernmental 
experts, such as NRDC. Internal bureaucratic divisions and the politically 
constructed crisis over nuclear testing in 1995 also made it more possible for 
President Clinton to base his decision on the normative, regime-promoting principles 
of what a CTBT should be about. 
Because of advances in technology, a CTBT that permitted low yield testing and 
hydronuclear experiments offered little to proponents of nuclear disarmament, greatly 
lowering the benefits implied in the concept of diffuse reciprocity, and so reducing 
test ban advocates' incentives to support the treaty. The zero yield decision was seen 
to foreclose many modernisation options and therefore raise the value of the CTBT in 
the eyes of the NNWS. That this was recognised by the United States is clearly 
demonstrated in the following statement from ACDA director John Holum, who was 
at pains to emphasise the important and genuine constraints involved in the zero yield 
decision: "Without nuclear testing the nuclear weapon states will not be able to 
pursue confidently such technologies as the nuclear explosion pumped X-ray laser, 
the so-called nuclear shotgun, enhanced electromagnetic pulse weapons, microwave 
226 
weapons, and enhanced radiation weapons. This is a real constraint... The true-zero 
test ban will also place out of reach new `mini-nuke' and `micro-nuke' concepts - 
technologies designed to use nuclear explosive yields in small amounts. " 133 
Although a zero yield test ban was more than many CTB advocates had dared hope 
for, John Holum overstated the case that it ruled out modernisation of nuclear weapon 
systems. Some qualitative developments remain possible through subcritical tests, 
inertial confinement fusion and other technologies that were additionally funded and 
deliberately enhanced under the stewardship programme, instituted by the United 
States as a payoff to its nuclear weapons establishments. Though the other nuclear 
weapon states were less well equipped for continued modernisation of warheads 
under a test ban and lacked US resources, they each established similar programmes. 
Like the United States, all but China made statements on the record in conjunction 
with their acceptance of zero yield. Nevertheless, despite conflicting assessments of 
the real significance of the zero yield decision for the sophisticated nuclear weapon 
programmes, 134 it was a very hard fight, and one in which transnational civil society 
was at the forefront. 
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Chapter Seven 
Verification: Detection, Deterrence and Bearability 
With the aim of encouraging US ratification of the CTBT in 1999, where cold war 
rhetoric questioning the treaty's verifiability had been revived by test ban opponents, 
the heads of state of its three major European allies issued a public appeal: "the 
United States and its allies have worked side by side for a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty since the days of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This goal is now within our 
grasp. Our security is involved, as well as America's... The treaty is effectively 
verifiable... the [monitoring] system is already being put in place. We know it will 
work "1 
Negotiating the verification for arms control and disarmament treaties had proved a 
difficult and divisive challenge during the cold war, but as this chapter shows, it was 
much less contentious during the post cold war CWC and CTB negotiations. For this 
reason, the Clinton administration and international test ban advocates were surprised 
when criticisms of the verification system became a major plank of Republican 
opposition to CTB ratification by the United States. 
In the cold war context of ideological conflict and mutual suspicion, verification had 
to take into account developments in advanced technology for observing and 
detecting clandestine military-related activities, as well as potential technologies and 
opportunities for circumventing an accord. Intersecting technical capabilities and 
political concerns, negotiations had to contend with deep rooted sensitivities around 
military intelligence, espionage and national security secrecy that frequently pitted 
domestic and opposing military and political interest groups against each other. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a comprehensive treaty banning nuclear testing in all 
environments was potentially achievable in 1958 and again in 19632, but an 
unrealistic burden placed on verification by test ban opponents in the United States 
played a major role in preventing an agreement that included underground testing. At 
the forefront of those who elevated verification objectives to impossible heights were 
some of the key scientists in the nuclear laboratories who had a direct interest in 
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maintaining the research resources and intellectual drive and stimulus associated with 
nuclear weapons testing. Though the American negotiators fostered the concept of 
verification as neutral and objective, some influential scientists took advantage of the 
technical limitations of many officials and politicians in the US government (and the 
insecurity and awe that many non-scientists feel around technical experts) to promote 
demands for stringent and intrusive provisions for monitoring stations and on-site 
inspections. Soviet negotiators, provided with counter information from their own 
scientists, dismissed the technical premises on which the more far-reaching US 
verification positions were based, a position shared by some of the American 
scientists. Suspicious of American motives, the Soviets rejected the neutral, 
objective image of `proverka' (verification) with which the US negotiators promoted 
their demands. Instead, US demands for intrusive verification were depicted as 
`kontrol' (oversight), a mechanism viewed as being not for confidence building so 
4 much as for collecting intelligence on sensitive Soviet military and industrial sites. 
In view of the US-Soviet dominance of cold war politics, it is unsurprising that much 
of the literature on verification drew its conclusions from analysing bilateral arms 
control. Throughout the cold war, arms control and verification were subject to the 
mutual fears, suspicions and exaggerations that characterised US-Soviet relations. 5 
Sir Michael Wright, a PTBT negotiator on behalf of Britain with a close-up view of 
the US and Soviet postures, summed up the fundamental division in attitude to 
verification as: "what the West considered adequate, the Communist countries 
rejected as unbearable; what the Communist countries considered bearable, the West 
regarded as inadequate' .6 Put another way, the Americans assumed the Soviets 
would try to cheat and so pushed for the fullest possible range of verification 
provisions, while the Soviets assumed the Americans would spy, and so resisted 
mechanisms or technologies that might compromise their security. 
The `adequate versus bearable' dilemma hinged particularly on the more intrusive 
components of verification, drawing much of its power from the deep ideological 
divisions between the major cold war protagonists. Verification was not the neutral 
objective instrument of confidence-building that the United States sought to portray, 
but subject to domestic political manipulation. At times, for example, it was 
employed as a propaganda tool to contrast the US `open society' with the `closed' 
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Communist regime; the United States cast itself as pro-verification (signifying pro- 
honesty) and the Soviet Union as obstructive (signifying deceit). In addition to the 
noted example of the nuclear weapon laboratories distorting technical requirements 
and swaying US negotiating positions prior to the PTBT, the US intelligence agencies 
traditionally carry considerable weight, forming a powerful interest group in a 
partisan political environment where treaties require a two-thirds majority in the 
Senate. 7 
The CTBT is the first nuclear arms control treaty where attempts have been made to 
develop a multilateral monitoring regime, with stations and sensors based in many 
countries around the world. By contrast, conflicts over national technical means and 
OSI have been a familiar, politically-charged characteristic of bilateral nuclear 
negotiations in the cold war. 8 The influential verification question posed by Allan 
Krass in the 1980s - "how much is enough"9 - resurfaced in the multilateral context 
of the CTBT negotiations in the 1990s, but with notable differences in the 
protagonists and dynamics. As a consequence of the changes in Russian attitudes to 
verification, initiated under Gorbachev, post cold war Russia was no longer 
America's main ideological combatant on verification. However, during the 1990s, 
US-Chinese debates over CTBT verification, especially national technical means and 
on-site inspections, came to sound remarkably similar to the earlier US-Soviet 
debates. Other delegations, notably India, Pakistan, Iran and Israel, echoed similar 
concerns, wanting to protect their sensitive sites from scrutiny by neighbours or 
adversaries. Though the priority of most negotiators was to ensure that the 
verification system would deter and detect cheating, the CTBT case shows that for 
some participants, preventing the verification provisions being utilised as a cover for 
espionage or inappropriate intelligence gathering was an equal if not higher priority. 
After long and intensive negotiations that brought the military and national security 
interests of some of the P-5 and D-3 into confrontation with the United States, the 
middle powers helped to bridge the differences and broker compromises. The result 
was a verification regime comprising four basic elements: an international monitoring 
system; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building 
measures. Chapter 7 looks in detail at the negotiating history and dynamics for the 
two principal components of the CTBT verification regime: the international 
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monitoring system and on-site inspections, including the role of national technical 
means. These issues were chosen for study because they most clearly reveal the 
dilemmas and dynamics of negotiating multilaterally on cooperative and adversarial 
verification approaches. My intention is to look at the different ways in which 
convergence was reached, drawing out the factors by which the IMS negotiations 
differed from OSI and NTM. What role can be ascribed to Krasner's five factors - 
political power, self interest, knowledge, usage and custom, and diffuse norms and 
principles - and how did these affect the way the adequate/bearable dilemma played 
out in this example of post cold war multilateralism, especially in relation to the 
nuclear weapon status and interests of the various members of the P-S and D-3? 
Conceptualising CTBT Verification 
Nuclear testing produces four kinds of primary effects: blast, heat, initial and residual 
nuclear radiation. These phenomena result in different short, medium and long-range 
effects able to be detected by a range of different technologies and techniques. 
Although the PTBT already prohibited nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space 
and underwater, the Nuclear Test Ban Committee decided early on that the 
verification regime for the CTBT should be capable of detecting and identifying 
nuclear explosions in these environments as well as underground. Agreement soon 
emerged that the verification system would need to encompass the following: an 
international monitoring system incorporating a set of mutually complementary 
technologies enabling the prompt detection of events, providing treaty parties with 
source detection, identification, location and attribution capabilities; the exchange, 
interpretation and analysis of data; the ability to distinguish false alarms1°; the role, 
scope and provisions for OSI; the political requirement for a multilateral and 
nondiscriminatory regime and whether to incorporate information derived from 
national technical means; cost and cost effectiveness; universality and regional 
concerns; and, finally, the time required for systems to become operational. 11 
Three years before the CTBT negotiations opened, Ola Dahlman, the Swedish Chair 
of the Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to 
Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE)'Z, who played an important role in the 
development of the seismic network for the IMS, identified verification's basic 
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purposes as: "to provide confidence that other parties to the treaty are obeying their 
obligations, and to deter parties from clandestine activities violating the treaty". To 
fulfil this purpose, the verification system "must provide a high capability for the 
detection and identification of clandestine activities... [and must] limit the risk of 
creating false alarms by misinterpreting naturally occurring events as clandestine 
activities". 13 Dahlman's practitioner's definition was consistent with Allan Krass's 
classical definition of verification as "the action of demonstrating compliance with 
treaty obligations by means of evidence or information gathered by a variety of 
technical and institutional means". 14 But these basic definitions glossed over issues 
of great sensitivity and importance to the countries with capabilities that might come 
under scrutiny. 
Addressing the modem version of the adequate/bearable dilemma, arising from the 
dual-use capabilities of some technologies and techniques of verification, Krass 
sought to distinguish between verification, intelligence and espionage thus: 
"intelligence can be seen as an umbrella term covering the full spectrum of 
information-gathering activities, verification can be seen as those legal and proper 
intelligence activities which are carried out for the explicit purpose of demonstrating 
compliance with existing treaties and agreements, while espionage can be seen as 
those intelligence activities which are illegal or improper under generally accepted 
rules of international conduct". 15 Definitions notwithstanding, the problems for CTBT 
negotiators arose over how to apply the distinctions (and the fact that they were 
mediated through different worldviews about nonproliferation, disarmament, 
transparency and confidence) to the practical design of the CTBT verification system 
in ways that would reassure governments concerned not to legitimise espionage 
without risking the credibility of the treaty by allowing a major loophole for cheats. 
Civil society had already played an important role in reintegrating verification into 
arms control and challenging the misuse of verification questions as rhetorical 
devices for obstructing or delaying arms control and disarmament agreements, as 
happened too frequently (particularly in the United States) from the late 1950s 
through the 1970s. Epistemic actors and norm entrepreneurs played a leadership role 
in verification projects such as the NRDC-SAS joint experiments, helping to identify 
the verification approaches, technologies and techniques that a CTBT might require. 16 
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In a study prepared as a resource for the delegates to the PTBT Amendment 
Conference, VERTIC in 1990 identified three main functions of a CTBT verification 
regime: i) to establish a "verification gauntlet" to detect significant cheating; ii) to 
deter cheating by rendering a potential violator sufficiently unsure of escaping 
detection; and iii) to build confidence in the treaty so that the security of all parties is 
enhanced and there is an incentive for others to join in. 17 In essence, these VERTIC 
criteria reflected the verification principles developed by the Reagan Administration 
for the INF Treaty of 1987, the first breakthrough in arms limitation for more than a 
decade. Reagan's dictum "trust but verify" was open to competing interpretations, 
however. Did it signify a more constructive approach to cooperative arms control as 
the cold war ended, giving hope that verification might take its rightful place as a 
confidence-building tool to reinforce arms control compliance? Or did it confirm the 
prejudices of those who raised unobtainable and unnecessary verification demands so 
that the other party could be blamed for failing to compromise sufficiently for arms 
control to be achievable? 
Some US nongovernmental analysts sought to engage traditional opponents of arms 
control by highlighting the role that verification could play in increasing the financial 
and political costs of clandestinely producing or testing weapons in violation of treaty 
commitments. Backing agreed constraints with monitoring and inspection provisions 
can significantly diminish operational and military confidence in weapons 
developments carried out under clandestine conditions and will substantially increase 
the technical risks and economic and political costs to a cheating government. 18 
Sceptics tend to point to the discovery of Iraq's extensive nuclear weapon programme 
in 1991 as evidence that the safeguards-based verification under the NPT, of which 
Iraq is a party, had failed. Verification proponents draw a different lesson. 
Undoubtedly, the IAEA inspections of declared facilities had failed to detect Iraq's 
clandestine production at hidden, undeclared sites, a recognition of inadequacy that 
led to the overhaul of the IAEA's inspection mandates through Programme 93+219 
and the negotiation of more far-reaching safeguards protocols for NPT parties to 
adopt. Yet inadequate though the IAEA's safeguards may have been, Saddam 
Hussein's attempt to evade detection necessitated a much more expensive and 
technically difficult programme than if Iraq's nuclear weapons development had been 
able to be open and not clandestine. 20 
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This example illustrates the philosophical clash between those who perceive 
verification as primarily a confidence-building measure and deterrent against 
cheating, and those who prioritise the highest levels of detection and proof covering 
all imaginable violation scenarios. The two purposes are related, as the detection, 
location and identification capabilities must be sufficiently credible if the verification 
system is to function as an effective deterrent, but the different approaches have 
implications for negotiating posture. Neoliberals will tend to be deterrent 
verificationists and favour a more pragmatic approach designed to instil confidence in 
the system rather than guarantee a hundred percent protection against violation; 
realists, on the other hand, are more likely to be detection verificationists and to 
demand high levels of coverage for conceptually imaginable violation scenarios 
however remote they might be in practical terms. 21 
By the time the CT13T negotiations in Geneva commenced in January 1994, verifying 
a nuclear test ban had been the subject of competing ideologies, demands and 
expectations, not only between the nuclear weapon states, but among interest groups 
and departments within some of the key governments as well. Recognising this, the 
first Chair of Working Group I on Verification, Germany's ambassador, Wolfgang 
Hoffmann, sought to bring the competing approaches into the open from the start and 
enable the political and technical assumptions to be unpacked and disaggregated. In 
his first working paper, Hoffmann posed four fundamental questions: 
1) What are the main objectives of the verification of the treaty's basic 
obligations? 
2) What would be the components of such a verification system? Aside from 
seismic monitoring and on-site inspection, should the treaty envisage other 
measures such as radionuclide and hydroacoustic monitoring? 
3) What do we mean by a "cost effective" verification? What could one 
reasonably expect to verify and how much would it cost? 
4) If one opts for an "evolutionary approach", should the treaty itself provide for 
a mechanism (and resources) to develop and evaluate other monitoring 
techniques? 22 
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As responses to these questions came in, the differing priorities could be more clearly 
be assessed. The evolutionary approach referred to by Hoffmann was advocated by 
Russia, and came to be widely supported among the nonaligned states. In contrast to 
some of the proposals from the United States and also China, which advocated the 
inclusion of satellites in the IMS, Russia wanted the verification system to begin with 
a pragmatic baseline, allowing for the gradual inclusion of "new methods and 
technical means that would increase the reliability and quality of the CTBT 
compliance verification". 23 The evolutionary concept was immediately opposed by 
the United States, France and Britain, who portrayed it as tantamount to agreeing to 
open-ended verification. To understand how these differences were resolved, the 
following section considers the development of the IMS in detail. 
The International Monitoring System 
Of all the different parts of the CTBT negotiations, developing the IMS was the most 
genuinely multilateral. There were three major - and related - reasons for this: 
effective management and continuity of coordination; the direct, accountable 
engagement of scientists and technical experts on a number of NNWS delegations as 
well as from the nuclear weapon states; and conscious attempts to disaggregate issues 
and depoliticise disagreements. Although there was an inevitable dominance by those 
with greater technological expertise and command, they did not always get their own 
way. 
The principal coordinator throughout the IMS negotiations was Peter Marshall, a 
British MoD scientist with long experience in monitoring technologies, who had 
participated in the tripartite testing talks as part of the British delegation in 1977-80. 
In addition to those earlier negotiations, Marshall had considerable multilateral 
experience, having been a member of the GSE since its inception in 1976. This gave 
him the advantage of being well known and already respected among many of the 
scientists from other delegations. In 1994, he was appointed Friend of the Chair on 
Non-Seismic Verification, with Ajit Kumar of India providing diplomatic oversight 
of the seismic component of the IMS, working closely with Dahlman and the GSE. In 
1995, Patrick Cole of Australia was appointed Friend of the Chair for the IMS, tasked 
with negotiating treaty language on the technical options being worked out among the 
scientists. Marshall, made responsible for Technical Verification, carried on with his 
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work to develop the IMS, while Ralph Alewine (United States) was appointed to 
coordinate negotiations on the International Data Centre. These three worked 
exceptionally well together and were reappointed to the same positions in 1996 in 
order to finalise agreement on the architecture of the IMS and its appropriate 
representation in treaty text. 
A major problem for bilateral arms control negotiations in the past has been the 
perceptual dissonance among Soviet and American policy-makers about the 
relationship between the technical and political components of verification. 
Portraying their verification positions as arising from a neutral, technical quest to find 
the best, objective means to ascertain compliance or non-compliance with a given 
agreement, the United States has appeared to regard any opposition to its verification 
demands as having an ulterior political motive, i. e. to weaken the US ability to deter 
potential or planned cheating. By contrast, Soviet policy-makers viewed verification 
as inherently political, the perception of data and technical arguments depending on 
policy objectives and negotiating strategies. 24 
In the negotiations on the IMS, there continued to be a strong US disposition towards 
presenting its proposals as if based on neutral technical data and therefore non- 
negotiable. But possibilities for polarisation were undercut by the fact that the 
criticism of US positions in the CTBT was as likely to come from its Western allies 
as from opposing weapons states or G-21 members. The multilateral dynamic in the 
IMS negotiations therefore curtailed the American capacity to dismiss arguments 
against its IMS positions as emanating from ideological incompatibility or the malign 
purpose of seeking ways to cheat. In addition, Marshall worked hard to demystify 
concepts, unpack complex issues, and represent technical and financial options in 
ways that built confidence among some of the less technically well resourced 
delegations. By deliberately highlighting the policy implications of different technical 
options that the working group put forward, his strategy (paradoxically, some might 
think) helped to depoliticise the disagreements. 
Though there were many differences of view regarding the number, distribution and 
location of sensors, there were only three major disputes, each of which pitted one of 
the NWS against the majority of participants in the negotiations. The most difficult 
243 
dispute to resolve concerned China's insistence (supported by Pakistan) that the IMS 
must include satellites and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) monitoring, and that it 
should omit the infrasound network. The second problem concerned the analysis of 
data by the international data centre. The United States, the only country to have 
direct experience running a prototype IDC (in Virginia), argued that the massive 
amount of complex data from the IMS should only be processed, to produce a bulletin 
of detected events, and then disseminated and archived, leaving all interpretation in 
the hands of individual states parties. Fearing that the majority, lacking adequate 
resources to analyse such data, would be disenfranchised, the G-21 pushed for the 
IDC to provide more `user friendly' reports, with some analysis and at least 
preliminary identification of any events that could be clearly identified as of natural 
origin. Russia sparked a further, short-lived but politically problematic dispute over 
additional test site monitoring, suddenly putting in a late demand for extra seismic 
and radionuclide stations to be placed at the four operational test sites. 
In the first year, the competing claims of seven technologies were discussed in the 
verification working group: seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, infrasound, ground- 
based optical, ground-based EMP detection, and satellites. 5 Under Marshall's 
direction, the experts developed six options for consideration, looking at detection 
capabilities for explosions of three standard yields. Four options were offered for the 
anticipated baseline of 1 kt, a practical standard for detecting nuclear explosions 
equivalent to 1000 tonnes of TNT or more. Minimalist and maximalist options were 
also provided for a larger potential baseline of 5 kt (involving around 25 primary 
seismic stations with three other IMS technologies) and for a much lower baseline of 
100 tonnes, which would have required much more extensive monitoring based on 
150 primary seismic stations and increased coverage from a range of other IMS 
technologies. 
There was some anxiety among non-nuclear countries that this baseline was 
conveniently higher than the threshold negotiations being conducted among the P-S. 
When I kt was formally accepted as the baseline criterion, Marshall sought to address 
this concern, emphasising that the baseline was a practical measure for designing a 
cost effective system and must not be confused with a threshold. 26 The baseline 
determination reflected two kinds of assessment: the need to keep costs down; and the 
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scientists' confidence that the synergistic relationship between different IMS 
technologies would ensure that nuclear explosive testing at much lower levels would 
in practice be detected. The uncertainty factor was expected to provide a high 
deterrent value down to very small yields. 27 
The Seismic Signature 
The core of the IMS is the seismic network. An underground explosion generates 
seismic waves which can be detected by special sensors, data from which can be used 
to locate and identify the origin of the waves. As nuclear explosions have a 
characteristic signature, seismic stations can also distinguish between earthquakes and 
explosions. Much work had already been done on seismic verification, principally 
through the work of the GSE, established at the insistence of a group of non-nuclear 
and nonaligned countries in 1976, in part to counteract test ban opponents' portrayal 
of the CTBT as unverifiable. 
As negotiations got underway in the verification working group, there was much 
concession-trading around the number and location of primary and secondary seismic 
stations that would be needed to provide cost effective verification confidence. Some 
countries were concerned about the expense and inconvenience of having stations on 
national territory, while others were keen to host a station, perceiving it as an 
opportunity for closer participation in international projects or research. Some were 
wary of stations being sited close to sensitive facilities. With Marshall's careful 
management, the majority of such concerns were able to be resolved by a process of 
trade-offs, negotiation and reassurance. In January 1996, however, after the IMS was 
thought to be substantially finalised, Russia caused astonishment with a late proposal 
calling for four additional seismic and radionuclide stations, one each to be located at 
the test sites at Nevada, Lop Nor, Novaya Zemlya and Moruroa. Explaining the late 
demand, Berdennikov argued for "identical transparency", claiming that Novaya 
Zemlya was more closely monitored than Nevada. 28 Russian diplomats went further, 
indicating that the zero yield decision altered the government's view of IMS 
requirements. 29 
Russia's demand was a petulant reaction to being steamrolled into the zero yield 
scope and was targeted at the United States, but China objected most vociferously. In 
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an oblique reference to mutual support between the Russian and Chinese delegations 
over issues such as PNE and OSI, China criticised the new proposal as presenting 
"only Russian views" and said it gave the impression that only the NWS might be 
suspected of violating the treaty. China objected that Lop Nor was more closely 
monitored than the global average in any case and rejected any further enhancement 
of the detection level as excessive and unacceptable. 30 Ignoring the fact that the P-5 
are more capable of conducting (and concealing) nuclear tests than the global 
average, China based its objection on the principle that the verification system must 
be equal and nondiscriminatory. The Russian demand combined with Chinese 
hostility to increased monitoring at Lop Nor threatened the IMS negotiations with a 
verification deadlock. The United States took the lead in bridge-building to resolve 
the conflict, initiating hurried negotiations among the P-5, and then negotiating 
bilaterally first with Russia, to whom it offered bilateral confidence-building 
measures, and then China. In the end it was agreed that the location of one seismic 
station would be changed from California to Nevada, closer to the US test site, and 
that the station earmarked for Kazakhstan would be updated to a more sophisticated 
array and moved closer to the border with China's Xinjiang province, thereby 
bringing it closer to Lop Nor without requiring explicit Chinese agreement. 31 The 
incident took the CD by surprise because it was a regression to the days when 
arguments about verification masked other political, ideological or power struggles. 
Detecting Airborne Radioactivity 
The second network to be incorporated into the IMS was designed to measure the 
radionuclides emitted from a nuclear explosion in the form of dispersed particulates 
and gases. These emissions can be distinguished from similar fission products 
released by nuclear power plant operations or accidents. Though there was general 
agreement that radionuclide sampling would be necessary to detect atmospheric tests 
or venting from underground or underwater explosions, there were two areas of 
contention: whether it was necessary to measure for the emission of chemically inert, 
`noble' gases such as argon-37, with a half life of 35 days, xenon-133, with a half life 
of 5 days, and the more long-lived isotope, krypton-85, with a half life of 10.7 years; 
and whether specially equipped aircraft could play a useful role. Experts from two 
delegations were charged with the task of analysing how the radionuclides would 
respond to geographical and meteorological conditions, such as wind transportation. 
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Aiming for 90 percent detection probability of aI kt explosion within 14 days, the 
experts recommended a radionuclide network comprising some 70-80 stations and 
from five to ten radionuclide laboratories around the world 32 
On the grounds that noble gases from nuclear explosions are known to leak from 
underground explosions, 33 eventually all but one delegation in the `Radionuclide 
Expert Group' agreed that noble gas monitoring should be included in the IMS. They 
reasoned that noble gases could play a uniquely valuable role in early detection and 
identification (within ten days) of an explosion in several potential environments, 
contributing especially to early resolution of ambiguous events, which would be 
politically desirable. Noble gas monitoring would also assist in detecting a decoupled 
explosion and increase the costs and risks to a potential violator, thereby maximising 
the deterrent function of the verification regime. China's experts disagreed. They 
argued that the effectiveness of noble gas monitoring was difficult to judge but would 
significantly increase the overall costs of the IMS. In Beijing's view noble gas 
monitoring would only contribute to the detection of underground or underwater 
testing if sensors were located very close to the site. China was willing to include 
testing for noble gas emissions as part of an OSI, but noted that time-critical 
phenomena, such as xenon gas, would disappear aller two weeks. 4 Appearing to 
endorse the concept of evolutionary verification, on which it had remained hitherto 
silent, China argued that the question of adding a noble gas monitoring capability 
should be deferred; if more technical study showed that inclusion was warranted, 
noble gas monitoring could be added to the IMS at a later stage. 5 During the final 
concession-trading of the endgame, China accepted Ramaker's draft incorporating 
noble gas sensors co-located with 40 of the 80 radionuclide stations. 
A second disagreement arose because Russia wanted fewer ground-based 
radionuclide sensors than were being considered in Marshall's options. Instead, 
Russia proposed equipping three special aircraft which could be quickly scrambled to 
over fly a suspicious location or event, with sensors to detect particulates and noble 
gases. Russia's position was that a CTBT violation was likely to be very rare, and that 
maintaining a full radionuclide monitoring network in perpetuity would be very 
expensive. They considered it more cost efficient to have the commitment to deploy 
appropriately equipped aircraft immediately after a suspicious event was detected by 
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other technologies. Russia argued that this could be accomplished rapidly and would 
enable samples to be taken in various atmospheric layers. 36 Others, however, worried 
about the timing and terms (ownership, responsibility for equipping, personnel 
training, piloting etc. ) that would govern the deployment of the aircraft. In the end, 
this issue was resolved through US-brokered concession-trading in conjunction with 
the P-5 negotiations on Russia's proposal for identical transparency at the test sites. 
In return for two seismic stations being moved a little closer to the US and Chinese 
test sites, Russia abandoned the proposal for aircraft and agreed to the network of 
monitors outlined in Ramaker's draft treaty text. 
'Hearing' Underwater Explosions 
From the beginning there was agreement that there should be a hydroacoustic 
network for detecting explosions conducted underwater or underground in marine 
environments, such as the French test sites at Moruroa and Fangataufa in the Pacific. 
Such explosions generate a wave in the low sound velocity layer in the oceans known 
as the SOFAR (sound and far range) channel, 37 which can be detected by 
hydroacoustic sensors thousands of kilometres from their source. Negotiations 
therefore focused on the number and location of hydroacoustic stations, to maximise 
cost effectiveness. Initially there was enthusiasm for establishing 16 stations: four 
each to cover the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, plus a station south of Africa 
to cover both the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, and three additional hydroacoustic 
stations to aid location identification and to cover in the event of failure of one of the 
primary stations. Because of the very high expense, this system was modified down 
by agreement to six fixed cable hydrophone stations and five T-phase stations near 
coasts or on islands. 38 
Sensing Nuclear Shockwaves 
A further technology, infrasound, was advocated by the majority of delegations to 
provide enhanced detection and location capabilities for nuclear explosions conducted 
in the atmosphere. Consisting of either microphones or microbarographs, organised 
for maximum effectiveness in arrays of three or more sensors, infrasound sensors 
detect the shockwaves produced by nuclear explosions once they have decayed into a 
sound wave. Apart from China and Pakistan, who argued that satellites and EMP 
would be more effective and would obviate the necessity for infrasound coverage, 
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there was an early majority for including an infrasound network of around 60 sensors 
in the IMS. When Beijing finally accepted that satellites and EMP monitoring would 
not be included in the IMS, China and Pakistan also withdrew their objections to 
incorporating an infrasound network into the treaty. 
Leaving out Satellites and EMP 
China's proposal for the IMS to include a network of satellites and electromagnetic 
pulse monitors proved very controversial. China's position was that EMP and 
satellites were necessary to detect and identify nuclear explosions conducted in the 
upper atmosphere or space and to monitor potential sites on the ground. Most other 
delegations regarded a CTBT-specific satellite system as prohibitively expensive. 39 
Additionally, China proposed that a network of around 60 EMP sensors could be 
established at relatively low cost and would provide "high sensitivity, precise location 
and prompt response" for detecting nuclear explosions conducted in the upper 
atmosphere 40 By contrast with its position on satellites, which was shared only by 
Pakistan, there was wider interest in China's assertions that a ground-based EMP 
system would enhance the location and identification capability for atmospheric and 
high altitude tests. Concerns were raised about a high false alarm rate due to 
lightning, however. China proposed that the analytical software could be designed to 
discriminate between lightning EMP and nuclear EMP, but other experts were 
sceptical that this would be possible, and in the end, EMP monitoring was left out 41 
Interpreting IMS Data 
The International Data Centre, modelled on the US experimental IDC in Virginia, 
was intended to process thousands of pages of computerised data from the stations 
and networks in the IMS. Among the many details that needed to be resolved, the 
question of IDC "products" - in effect, how often and in what form the IDC data 
should be transmitted to states parties - became a focus for sharp disagreement in late 
1995 and early 1996. Although carried out in the language of technical parameters for 
filtering and analysing data, the underlying issue was primarily one of participation, 
finance and cost effectiveness. Although some G-21 members would have preferred 
the IDC to tell them if there was a violation, there was no serious or lasting dispute 
over the majority view that it was the responsibility of states parties and not the IDC 
or technical secretariat to assess compliance, as this required the exercise of political 
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judgement. In contention was what form of information, reports or bulletins the IDC 
should send out to enable states parties to exercise this judgment role according to the 
treaty's purpose and requirements. In this, as in nothing else, the US approach was 
minimalist. 
Though it was indisputable that the raw data would be unmanageable for most states 
parties, the United States took the view that the IDC should only process, compact 
and disseminate the data; anything more would usurp the responsibility of states 
parties to assess compliance. But only a very few states have the technology to come 
near to the US capacity to analyse the data in a timely, regular and effective manner. 
The American position provoked widespread hostility from most NNWS. They 
considered it absurd to base a standard on US technological supremacy, as this would 
effectively exclude the majority from decisionmaking 42 Resolution of the issue was 
complicated by the fact that the Friend of the Chair on the IDC for most of 1995 and 
1996 was a member of the US delegation, Ralph Alewine. In February 1996, Alewine 
put out a working paper with three options, presenting the one closest to the US 
position as the cheapest for the CTBTO to provide. Other negotiators, however, 
pointed out that for states parties wishing to participate fully in decisionmaking, this 
option would actually be the most expensive on an individual basis 43 As a US 
government employee, Alewine was in a difficult position. While sympathising with 
his dilemmas, some negotiators felt that he had skewed presentation of the options 
towards the US policy position. As the debate developed, Germany was the first 
Western ally to take a public stand against the US position. Commenting that all the 
options put forward by Alewine were simply different degrees of technical evaluation 
and screening of data, Germany advocated making use of IDC expertise to provide 
substantial filtering for the data. This would be more cost effective in the long run 
and would ensure greater participation by states with limited technical capabilities of 
their own . 
44 With Germany's formidable technical experts weighing in on the side of 
the non-aligned, the US position began to weaken. After considerable consultation 
and discussion during the final year, Ramaker decided that the IDC would screen data 
in accordance with internationally standardised criteria established by the CTBTO, 
filter it according to nationally requested criteria, and provide some additional 
technical assistance to states parties. This "enhanced option 2" was accepted by the 
United States and others in May 1996. 
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With conclusion of the provisions for the IDC, the IMS was finally agreed. It was to 
comprise 50 primary seismic stations and 120 auxiliary seismic stations; 80 
radionuclide stations for monitoring particulates in the atmosphere, of which 40 
would ultimately be capable of monitoring noble gases; 11 hydroacoustic stations, 
and 60 infiasound monitors. 45 
One final note must be added here. Having participated fully in the IMS negotiations, 
even acting as a Friend of the Chair in the first year, India withdrew its participation 
in the IMS during the very last stage of negotiations. This had nothing to do with its 
position on the IMS per se, but was in reaction to the entry into force formula inserted 
into the Chair's first draft treaty. 4' Thus, the exemplary multilateral negotiations on 
the IMS fell victim to India's retaliation against what it perceived as coercion over 
entry into force, an outcome that highlighted the British delegation's postural 
contradictions. 
On-Site Inspections 
From the multilateralism of the IMS negotiations, we turn now to consider how the 
negotiations achieved convergence on the issues of inspections and national technical 
means, recurring sources of conflict in arms control negotiations. Negotiations about 
on-site inspections - the direct, physical examination of a suspected site or facility - 
and the related question of whether and how data from national technical means 
would be incorporated, laid bare governments' concerns about national security, 
equality and discrimination under international law. It pitted anxieties about spying 
against the verification requirement of timely access to evidence. As this section 
shows, the principles of sovereignty and nondiscrimination, evoked primarily by 
China, the weakest of the NWS, and the D-3, were juxtaposed against the US's 
unilateralist desire to watch, know and have the option to control other states that 
might impinge on its own national security. 
Though deliberations on OSI started at the same time as other issues, with a Russian 
Friend of the Chair in 1994, actual negotiations did not get underway until the final 
year. The first two years generated many questionnaires and working papers to define 
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the parameters and issues relating to OSI, but there was little real political attention. 
This was in part because of the impossibility of determining the level of intrusiveness 
that would be required until the scope and basic obligations had been substantially 
agreed. Such slowness in getting to grips with the challenges was due not only to the 
sensitivity of OSI for domestic military, national security and intelligence interests, 
but also to some states parties' attempts to renegotiate the precedents on inspections 
set by the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the CD concluded just before 
embarking on the CTBT. 
In the CWC, there had been little controversy over NTM, but OSI was central, with 
the main protagonists switching positions, partners and priorities over the adequacy 
and bearability of levels of access and intrusion. 47 In the wake of post-Gulf War 
revelations in 1991, showing how Iraq had evaded the IAEA safeguards inspections, 
many states wanted the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) to have wide powers of inspection, including the right to conduct short- 
notice inspections at undeclared as well as declared sites. Having accepted the 
principle of intrusive OSI in the INF Treaty, President Gorbachev in 1988 indicated 
his willingness to accept the US demand for "anytime, anywhere" inspections in the 
CWC. 48 The Soviet acceptance of the US position threw Washington into confusion, 
leading to interagency reviews, with muddled and contradictory statements, and an 
eventual reversal of US policy on OSI. During the difficult negotiations that ensued, 
the United States was opposed by most of its allies, but found odd bedfellows as 
China, Pakistan, India and Iran gave guarded approval to the less-intrusive 
inspections put forward in the US-led "gang of one plus three" proposals of July 
199149 In the end, Australia and Britain brokered a compromise which was accepted 
by the United States and, in effect, imposed on the rest. Described by one enthusiastic 
observer as its "crowning glory", the CWC concluded with mandatory, short-notice 
"challenge" inspections with procedures for "managed access" to protect sensitive 
information or sites not related to the CWC. 5° 
After the confusions of the CWC, when the United States and Russia switched 
positions and Washington lost credibility by retreating from the wide-access 
provisions it had laid down in the 1980s, it was not Russia, but China, which took the 
United States up to the wire on OSI provisions for the CTBT, managing to force a 
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last-minute change to the Chair's draft text. With important domestic constituencies 
to satisfy, the national interests of both countries took precedence over regime 
considerations, showing once again that for states with nuclear weapons programmes 
or ambitions, the question of intrusive inspections can make or break arms control 
negotiations. 
Background 
During the first phase of negotiations for a test ban in the 1950s, the Report of the 
Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violation of a Possible 
Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests concluded as follows: "When the 
control posts detect an event which cannot be identified by the international control 
organ and which could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, the international 
control organ can send an inspection group to the site of this event in order to 
determine whether a nuclear explosion had taken place or not. " s' Theoretically sound, 
perhaps, but it soon became clear that the Soviet delegation and the US-UK 
delegations differed in their interpretation of the Conference of Experts' 
recommendations. Britain and the United States wanted inspections to be launched 
"at any time" that the seismic data were deemed to be inconclusive. Moscow 
considered that ambiguous events should first be the subject of consultations between 
the treaty parties, and that inspections should only take place if agreed to by the party 
on whose territory the unidentified event had occurred. 52 In the end, unable to agree 
on control posts and inspections, the three nuclear powers settled on the PTBT, 
deciding that remote monitoring by technical means would be sufficient to oversee a 
prohibition on nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, 
without the intrusiveness that a ban on underground testing would require. 53 
Subsequently, and for much of the 1960s -1980s, disagreements over the requirement 
and modalities of OSI pitted Soviet and American negotiators against each other. The 
Reagan administration raised the standard verification requirement from "adequate" 
to "effective", and for many American policymakers, effective verification meant on- 
site inspections; the terms were employed politically as if they were synonymous. 54 
At the same time, OSI had become a potent tool of confrontation. The US 
government would call for intrusive inspections as a means of undercutting Soviet 
disarmament proposals, enabling Washington to take the political high ground and 
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put Moscow on the defensive, while garnering domestic and international support 
against the resulting `intransigent' Soviet behaviour. Bureaucratic manoeuvring over 
OSI also became a tactic in Washington's domestic arguments over arms control. ss 
After the inability to agree on intrusive inspections ruined the chance of achieving a 
ban on underground tests with Eisenhower and Kennedy, little progress was made 
until the mid-1980s when, in a radical departure from previous Soviet policy, 
Gorbachev accepted intrusive inspections in order to secure the INF Treaty. 56 
As already noted, OSI was hard fought in the CWC, and there was spillover from its 
conduct and outcome into the CTBT negotiations. As the following section details, 
the United States in the CTBT reverted to advocacy of stringent OSI requirements. 
China took the opposite extreme, fearing interference in its sovereign affairs and 
raising objections about espionage. The United States, Britain, and France 
emphasised the necessity for quick access and the prompt gathering of time-critical 
evidence, such as aftershocks and the venting of short-lived radioactive gases, 
although Britain and France were more prepared to compromise on questions of 
decisionmaking and access. Russia provided weak support to the Western positions, 
but favoured early provision for consultations and clarification, though with greater 
flexibility about its terms and timing. Along a continuum between the US and 
Chinese extremes, Russia was a little further from US positions than the two 
European NWS, especially regarding access to sensitive facilities, but not as 
distinctly opposed as its adversarial, pre-INF history on OSI might have suggested. 
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China, India, Pakistan and Israel argued that OSI should be a tool of last resort, used 
rarely, and only undertaken if a mandatory period of consultations failed to resolve a 
suspicious event or ambiguity. Israel, which for most of the negotiations had kept 
close to US positions, took a line much closer to that of China than the United States, 
principally because of its concerns about neighbours using the provision to gain 
access to sensitive facilities. 
Intrusion -v- Protection: the Underlying Questions 
The first two years of negotiations, 1994-95, focused on technical questions. In so 
doing, they brought out - but failed to address - the conflicting sensitivities that were 
to polarise the endgame. After its lack of coherence on OSI during the CWC 
negotiations, the United States now pushed for a stringent CTBT inspections 
254 
provision based on simplified decision-making and early access. As noted above, 
relations with Russia were less adversarial than in past negotiations, amounting to a 
form of collaboration on technical questions, in which both nuclear powers had much 
greater experience than most other participants. Having set the precedent in the INF 
Treaty and CWC of accepting a substantially more intrusive OSI regime than before, 
and with the major Soviet test site of Semipalatinsk already closed and under Kazakh 
administration, it was in Russia's interests to take a pragmatic approach. 
In the first year of OSI negotiations, Victor Slipchenko, the Russian Friend of the 
Chair, appointed US delegation member John Zucca to head an expert group to 
consider the detectable characteristics, termed "manifestations or residual effects" of 
nuclear detonations and evasion scenarios in various environments. After much 
technical discussion, in which experts from the P-5 were most prominent, Zucca's list 
of what evidence might reveal a clandestine nuclear explosion looked remarkably 
similar to that developed by the Geneva Conference of Experts forty years earlier. 
Ruling out the possibility of conducting OSI in space and the upper atmosphere, the 
expert's report focused on testing in the lower atmosphere, underground and 
underwater environments, with particular emphasis on underground. Time critical 
manifestations identified included aftershocks; xenon gas58; and human-generated 
artefacts, such as roads, debris or tailings, which could be quickly concealed or 
altered. Less time-critical manifestations included: surface cratering; underground 
cavity and rubble zone; residual underground radioactivity; surface changes from 
ground spallation; argon gas59; changes in ground water level; and anomalies of heat, 
pressure and gas flow within the fractured geology. 60 
Zucca's report was not intended to address political questions per se, but he did 
acknowledge the political sensitivity of questions relating to: information and 
procedures for "triggering" and deciding on an OSI; timing; the size of the inspection 
area; restriction of access in the event of national security sensitivities; and the terms 
and requirements, if any, of a consultation and clarification process. Since there was 
general agreement on what an OSI would look for, discussion in 1995 skirted around 
the politically sensitive issues. Many countries put forward working papers, 
exchanging information on national positions, but until the scope was agreed, there 
was little pressure to resolve other issues. By the end of 1995, the problems and 
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disagreements relating to inspections were at least out in the open and could be 
summed up as a series of questions. First, and most importantly: by whom should an 
OSI request be made: states parties only, the CTBT Organisation or both? Secondly, 
there was the question of what kind of evidence would be permissible to use when 
making an OSI request: data from the IMS only, or would nationally acquired 
information (from intelligence sources or satellites, for example) be acceptable as 
well? If NTM were accepted, should such information be evaluated on the same 
terms as IMS data or be accorded different weight? 
A further question divided negotiators into advocates of either a `red light' or `green 
light' decisionmaking process: assuming an executive council with the right and 
responsibility to authorise inspections, should the procedure be made easy, for the 
sake of speed, or more stringent, to avoid unnecessary intrusion on a state's sovereign 
territory? Somewhat confusingly for many delegations, the `red light' was less 
stringent because it provided for a requested OSI to be conducted automatically 
unless the executive council voted to stop the OSI (giving it the `red light'), for which 
it would require a specified majority (the options were for a simple, two-thirds or 
three quarters majority). Under the `green light' procedure, the executive council 
would be required to consider any OSI request, which would only go ahead on the 
basis of council agreement to give it the `green light' (again, by a possible simple, 
two-thirds or three quarters majority). 
When negotiations reconvened in January 1996, the competing approaches to OSI 
had been narrowed down to three broad issues: the role of transparency, 
consultations and clarification; the informational basis on which an inspection could 
be triggered, i. e. a determination of the role of NTM; and the bundle of questions 
relating to the decisionmaking process, access, timelines and whether inspections 
should be undertaken in phases. Each of these questions hinged to some degree on the 
others, and all required political decisions that carried sensitive burdens among 
powerful domestic interest groups dealing with intelligence and national security. 
Transparency 
During the CWC an important distinction had been drawn between routine 
inspections, aimed at verifying declarations (while also monitoring for signs of 
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undeclared activity) and challenge inspections, triggered on the basis of suspicions 
that clandestine activities in violation of the treaty might have taken place. 61 Given 
the nature of nuclear tests, routine inspections were dismissed as unnecessary for the 
CTBT, but suggestions were made to open certain areas or activities to transparency 
measures. The major concerns focused on the former nuclear test sites, mining areas, 
locations of large chemical explosions, and caverns with potential for decoupling 
(masking the signature) of nuclear explosions. The proposed transparency measures 
included declaration and notification prior to activities that might be registered as 
ambiguous by the IMS, and information and clarification following any anomalous 
seismic events or releases of radioactivity. 
The NNWS themselves were divided about transparency and what would constitute 
effective - and cost effective - verification. Some advocated observers in the event of 
particularly large chemical explosions, but this was rejected as overly expensive and 
time-consuming. Sweden advocated notifying the CTBTO of chemical explosions 
above 500 tons, but Australia and Canada (both of which had to pay attention to the 
concerns of their commercial mining companies) argued against, on grounds that this 
"would serve no useful purpose without an observer being present at the time of the 
blast". 62 Instead, they proposed that there should be transparency measures with 
respect to the former nuclear test sites, as well as declarations on the locations of 
frequent and significant explosions, and technology transfer to enable more countries 
to make use of ripple-firing techniques, which were regarded as less likely to be 
confused with the seismic signature of a nuclear explosion. These ideas, as well as 
discussions of the potential OSI requirements associated with proposals from 
Germany and Sweden for the treaty scope to cover preparations for testing, did not 
survive the opposition of the weapon states and others. 63 Associated with 
transparency and confidence-building measures, most states argued that there should 
be an opportunity for consultation and clarification following detection of an 
ambiguous event, but they disagreed on whether consultations should be mandatory, 
prior to an OSI request, and if so, for how long and between whom: just the 
challenging state party and the challenged state party, or whether the technical 
secretariat and/or the executive council should be involved at this stage. 
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Phased Inspections, Decisionmaking and Access 
As some states questioned the actual importance of evidence deemed time critical, 
such as local aftershocks or the venting of xenon gas, the United States promoted the 
idea of challenge inspections in phases, augmenting the level of intrusion if 
successive phases were warranted by a failure to resolve the ambiguity or suspicion in 
an earlier phase. The idea for a three-phase process was first put forward in June 
1994.64 After refining its approach, more as a result of discussions among its 
domestic experts than negotiations with other delegations, the United States put 
forward further proposals in June and July 1995, this time advocating that there 
should be two discrete phases 65 In the US view, a two-phase approach would 
"balance... the competing requirements for ... quick and early access to an inspection 
site, cost effectiveness, limited intrusiveness, and prevention of frivolous and abusive 
OSI requests". 66 
Conducting OSI in phases had implications for the decisionmaking process: would an 
executive council decision be required for each phase or could the next phase proceed 
automatically if the inspection team considered it needed further data? In the US 
proposal, each phase would need to be requested by a state party, but there was also 
the option of choosing means other than OSI, including direct consultations, to clarify 
ambiguous events. A challenging state party would have to balance the political 
circumstances and risks of being judged to have made a frivolous or abusive request, 
but "if states parties act responsibly, the US approach will keep the number of OSIs 
and OSI costs manageable". 67 In addition, the US papers suggested that investigations 
into ambiguous events outside the jurisdiction of any particular state party, such as in 
international waters, could be undertaken by one or more states parties individually, 
with or without the involvement of the technical secretariat 68 The G-21 immediately 
objected to extending an individual state's investigating rights in this way, counter. 
proposing that the CTBTO should have "exclusive responsibility" for OSI "in areas 
both within and beyond the jurisdiction or control of states parties". 69 
As the US delegation argued strenuously for phased OSI, the rest of the P-5 were 
divided along unusual lines. France and China appeared initially open but wanted to 
discuss ideas that would significantly modify the US concept. Russia and Britain 
opposed the two-phase approach altogether, preferring there to be one request and 
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one decision, although they had different views about what the actual decision 
mechanism should be. China advocated a mandatory consultation and clarification 
process of up to three days and a consideration and preparation stage taking up to 
three weeks. The Chinese delegation consequently suggested that a less intrusive 
OSI, not exceeding 15 days, could be followed by a second phase of up to 30 days. 
Both phases would require a `green light' vote in favour by a two-thirds majority of 
the executive council 70 Russia preferred either a voluntary or compulsory 
consultation and clarification process, arguing that OSI, though an essential part of 
the verification regime, should be presumed an exception. Reasoning that "as a rule, 
all other possibilities of clearing up the situation will be exhausted before a request is 
made for inspection", Russia wanted there to be a single decision to undertake an 
inspection, taken within seven days of the initial request by a state party. The decision 
would need a `green light' vote in favour by a two-thirds majority of the executive 
council. Suggesting a maximum of 40 days per inspection unless drilling was 
necessary, Russia emphasised that there needed to be some flexibility. The time- 
frame should be determined by the type of ambiguous event and evidence available: 
up to the designated maximum, an OSI should be able to be extended or terminated 
early depending on the evidence. If drilling were required, a separate decision should 
be taken by the Director-General and confirmed by the executive council permitting 
an additional 50 days for this purpose. 7' 
Outside the P-5, the D-3 were the most active participants in the OSI negotiations. 
Both Pakistan and India joined China in advocating a mandatory period of 
consultation and clarification; they argued that only once this has failed to resolve the 
ambiguity would the challenging state party's request for an OSI be submitted to the 
executive council, which would have to provide authorisation by a `green light' vote 
of two-thirds or three-quarters majority for the inspection to go ahead. Maintaining 
that OSI should not be conducted in a "hasty manner", Pakistan's Ambassador Munir 
Akram also questioned the premise on which the two-phase argument rested, averring 
that in a well camouflaged test, noble gas releases and after shocks could be made 
negligible. 72 
During the negotiations, Israel put in a number of working papers relating to OSI 
procedures and technologies, even proposing draft treaty text to ensure the protection 
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of confidentiality and national security under the verification regime, particularly 
with respect to OSI. Up to that point, Israel - the only D-3 state not then a member of 
the CD - had participated in the CTBT negotiations, but was rather quiet and 
unobtrusive on most issues. 73 It was assumed that Israel was in close consultation 
with the United States and in agreement with its major positions. With respect to OSI, 
however, Israel's military and intelligence lobbies were active in pushing for a 
slower, more restrictive and much less intrusive OSI provision than demanded by its 
ally. Concerned that some of its Middle East neighbours might use the OSI provision 
to demand frequent inspections at the Dimona nuclear facility or elsewhere, Israel's 
positions were almost diametrically opposed to the American proposals on three 
major issues: elevating the role of the technical secretariat and diminishing the rights 
of states parties in OSI requests; a long mandatory consultation period; and stringent 
decisionmaking procedures. For example, Israel opposed separately phased OSI and 
wanted authorisation to be on the basis of one `green light' decision, requiring the 
positive vote of a two-thirds majority. In its view, although a treaty party may submit 
a request, with evidence, it should be the technical secretariat rather than an 
individual state party that would have the primary right to request an inspection. 
Moreover, the Israelis wanted a time-frame allowing ten days for mandatory 
consultation, clarification and consideration of relevant information, before any OSI 
request would go before the executive council. Israel also pushed for inspected states 
parties to have the right to "exclude locations and facilities at the initial stage" of an 
OSI and "to exempt sensitive facilities from access on the basis of national security, 
proprietary rights and health and safety reasons. "74 If denying access, a state party 
would be required to "make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through 
alternative means that a nuclear explosion has not been conducted there" and should 
not invoke denial provisions to conceal a clandestine test. 75 
Despite acknowledging Israel's concerns and accepting that there might be a need for 
"managed access" to "protect certain sensitive facilities within the requested area 
from OSI intrusion", the US delegation maintained its position that the presumption 
should be full access, with restrictions only as the exception. 76 Managed access was 
a problem for more than just Israel. Russia also referred to the right to protect national 
security during an OSI by means of managed or regulated access, and proposed that 
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the inspected state party could provide convincing evidence "that the excluded part of 
the region had no connection with the ambiguous event". 77 
National Technical Means 
An issue which was discussed from the beginning and only resolved at the very end 
of the negotiations was whether to permit information derived from NTM to 
supplement IMS data or to support a request for an inspection. The US position was 
at one extreme, pushing for any kind of data to be permissible in support of a state 
party's request for an OSI. 78 Arguing that NTM must be admitted as a legitimate 
component of CTBT verification, the US frequently cited the belated discovery of 
Iraq's nuclear programme as vindication of its position that a multilateral verification 
system, of itself, could not be fully relied on. 79 
Russia, France, Britain, and indeed most of the Western and Eastern European 
delegations favoured incorporation of some kinds of NTM data to complement the 
IMS, but the major states disagreed about where and how to draw the line. Russia, 
for example, supported inclusion of IMS-type data but wanted definite exclusion of 
communications intercepts (COMINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT), which it 
characterised as espionage. China and Pakistan were at the opposite extreme to the 
United States, and opposed any inclusion of information derived from NTM, a 
position substantially supported by the G-21 during the first two years of 
negotiations. Both countries claimed to have been victimised by false American 
intelligence, a point underlined by Sha's reference to "a self-assumed mandate as a 
`world police". 80 As far as China was concerned, sovereign states were entitled to 
develop NTM for the purposes of conducting activities "within the scope of their 
sovereignty", but because NTM were "inherently selective, arbitrary and subjective" 
it would be "unacceptable" for states to take advantage of NTM outside their own 
jurisdiction. 81 G-21 members based their arguments more generally on the principle 
of nondiscrimination and the mandate's injunction that the treaty should be 
"multilaterally verifiable". They did not want to legitimise a means of verification 
that would be available only to a few, privileged states, and which could be exercised 
in exclusive, discriminatory or abusive ways. 82 
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Countering the G-21, the United States insisted that the mandate also required the 
treaty to be "effectively verifiable", which it would not be if it prevented national 
means from being utilised to supplement potential inadequacies in the multilateral 
system. 83 Utilising what many regarded as coercive hostage-taking tactics in an 
attempt to show that he had no room to manoeuvre, Ledogar portrayed OSI and the 
permissibility of NTM as a "treaty-breaker" for the US government. 84 Anxious to 
avoid a deadlock on the issue, some of the P-5 and Western NNWS sought to erode 
G-21 solidarity on the issue by offering modalities for the limited incorporation of 
NTM to meet some of the G-21 concerns about discriminatory use. For the other 
NWS, the primary motivation was to isolate China and force Beijing out of its 
intransigent posture. Others hoped to develop a precedent for a more accountable 
incorporation of data and evidence acquired from national sources. While aimed 
primarily at the G-21 and China, the bridging proposals also challenged 
Washington's hard line. 
France, for example, made the unusual proposal that OSI could be requested on the 
basis of information from the IMS or from NTM, but that different weight should be 
accorded to each. 85 South Africa built on France's proposal, advocating an 
"objective" role for the CTBTO in evaluating NTM data provided to it. 86 Israel 
proposed that states parties could put data from their national facilities at the disposal 
of the IDC, or even allow the IDC and technical secretariat direct access to NTM 
data, thereby allowing for NTM but providing some level of screening and control of 
access and source. 87 Other countries reinforced the concept of a limited legitimacy for 
NTM by offering to supply the IDC with data from their national laboratories. As a 
consequence of a widening of the debate to include more NNWS, a number of 0-21 
delegations began to show interest in considering how nationally or commercially 
acquired data could be fed into or accessed by the IDC. They were interested in ideas 
for how the verification regime might benefit from NTM without surrendering its 
independence to the individual power of certain states with very extensive and 
sophisticated surveillance and intelligence resources. With the apparent aim of 
preventing such slippage among those whose backing it had cultivated, China 
underlined the case for opposing NTM in further working papers and reiterated its 
position in another strongly-worded statement in September 1995, in which it argued 
that "no NTM should be allowed" in the IMS. In a textbook example of hostage- 
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taking tactics, China then baldly stated that it would "not accept the triggering of OSI 
by NTM data or `any other information"'. 88 
The bridging efforts began to bear fruit in early 1996, as illustrated by the Australian 
and Iranian draft texts. Of most significance, Iran's draft text showed that one of the 
staunchest opponents of NTM was prepared to compromise. While maintaining that 
OSI be based solely on IMS data, Iran's draft allowed for supplementary information 
to be considered by the technical secretariat. 89 The United States continued to reject 
all such attempts to find a compromise, arguing that they would not be convincing to 
the intelligence agencies and US Senate. As the US ratification problems would later 
show, there is sometimes a fine line between employing the hostage-taking tactic to 
coerce others to accede to one's wishes and a genuine bottom line "treaty-breaker" 
dictated by domestic or other factors. 
Running out of time by August, and faced with intransigence on both sides, Ramaker 
decided that NTM should be "acceptable in principle, but not in any unqualified 
manner". The draft text therefore allowed any relevant information, including 
national technical means, "consistent with generally recognised principles of 
international law", a phrase understood to exclude espionage. This satisfied Russia, 
but a number of countries continued to raise concerns about legitimising NTM. 
Ramaker undertook consultations: on one side he was faced with China, Pakistan, and 
to a lesser extent Iran and India; on the other was the United States, still insisting that 
the issue was a "treaty breaker". Ramaker subsequently decided not to try and alter 
the treaty text. Instead, he made a statement on the record to allay some of the 
expressed fears about abuse of NTM or OSI, later including this in his report. With 
regard to NTM, he emphasised that verification activities would be based on 
"objective information... limited to the subject matter of the Treaty" and carried out 
on the basis of "full respect for the sovereignty of states parties". 90 
OSI: A Make or Break Issue 
The Iranian and Australian model texts encompassed broadly similar approaches on 
OSI, but with some important differences. Both favoured a presumption of access 
with two phases for inspections. For the initial phase, Australia echoed the French 
proposal for different decisionmaking procedures depending on whether the OSI 
263 
request was based on IMS data or solely on NTM. Iran proposed that an OSI request 
could rely only on IMS data and advocated a simple red-light process by which a vote 
by three-quarters of the executive council would be necessary to prevent the initial 
phase of an OSI from going ahead. Both drafts proposed a two-thirds majority to give 
the green light to any consecutive phase of OSI. 91 China's position appeared to 
harden, as Sha Zukang made it publicly known that OSI would be a crucial factor in 
the success or failure of the treaty. Echoing Ledogar, he declared it a "make or break" 
issue. 92 
Attempting to negotiate a compromise between the US and Chinese positions, 
Ramaker's May 28 draft specified that a green-light simple majority decision of the 
executive council would be necessary to initiate an inspection. As is often the case 
with bridging proposals that split the difference, neither the United States nor China 
was happy with this. But the US delegation, which had been consulted by Ramaker 
prior to his tabling the draft, said it could "live with it", while Sha declared that China 
would not 93 Pointing to the distinction made elsewhere in the text between 
procedural matters (requiring a simple majority) and substantive matters, Sha stated 
that "the launching of OSI can only be considered as a substantive issue", which 
would thereby require at least a two-thirds majority of the executive council. 4 During 
intensive P-5 negotiations on the issue, Britain, France and Russia attempted to put 
pressure on the United States by indicating that they would accept a green light OSI 
process requiring approval by three-fifths of the executive council, as China wanted. 
The United States at first refused to go above the simple majority in the Chair's draft. 
When Ramaker repeated this formula in the June 28 text, Sha stated again that 
without concessions on OST decisionmaking, China would be unable to sign the 
treaty. 95 
Insisting on bilateral negotiations with the United States, Sha argued for a three-fifths 
majority. Beijing had calculated the balance on the executive council and considered 
that 30 out of the 51 members was the minimum assurance it needed that the United 
States and its allies did not have the automatic weight to vote for an OSI request 
irrespective of the supporting evidence. Beijing preferred two-thirds (34 members of 
the council), but proposed three-fifths as a bearable compromise, having previously 
ascertained that Britain, France and Russia would go along with this. Under pressure 
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from the other NWS, and despite insisting that the text should not be reopened, the 
United States finally agreed to an amendment whereby an OSI would be authorised 
by "at least 30 affirmative votes" of the 51-member council. This was the only 
substantive amendment to the June 28 text 96 
The US was not the only delegation to be concerned that requiring a green light 
decision of the council to permit an inspection could cause delays, enabling time- 
critical evidence to be dispersed or erased. Ramaker's text dealt with this by 
providing a practical but strict timeline for the various stages between an OSI request 
and arrival at the site to be inspected, so that the time taken must not exceed one 
week. According to the final text, once an inspection is initiated, it can only be halted 
by a majority decision of the council, or by recommendation of the inspection team 
(unless countermanded by the council). If drilling is to be conducted, a further green 
light decision of the council must be sought 97 
Concerns about intrusion and effectiveness were balanced with overflight provisions 
and managed access. Although these did not cover all of the Russian and Israeli 
concerns, both were persuaded not to reopen negotiations. The envisaged time-frame 
for an inspection is 60 days, with the possibility of an extension of up to 70 days, 
subject to a majority decision of the council. Provisions covering the conduct of 
inspections were intended to diminish the opportunity for abuse while ensuring that 
the inspection team is not prevented from carrying out its mandate by undue delays 
and impediments thrown up by an inspected state. Responding to concerns expressed 
by Pakistan, India and others, Ramaker underlined that the sole purpose of an OSI 
was to gather any facts which might clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion 
had occurred and to assist in identifying a possible violator, and that requesting states 
were under an obligation to keep the OSI request within the scope of the treaty. "' 
States would therefore be allowed to protect sensitive facilities and information 
unrelated to compliance with the treaty. Inspections would move from less intrusive 
to more intrusive procedures. In all cases, the decision to conduct an OSI would have 
to include approval of a concrete inspection plan and mandate drawn up by the 
technical secretariat. Inspectors and access points would have to be identified to the 
CTBTO within 30 days of the treaty's entry into force for a particular country (and 
updated as appropriate). Provisions were worked out for unusual circumstances, such 
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as where the site under one state's jurisdiction or control is on the territory of another 
state (as with US bases in Europe or Japan). It was agreed that three observers from 
the requesting party or parties would be permitted to accompany the team, subject to 
the inspected party's agreement on the actual personnel. Arising from the experiences 
of the UNSCOM inspections in Iraq, the treaty also enshrined privileges and 
immunities for personnel carrying out an inspection, consistent with diplomatic 
status. 
In response to some delegations' concerns that the OSI process could be misused for 
other purposes, Ramaker also included penalties in the event that the executive 
council deemed an OSI request to have been "frivolous or abusive". Penalties could 
be financial (requiring the requesting state party to bear the costs incurred) or any of 
the measures in article V of the treaty, which covers the redressing of a situation, 
compliance and sanctions. Accordingly, failure to comply with treaty obligations or 
abuse of the treaty's provisions could result in penalties ranging from suspension of 
membership rights, collective measures in conformity with international law, and the 
taking of cases of `particular gravity' to the United Nations. An earlier reference in 
the rolling text giving a role to the UN General Assembly and Security Council in the 
enforcement of the CTBT (not specific to, but inclusive of OSI) was left out of the 
final draft text. Highlighting the problematic congruence of the P-5 with the NWS, 
opposition to giving the UN Security Council a formal role was based on non-aligned 
concerns that the permanent representation of the declared nuclear weapon states in 
the UN Security Council could cause bias or prompt a misuse of their veto power to 
protect themselves or allies. 99 
Concessions and Trade-offs: Making the Adequate Bearable 
In previous attempts to negotiate a comprehensive test ban, notably in 1958-63 and 
1977-80, verification had become the overt stumbling block to agreement. It did not 
play that role in 1994-96. There were, of course, conflicts over verification during 
the negotiations, but they were resolved largely through the normal processes and 
channels of multilateral and, at times, minilateral bargaining. Civil society, including 
epistemic actors from rival nuclear laboratories and NGOs, was much less engaged 
on verification issues in the 1994-96 CTB negotiations than in the past, largely 
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because developments since the INF Treaty and collapse of the Soviet Union had 
drawn the ideological heat out of much of the issue. By contrast, government 
scientists were important in building knowledge and embedding verification norms 
and principles among the participating states. Nevertheless, the verification outcome 
largely centred on the attitudes and conflicts among the P-5 and D-3: echoing the 
concerns that had underpinned the earlier US-Soviet adequatelbearable dichotomy, 
the United States took a stringent policing approach, while some of the others, 
notably China, India, Pakistan and Israel, were concerned to protect their sites, 
facilities and military interests from unwanted scrutiny. 
This was particularly true of the negotiations on on-site inspections and national 
technical means, where the familiar dilemmas of sovereignty (and the risk of 
cheating) versus intrusion (and the risk of spying) were played out, but this time did 
not derail the negotiations. Though US negotiators again tried to portray resistance to 
intrusive verification as rooted in suspect politics and even more suspect motives, 
Israel's inclusion in the resistant group exposed a more fundamental link: these were 
all nuclear weapon possessors or aspirants, with perceptions of real or potential 
victimisation from dominant powers or aggressive neighbours. In opposing intrusive 
inspections and NTM, China, India, Iran and Pakistan all evoked specific incidents of 
unjust accusation and "harassment" from the United States; Israel's fear was that its 
neighbours in the Middle East might "abuse" inspections procedures to undermine 
Israel's security (and nuclear programme). 
Once China had made its decision to join the CTBT, as was clear in the concessions it 
made on other issues, including PNE, during the first part of 1996, there was a strong 
incentive to find a solution on OSI and NTM, which Ledogar and Sha achieved, with 
the bridging assistance of Ramaker and some of the NNWS. Though Ledogar had 
stressed that OSI and NTM were treaty-breakers, his problem was not the Clinton 
administration. Having made the CTBT a major foreign policy objective, Clinton 
wanted the treaty concluded. Throughout the verification negotiations, Ledogar's 
principal difficulty was that he had the future ghost of Congressional ratification 
peering over his shoulder. For that, he had to be sure to deliver a strong package that 
would appease the intelligence agencies and the Pentagon. Nevertheless, even though 
the US delegation prioritised verification and, in fact, negotiated with a high measure 
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of success on all its provisions, this was not enough when the Republicans at home 
decided to attack the treaty on ideological grounds, making criticism of the 
verification system a major plank in their opposition to the ratification of the CTBT 
in 1999. 
The IMS was the only aspect of the CTB negotiations to conform recognisably with 
Ruggie's model of multilateralism. Notwithstanding material asymmetries in terms of 
capabilities, geostrategic location and so on, Ruggie's principles of diffuse 
reciprocity, shared responsibilities and benefits, and nondiscrimination were reflected 
in the IMS negotiations. The majority of problems over the IMS were based on 
cognitive dissonance, in large part due to differences of technical expertise and 
opinion over capabilities and coverage, combined with some national interests 
regarding the purchase and supply of technologies and location of specific stations. 
Most were able to be resolved through constructive, integrative multilateral 
negotiations. Peter Marshall, in particular, used a range of cognitive shaping tactics 
to achieve convergence, including unpacking complex issues, demystifying technical 
questions, and training the scientists and diplomats from as many countries as 
possible, including the usually marginalised nonaligned states. By such means, he 
embedded the IMS negotiations in "consensual knowledge" , 
10° a process that also 
reduced the politicisation of disagreements, thereby encouraging cooperative 
convergence. 
Even so, concession-trading among the P-5 was necessary to resolve some of the 
sharper disputes. As already discussed, Russia's late demand for additional 
monitoring at the US and Chinese test sites was not really about the IMS, but in 
reaction to not having been adequately consulted when the United States pre-empted 
the P-5 threshold negotiations in August 1995 and decided in favour of a zero yield 
scope. Russia dressed its linkage of these two issues in practical terms: if the treaty 
had contained a low threshold, as Moscow wanted, then the previously negotiated 
IMS would have come close enough to Russia's verification requirement that 
militarily useful explosions were not being conducted at yields significantly above the 
threshold agreement. The zero yield scope ruled out hydronuclear and low yield 
explosions altogether; in reaction, Moscow raised concerns (legitimate, if not 
convincing) that geological conditions at Lop Nor and Nevada - as opposed to 
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Novaya Zemlya - might conceal attempts by the other weapon states to conduct very 
low yield testing clandestinely. Though Marshall attempted to work out a technical 
solution, in the end resolution came by means of a P-5 trade-off spearheaded by the 
United States, which also assuaged sore Russian feelings by undertaking closer 
bilateral consultations. In the same P-5 package deal, Russia agreed to drop its long 
standing but unsupported proposal for a reduced radionuclide network bolstered by 
three specially equipped sampling planes. 
Though it is important in negotiations analysis to be wary of ulterior motives or 
underlying political purpose behind states' positions, some disputes may genuinely 
arise from pragmatic differences of view or resources. For example, some delegates 
sought to portray Russia's advocacy of a less comprehensive radionuclide network as 
stemming from a desire to escape close monitoring of its radiation emissions. But if 
Moscow's premise was right - that an outright violation after entry into force of the 
treaty was unlikely - the proposal for three appropriately equipped sampling planes 
could have made sense as a cost-effective deterrent. Despite US scepticism, many 
Geneva diplomats did recognise that underlying a number of Russia's verification 
positions was a concern to avoid an excessive financial burden. Given the post- 
Chernobyl recognition of the merits of early detection of radiation releases, however, 
most delegations considered that the collateral benefits of a substantial radionuclide 
network outweighed the costs. 
Similarly, despite inevitable attempts to find a sinister motivation behind the Chinese 
and Pakistani opposition to noble gas monitoring and their determination to include 
satellites and EMP monitoring in the treaty, the reasons may have been more 
straightforward. While Pakistan's advocacy was clearly due to its political relations 
with China, Beijing's positions were backed up by feasible technical assumptions and 
cost-benefit calculations. 101 Though held until very late in the negotiations, such 
differences were eventually resolved through a combination of P-5 and multilateral 
trade-offs. In an example of the first, China traded concessions with the United States 
and Russia over NTM. In examples of the second, Ramaker brokered several 
bridging compromises. Although he omitted satellites and EMP sensors from the 
IMS, Ramaker included in the treaty text provisions for "improvement of the 
verification regime", permitting technologies or stations to be added to or deleted 
269 
from the IMS on the basis of consensus among the executive council, without 
requiring the full process of an amendment conference. Recognising that the value of 
satellite information to the verification regime was not the main issue of dispute and 
that those who opposed a dedicated satellite network did so primarily on grounds of 
cost, Ramaker also included a provision for "cooperative arrangements" whereby any 
state party could make data from non-IMS-incorporated national stations available to 
the IMS and IDC. Paradoxically, although introduced to placate China and Pakistan, 
the reference to IMS-type technologies opens the treaty's door to NTM, which both 
states had wanted to rule out. At the very least, Ramaker's team engaged in some neat 
mediation, leaving an ambiguity about whether this provision could be a means 
whereby information from national or commercial satellites could be fed into the 
IDC, if required. 
Several middle power NNWS, including the Chair, used a range of bridging 
techniques to promote convergence. For example, steering clear of explicit reference 
to evolutionary verification, and so avoiding a head-on clash with the United States, 
Britain and France, the middle powers essentially supported the Russian and 
nonaligned position and managed to get the evolutionary concept incorporated into 
the treaty in everything but name. This was possible because the Western NNWS, 
some of whom had technical experts on a par with those of the nuclear powers, were 
prepared at times to challenge the dominance of US technical assumptions and come 
down in support of positions favoured by the more marginalised, nonaligned states. 102 
Western NNWS also employed strategies aimed at avoiding a recurrence of the 
verification conflicts that had contributed to the failure of previous attempts to 
achieve a CTBT. Germany, chairing the verification working group in the final year, 
insisted on engaging the experts of as many delegations as possible in weighing the 
technical objectives, capabilities, parameters and criteria for international verification, 
in the hope that differences could be bypassed or narrowed without having to 
confront the competing adequate/bearable perceptions that had so bedevilled past test 
ban negotiations. It must also be recognised that US positions on the IMS were 
generally more pragmatic and less `gold-plated' than would have been predicted from 
its stance in previous test ban negotiations. For this reason, the US intransigence over 
limiting the interpretation of data by the IDC took many delegations by surprise. 
Although there were complaints in the corridors, and Western sympathy with the G- 
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21 position was fairly widespread, it was not until Germany openly challenged the 
United States, pitting its solid verification expertise against the US arguments, that 
the logjam began to shift. Ramaker's solution was typically managerial, adroitly 
splitting the difference. 
Peter Marshall's success in managing the complexities of the IMS negotiations was 
not a foregone conclusion. He was professionally attached to Britain's Atomic 
Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston (albeit the verification wing at 
Blacknest103). This connection with the UK nuclear weapons laboratories could have 
raised G-21 suspicions about his objectivity, particularly since the UK delegation was 
more generally perceived as negative towards the CTB and obstructive in its tactics. 
Though representing the government, Marshall was an influential epistemic actor, 
whose high level of technical expertise and attention to detail commanded respect 
among his scientific peers in other delegations. His technical authority also gave him 
some measure of independence from other aspects of UK policy, with which he 
frequently disagreed. In many ways, therefore, he also displayed the characteristics 
of a norm entrepreneur, pushing for regime-enhancing outcomes and a strengthening 
of verification in principle and practice, in the face of Britain's narrower objectives. 
Lacking significant political power to impose outcomes, Marshall's epistemic 
authority and low key, inclusive management style persuaded all sides of his 
willingness to listen and take their arguments seriously, a skill which enabled him to 
carry opposition and enable the disparate views and interests to reach convergence. 
The only significant failure for the IMS was India's withdrawal of its stations. Since 
India's participation in the IMS benefited others as much if not more than India itself, 
India caused more pain to others than itself by pulling out of this part of the treaty. As 
will be discussed in the next chapter, when the badly conceived British strategy on 
entry into force backfired, they high costs continue to be paid by supporters of the 
CTBT and nonproliferation regimes rather than the intended target, India. 
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Chapter Eight 
Entry into Force: Too Rigid, Too Rushed 
When India voted against the CTBT when it was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in September 1996, Ambassador Arundhati Ghose declared: 
"India will never sign this unequal Treaty, not now, nor later. "' Characterising the 
entry into force provision as coercive, she asserted that because of it, the Treaty 
would never enter into force. Ambassador Ghose's words have haunted the CTB 
negotiatiors ever since. 
Ignored for most of the negotiations, entry into force turned into a battleground for 
the competing objectives of some of the P-5, for whom the chief purpose of the 
CTBT was to curb the development and spread of nuclear weapons outside the NPT- 
recognised nuclear weapon states, and India, caught between nationalistic nuclear 
ambitions and the remnants of its nonaligned, pro-disarmament ideology from the 
immediate post-colonial time of Gandhi and Nehru. 2 The desired outcome for entry 
into force negotiations is a credible payoff between political reassurance and 
operational viability. Assessing the CTBT from the first six years after the treaty was 
opened for signature, it is hard to escape the judgment that the negotiators failed to 
find the right balance. While India's domestic debate on its nuclear options was 
undoubtedly a central feature of what went wrong, Chapter 8 is particularly 
concerned to look at the sources within the EIF negotiating dynamics. How was it 
that the most reluctant participant in the negotiations was at the end handed the power 
of veto over the treaty's legal status and implementation? And what did the UK do to 
prompt one senior European diplomat to label Article XIV "Britain's Revenge"? 3 
The entry into force requirements for a treaty determine the conditions which must be 
met in order for the agreement to take full legal effect. EIF negotiations aim to set 
appropriate conditions to give national and international confidence that the 
agreement will enhance rather than detract from the participants' security. Entry into 
force is therefore a mechanism related to reciprocity and implementation. Because it 
confers authority on the full operation of the verification regime and implementing 
organisation, compliance and enforcement are closely bound up with it as well. 
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Where signing and ratifying an agreement formally express the national political will 
to comply, entry into force gives confidence that a critical mass of others will do 
likewise. Viewing security as a public good, the greater the number of participants in 
the regime the greater the benefits for all. 
The NNWS and civil society made the mistake of paying scant attention to entry into 
force until the very last. They were seduced by the past: in most cases, as in the 
CWC, the entry-into-force provision has fallen into place during the endgame. 4 By 
mid-1996, when it was clear that this would not happen, they found themselves 
unable to influence key states' positions quickly enough to prevent an endgame stand- 
off. The result was less an agreement than a management compromise rushed through 
in the belief that the treaty would fail without it. Now the entry into force article looks 
more like an Achilles heel, an exposed flaw by which its opponents are slowly killing 
the test ban. 
General Considerations for Entry Into Force 
An EIF article will usually specify that before the treaty takes legal effect it must be 
ratified by a certain number of states. In addition, the EIF provision will often set a 
specific period between the treaty being opened for signature and the earliest time it 
can enter into force, or it may specify a period between the `triggering' ratification 
and entry into force. As a state's decisions about whether and when to accede to a 
treaty may have implications for security, EIF conditions are frequently subject to 
close political scrutiny during national ratification debates. It is therefore important 
that EIF provisions give a treaty credibility, without being prohibitively stringent. The 
simpler the EIF arrangements, the easier it is for the treaty to take effect quickly. An 
example of this was the PTBT, which took just three months between signature and 
entry into force, despite having to get a two-thirds majority of the US Senate. Entry 
into force only required the ratification of the three negotiating parties: (the Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom and the United States). At the time, these three had 
reason to worry about France, China and several other proliferant states. They opened 
the PTBT to all states to join, but chose not to make its entry into force contingent on 
the accession of any specific additional states. 5 Indeed, China and France have never 
acceded to the PTBT, and yet France ceased atmospheric testing after Australia and 
New Zealand sought redress for contamination of the Pacific in the International 
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Court of Justice in 1973. In so doing, they also made the argument that the PTBT had 
been so widely accepted and adhered to that it had established a norm, effectively 
becoming part of the body of law applicable to all, and therefore applicable to France, 
regardles of whether France had itself signed 6 
The NPT and CWC are both successful examples of multilateral arms control treaties 
that set the bar low enough to be able to enter into force without undue delay, and 
which fulfilled their negotiators' hope that numbers would build incrementally. Such 
approaches rely on political pressure on hold-outs to intensify as the principles and 
norms in the treaty become embedded in international expectations. The NPT 
required ratification by the three depositary NWS, (the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom and the United States) plus 40 others, unspecified. 7 Concluded in 1968, the 
NPT entered into force on March 5,1970, and by time of writing had 188 states 
parties. The CWC, which opened for signature in January 1993, specified only that it 
would enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the 650' instrument of 
ratification! Though no-one was specified, it was recognised that entry into force 
without certain parties would make enforcement difficult, so there were substantial 
incentives for original signatories. Fearing that the United States would be excluded 
from important posts and decisionmaking if the CWC entered into force without it, 
the Clinton administration pulled all its political stops out to get CWC ratification 
past Republican obstacles before the treaty entered into force on April 29,1997. The 
United States managed to squeeze in under the wire with only 5 days to go, 
illustrating that flexible EIF provisions may actually provide more incentives and 
political pressure to accelerate ratifications than overly rigid provisions. 
Although it has failed to bring in India, Israel and Pakistan, the NPT has over the 
years built a nonproliferation regime strong enough to convince many others that their 
security would be better served as NNWS than by pursuing their own nuclear weapon 
ambitions. Hence, the regime has strengthened as it has grown. 9 If instead of its rather 
flexible EIF provision, Article IX of the NPT had specified a list of all states with 
nuclear capabilities, as CTBT entry into force requires, it is unlikely the NPT would 
ever have taken effect. Trying to build a nonproliferation regime on a lame-duck NPT 
would never have worked as well as legally enforcing the treaty early and then 
building up membership through a mix of pressure and incentives. In view of the 
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effective examples of flexible EIF provisions in the NPT and the CWC, why and how 
did the CD come to impose an entry into force provision so tight and rigid that it is 
already strangling the newborn treaty? 
Marking out the Territory 
The basic positions on entry into force were drawn early on in the CTB negotiations. 
The 1993 Swedish draft treaty took an approach similar to the NPT, proposing 
ratification by 40 countries, including the five declared NWS. 10 This pragmatic base- 
line found many supporters among the pragmatic NNWS. Australia led those who 
advocated a simple number, as in the CWC, taking the view that this would be in 
keeping with the multilateral and nondiscriminatory intentions of the negotiations; 
and would prevent the treaty being held hostage to the politics of any individual 
NWS. Supporters of this position reasoned that international and regional pressure 
could be exerted to encourage recalcitrant states to ratify. Consistent with the 
Swedish draft, the United States held that a minimum condition must be ratification 
by the five NWS. By contrast, the opening positions put forward by Britain, France, 
Russia and, later, China, were designed to ensure that ratification by the D-3 would 
be as basic a condition as ratification by the P-5. Acknowledging that most other 
states favoured the CWC model, Sir Michael Weston epitomised the reasoning of the 
`Group of Four' NWS, when he argued that "adopting this formula would provide no 
guarantee of adherence by all - or indeed any - of the countries whose commitment 
to the treaty we would regard as necessary if it is to play the non-proliferation role we 
want from it. " 11 This view flew in the face of past experience, especially with the 
NPT. 
In deference to widespread political sensitivities about not according the D-3 any 
special status that might be interpreted as recognition of nuclear weapon status, 
Russia proposed ratification by around 65 states, including all that possess nuclear 
reactors or nuclear research programmes on the date of the treaty's signature. 12 With 
the same intention but a different proposal, the UK proposed that "at a minimum, all 
members of the CD should ratify the Treaty before it enters into force". By way of 
explanation, Weston smoothly argued that "[G]iven that we proceed in this forum by 
consensus, it is surely not unreasonable to expect that a Treaty whose terms we have 
all been prepared to agree should be ratified by all without undue delay. "13 Sharing 
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the UK's expectation of the imminent expansion of the CD to 60, giving membership 
for the first time to Israel, Iraq and North Korea (India and Pakistan were already 
members), France adopted the same position; t hen, as the CD became deadlocked 
over enlargement, both delegations shifted during 1994 towards the Russian 
position. '4 
The first 30 months of EIF negotiations did little more than identify the basic options. 
In an early working paper from Working Group 2 on signature, ratification, 
accession, and entry into force, the Friend of the Chair, Alessandro Vattani of Italy, 
stated the obvious when he identified the options: "Should the treaty enter into force 
(immediately, x-days) after the deposit of instruments of ratification by: (a) five 
nuclear weapon states; (b) five nuclear weapon states and all nuclear capable states; 
(c) all members of the Conference on Disarmament (d) all members of the 
Conference on Disarmament after expansion; (e) all States (or 95% of those) 
possessing nuclear reactors or nuclear research programmes; (f) a fixed number of 
States (e. g. 40 or 65, including five nuclear weapon States or including members of 
the CD); (g) along the lines of the provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; (h) a 
significant number of key states; (i) other? " 15 Later Friends of the Chair failed to take 
the issue much further than this comprehensive but unilluminating list of possibilities. 
Stringent Conditions and Bypass Mechanisms 
In essence, the choice at the end of 1994 was perceived to be between a particular list, 
a set number or a formula. By the end of 1995, the nature and limitations of all the 
options had been exhaustively explored, but the negotiators were still far from any 
convergence of views. Those who wanted to ensure early entry into force still 
preferred to replicate the CWC approach, based on a simple number, such as 60. 
Britain, Russia and France adhered to their advocacy of an IAEA-based list 
containing all states capable of nuclear testing. Sharing this stringent position, China 
hedged its bets by combining the CD and IAEA lists, proposing that the treaty could 
enter into force one year after "ratification by all States that were members of the 
Conference on Disarmament at the time when the Treaty was opened for signature 
and by all States known by the International Atomic Energy Agency to possess 
nuclear capabilities (i. e. to possess nuclear power stations or nuclear reactors)'. 16 
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The United States continued to favour the CWC approach, provided the NWS were 
explicitly included. While taking the view that making entry into force conditional 
upon ratification by a specific list could render it too difficult to achieve, the US also 
recognised that its P-5 colleagues were very determined to achieve a stringent 
criterion, and therefore its delegation tried suggesting two different options for 
moving beyond a deadlock. In the first, entry into force would be enabled if a high 
percentage (95%) of listed states had ratified. In the second, providing that the P-5 
were among the ratifiers, the United States suggested that a "waiver conference" 
could be held if the treaty had not entered into force two years after signature. 
According to this scenario, the conference participants, or at least all participants that 
had ratified the treaty, could then decide whether to waive the specific EIF 
requirements, and, in effect, behave as if the treaty had entered into force. This would 
enable them to establish the verification regime and implementing organisation. US 
delegation members also argued that the conference could be a useful mechanism to 
apply pressure on non-ratifying states, threatening them with loss of influence and 
appointments in the establishment of the implementing organisation. '7 
Many delegations found the waiver conference idea interesting in principle but few 
supported the US requirement that all five NWS must ratify before such a mechanism 
could be invoked. They argued that by making ratification by the P"5 a condition 
before even the waiver conference could be invoked, the United States was 
discriminating in favour of the NWS, giving them a risky opportunity for veto. China, 
for its part, considered the US proposal "a kind of political discrimination against the 
five nuclear weapon states". 18 For some negotiators, China's opposition compounded 
their concerns that Beijing intended to keep on with its nuclear test programme until 
the CTBT had fully entered into force. Such concerns had been provoked by Sha's 
assertion that "once a CTBT has entered into force, [China] will cease nuclear 
testing". 19 
Australia, which stated that it preferred the concept of a simple list combined with 
political pressure to ensure that key states would accede, also proposed an alternative 
approach, based on the waiver provision in the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which 
established a nuclear weapon free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. This 
innovative waiver provision is credited with successfully preventing the Tlatelolco 
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Treaty being held hostage by the domestic or national considerations of any state or 
states in the Latin American region, while enabling governments to take account of 
regional rivalries and shifts and choose a time appropriate to their own security 
assessments. 20 Australia's proposal was to list the specific states deemed essential, 
but with each ratifying state having the right to waive the requirements and allow the 
treaty's provisions to become legally binding for them. A number of delegations 
considered such an arrangement to be impractical for the CTBT, pointing out that 
although the Tlatelolco Treaty implementing organisation, OPANAL, was established 
by acceding states, verification was by bilateral arrangements with the IAEA. They 
objected that Tlatelolco's ingenious mechanism, which has not been tried in any other 
treaty arrangement, would not work for the CTBT, where the core of the verification 
regime was to be an international monitoring system. 
Australia envisaged that unless some mechanism were worked out for a sufficient 
number of states to inaugurate the multilateral verification system, implementation 
pending full entry into force would be based on national monitoring. The objections 
to such a possibility, deemed by some nonaligned states to be a recipe for 
undermining the rationale for a multilateral CTBT, proved to be too strong for the 
proposal to survive very far into 1996 21 Australia soon tried again, reviving the US 
idea of a "waiver conference" in the model treaty it tabled in February 1996.22 
Curiously, Iran, which had tabled a draft treaty text a week earlier, modified another 
US suggestion for its EIF provision. 3 Although the particular solutions they proposed 
were different, the Iranian and Australian drafts surprised many with their similarity 
of approach on EIF, with both combining a list with a veto-avoiding mechanism. 
Nevertheless, there was criticism of the Australians for basing ElF on the concept of 
an expanded CD, since that proposal had been dropped from the rolling text, while 
others complained that Iran's proposal could result in implementation of the treaty 
without three out of the eight target states. Though both drafts were welcomed, they 
did not advance the EIF debate significantly. 
Battle is Joined between the P-5 and D-3 
By the time the Australian and Iranian drafts were attempting to find workable 
compromises, the political struggle between the P-5 and D-3 underlying the EIF 
negotiations had fully surfaced. In January 1996, India introduced a qualitatively 
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different variable, relating entry into force to nuclear disarmament: "... this Treaty 
shall enter into force only after all states parties have committed themselves to the 
attainment of the goal of total elimination of all nuclear weapons within a well 
defined time framework (of ten years). 9,24 As discussed in chapter 5, this was one of 
three substantive proposals tabled by India at that time, covering the preamble, review 
and entry into force. These working papers were seen as the first clear indications 
from India of the direction its domestic debate on nuclear policy and options was 
taking. While some of India's previous proposals had been sufficiently practical to be 
a possible basis for negotiations, the linkage of entry into force with nuclear 
disarmament was viewed with grave consternation by advocates of the test ban, 
however much they also desired disarmament, and with cynicism from the P-5. Most 
significantly, the linkage was symptomatic of India's apparently painful realisation 
that this time the test ban negotiations were likely to conclude with a treaty, and that 
it would soon be necessary for India to take a decision beyond traditional rhetoric. 
The Indian proposals were tabled soon after Prime Minister Narasimha Rao cancelled 
the nuclear test preparations reportedly leaked by US intelligence sources to the New 
York Times. The New York Times report unleashed a turbulent domestic and media 
debate in India about national interests and the CTBT, in which those linking 
retention of the nuclear option with independence, status and future security (not to 
mention virility) were in the unmistakable majority. 25 New Delhi undoubtedly 
calculated that an explicit link between the CTBT and a ten year target date for 
nuclear disarmament would be popular with the public and dismissed by the NWS. 
Although Indian diplomats insisted that their proposals and target dates were 
negotiable, it appeared to many negotiators that, in mounting its challenge in this 
way, India was deliberately manufacturing conditions of disappointment to prepare 
the ground for a best-versus-good rejection of the treaty later on. 
In March 1996, the UK delegation, which was the most vocal of the P-5 proponents 
of a stringent EIF provision, decided to sharpen the debate and cut through the 
euphemistic role of lists such as the IAEA or the expanded CD by floating a 'non- 
proposal' aimed solely at the P-5 plus D-3. The UK's informal suggestion was to 
specify states on the IAEA list "not under a legally binding treaty obligation not to 
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons". 26 Such a formula covered all countries 
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with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and excluded the non nuclear weapon parties to 
the NPT or to regional NWFZ treaties (Brazil, for example, had not at the time 
acceded to the NPT, but was party to the Tlatelolco Treaty). Although the British 
delegation never formally put the proposal, which was disliked by many, it was put 
into the rolling text by Pakistan. Pakistan's eager adoption of the formula had not 
been anticipated, but it caused little surprise, and was generally viewed as just another 
tactic by Pakistan in its diplomatic judo with India. 
Of course it had long been clear to everyone that the purpose of the CTBT was to 
prevent nuclear testing by the P-5 and the D-3, since other states, including Iraq and 
DPRK, were already covered through their NPT obligations. But Britain's 
suggestion, which forced into the open the subtext underlying the lists, did not merely 
evoke criticism; it caused considerable dismay on all sides. Some NNWS argued that 
it placed an undesirable power of veto in the hands of the targeted states. Others 
feared that linking the D-3 with the P-5 directly would confer special status on India, 
Israel and Pakistan. For Japan and South Africa, the issue was legitimation of the D-3 
through the back door: they feared that putting what amounted to a new definition 
into the CTBT, a later treaty than the NPT, would set a precedent and undermine the 
nonproliferation regime's demarcation between NWS and NNWS. More particularly, 
Egypt and some of the other Arab states were determined to allow nothing that could 
be construed as legitimation of Israel's nuclear status as they continued to push for it 
to join the NPT as a NNWS. By contrast, despite insisting on a provision that would 
bind the D-3, some of the NWS were hypersensitive opponents of associating the 
non-NPT nuclear weapon possessors too directly with the NWS, not only for fear of 
undermining the NPT, but because the linkage could erode the special status they 
themselves enjoyed in the nuclear club. 7 
For those less worried about the risk of setting a precedent that might undermine the 
NPT, the British suggestion was thought capable of getting round India's objections 
to the wider list, as it provided the attractive payoff for India of appearing to 
recognise the nuclear weapon status of the D-3, something that India had long sought. 
A few even harboured the hope that it offered a way for Islamabad to sign and ratify 
the CTBT, secure in the knowledge that it would not take legal effect without India's 
accession as well. But India, it soon transpired, was not interested in this kind of 
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payoff of status-by-association. India, Israel and China all objected that the formula 
singled them out. India and China claimed it violated the principle of 
nondiscrimination. Israel, which was prepared to accept its inclusion in a list of over 
40 nuclear capable states, feared that a narrower P-5 plus D-3 provision would have 
the effect of withdrawing its politically convenient cloak of opacity, and might 
expose it to even more pressure from NPT states parties in the Middle East. 
By this time, the CD had wakened to the realisation that the political problems 
between the P-5 and the D-3 (and Israel and its Middle East neighbours) could make 
compromise on entry into force very difficult to achieve. In this context, Austria drew 
attention to a proposal on provisional application that it had originally tabled in June 
1995, but which had received scant attention at the time. After updating it in February 
1996, Austria found more states willing to listen to its argument for a conference to 
be convened by all states that had ratified, if the treaty has not entered into force two 
years after the date of deposit of the first instrument of ratification. These states could 
then decide (by a process to be determined) to let the treaty, or parts of it, be applied 
provisionally. 28 Under provisional application, the states agreeing to be covered by 
the treaty would decide among themselves about verification and financing. In the 
event of incomplete accession, provisional application would thus enable the 
international verification system and implementing organisation to be inaugurated, 
with special financial arrangements agreed among the states concerned. 
Austria's proposal represented a different approach from waiver options because it 
was based on collective decisionmaking among states which had ratified, rather than 
individual waivers. It therefore could potentially bypass the verification question, 
since the participating states could institute some if not all components of the 
multilateral verification system and would not necessarily have to rely solely on 
national technical means. The United States, among others, regarded it as an 
inadequate and even dangerous solution; since provisional application lacked full 
legal force it would not be able legally or satisfactorily to address a suspected 
violation (or initiate any kind of on-site inspection) without the cooperation of the 
suspect, which was unlikely to be given. There was also a question about the legal 
standing of decisions and the status of those states which, having themselves ratified, 
were in the minority that voted against provisional application: would they be 
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permitted to hold aloof from the provisional organisation or would they be bound by 
the majority decision? This question had the situation of Pakistan or some of the 
Middle East countries in mind, though they did not openly raise it themselves. 
Attempts to Manage the Conflict 
As discussed earlier, Jaap Ramaker presented his first Chair's draft treaty text on May 
28,1996. After an inconclusive meeting on entry into force on May 23, which 
demonstrated the lack of a front-running option, and under severe pressure from 
Britain and Russia, Ramaker adopted at the last minute another British suggestion 
that had never been formally proposed. Still seeking a formula to accomplish the 
UK's apparently paramount purpose of binding the P-S and D-3, Sir Michael Weston 
suggested listing the 37 states which hosted either a primary seismic station or a 
radionuclide laboratory as part of the international monitoring system. The UK's 
reasoning was similar to its argument for preferring the expanded CD to the IAEA 
list: as the agreement to host a component of the verification system could be 
construed as a form of commitment, listing the same states for EIF requirements 
appeared to be a logical extension. 29 
How Ramaker came to put such a controversial proposal into his first Chair's draft 
without wider consultation is more difficult to understand. Clearly he was up against 
the clock and under heavy pressure from Russia and Britain, knowing also that 
several other states, notably China, Pakistan and Egypt wanted to bind the D-3 into 
the EIF provision as tightly as possible. On the other hand, the waiver options put 
forward by the United States and canvassed in the Australian and Iranian drafts had 
received much wider support, and the majority of CD members were expecting the 
final outcome along the lines of a list plus waiver combination. According to senior 
Dutch officials, Berdennikov had deployed the hostage tactic and made very 
convincing threats that Russia would not accept any Chair's text as the basis for 
further negotiations unless it contained a stringent EIF provision. Ramaker believed 
him and feared that if the Chair's text were rejected as a whole by any of the P-5, the 
negotiations would go "back to square one' . 30 It later transpired that Ramaker had 
deliberately chosen the British formula for his first draft because it had never been 
part of the rolling text or any formal proposal, and so would not suffer from 
"ownership" or "turf' difficulties. He meant it to be a `holding article' and hoped that 
290 
it would galvanise the negotiators into renewed determination to find a workable 
compromise 31 
Instead, the formula was condemned by many CD members, who complained that it 
opened the practical, scientific decision about where to locate IMS stations to legal- 
political disputes about entry into force. They worried about the effect of such linkage 
on the verification system, which had been close to agreement. Advocates of a more 
flexible EIF provision were also concerned that it placed inappropriate leverage and 
potential delaying power in the hands of certain states, a problem common to all the 
lists under consideration. Though behind the scenes Ramaker stressed that he was not 
committed to this provision, and that the purpose of his draft was to "test the 
waters", 32 his public message was rather different. Acknowledging that there was no 
"magic formula" and that the provision linking entry into force with states responsible 
for IMS facilities had met with some criticism, Ramaker insisted that "a number of 
delegations expressed an interest in this formula, and indeed it seems to indicate the 
way forward"'. 33 Whether at the time he really considered this could provide the 
solution or, as claimed, he put the British formula in as a holding position in the hope 
of forcing delegations to negotiate something more practical, Ramakcr became 
trapped when Berdennikov declared that he was satisfied with the stringent entry into 
force in Article XIV and regarded it as final. China and Pakistan speedily and 
directly endorsed this draft Article XIV, further reducing the Chair's room to 
manoeuvre. The British formula backfired even more spectacularly when India 
retaliated by withdrawing all its facilities from the IMS. 34 A formula based on the 
argument that participating in the verification system was tantamount to commitment 
to the treaty thus had the malign (and foreseeable, though apparently unforeseen) 
consequence of pushing India out of the kind of cooperative association with the 
treaty that could, over time, have been a lever for building confidence and bringing 
India on board the treaty as a whole. Although based on a British formula, UK 
scientists who had devoted much time and energy to ensuring that the IMS was 
representative and provided effective global coverage were furious with this outcome, 
but powerless. 
The die was now cast. In withdrawing its stations from the IMS, India had severed all 
cooperative links with the CTBT, nullifying any lingering hope that its participation 
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in the negotiations would bind it to the outcome. India's proposals linking entry into 
force with nuclear disarmament had been ignored in large part because even the G-21 
were sceptical of New Delhi's motives. On May 16,1996, Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
became Prime Minister of a coalition led by the DJP, but for only 12 days. It later 
emerged that, on taking power, Vajpayee had immediately authorised the weaponeers 
to proceed with the nuclear tests called off earlier by Rao, but before they could be 
conducted he lost a vote of confidence and had to concede power to a different 
coalition. The scientists continued their demand for tests and even placed a nuclear 
device in a test shaft at Pokhran. The new Prime Minister, N. D. Deve Gowda, neither 
permitted nor rejected their demands, "but instead sought to delay a decision while 
the government attended to more pressing domestic matters". 35 
India, meanwhile, ratcheted up its demand that the CTBT must not enter into force 
without a timetable for nuclear disarmament accepted by all states parties. Whether a 
tactic or not, the linkage had the consequence of the P-5 ignoring the rest of India's 
demands - and also the G-21's attempts to negotiate for stronger language on 
disarmament and the prevention of qualitative improvements to nuclear weapons. It 
came as little surprise, therefore, that as the negotiations reached their endgame in 
June 1996, Arundhati Ghose declared that the treaty was inadequate: "India cannot 
accept any restraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the 
obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons". 36 Having indicated that it would not 
sign the treaty, India redoubled its objections to being named as one of the countries 
responsible for whether or not the CTBT could enter into force. 
In Geneva, belated recognition began to dawn that the EIF negotiations carried 
serious risks for the treaty. Antonio de Icaza of Mexico had been appointed EIF 
Friend of the Chair for 1996, and then "moderator", but Ramaker was increasingly 
taking negotiations into his own hands. In a fraught atmosphere, assailed by a number 
of competing demands and different states' priorities, Ramaker and the Dutch 
delegation were run ragged as they tried to work out the details of possible 
compromises. Among the P-5, Russia, China and the UK continued to insist that the 
treaty must unequivocally bind the nuclear capable states as well as the P-5. They 
appeared willing to take the treaty hostage on this issue, so the pressure on Ramaker 
to meet their demands was heavy. 
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But was entry into force a real treaty-breaker, meaning that without a binding "P-5 
plus D-3" condition Britain, China and Russia would defect from the agreement and 
refuse to sign, or were the three delegations just playing a very tough tactical game, 
expecting their price to be knocked down to something more reasonable? China's 
concerns were international and regional: it wanted to be counted among the P-5, but 
didn't want India either to be accorded the same status or allowed to become a serious 
nuclear competitor in the future. The United States took China's position on EIF 
seriously. 37 Sha Zukang has confirmed that binding the D-3 was an important 
objective for China, but he never referred to this as a "make or break" or "treaty- 
breaking" issue, and it did not appear to be on a policy par with on-site inspections or 
even PNE, on which, as discussed in chapter 6, Beijing ended up making very 
important concessions. 8 
Russia's motives for insisting on the adherence of the D-3 as a condition were less 
obvious. In the PTBT, NPT and CWC negotiations, the Soviet Union (and Russia, 
after 1991) had recognised the benefits of facilitating early entry into force rather than 
requiring prior adherence from all states of concern, and had subsequently witnessed 
how states which did not immediately accede became drawn into compliance with a 
regime's norms and principles once the treaty had taken effect. The institutional 
process of incremental build-up had proved successful for the NPT and PTBT, and by 
1996, progress on the CWC was looking positive. Moreover, it was hardly plausible 
that Russia feared that India would constitute a significant national security threat if it 
stayed outside the CTBT (as opposed to being a continued thorn in the flesh of the 
nonproliferation regime). The strength of Russia's obduracy appeared to derive from 
its view that the CTBT's chief function was as a mechanism to pull the D-3 into legal 
obligations with regard to nuclear weapons, especially given that they were unlikely 
to accede to the NPT in the near future. Establishing a nondiscriminatory regime 
against testing was therefore treated as subordinate to universalisation of the 
discriminatory nonproliferation regime. 
Although China and Russia were clearly in favour of a stringent EIF provision, both 
had engaged actively in concession-trading on other issues, notably the verification 
regime and CTBT Organisation. By 1996, both China and Russia appeared to be on 
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board the treaty, as signified by China's virtual surrender on PNE and Russia's 
grudging acceptance of the zero yield scope. In light of such political developments, 
Berdennikov's continued assertion that Russia could not have compromised on EIF39 
are open to question. Further doubt has been cast by a former US official's 
recollection of a Russian memo sent direct to Washington from Moscow at the height 
of the impasse over entry into force. Reportedly, Moscow proposed that if the CD 
could not finalise the CTBT by September 1996, the P-5 should conclude among 
themselves, sign the treaty, and then open it to other states, as had been done with the 
PTBT. Washington, determined that the CTBT should be multilateral, did nothing 
with the Russian suggestion, which dropped out of sight 40 Since few if any of the 
Geneva negotiators heard of such a memo, it did not influence the negotiations at the 
time, but the significance of Moscow's communication is that it indicates that Russia 
may well have been prepared to join a treaty that included only the P-5. It is clear 
that Berdennikov considered himself to be under instructions to negotiate 
aggressively for a stringent P-5+D-3 provision, but if Moscow sent this parallel 
memo to Washington it implies that Russia would not have actually rejected the first 
Chair's draft or wrecked the negotiations as long as the EIF provision ensured 
accession by the P-5. Had Ramaker known that Moscow's bottom line was P-5 
adherence rather than the full P-5 + D-3 condition, he may have been less intimidated 
by Berdennikov's hostage-threatening tactic, and could thus have risked a more 
practical provision in the May 28 draft. 
Russia was not Ramaker's only problem, however, for he also had to contend with an 
unusually vocal and hardline British posture. While it was clear that the Conservative 
government wished to portray the CTBT as pre-eminently an instrument of 
nonproliferation, the stridency of the British position baffled delegations and NGOs 
in Geneva, London and Washington, particularly after France had moved closer to the 
US position. Weston has subsequently expressed immense pride in keeping the UK 
delegation consistent with the initial principles it laid down for the CTBT, and it is 
true that he refused to yield on the British demand for a rigid, list-based provision 
since his opening policy statement in January 1994.41 In view of the uncompromising 
rigidity of the UK's EIF position, and unable to see a significant security threat to 
Britain if India, Pakistan or Israel failed to accede to the treaty immediately, other 
delegations wondered about more personalised, political or grudge-bearing 
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motivations. Some speculated that Britain could be using this issue to get back at the 
United States, a possibility consistent with evidence that the UK MoD was more 
determined to hold on to the position than the FCO 42 At one point Weston explained 
his position as being necessary to obtain Pakistan's accession: contrary to the main 
evidence from the NPT and PTBT experiences with states that were still considering 
their nuclear options, he expressed confidence that a strict mechanism would bring 
Pakistan on board and completely isolate India, and that this would then be more 
successful in bringing India on board than a flexible approach that was not legally 
binding 43 
France's opening position on entry into force in 1994 had been identical to Britain's, 
but during 1996 it moved towards American flexibility. This French willingness to 
compromise was consistent with its overall shift in posture following Chirac's 
election and the decision to resume testing. Having achieved its desired delay, Paris 
ceased to be the most openly obstructionist of the P-5 after June 1995. However, due 
to a change of French ambassador at the end of August 1995, the more constructive 
as French posture was offset by its weaker position within the P-5 
Most middle NNWS, notably Japan, Australia, Germany and most of the EU, 
Mexico, Canada and the Netherlands (notwithstanding Ramaker's position as Chair), 
preferred a more flexible EIF approach, but they were slow to recognise how close 
this issue would come to breaking the treaty. The G-21 was divided, with the Arab 
states generally advocating a P-5 + D-3 provision to bind Israel, and the rest 
preferring something more flexible. Several delegations began to float ideas whereby 
states particularly concerned by certain others (e. g. the P-5 with respect to each other, 
Pakistan with respect to India, Egypt with respect to Israel) could coordinate their 
accession with that of another state. One suggestion was for certain states to attach to 
their own ratification an EIF condition that the treaty would not be deemed legally 
binding on them unless State A had also ratified. Such conditions are sometimes 
attached to ratification legislation at the behest of national legislatures4s but not 
usually incorporated into a treaty itself. In the event, none of these suggestions was 
turned into a formal proposal. 
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Though the EIF issue had been virtually ignored by NGOs, some were now sounding 
the alert about the dangers inherent in an overly rigid provision. In response to my 
Geneva reports, George Perkovich, a well-respected US analyst of South Asia's 
nuclear politics, circulated a memo to "Parties concerned about the CTBT' in early 
June. Perkovich's analysis directly contradicted Weston's, as he noted that "putting 
India in a make-or-break EIF position would create a hot-button political issue in 
India... no matter how this or any other scenario played out, it's hard to see any 
positive aspect to having Indian accession required for ElF, once you accept that 
Indian signature on the treaty is unlikely. " Given the turbulence and fluidity of 
Indian politics at the time, Perkovich urged that "the best politically feasible outcome 
would be for the treaty to move enough in India's direction that Indian leaders would 
not foreclose future signature, and that diplomacy and international developments 
over the next months and years evolve to the point where India can be persuaded to 
sign, perhaps with additional inducements... If Indian accession is unlikely, then 
making EIF contingent upon this accession is self defeating. A6 On the basis of such 
advice, several NGOs, including Acronym, VERTIC, the Campaign for the NPT 
(which had morphed into the Working Group on the CTBT), and the Stimson Center, 
coordinated NGO letter writing to key governments and Geneva delegations. Pressure 
was also exerted through letters and questions to MPs and Congressional 
representatives. Their objective was to focus political attention on finding a regime- 
enhancing resolution to the EIF dilemma, which necessitated high level pressure on 
the Clinton administration, which still did not seem very seized of this issue, and 
some kind of parliamentary or FCO intervention to make Britain take a more flexible 
and constructive stance. Though these civil society endeavours bore some fruit, as 
discussed below, they were too late to influence the outcome. 
The June 20 Watershed 
Amid deteriorating personal and political relations among some of the key 
delegations, matters came to a head on June 20,1996. Handing over as "moderator" 
on entry into force, the Mexican ambassador Antonio de Icaza referred to the many 
letters from NGOs, expressing their concerns that what was called "the eight 
condition" could be discriminatory and result in "excessive delay". In his national 
capacity, de Icaza said that he fully shared the NGOs' concerns and favoured an EIF 
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solution that "endows the treaty with credibility ... such as a list combined with a 
waiver' . 47 
It was not to be. At the CD plenary on the same day, Arundhati Ghose castigated the 
NWS for shaping the treaty to their technological preferences. In what was 
interpreted by many as an ultimatum, Ghose declared: "India cannot accept any 
restraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation 
to eliminate their nuclear weapons". She rejected attempts to coerce India through 
the EIF provisions of the treaty, saying that India "would not accept any language in 
the treaty text which would affect our sovereign right to decide, in the light of our 
supreme national interest, whether we should or should not accede to such a treaty. -AS 
Also on June 20, but in the NTB Committee that followed the plenary, Ramaker 
tabled a Chair's working paper on entry into force. His proposal contained a series of 
staggered provisions. The first and main condition was accession by all states with a 
primary seismic station or radionuclide laboratory, as in the May 28 draft. If this strict 
requirement was not met within five years, then states that had ratified would have a 
second chance to bring the treaty into effect by a combination of a simple number, 
waiver conference and a "deferment" option. If at least 75 states had signed and 
ratified, then the treaty would enter into force automatically five years plus 180 days 
from the date of its opening for signature, unless one or more of them requested a 
special conference to be convened. If a conference were requested, then this would be 
open to all states which had ratified. They would have the power to agree to 
implement the treaty by a two-thirds majority. 49 Responding to concerns put forward 
by Pakistan and Egypt, Ramaker's working paper proposed that any state which had 
ratified but did not support the decision to implement the treaty could, at the time of 
the conference, defer its own accession to the treaty until all the original conditions 
had been met, or until it felt able to revoke its decision to defer (a kind of reverse 
Tlatelolco mechanism). 
The formula was ingenious and potentially workable, but it suffered from three major 
problems: it was too late, too complicated, and reproduced the discredited IMS-based 
list, from which India had already withdrawn. Despite its complexity, a modified 
version of such a phased entry into force proposal could possibly have won through 
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even if this overly complicated text had been inserted into Ramaker's May 28 draft. 
That would have given the phased concept greater authority, while allowing for 
discussion of the details. It might also have been taken more seriously if it had used 
as its base-line the IAEA list or newly expanded CD. S° As it was, the tactics and 
timing were wrong. Russia and Britain rejected it out of hand and, despite the valiant 
attempts of NGOs and the Dutch delegation, even the supporters of flexible entry into 
force did not take it seriously. 
The NTB Committee made one last attempt to find a compromise, meeting until 
midnight on June 20. As noted in Chapter 5, the notorious exchange between Weston 
and Ghose occurred early on: Sir Michael's comment about India "wriggling on the 
end of a hook" provoked an acerbic response from Ghose to the effect that India was 
no longer a colony and could not be bullied. According to diplomats in the room at 
the time, the exchange poisoned the atmosphere of the meeting, and no-one wanted to 
speak after that. 5' Chairing the meeting in his last act as moderator, De Icaza tried to 
move on and get the Committee to discuss Ramaker's paper, but got little response 
from the stunned room of diplomats. He mistakenly interpreted the silence as a lack 
of support for the phased EIF concept. As the delegates stewed in summer heat and 
the acrimonious atmosphere, De Icaza then attempted to jumpstart discussion by 
going round the room and asking each delegation to say whether it could accept the 
EIF formulation in the May 28 Chair's draft. This proved to be a tactical error, as his 
question was understood by delegations in the narrowest of terms: not "does your 
country accept this as the best formula for the treaty? " but rather "do you have 
national instructions to reject it? " On that basis, only India rejected it, although a 
number of others commented that they would have preferred something more 
flexible. 
Many diplomats recall the June 20 meeting as the day entry into force was lost. 
Though it was widely speculated that India had already taken its decision to walk 
away from the treaty and that changing Article XIV would not make much difference 
at this point, a number of diplomats present blamed Weston's "blast" for the final 
breakdown in communication with India. 52 Be that as it may, it is important to note 
that Weston was accompanied on June 20 by Roland Smith, a senior FCO official 
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from London, and that most of his remarks that day were not off-the-cuff comments 
(as many assumed at the time), but read from a written statement. 53 
Confusion and Haste 
Ramaker's hope of being given the authority to find a suitable alternative were 
effectively killed on June 20, but he continued to try. With time running out, many 
returned to the view that listing the members of the newly expanded CD, combined 
with a waiver provision, could facilitate wide adherence and early implementation 
and also exert pressure on the nuclear test capable states. But the United States 
reportedly considered 60 too large, and Britain, Russia and China continued to 
oppose any kind of waiver. Ramaker resurrected an idea originally floated some 
months previously by Canada for a "political conference" that would be held by 
signatories after some years if the treaty had not entered into force, and which could 
discuss ways to persuade hold-out states to accede. It was envisaged that this would 
be less formal, with fewer decisionmaking powers than a waiver conference. 
During the final weeks of June, and particularly after the June 20 meeting, several 
attempts were made to influence the EIF decision, but they turned out to be 
insufficient or too late. On June 24, in response to British NGOs, Robin Cook, 
Labour's Shadow Foreign Secretary, put down a series of five questions for the 
government on CTBT entry into force, calling for a response to Ramaker's EIF 
working paper 54 and asking about the "implications for international security of a 
lengthy delay in the entry into force" of the CTBT. 55 The government's reply, given 
by David Davis, FCO Minister of State, was: "fier Majesty's Government's position 
is that, for it to be a fully effective non-proliferation measure, the comprehensive test 
ban treaty must have as parties the declared nuclear weapon states and all other states 
with a nuclear capability and which are not otherwise prevented from testing by other 
international agreements to which they are parties. The formula proposed by 
Ambassador Ramaker on 20 June, but not incorporated into his revised text, does not 
meet this requirement 06 Dodging the central challenge implied in Cook's questions, 
Davis also intoned: "We believe that the earliest practicable entry into force of the 
treaty on the basis of universal adherence would best serve the interests of 
international security. "57 
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Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center had been trying for months to get a 
high level group of scientists and former diplomats together (as he had done on the 
issue of scope a year earlier) to convince the White House to exert its political 
authority to get a more credible EIF provision. Finally, on June 28, a delegation 
including the Chair of the JASON Group Sidney Drell, Carter's former Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance, General Andrew Goodpaster and McGeorge Bundy, visited the 
White House and obtained a promise that Clinton would try to get a more flexible 
entry into force provision. SB Letters were also sent to Malcolm Rifkind, the 
Conservative Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, from the 
Foreign Ministers of several EU and Commonwealth states, including the 
Netherlands. S9 Joa1le Bourgois was also seeking ways to exert pressure on Britain to 
modify its posture. Whether because of French efforts, or following the high level 
meeting at the White House, Sir Michael Weston received a telephone call from 
British government representatives attending the meeting of G-7 heads of state in 
Lyon, June 27-29,1996, instructing him to show more flexibility on entry into 
force. 60 Although it is understood that the change in instructions occurred as a direct 
result of discussions between President Clinton and John Major, it arrived too late to 
have any effect (according to Sir Michael). 61 
Ramaker put his `final' treaty text on the table on June 28. He had replaced the 
discredited IMS-based list in Article XIV with a version that combined the IAEA list 
of nuclear capable states and members of the enlarged CD, from which India could 
not simply withdraw. He combined the list with an amalgam of the suggestions from 
Canada and Austria regarding provisional application and a political conference. In 
an instance perhaps of the right hand not knowing what the left was doing, the US 
State Department rallied support for the June 28 draft as a package deal, arguing that 
it should now be agreed without further negotiations. While it was useful to signal a 
close to the negotiations as a whole at this time, this added unnecessary weight 
against reopening Article XIV, and so negated any effect that might have attached to 
Clinton's "Lyon" action on behalf of a flexible EIF provision. It also made the US 
insistence on reopening the text to reflect concessions made to China on OSI look 
like hypocrisy. Such confused responses also reinforced the impression that the 
United States did not have its eye properly on the EIF ball. 
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The new Article XIV in the revised Chair's text set a primary condition of ratification 
by a list of 44 states which were participating members of the CD on June 18 (aller 
expansion) and appeared in the 1995 and 1996 IAEA lists of countries with nuclear 
research or nuclear power reactors respectively. Contained in Annex 2 of the treaty, 
the wording carefully excludes Yugoslavia (a CD member by name but barred from 
participation during its wars of disintegration) and Iraq, to deny Saddam Hussein the 
potential leverage of a veto. If the condition is not met within three years, then states 
which have already ratified can convene a conference to decide on measures to 
"accelerate the ratification process" and facilitate early entry into force. Following 
concerns, raised principally by India, that the term "measures" might imply sanctions 
and that the provision as a whole was a threat to sovereignty, Ramaker gave the 
clarifying reassurance that "the current article on entry into force did not impinge on 
the sovereign right of any state to take its own decision about whether or not to sign 
and ratify the treaty. " He also stated that Article XIV paragraph 2, which related to 
the conference, "did not refer to United Nations Security Council measures in 
accordance with chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. , 62 The NTB Committee 
report also placed on record that Article XIV did not impose any legally binding 
obligations on a state not party to the treaty, regardless of whether or not ratification 
by that state was a condition of entry into force. None of these assurances ameliorated 
India's objections sufficiently to alter a decision to defect that now appeared 
irrevocable. 
The text that became Article XIV of the CTBT was formed out of bridging proposals 
from at least three delegations that were themselves actually opposed to basing entry 
into force on the P-5 + D-3 condition. Faced with what appeared to be a lose-lose 
situation, they tried to make the best of a bad job. To get the political conference 
through, proponents of this Article XIV had to make clear that the conference was not 
a waiver conference. India stressed that despite the Chair's assurances it still viewed 
the provision as coercive. On August 8, Arundhati Ghose repeated that India would 
not sign a CTBT text that did not address nuclear disarmament in a timebound 
framework, and announced that because of the current provision on entry into force, 
India would also block CD consensus on the treaty, a threat it carried out, with messy 
consequences. 3 Though Weston appeared triumphant, few others were happy with 
the outcome. Among CD members, a large majority had wanted a flexible provision 
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to encourage early entry into force, but the Article XIV in Ramaker's June 28 draft 
was never reopened. The CTBT went forward with its Achilles-heel EIF requirement 
identifying a rigidly defined list containing at least one declared defector. Castigated 
as "coercive"64 by more than just India, Article XIV was derided by many. The 
conference mechanism, dismissed by some CD delegates as a "handwringing 
conference", has (at the time of writing) fulfilled their predictions that its powers 
were too limited for it to be effective in facilitating entry into force. 65 
Misperception and Intransigence 
The negotiating history on entry into force was characterised by muddle, 
misperception, dissonance and intransigence. It does not lend itself to rational 
theories of interest and outcome, unless a covert desire by several states to wreck the 
treaty is assumed. Such an assumption is contradicted by the endgame dynamic of 
fierce but solution-oriented concession-trading among key states such as Russia, 
China and the United States on other issues. India had given several months' warning 
of its intention to defect from the treaty, but the CD slid inexorably into an entry-into- 
force trap, and seemed to be surprised by how quickly the trap snapped shut. The 
diplomats themselves blamed India's domestic politics and some of the key 
personalities - Weston, too rigid and aggressive; Ledogar, too preoccupied; Ramaker, 
too weak; Bourgois, lacking the P-5 clout of her predecessor to outwit Weston; 
Ghose, manipulative and clever. While acknowledging that the personality, skills and 
status of strategic individuals can make a difference, each of these "personalities" was 
also a cipher fulfilling an institutional role. Was Berdennikov too successful in 
browbeating the Chair with his hostage-taking tactic, or was he, rather, a very 
competent diplomat pursuing his instructions with zeal? Although many seemed to 
pin the blame personally on Weston, the presence of a senior FCO official at the 
crucial meeting on June 20 indicates that what many viewed as maverick behaviour 
was within instructions. Was Ledogar too preoccupied or was the problem that 
Washington was not paying sufficient attention to the growing EIF crisis regardless 
of the many letters and cables received there? Ramaker, too, had to manage a highly 
charged conflict on the basis of information available at the time, without knowing of 
Moscow's willingness to settle for a P-5 treaty, for example. Secret back-channel 
bilateral communications between the capitals of key states, as well as the minilateral 
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negotiations among the P-5, may have facilitated some agreements, but at times also 
compounded the difficulties faced by non-P-S diplomats responsible for the conduct 
and outcome of multilateral negotiations. 
It appears, from conversations at the time and my subsequent interviews with the 
main protagonists, that no-one deliberately used entry into force as a means of 
undermining the treaty; moreover, few are prepared to admit that they made mistakes. 
Later revelations and hindsight indicate that alternatives may have been possible. At 
the very least, on the basis of what was knowable at the time, it appears there were 
errors of timing and tactics, and over-cautious attempts to paper over and manage 
conflict. The main problem, however, was a lack of sufficiently high level 
governmental and diplomatic attention, until far too late. Squeezed between the P-5 
and the D-3, and against the pressure of the very potent, if not legally binding, 
deadline of September 1996, Ramaker was left to resolve the issue, but given 
insufficient support or ideas with which to counteract Berdennikov's veiled threats 
and Britain's strident determination. In the end, an unyielding provision was imposed 
against the implacable opposition of one delegation and the serious misgivings of 
many more. This was a management solution to ensure that EIF negotiations did not 
delay the treaty's finalisation, but it came at the expense of the CTBT's political 
credibility and future prospects. 
Britain was apparently deceived by a promise from Pakistan, but that begs a larger 
question. Though taken as an insult directed at India, Weston's "wriggling on a hook" 
metaphor is more revealing of British attitudes to the CTBT: it is a metaphor related 
to fishing, to reeling in the D-3. The Conservative government had explicitly opposed 
a CTBT after taking power in 1979, and its negotiating posture from 1994-96 
suggests that the policy preference underlying this position did not alter during the 
negotiations, unlike some of the other NWS. Binding the D-3 was therefore an 
overriding objective because nonproliferation was the major justification that realist 
policymakers in the NWS could ascribe to their participation in negotiating away 
their own option to conduct nuclear tests. The UK could afford to stick to its guns 
because it didn't regard the CTBT as intrinsically valuable in its own terms. 
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But if binding the D-3 was the aim, then the UK's analysis was glaringly wide of the 
mark where India was concerned. As subsequent events have shown, Perkovich's 
memo was a far more astute assessment of the consequences of trying to corner India 
with inclusion in this kind of list. Despite playing a constructive role on matters 
related to verification, the UK posture bore out the fact that John Major's 
Conservative government had been dragged unwillingly into the CTBT negotiations 
by the United States. It had little vested interest in the treaty and made very few 
concessions in the negotiations, with the exception of safety tests, associated more 
with British interest in achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT. The relative 
lack of US engagement on entry into force gave the UK plenty of space to flex its 
muscles on this issue. Revealingly, Weston proudly claimed that the treaty contained 
practically all of Britain's opening positions. 66 But such inflexibility is not necessarily 
laudable, since coerced agreement is less conducive to regime-formation than 
convergence achieved through negotiations and the building of shared norms and 
principles. The self-defeating entry into force provision is perhaps the clearest 
example of multilateralist objectives being undermined by the conflicting and 
contradictory understandings that the major players had about the role, function and 
benefits of multilateral arms control in general and the CTBT in particular. 
Notes 
1 Arundhati Ghose, Ambassador of India, United Nations General Assembly, September 10,1996. 2 For a thought-provoking analysis of India's nuclear-related dilemmas at the time of CTB finalisation, 
see William Walker, "Viewpoint: India's Nuclear Labyrinth", The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 
1996) pp 61-77. 
3 This characterisation came from a European diplomat in off-the-record conversation with the author, 
August 1996. The revenge was supposedly against the Americans for inflicting their moratorium on 
Britain when the UK nuclear weapon and defence establishment still had some tests lined up to do. 
Trevor Findlay, Peace through Chemistry (Canberra: Australian National University, 1993). pp 15- 
19. 
9 Article III, 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under 
water. See also the discussion in Kim Tay, "Entry into Force", Verification Matters No. 6 (London: 
VERTIC, September 1994). 
See Chapter 3 note 92. 
7 Article IX, 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
8 The Chemical Weapons Convention eschewed the specification of certain states and provided for 
entry into force 180 days after the 65th state deposited its instruments of ratification, but not earlier 
304 
than two years after being opened for signature. Article XXI, 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. 9 Post 1990 accessions to the NPT include a number of countries that for different reasons gave up 
substantial capabilities or nuclear weapon options, including Argentina, Algeria, Brazil, South Africa, 
as well as Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan after the Soviet Union's disintegration. China and France 
also chose to join in 1992, although their case was somewhat different, as they were recognised under 
the NPT as nuclear weapon states. See Chapter 2. 
10 Permanent Representation of Sweden to the CD, Draft comprehensive nuclear lest ban treaty and 
annexed protocol, CD/1232, (December 6,1993). This draft was based on based on earlier drafts 
dating back to 1983. See especially Sweden's Drall comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, CD/1089, 
(July 31,1991); and CD/1202, (June 3,1993). See also Maurice A. Mallin, The June 1993 Swedish 
Drall Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: Implications and Issues for Negotiations (McLean 
VA: The Center for National Security Negotiations, SAIC March 1994). 
11 Sir Michael Weston, January 25,1994, CD/PV. 666. 
12 Grigori Berdennikov, February 1,1994, CD/PV. 668. 
13 Sir Michael Weston, January 25,1994, CD/PV. 666. 
'4 As noted in Chapter 2, expansion of the CD had been expected in 1993, but failed to go through as a 
result of a last minute veto from the United States over admitting Iraq. The UK and France preferred 
the expanded CD option over the IAEA list, which also covered the P-5, D-3 and a number of other 
states with potential nuclear ambitions or capabilities, on the normative grounds that participation In 
the negotiations should confer an added incentive and interest in acceding to the treaty. The stand-off 
with the United States over Iraq took so long to resolve that Britain and France had abandoned their 
proposal by the end of 1994. The enlargement decision was not adopted by the CD until June 1996, 
just in time for the CTBT negotiations' final throes. 
s Friend of the Chair, Working paper on signature, ratification, accession, entry into force, March 10, 
1994, CD/NTB/WG. 2/9 
16 China, Working Paper, Entry into Force ojthe CTBT, 20 June 1994, CD/NTB/WP. 123 17 This discussion of the US's floated suggestions derives from conversations at the time with 
American and other diplomats in Geneva. I have not been able to obtain papers detailing the 
suggestions, and it is possible that they were not circulated in writing. 
IS Zou Yunhua, China and the CTBT Negotiations, (Stanford CA: Stanford University Center for 
International Security and Cooperation, 1998) p21. 
" Sha Zukang, September 5,1995, CD/PV. 717. In the end, China stopped testing after signing the 
CTBT in September 1996. That does not, however, mean that the concerns about the possibility of 
China continuing to test until entry into force were unfounded. Colonel Zou Yunhua acknowledged 
that China wanted "at least a few more tests", and until late in the negotiations China's diplomats were 
careful to leave open the possibility of testing after conclusion of the treaty, either through delaying 
signature (while declaring willingness not to impede entry into force) or through defying the norm 
established by the Vienna Convention on Treaties and Conventions, which China has avoided signing. 
See Zou, 1998, p 26. 
20 The Tlatelolco Treaty negotiators were conscious that two important target states - Brazil and 
Argentina - were at that time engaged in a race to acquire the technology for a nuclear weapon option 
(a potentially deadly rivalry that the treaty was intended to assist in defusing), and that this could affect 
the decisions taken by some of their neighbours. Moreover, Cuba's relative isolation and relationship 
with the Soviet Union made its accession difficult to influence and impossible to predict. To address 
this potentially destabilising dilemma, Mexico, with help from UN-based lawyers, notably William 
Epstein, developed the unusual waiver formula to facilitate early establishment of the nuclear weapon 
free zone. The formal EIF conditions required ratification by all the states in the zone of application, 
plus ratification of Additional Protocols I and If. However the treaty contained a provision whereby 
states which had ratified could choose to waive the specified EIF conditions, thereby enabling the 
treaty to enter into force for those that chose to abide by it. The treaty therefore became "operative" in 
April 1968. This formula was able to act as a confidence-building measure, allowing a credible treaty 
regime and implementing authority (Organlsmo para la Proscr: pcion de las Armas Nucleares en la 
America Latina - OPANAL) to be developed as the adherents grew in number. Jozef Goldblat, Arms 
Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, (London: Sage Publications, 1994), pp 149-153. 
21 This summary was based on sight of a draft document and conversations with the Australian 
delegation during 1995. 
22 Australia's national preference was still for a simple number, but the delegation acknowledged that 
the opposition to this appeared entrenched. The Australian model text therefore proposed that the basic 
305 
condition should specify ratification by all CD members plus observers (which would have been some 
75 states, including the P-5 and D-3), but that the EIF article should explicitly provide for a conference 
to consider whether to waive this stringent condition, even if a few states on the list had not yet joined, 
and inaugurate the verification system. The conference could be initiated any time after two years from 
the treaty being opened for signature, and would be called by decision of those who had ratified. This 
was a modified version of the US waiver conference proposal, but without the US condition requiring 
all P-5 on board. Australia, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Model Treaty Text, February 29, 
1996, CD/1386 and Australia, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Explanatory Notes 
Accompanying Model Treaty Text, February 29,1996, CD/1387. 
u Iran based entry into force on the full IAEA list of all 68 states which have or have had any level of 
nuclear technology or capability, and specified that the treaty should enter into force if 65 out of these 
68 states ratified (a modified version of the percentage option). Islamic Republic of Iran, Draft 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, February 21,1996, CD/1384. 
24 India, working paper, Entry into force, January 29,1996, CD/NTB/WP. 297. 
25 See Chapter 5. 
26 The quote was taken from an informal non-paper provided to the author by the British delegation. 
27 Such concerns came to a head after India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998. See 
Chapter 2. 
28 Harald Kreid, 28 March, 1996, CD/PV. 733; and Austria, Working Paper, Draft Treaty Language on 
Provisional Application, June 16,1995, CD/NTB/WP. 242. 
29 Sir Michael Weston, interview with the author, Matfield, June 11,2002. See also note 13. 
30 Author's conversations with senior Dutch officials, The Hague, March 29,2002. 
31 Jaap Ramaker, interview with the author, July 16,2001. 
32 Author's conversations with senior Dutch officials, May 28-30,1996; and confirmed by Jaap 
Ramaker, interview with the author, Vienna, July 16,2001. 
33 Jaap Ramaker, Chair of the Nuclear Test Ban Committee, statement to the CD, May 30,1996, 
CD/PV. 736. 
34 See Chapters 5 and 7. 
s' George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, (Berkeley CA, University of California Press, 1999) pp 
353-354. 
36 Arundhati Ghose, June 20,1996, CD/PV. 740. 
37 Robert Bell, from a transcript of a Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers press conference coinciding 
with the start of Senate Hearings on the CTBT. See "The Issues Behind the CTB Ratification Debate", 
Arms Control Today (October 1997), www. armscontrol. org/act/1997_1 0/coaloct. asp. 
31 Sha Zukang, interview with the author, Beijing, October 15,2000. 
79 Grigori Berdennikov, interview with the author, Vienna, July 17,2001. 
40 The memo is reportedly classified, and I rely on information from a former US official close to the 
negotiations, provided during a conversation with me in Washington DC, April 2002. When 
questioned informally at a reception in Stockholm, September 2002, Berdennikov admitted hearing 
"something" of a memo along the lines I had described, but he denied seeing it and appeared to doubt 
its authenticity. After an informal follow-up discussion with Jaap Ramaker in Washington DC, 
November 2002, I am convinced that he knew nothing of such a Russian memo. Because of the 
potential significance of this memo, if true, in assessing Russia's true bottom line on EIF, and in view 
of my informational source and Berdennikov's admitted recollection of hearing about it, I have 
decided to include it in this account, while emphasising that more time is required before the full truth 
of this matter can be brought into the open. 
" Sir Michael Weston, interview with the author, Matfield, June 11,2002. 
42 This speculation, rife among UK NGOs, was based on the knowledge that the MoD had been 
severely put out when the United States declared a moratorium in 1992, as it scuppered the nuclear 
establishment's chances of completing three tests that had already been planned and prepared. 
Moreover, Malcolm Rifkind and John Major were unhappy with the Clinton administration's decision 
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nuclear establishments and between the MoD and Pentagon officials opposed to the moratorium. 
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June 11,2002. 
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Chapter Nine 
Expectations, Interests and Multilateral Convergence: 
Considerations and Conclusions 
As he signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on September 24,1996, President 
Bill Clinton called it "the longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control 
history"! This long struggle was characterised by competing motivations not only 
for and against halting nuclear tests but also for and against disarmament. 
The opposing views played out in both the international forum and in the domestic 
debates of the major states. In favour of a test ban were those who wanted to prevent 
the development of new and destabilising weapons, protect against further 
environmental damage and harmful releases of radioactivity, and curb proliferation. 
Test ban opponents, by contrast, associated their own country's possession of nuclear 
weapons with stability and security; they wanted to continue testing in order to keep 
open their options to develop or modernise "safe and reliable" nuclear arsenals into 
the future. Whilst opposing proliferation by other actors, they tended to regard their 
own nuclear weapons as both a guarantor of national security through deterrence and 
a conveyor of international prestige and status. 
Only six states had conducted a nuclear explosion prior to 1994, when the 
negotiations opened. The NPT already forbade nuclear testing by its non nuclear 
weapon states parties, who comprised the majority of CD members. Because of the 
normative value associated with multilateral regimes, however, no serious 
consideration was given to holding plurilateral negotiations among the NWS and non- 
NPT possessors most directly concerned. 
While the CTB negotiations can be characterised as a process of intentional regime- 
building by all concerned, this study has demonstrated that negotiators' harboured 
substantially different expectations and requirements of the regime. The conflicting 
views occurred in a context in which assumptions that nonproliferation was a `good' 
appeared to be commonly accepted (at least with lip-service). Yet this ostensibly 
shared objective masked differences of negotiating goals that correlated significantly 
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with where a state was located on the spectrum of nuclear capabilities and interests. 
Having detailed the processes of convergence in the negotiations, the thesis now 
concludes by drawing out the major themes, first considering how a state's interests 
in nuclear weapons - as declared or de facto possessor, aspirant or non-nuclear 
weapon state - influenced its expectations and negotiating posture, and then 
summarising the processes and factors most relevant for explaining first the transition 
from prenegotiations to negotiations and then the outcomes on scope, verification and 
entry into force. 
Nuclear Weapons, Programmes and Perceptions of National 
Interest 
The nuclear weapon states viewed the CTBT as a component of the wider 
nonproliferation regime, which had defined and (as far as they were concerned) 
legitimised their nuclear capabilities, conferring prestige, leadership and special 
privileges. Consistent with both realist and neoliberal regime analysis, they agreed to 
negotiate a CTBT for three reasons: i) to cap the nuclear capabilities of India and 
Pakistan before they became weaponised to any significant degree; ii) to induce all 
the de facto nuclear weapon possessors to take this first step towards formal 
engagement in the established arms control and nonproliferation regimes and to place 
a further barrier in the way of any nuclear aspirants; and iii) to reinforce the 
credibility of the NPT so that it would be indefinitely extended in 1995. 
The probability that the CTBT would freeze the capability differentials among the P-5 
was useful for the United States and did not seem to be of paramount concern to the 
others, who recognised that economics largely determined their post cold war military 
asymmetries. Their important security concerns were to stabilise the status quo in 
relation to each other, secure their nuclear arsenals, and prevent the rise of additional 
nuclear weapon possessors. The CTBT was vital in relation to the NPT linkage 
because it was a stated objective in the treaty's preamble and was demanded by the 
non nuclear weapon states - especially the nonaligned - and civil society as the 
minimum basic step to show that the NPT's Article VI was being taken seriously. 
Israel's nuclear arsenal, though ritually included in appeals to the D-3, was of less 
political importance for the P-5 than the nuclear ambitions of India and Pakistan, 
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which were viewed as regionally destabilising and less well controlled. Israel's 
involvement was required chiefly to ensure the credibility of the nonproliferation 
regime for the Arab states and Iran, whose consent for the NPT's extension was 
considered politically crucial. 
Negotiating a CTBT did not mean that any of the P-S had been converted to the cause 
of nuclear disarmament. 2 Defining the CTBT's role and function mainly in 
nonproliferation terms, they negotiated with a view to normalising the possession of 
nuclear weapons by their privileged group, while strengthening the barriers against 
others. Though the P-5 differed in how bluntly they expressed the sentiment that the 
CTBT was to ban the bangs not the bomb, they all sought to protect as much of their 
nuclear weapons research and development options and infrastructures as possible. 
Even when they adopted the zero yield scope, they all made sure to offset its 
disarmament effects by ensuring more effective capabilities through, for example, 
stockpile stewardship programmes, enhanced subcritical and hydrodynamic testing 
and inertial confinement fusion. These programmes to mitigate any disarmament- 
leaning outcomes of the CTB negotiations have provoked considerable criticism from 
the NNWS and NGOs, for whom a legitimate aim of the treaty was indeed to erode 
the role of the nuclear weapons laboratories and design infrastructures and promote 
nuclear disarmament. 
The D-3 pursued different strategies in accordance with their perceived interests and 
political resources. For example, Israel prudently chose to slipstream behind the 
United States through most of the negotiations, aided by its close alliance. Influenced 
also by the fact that it was not a member of the CD until June 1996, Israel adopted a 
relatively low profile except when it had to light for national interests that diverged 
markedly from those of the United States. With on-site inspections, for example, 
Washington wanted rapid decision-making and easy access, while Israel, like its D-3 
cohorts and China, wanted to establish tough procedural hurdles to protect its 
facilities from most kinds of scrutiny. Israel's confidence in its continuing 
collaboration with the United States and the ability of its nuclear arsenal to perform 
the political and military functions it required vis-ä-vis its non nuclear armed regional 
adversaries enabled it to view the prospect of a CTBT with equanimity and become 
an early signatory. 
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The political calculations for Pakistan and India were rather different. Having 
conducted its first nuclear explosion in 1974, outside the NPT definitional date, India 
was institutionally excluded from gaining the perceived status and privilege of a 
NWS under the NPT-based nonproliferation regime. India operated from essentially 
realist assumptions, but its calculations were complicated because it was trapped 
between a desire for power through increased nuclear capabilities and its long-touted 
advocacy of nuclear disarmament, linked to that part of its post-colonial identity and 
sphere of influence that derived from the Gandhi-Nehru heritage and leadership in the 
nonaligned movement. India's regional situation vis-i -vis China, an established 
NWS, and unstable Pakistan, with nuclear potential and inferior conventional forces, 
further complicated New Delhi's calculations. Denied access to special status through 
the NPT, India has long sought to undermine the nonproliferation regime as it is 
currently structured. The treaty's indefinite extension without a vote in 1995 was 
perceived as a severe political blow, reinforcing India's exclusion from the nuclear 
club. India then used the CTBT to underscore its rejection of discriminatory 
nonproliferation, and was helped by the clumsy handling of the entry-into-force issue 
and the British ambassador's provocative rhetoric. 
India's dilemmas have some of the characteristics of Rousseau's staghunt, but 
illustrate especially the importance of how the stag is perceived. If the treaty is 
conceptualised in the NWS' terms, the CTBT stag is a nonproliferation feast. In 
India's view, the NWS wanted the cooperation of everyone else to capture this 
nonproliferation stag, but intended to keep all the best parts. Since India had already 
concluded that nonproliferation as presently constructed excludes states other than the 
P-5 (and their nuclear allies) from a full share of security, the benefits for India's 
perceived national security of sharing in the capture of the CTBT were uncertain. 
Therefore, India defected from the treaty hunt to secure the lesser hare of its own 
nuclear arsenal. If, on the other hand, the CTBT stag were to be recontextualised as a 
nondiscriminatory disarmament objective, as most of the nonaligned and some 
middle powers sought, India's defection ensured a suboptimal outcome that 
undermined disarmament efforts worldwide. Viewed in this light, India satisfied its 
own immediate hunger for regional power and NWS status at the expense of a future 
security objective desired by most of the world, which would arguably have offered 
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greater satisfaction and security for all, including India itself, over the long term. 
India's nuclear disarmament positions in the CTBT, derided by many as either 
idealist hypocrisy or cynical rhetoric, were a way of hedging its bets: strategically, 
since nuclear disarmament could diminish the relative power of competitors, 
especially China; and tactically, as a `best versus good' let-out from the finalised 
treaty. 
Pakistan was also outside the NPT and also employed disarmament rhetoric, 
especially in appealing to nonaligned solidarity, but its role was different from 
India's. Pakistan's interests were conditioned by its regional relations and 
conventional military inferiority with regard to India. Its primary objective was to 
ensure that India gained no relative advantage and, where possible, to use the 
negotiations to increase pressure on its neighbour. It was in Pakistan's interests to be 
a supporting adjunct to China on many issues, but it did not merely slipstream in 
China's wake, and occasionally fronted an issue for China or the G-2 1, playing its D- 
3 ambitions off against both the NWS and the NNWS. This, and its manipulation of 
Britain during the EIF negotiations, show the shrewdness with which it maximised its 
position, despite being comparatively disadvantaged in terms of power. 
Traditionally, and consistent with both the realist and neoliberal approaches to 
multilateralism, the nuclear weapon possessors (both the P-5 and D-3) are viewed as 
having direct interests in the negotiations by virtue of their nuclear capabilities. 
Perceptions of the level of interest may be determined not only by the number or type 
of weapons a party possesses, but also whether the weapon (or a practice such as 
nuclear testing) is regarded as of strategic or marginal importance to national security 
or political identity and status. 3 Aspirants, too, have direct interests in the 
negotiations, at least insofar as the outcome(s) may close off their options. The non- 
nuclear weapon states, by contrast, are generally considered to have `only' indirect 
interests in the outcome, deriving from their security interests in building an effective 
regime. This marks out a fundamental difference between the theoretical approach of 
new multilateralism and both the realist and neoliberal schools: new multilateralists 
take the view that the regime interests of non-weapon possessors are direct and actual 
and, in terms of their national security, equivalent to the weapon-based interests of 
possessors. 
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The thesis shows that the NNWS themselves seemed to be equivocal about the 
importance of their interests in the CTBT. This may have been due to the dominance 
of realist training among foreign policy practitioners. 4 Though the nonaligned 
underscored as often as possible that their objective in negotiating a test ban was 
disarmament, which was portrayed, with due reference to the NPT's Article VI, as an 
obligation and objective of nonproliferation, they lacked conviction and coherence. 
Their marginalisation can in part be explained by their weaker resources and 
bargaining power. That begs the question however: if the NAM had perceived 
themselves as having actual security interests in the treaty outcome, it is likely that 
more would have found the resources to increase their bargaining effectiveness, as 
India, Pakistan and, indeed, aspirant Iran chose to do. 
Many NNWS - and particularly the Western allies of the United States, Britain and 
France - seemed generally to accept that their interests in a strong regime were of less 
weight than the NWS' nuclear force-related interests. Though they clearly wanted a 
strong test ban, they appeared prepared to accept almost any version of a CTBT that 
the NWS were willing to accede to. Where much of the dynamic of the CTBT 
negotiations in Geneva was the result of the NWS pursuing their narrower interests, 
most of the Western middle powers were motivated by a desire to get a test ban treaty 
that would prohibit the worst of nuclear testing, contribute to the NPT regime, and 
stand up in court. Yet faced with the `reality' of the NWS' expectations, most 
NNWS started the negotiations thinking the payoff structure was bounded (essentially 
zero sum), and they were therefore prepared to manage the process of convergence by 
facilitating concession-trading, and seeking to balance or split the differences. 
Dynamics of Convergence 
Two types of convergence were analysed in this thesis: distributive, encompassing 
both imposed and managed divisions of gains and losses; and integrative, in which 
perceptions of what would constitute an acceptable agreement are expanded or 
changed, principally through cognitive strategies and the shaping of norms and 
perceptions of interests. The following sections assess the dynamics of convergence 
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in the four principal areas studied: prenegotiations, scope, verification and entry into 
force. 
Prenegotiations 
For the purposes of this analysis I have limited my discussion of prenegotiations to 
the four-year period immediately preceding the January 1994 opening of negotiations. 
Following the stand-off on the CTBT that prevented agreement of a final document 
from the 1990 NPT Review Conference, the major hold-outs against test ban 
negotiations in the CD continued to be the United States and United Kingdom. 
France's accession to the NPT in 1992 affected the dynamic but generally reinforced 
the Western nuclear alliance. China, which had also joined the NPT in 1992, used 
rhetoric that echoed the NAM on nuclear disarmament, but Beijing was actually 
pursuing the major modernisation of its nuclear arsenal, so continued to be dependent 
on testing. Of the NWS, only Russia appeared genuinely keen on a CTBT. The 
precipitating factors that brought the major parties to the negotiating table were 
threefold: the geostrategic upheaval at the end of the cold war which opened up new 
opportunities in security relations and nuclear policy; the forthcoming extension 
decision on the NPT in 1995; and the Russian, French and US moratoria on testing in 
1991-2. 
The first two events were exogenous. The moratoria, however, were the result of the 
intentional actions of political players, both government and civil society. Though the 
reasons and dynamics were different for each case, all three testing moratoria were 
the consequence of domestic decision-making, in which civil society demands and 
strategies were an important factor. Though the last moratorium to be announced, it 
was the United States that had most impact on shifting the CD logjam and facilitating 
the start of negotiations. This was mainly a function of its pre-eminent political 
power, but also due to the CD's consensus rule: as long as the United States opposed 
the CTBT, the CD was paralysed on this issue, as it had been from the beginning of 
the Republican reign in 1981. Once the United States halted testing and the race was 
on for a CTBT, it became much harder for other reluctant states to avoid participating 
in the negotiations. 
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As Chapter 4 discussed, the US moratorium was imposed through a combination of 
public mobilisation and legislative strategies on a president whose policy preference 
was to continue testing. Unlike the Russian and French moratoria, the Senate 
legislation explicitly linked the US moratorium to negotiations on a CTBT -a classic 
example of prenegotiations confidence building. The initial duration, however, was 
only for nine months. The legislation bears out 11ampson's observation about 
simplified focal points and issue sequencing: the fact that they were being asked to 
impose a relatively short, potentially temporary measure, that included an option for 
up to 15 safety tests, undoubtedly swung the votes of a number of Congressional 
representatives who would have balked at calling for a total, permanent cessation of 
nuclear testing at that time. As a modest confidence-building step that was reversible 
and not legally binding, a moratorium was an attractive option for those wanting to 
show support for a test ban, without necessarily entailing commitment to all the steps 
to accomplish a comprehensive prohibition treaty and regime. 
A further important factor was that pro-CTBT Democrats won the White House in 
1992. Had George H. W. Bush been re-elected to a second term, it is likely the 
moratorium legislation would have been reversed in 1993. It is not so certain that the 
US would have continued to oppose CTB negotiations, however, as there were some 
Republican as well as Democrat voices advocating a more constructive attitude 
towards the test ban treaty in the run-up to the NPT extension decision. Though we 
cannot know what might have happened, prenegotiations theory predicts that it would 
have been harder to go forward into negotiations if the United States and Britain, as 
well as China, were continuing with periodic underground explosions. In such 
circumstances, it is probable that France would have resumed testing before 1995, but 
the different circumstances and timing would have lessened the political impact. 
Though not as decisive as the US moratorium in shifting the logjam, the Soviet - and 
especially the French - moratoria were important in helping to create the conditions 
to push for the US moratorium in 1992, by fostering a sense that there was a `window 
of opportunity' that was worth the expenditure of political capital by the Democratic 
politicians who pushed through the moratorium legislation. Crisis, which liampson 
and others have highlighted as important in bringing parties to the table for arms 
control and environmental negotiations5 does not seem to have been relevant here. 
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This finding does not necessarily contradict Hampson's observation, but requires it to 
be qualified. Crisis clearly has a role to play in some situations: the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, for example, concentrated US and Soviet minds on the necessity for better 
cooperation, thereby overcoming some of the artificially politicised verification 
hurdles and congressional or bureaucratic opposition to a partial test ban treaty. In the 
case of CTBT prenegotiations in the 1990s, however, the end of the cold war 
provided opportunities and the 1995 NPT extension decision may have imparted 
urgency, but though these acted as spurs to the negotiations, it would stretch 
fiampson's meaning to describe either of them as a crisis. 
Gorbachev's moratorium was pragmatically determined, dictated by the nationalist- 
environmentalist popularity of an ad hoc civil society movement that within less than 
two years had networked widely with the peace movements of the west, receiving 
resources and help to promote its demand for the closure of the main Soviet test site 
at Semipalatinsk. By the end of 1989, as the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Nevada- 
Semipalatinsk Movement had already forced an end to testing in Kazakhstan. The 
Soviet Union at the time possessed over 30,000 nuclear weapons, though some were 
obsolete. The nuclear arms race had bankrupted the Kremlin. Since the remaining site 
at Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic had environmental problems and was increasingly 
expensive to use, Gorbachev concluded that a moratorium was in his interests. Like 
France, however, there is little evidence that this gesture was undertaken with a 
CTBT strategy in mind. Although Gorbachev favoured a CTBT, his experience of 
having his 19 month moratorium rejected in the mid-1980s had hardly been 
encouraging. 
In France, Mitterrand saw the moratorium as a way to buy off a political challenge 
from the Green Party by dressing in more environmentally friendly clothes. As 
France's programme of tests (and justifications) in 1995 showed, the French nuclear 
establishment was unprepared for a total ban and clearly expected only a temporary 
halt in 1992. With Republicans in the White House and Conservatives in Downing 
Street, there was no reason why Mitten-and should have anticipated that the United 
States would follow suit, and it is probable that he expected to resume testing after a 
year or so. 
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Taken together, the three moratoria reflected and also promoted a confidence- 
building breathing space in nuclear testing, thereby helping to pave the way for 
negotiations on the CTBT to begin in earnest. There was no crisis or shock; nor was 
the diffusion of new knowledge, norms and concepts of relevance here, as the same 
arguments for and against the CTBT had been heard for years. Civil society's role 
was in raising the political stakes and narrowing the options for decision-makers, 
particularly by tying the moratoria in with issues of more direct political or financial 
interest to Gorbachev, Mitterrand and Bush. At the time, the fact that moratoria are 
by definition more temporary and revocable than treaties made it easier for the 
leaders to undertake them as interim steps. Each moratorium was used to reel in 
further weapon states. When the United States was signed up it explicitly called for 
CTBT negotiations, while at the same time pulling in Britain. The US moratorium 
thus became the tipping point in favour of a CTBT. 
Scope 
Because the scope conveyed the basic obligations and core philosophical and political 
underpinnings of the treaty, a range of interest groups actively sought to influence 
national positions and achieve an outcome that would accord with their primary 
objectives, whether nonproliferation or disarmament. The P-5, among whom 
interests were both complementary and competitive, tried to keep scope negotiations 
within their own minilateral forum. As a concession to multilateral concerns and 
conscious of the approaching NPT Review and Extension Conference, they delivered 
occasional position statements in the CD and NTB Committee. 
The core interest shared by all the NWS was to preserve their nuclear weapon 
programmes while curbing the options of others. Most NNWS did not subscribe to 
this objective, but opposition was diluted by the acceptance of nuclear deterrence by 
an influential group of nuclear allies. Their approach was pragmatic, and they devoted 
themselves to getting the technical parts of the treaty worked out and in reining in 
disarmament demands from the nonaligned. The G-21 generally wanted a workable 
convergence between a timely achievable treaty and one that was disarmament 
oriented, but their effectiveness was diminished by inadequate resources and the 
difficulties of substantive coordination, given the membership of India, Pakistan and, 
to a lesser extent, Iran. Had the P-5 been able to cooperate more effectively during 
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the first half of the negotiations, it might have been possible for them, as the 
dominant actors, to have imposed a scope outcome on the rest that would have 
represented narrow P-5 interests far better than the actual outcome did. But because 
of their asymmetrical technological capabilities, political distrust and rivalry, the P-5 
were unable to reach a satisfactory convergence by means of concession trading over 
`activities not prohibited'. 
As a consequence of their failure to agree on even a threshold for hydronuclear 
experiment yields, the P-5 ended up with a zero yield scope that reflected the hopes 
(if not expectations) of the structurally marginalised disarmament advocates more 
closely than their own perceived NWS interests. To minimise the political and 
military impact of the scope decision, the NWS sought to offset the zero yield by 
declaring their intentions to ensure stockpile maintenance and enhancement without 
explosive testing (in many cases entailing an increase in resources to these areas of 
what the US called stockpile stewardship). All but China also explicitly linked their 
supreme national interests with the condition of their nuclear arsenals, thereby 
preparing the ground for a future withdrawal based on making the argument that the 
test ban had resulted in a degradation of nuclear forces. 
While the outcome did not correlate with attributive political power in realist terms, 
power and self interest were relevant to an understanding of why the NWS' rivalry 
outweighed their mutual interests. This was a period of rapid geostrategic 
transformation, and despite the obvious military asymmetries, each wanted to retain 
their technological and military ground and, indeed, the political status they 
associated with nuclear weapons. For example, safety tests provided a context in 
which Britain and France could assert that they had NWS responsibilities to maintain 
safe, reliable nuclear arsenals. Though the French delegation appeared to slipstream 
in Britain's wake on safety tests, France's desire for such an option was actually 
greater than Britain's. Since the late 1950s Britain has benefited from nuclear 
cooperation with the United States, but France has relied more on its own research 
and capabilities. American opposition to the Franco-British safety test provision 
posed a major problem for the credibility of the British position "since Britain relies 
on the American test facility... it made no sense to insist on the right to carry out 
safety tests". 6 
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France's position was more consistent with its nuclear doctrine and infrastructure, 
though that did not make it any more palatable to CTBT advocates. 7 As far as Paris 
was concerned, nuclear weapons had secured for France a post-war "international 
rank" and strengthened its position within Europe, particularly vis-ä-vis Germany. 
France's support for a CTBT was made contingent on developing simulation 
capabilities, as Ambassador Errera had spelled out: until the nuclear establishment 
could be sure that Chirac would win the election and lift the moratorium, safety tests 
or a high ANP threshold had to be held open as options. Nuclear testing provided the 
overt demonstration of France's nuclear status, national independence, technical 
prowess and willingness to defend itself. 8 Some officials also claimed that without 
further testing, three newly-developed warheads, the M-5, the M-45, and the TN-75, 
would not be able to be certified for deployment. 9 Safety tests may therefore have 
been one approach to the problem that the French nuclear establishment later resolved 
by resuming nuclear testing in late 1995.10 In contrast to the ease with which Britain 
appeared ready to demonstrate its "good NWS" credentials by giving up the safety 
test proposal, France's Ambassador Errera characterised the move as "a very hard 
decision to come to". 11 
Britain was equivocal about the need for safety tests, as indicated by contradictory 
government statements at the time. As a delaying mechanism the demand could only 
have played a small role, since discussion of safety tests took up relatively little time, 
but it can be understood as part of an overall strategy of delay, illustrated also in the 
tactics the British and French delegations employed to prevent Marin Bosch from 
issuing his Chair's text in June 1994, and the `reversed linkage' by which they 
countered any attempts to conclude the CTBT before the NPT Review and Extension 
Conference. The timing of the decision to drop the proposal was related to the NWS' 
desire to obtain the NPT's indefinite extension, suggesting that whatever the original 
intention, safety tests were retained mainly as a sacrificial device to be given up with 
great display in time for the NPT conference. 12 However, since most NNWS had 
regarded the safety tests, like Washington's ten year easy opt-out "elephant in the 
living room" as a non-starter, dropping them failed to impress as much as the 
tacticians had hoped. 
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While the Anglo-French demand for safety tests was held longer than expected, it was 
nothing compared to China's persistence on PNEs. Rather than being a bargaining 
counter, as many CD diplomats had assumed, PNEs occupied a central position in 
China's negotiating posture, but this may not have been the original intention. 13 
Since China had no PNE programme and was well aware of the practical problems 
that had led to the Russians and Americans abandoning their PNE programmes, it is 
unlikely that Beijing had suddenly developed an overriding interest in conducting 
such explosions. More plausibly, PNEs were introduced into the negotiations to 
provide a peaceful uses justification in case China wanted to reject the treaty. As 
with the familiar early demand on no first use, China frequently deploys ideological 
positions with the objective of enabling negotiators to walk away if necessary without 
losing face with important domestic constituents or international allies (in China's 
case, its credentials with the NAM). If this analysis is correct, PNEs started out being 
for China the equivalent of what linking entry into force with disarmament was for 
India - an ideologically defensible get-out provision, if one were to be needed. Like 
India, China was equivocal about the CTBT when it entered the negotiations. The 
refusal to abandon PNEs before the endgame makes more sense if they are 
understood as China's `best-versus-good' weapon. But it appears that by the time 
Beijing had decided that it would be more in China's interests to join the rest of the P- 
5 in a CTBT than to remain outside, the negotiators' own room to manoeuvre appears 
to have constricted. In other words, a self-fulfilling feedback loop was created, in 
which the negotiators made such an appealing case for retaining the PNE option that 
they convinced domestic audiences, especially in the influential People's Liberation 
Army. There is evidence for this conclusion in the fact that China's negotiators held 
out for a PNE mention in the final treaty that is purely symbolic, with no institutional 
weight and no chance of being successfully invoked. 14 
Apart from Russia's equivocation, the rest of the NWS opposed PNEs; yet when zero 
yield had swept away HNE options, they were quite willing to do a trade-off with 
China to allow a more accessible provision for PNEs in exchange for Chinese 
concessions on other issues. Hence it was not in the minilateral P-5 bargaining that 
the demand for PNE was defeated, although it was undoubtedly helpful that China 
was relatively isolated and the other NWS had no significant interests at stake. 
Instead, the CTIT study shows that when it was on the verge of being accepted by 
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the P-5, the PNE permission was scuppered by the efforts of strategically-placed civil 
society actors working in partnership with several key Western NNWS such as 
Australia, Germany, Japan and Canada. By recasting the proposed PNE permission 
as a legitimiser for continued research into nuclear explosions by the P-5 and D-3, 
this civil society-middle power alliance undermined the P-5 deal and the options for 
managed convergence put forward by Russia and Iran. 
While eliminating safety tests and PNE from consideration was important, the turning 
point in the CTBT negotiations was indubitably the decision to go to zero, and this 
was almost entirely determined outside Geneva. According the resumption of French 
testing a decisive role in the zero yield outcome, as some - not least the French 
themselves - have claimed, would be consistent with theories about the role of crisis 
and exogenous shock in multilateral negotiations. " The evidence shows, however, 
that it was not the French decision per se, but international public reaction, that 
provided the policy-shaping jolt that pushed Clinton off the fence. The swiftness and 
intensity of public outrage, expressed through boycotts and demonstrations in many 
countries, acres of newsprint, and thousands of letters to the White House, reminded 
Clinton (ever sensitive to public opinion) that a total test ban was an important and 
popular objective. The protests also conveyed the warning that if testing were not 
properly banned, there could be a revival of the kind of anti-nuclear protest 
movements witnessed in the 1980s. If perception of crisis was a factor in this case, it 
was not exogenous, but a politically-generated crisis engineered mainly by 
transnational civil society. 
The second important factor in shaping the zero yield decision was the provision of 
technically relevant solution-oriented information by nongovernmental scientists and 
arms controllers in Washington. These resembled Peter Haas' epistemic communities 
in a number of ways, 16 but the CTBT case showed several knowledge-diffusing but 
politically fragmented groups of epistemic actors - not communities - offering 
competing information and advice. The most significant of these were in the United 
States: the JASON Group, which comprised experts from both the governmental and 
nongovernmental sectors, and the scientists and officials based in the US nuclear 
laboratories. Both groups were ostensibly responsible to the Department of Energy, 
whose Secretary, Hazel O'Leary, was more positive towards a zero yield CTBT than 
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many in her department. In addition to epistemic actors, norm entrepreneurs 
favouring or opposing zero yield were active among scientists and advisers dispersed 
among US government agencies and different kinds of nongovernmental institutions. 
Since there were at least two sets of expert authorities pulling in different directions, 
O'Leary based her position largely on an idea of the norms and principles that her 
advisers - formerly from pro-test ban advocacy groups - were promoting for a 
genuinely comprehensive test ban regime; the expert arguments were used to defend 
and justify her choice but were not decisive in determining it. In the US interagency 
process, O'Leary's decisions represented the DOE, greatly reinforcing the position of 
institutionalists within the State Department, such as Tom Graham and John Holum, 
who were keen to see a CTBT that would be credible for the NNWS and reinforce the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
The zero yield decision became possible not only because the P-5 were deeply 
divided over threshold levels, with no acceptable managed convergence in sight, but 
because there was also warring within and between the various US agencies. 
Transgovernmental alliances between the nuclear scientists and military officials of 
more than one P-5 country further complicated the picture. In this situation, in which 
interests and power were fragmented and pressure was being exerted on all sides of 
the argument, Clinton chose a scope more consistent with idealist views of a test ban, 
i. e. one that contributes towards disarmament as well as nonproliferation and arms 
control. This analysis of the shaping of the outcome on scope highlights two 
important aspects of multilateralism: the role of nonstate actors and the importance of 
ideas. It bears out the observations of Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, that 
"ideas influence policy when the principles or causal beliefs they embody provide 
road maps that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when 
they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, 
and when they become embedded in political institutions. "17 Though certain US 
government experts and officials were extremely influential, it was primarily civil 
society, using a range of cognitive and advocacy tactics, that succeeded in 
repositioning the issue of scope from a debate among the P-5 over "activities not 
prohibited" to one about the purpose of a test ban, thereby shifting the payoff matrix 
from LINE thresholds towards zero yield. 
323 
In doing so, they expanded the zone of possible agreements to include a prohibition 
on HNEs that in 1994 had been thought impossible. This integrative convergence was 
largely determined by normative considerations, but also reflected institutional 
objectives: it strengthened the chances of concluding a treaty that would be 
acceptable to the NNWS and so reinforced the nonproliferation regime. This was 
important, for although they had achieved the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 
without actually delivering a finished CTBT, the NPT agreements in 1995 and 2000 
and the policies of the NWS' governments during this period showed continued 
support for multilateral institutions, with a CTBT still viewed as an important 
component of the nonproliferation regime. Although institutional norms, ideas and 
epistemic strategies were more influential in determining the scope outcome than 
power and fixed interests, realist considerations were not wholly swept aside. Both 
Chirac's decision to obtain simulation capabilities through testing and Clinton's 
imposition of the six safeguards and the massive budget for stockpile stewardship 
guaranteed to the US nuclear weapons establishment were conditioned on an 
understanding of regime cooperation as mitigating the security dilemma by 
constraining others without significantly diminishing one's own relative power and 
capabilities. Even so, the Republican opponents of CTBT ratification argued that the 
treaty weakened US arsenal and capabilities. 
Finally it must be noted that though the scope outcome provides a good example of 
integrative convergence in all its complexity, the United States then exerted its 
position of dominance to impose its decision on the rest of the P-5 and ensure that 
this became the authoritative interpretation of the Australian scope text from then on. 
Verification 
Early on, a number of states, notably Russia, Australia and Mexico, as well as NGOs 
such as VERTIC, had argued that competent verification could be provided by a 
combination of national technical means and existing open seismic resources. Their 
position, which complemented the preference of Mexico and some of the nonaligned 
states for concluding the treaty before April 1995, was that the CTBT verification 
regime was essentially for multilateral confidence-building, and need not be very 
expensive or elaborately defined. Arguments for a less established verification 
system were dropped once the hope of an early treaty faded. 
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Apart from this divergence of perspective in the first year, there was little core 
conflict between the interests of the NWS and those of most NNWS with regard to 
the international monitoring system, though there were of course disagreements over 
specifics. Hence, IMS was the only negotiating outcome in this study to reflect 
Ruggie's principles of reciprocity, shared responsibilities and benefits, and 
nondiscrimination. Though there were differences in terms of technical expertise and 
opinion over capabilities and coverage, and some pursuit of narrow national interests 
over the supply of technologies and location of specific stations, these were resolved 
through epistemic strategies and bridging tactics aimed at depoliticising areas of 
contention. Disagreements were addressed with constructive, integrative multilateral 
approaches, and convergence largely achieved through cooperation, knowledge 
diffusion and the fostering of shared understandings about what would comprise a 
technically achievable, cost-effective system able to provide verification confidence 
and collateral benefits. The principal epistemic actor and strategist, Peter Marshall, 
was part of the UK government delegation, and civil society was hardly involved. 
By contrast, questions relating to on-site inspections and the use of Nl'M tapped into 
concerns about sovereignty and espionage, particularly among states with declared or 
de facto nuclear programmes. These echoed the cold war dichotomy of adequacy 
versus bearability, but pitted the United States more sharply against China than 
Russia, with India, Israel and Pakistan seeking also to protect their national nuclear 
assets from surveillance or prying eyes. The middle power NNWS tried to be brokers 
and knowledge diffusers, but were only weakly engaged. The overall outcome was 
distributive, determined by the competing interests and requirements of the P-5 and 
D-3. Among the two main protagonists on OSI, China - which lacked the United 
States' economic and military power - bargained effectively on these issues, in part 
through exerting `no-agreement' leverage, since it was important for the United States 
to have China join the CTBT from the very start. The final decision on OSI was a 
basic trade-off between China and the United States and imposed on the rest, who 
accepted. Civil society was much less engaged on verification issues in the 1994-96 
CTB negotiations than in the past, mainly because verification was far less politicised 
this time around. 
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Awareness of the need to have a sufficiently robust verification and inspection regime 
toughened some US positions, as illustrated when Ambassador Ledogar opposed 
some less stringent proposals as "treaty breakers". Nevertheless, it was thought that 
technical advances and the US-Soviet joint verification ventures of the 1980s'8 had 
considerably weakened the power of `impossibilist' verification arguments. These 
developments and the precedent set by the CWC negotiations on OSI and NTM made 
it appear that what Krasner identified as `usage and custom' were moving in the 
direction of acceptance of verification norms in regime building. While this had a 
beneficial effect on the 1994-96 negotiations, where verification was nothing like the 
political stumbling block it had appeared during the cold war, it does not appear to 
have extended to US domestic politics. 
Though less salient in the negotiations themselves, cold war doubts about verification 
and verifiability were revived by test ban opponents in the United States in their 
successful campaign to prevent Senate ratification of the CTBT in 1999.19 Their 
arguments, which also focused on the ability of the United States to maintain its 
nuclear arsenal under a test ban treaty, appeared to have taken the Clinton 
administration and many observers by surprise. The late 1990s were not, after all, the 
1950s and 1960s, when highlighting verification problems had proved such a 
devastating weapon in the arms control opponents' armoury. 20 Though regarded by 
many as ideologically motivated, the Republicans' stated verification concerns were 
taken seriously by test ban advocates, who were at pains to describe the considerable 
efforts that had gone into providing a verification regime that would meet US 
intelligence requirements and provide confidence in treaty compliance. The leaders of 
three of the United States' most important allies, Britain, France and Germany, 
devoted one fifth of their New York Times appeal on the eve of the Senate ratification 
debate to a defence of the treaty's verification provisions. ' 
After the ratification debacle in October 1999, US governmental and 
nongovernmental arms controllers undertook studies and commissions to show how 
effective the CTB verification regime actually was . 
22 The Report from General John 
Shalikashvili, commissioned by President Clinton in January 2000 to consult with 
Senators and "lay the groundwork for future ratification of the treaty", devoted 
considerable energy to proving how much the CTBT verification regime enhances US 
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security interests. Noting that "the value of a verification system extends well past the 
range where a monitor has high confidence of detecting, identifying, locating and 
attributing a violation, and down into the gray area where a potential evader lacks 
certainty about the likelihood of discovery", the Shalikashvili report emphasised how 
the CTBT's verification regime would be able to detect explosions of 10 t or lower at 
Russia's Novaya Zemlya Test Site; global coverage below 500 t and much lower at 
all known test sites; the right to use national technical means to back up a request for 
an inspection; and so on 23 
Unfortunately, these laudable efforts to prove the worth of the CTBT's verification 
provisions have missed the major political point. No verification system can provide 
100 percent deterrence and detection. Yet that is essentially the standard against 
which the test ban opponents insist on comparing the CTB's verification system. 
Unlike in the EIF case, these subsequent problems cannot be laid at the door of a bad 
agreement or suboptimal convergence. It is unlikely that many Republican Senators 
really believe that the verification deficits they complain about in the CTBT would 
actually leave the United States vulnerable. As the Bush administration has made 
explicit since assuming power in 2001, it is arms control that they oppose, and 
however comprehensive the verification regime, it would always be deemed to fall 
short. 24 
Entry into Force 
The entry-into-force negotiations were characterised by early neglect, on the 
assumption that the provision would fall into place once the `major' political issues 
had been resolved. With few actors engaged in finding ways to facilitate 
convergence, the zone of agreement was restricted by the competing expectations and 
interests among the NWS and de facto possessors, and positions became hardened in 
the endgame. Three of the NWS - Britain, China and Russia - succeeding in forcing 
through a stringent entry-into-force provision for narrowly nonproliferation 
motivations. They were egged on by Pakistan who played the British ambassador 
with false promises to sign up to the treaty if India's accession was made definite. 
Early in the CTB negotiations, India had been hedging its bets. The election in 1996 
of the nationalist BJP government, determined to show that India was a nuclear 
power, cemented India's opposition. Since the justification for India's defection was 
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couched in disarmament rhetoric, the coercive, nonproliferation-targeted entry-into- 
force provision favoured by Britain, China, Russia and Pakistan provided a 
predictably contentious platform for a showdown that resulted in India not just 
walking away, but lumping the treaty in with the NPT as a discriminatory instrument 
of the big powers. With Israel in mind, Egypt, Iran and most Arab states also 
favoured a more stringent approach, though they would not have opposed conclusion 
of the treaty with a more flexible alternative. 
High level political pressure from the United States might have made a difference, but 
Washington appeared disengaged, its attention elsewhere until the very end. 
Although France became supportive of a more flexible EIF approach in the final year, 
its power in the P-5 minilateral dynamics had weakened since changing its 
ambassador in 1995. The rest of the CD was largely in favour of a provision that 
would enable early entry into force, but they coordinated poorly on this issue and 
failed to unify around a credible alternative to Britain's proposals. Civil society 
likewise engaged very late and coordinated only weakly. 
Politically viable alternatives on entry into force were available to the CD negotiators, 
not least of which were the precedents set by the NPT and CWC, but little or no 
pressure was coherently exerted in favour of a flexible option. No-one took on the 
knowledge and norm diffusing roles deployed so effectively by civil society and 
epistemic actors in shaping the zones of agreement for scope and verification. 
Arguably related to this absence, there was insufficient high level governmental and 
diplomatic attention until far too late. The Dutch delegation was left to resolve the 
issue, but there was little effective exertion of countervailing power to offset the 
combined pressure of Britain, China and Russia in favour of stringency. The 
determining factors were power and perceptions of national interest, particularly 
among P-5 and D-3 states with ambitions and either insecure or declining nuclear 
weapon status. The outcome was the worst kind of managed convergence: an 
unwieldy, unworkable provision, for which the chief justification was in meeting the 
September 1996 deadline for conclusion of the treaty. 
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Conclusions 
As noted in Chapter 1, studies of post cold war multilateralism are sparse, and 
particularly where arms control is concerned, underdeveloped. Although it is 
important to recognise the distinctions between regime theory and multilateralism, 
they raise similar questions about the nature of cooperation. The relationship 
between multilateral processes and multilateral institutions, including regimes, is one 
of mutual reinforcement: the institutions and regimes are facilitated by sustained 
multilateral cooperation, while the establishment of effective institutions and regimes 
strengthens the credibility of multilateralism. 
To the extent that the CTBT was negotiated in Geneva, it was a mixed-motive 
interaction, employing strategies of dominance, cooperation, collaboration, 
coordination and persuasion. Conflicting expectations were apparent from the 
beginning: the P-5 and D-3 prioritised their interests in sustaining their nuclear 
weapons programmes, relying largely on concession-trading to balance gains and 
losses, other negotiators focused on facilitating the legal and technical issues to get a 
sufficient treaty concluded by the target date of September 1996, and earlier if 
possible. Of more than 70 CD members and observers participating, the study shows 
that fewer than 25 states had significant impact on the outcome. The rest, comprising 
a large block of nonaligned states, were marginalised, though they emerged 
periodically to make statements about disarmament. 
This thesis has demonstrated that, important as attributive power and the linkage 
between nuclear interests and expectations proved to be, they did not determine 
outcomes to the extent that realists or neoliberals would have predicted. While 
nuclear interests were a major factor in determining a state's expectations and 
negotiating posture, other factors were important in reaching convergence. These 
factors included: knowledge and ideas; civil society engagement; norms and regime 
values; partnerships and alliances; internal policy cohesion or division; the level of 
domestic and international political attention and support. By choosing to incorporate 
transnational civil society as a principal unit of analysis, along with states, the thesis 
has contributed to a fuller understanding of how states' calculations of what 
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constitutes self-interest and security can be influenced, shaped and expanded, opening 
up alternative solutions for agreement than initially envisaged. 
By considering the negotiations on scope, verification and entry into force separately, 
the thesis has illuminated aspects of negotiations and convergence that are 
underrepresented in other, less substantial overviews of treaty negotiations. The first 
two sections of Chapter 9 have shown that in cooperation scenarios where the forum, 
structure and parties (assumed in rationalist theory to have stable interests and 
expectations) are the same, the dynamics of convergence on particular issues may be 
quite different, indicating the importance of other variables. Managed convergence 
was found to be more likely on issues that were considered to be of high value to only 
a small number of states, such as OSI and entry into force, and which did not appear 
politically significant to the majority until the endgame. In addition to highlighting 
that managed solutions tend to split differences, foster compromise at the level of the 
lowest common denominator, or defer to the most powerful in the distribution of 
benefits and constraints, the thesis suggests there may be longer term negative 
consequences. Agreement may be achieved, but at high cost to regime interests. 
Negotiations that incorporated norm-sharing and compromise, as well as concessions- 
trading were more likely to bring about regime-enhancing convergence. Related to 
this, constructive concessions are more likely when there are vested interests in a 
successful outcome. 23 One of the major problems for entry into force was that the 
narrow interests of certain NWS that wanted primarily to curb the D-3 were very 
forcefully exerted. India was not the only state to prefer a `no-agreement' outcome. 
UK leverage over entry into force was amplified because its ambassador appeared 
willing to take the treaty to the brink, suggesting that a no-agreement alternative 
would not have been unpalatable to the Conservative government, although the 
strategic imperative of the Atlantic Alliance ensured that Britain did not openly work 
against American wishes. By contrast, the United States and middle powers kept 
asserting their flexibility on the issue. By failing to perceive and assert their regime 
interests as strongly as they would no doubt have sought to fulfil perceived national 
interests, these negotiators acquiesced in a managed convergence that undermined 
regime and national interests by placing unnecessary barriers in the way of the 
treaty's entry into force. 
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The study on scope shows a very different dynamic, where cognitive and advocacy 
strategies shaped understandings and norms and enabled parties with relatively little 
attributive power to maximise disarmament benefits over narrow nonproliferation 
interests. This was accomplished by redrawing the zone of possible agreements, 
enabling an integrative solution that cut through the distributive disagreements among 
the P-5. The zero yield decision could not be adequately explained if these factors 
and processes were omitted from analysis. 
In analysing the strategies employed and the processes entailed in different kinds of 
convergence, this CTBT study bears out much of Sebenius' analysis with regard to 
the potential of integrative agreements to increase mutual benefits and offset the 
differential advantages of powerful actors with respect to the distribution of gains. 26 
With some reservations, it also accords with the observations of Baas, Adler, 
Sebenius, Nadelmann, Price, Florini et a!, regarding the role of transnational civil 
society, norm entrepreneurs and epistemic actors in constructing political will and 
shaping interests. 27 
In the case of the CTBT, most specialists viewed as having authoritative knowledge 
about nuclear science or verification were either government employees or had served 
for part of their career in their countries' nuclear laboratories or establishments. 
Although some became formidable advocates, there was little evidence of an 
epistemic community per se. This thesis contends, rather, that there were epistemie 
actors, some of whom formed networks, but that they did not necessarily have a 
commonality of purpose as implied in the concept of a community. Governments or 
pressure groups called on the scientists' knowledge and expertise to give authority to 
arguments for or against a proposed approach or provision for the treaty. Epistemic 
actors and networks operated not only in a domestic policy environment, but were 
found to be transnational, spanning national and international borders and the 
boundaries between the governmental and nongovernmental spheres. 8 
In addition to civil society pressure, influential actors in the defence and nuclear 
agencies of the NWS at times pursued agendas that competed with or undermined 
policies being taken forward by the executive branch, foreign ministries or other 
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departments. To strengthen their domestic and international bargaining positions, 
transgovernmental alliances were sometimes forged between the defence and nuclear 
establishments of some of the NWS. 29 
Robert Putnam characterised foreign policy as a two-level game, played 
simultaneously on the domestic and international levels, with interaction and mutual 
shaping of agendas, options and interests. 0 Putnam identified international 
bargaining between negotiators as level I, and separate bargaining among domestic 
constituents, agencies, interest-groups etc as level II, but this division fails to account 
for the complex domestic and transboundary interactions and influence of 
government officials, epistemic actors and civil society. Offering an alternative 
formulation of domestic/international interactions that he calls a "three-and-three 
analysis", Jeffrey Knopf places emphasis on three forms of transboundary interaction: 
transgovernmental, involving collaboration or collusion between officials from 
different states; transnational, defined as links between domestic actors from different 
states; and cross-level, where interaction takes place between governmental and 
nongovernmental actors from different states 3' Knopf also incorporated alliances as 
the third level of analysis (the first two being domestic and international) in 
transboundary interactions. 32 Where Putnam's two-level analysis provided a useful 
representation of the domestic/international dynamic in the more restricted, binary 
relations of the cold war, Knopf s three-and-three formulation accords better with the 
complex interactions revealed in this CTBT study, suggesting an area for further 
fertile research. 
Hampson's case that "the hallmark of multilateral diplomacy"33 is that it is conducted 
between groups and coalitions, is overstated, although it is accepted that alliances 
would be rational for less powerful states "so that they stand a better chance of 
obtaining a desired outcome or of controlling others not included in the coalition. "34 
The study supports his contention that banding together, pooling resources and 
forming "bargaining units" can enable weak actors to facilitate communication and 
information-sharing, simplify bargaining procedures and "compensate for structural 
weaknesses in asymmetric bargaining situations". 35 However, in the CTBT 
negotiations, the formal CD groups were poor, less-than-productive instruments for 
representing interests, coordinating strategies or managing decision-making. Apart 
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from the P-5 minilateral negotiations36, group behaviour was seldom relevant in the 
substantive negotiations, despite considerable incentives to reduce variables, 
complexity and uncertainty. In analysing alliances as a factor in convergence, this 
thesis highlights instead the effectiveness (or absence, as in the EIF case) of informal, 
transient alliances (among middle powers, or between a few individual states and 
civil society actors, for example) with specific objectives, strategies and temporary 
coordination. As illustrated in the landmines case and CTBT scope, alliances are most 
likely to be effective in augmenting the power of smaller states to shape negotiating 
outcomes if they are coordinated around cognitive, knowledge-sharing and norm- 
promoting strategies. 
Based as it is on a single case study, this thesis is necessarily limited in the 
conclusions it can properly draw, but the findings help to indicate areas for further 
research and consideration. Positivism expects theoretical consistency, but it 
appeared from the CTBT negotiations that three games with three different sets of 
theoretical assumptions and rules were being simultaneously played, not only in the 
international arena, but in domestic foreign policy formation and transboundary 
interactions. Furthermore, in addition to the factors identified by Krasner and 
Hampson, different actors were tailoring their strategies in accordance with whether 
they viewed the test ban negotiations (as cooperation scenario) through a realist, 
neoliberal or new multilateralist lens. 7 This observation might partly explain the 
thesis finding that unless civil society or epistemic actors were actively engaged in 
promoting integrative strategies and solutions, the majority of states tended to 
acquiesce in suboptimal distributive outcomes. One reason for this, which it was not 
possible to explore within the framework of the present thesis, might be that the 
generally realist assumptions embedded in the education available to diplomats in 
most countries exclude many of the factors this study has shown to be influential. As 
a consequence, few diplomats and policy-makers are trained to perceive (let alone 
work for) integrative outcomes, even though integrative convergence is more likely to 
enable less powerful states to increase mutual gains (and enhance regime interests). 
An interesting research programme might therefore be a series of studies at the three 
levels identified by Knopf, investigating the links and contradictions between 
interests, policy-formation and negotiating postures, with consideration of the genesis 
of state and nonstate actors' theoretical assumptions, perceptions of the problem and 
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assessment of their interests with regard to that problem and its zone of possible 
solutions. 
In conclusion, this thesis finds that the realist and neoliberal approaches of traditional 
regime theory are limited by their failure to distinguish between distributive and 
integrative convergence, and by inadequate theories of civil society. New 
multilateralism, on the other hand, is limited by its failure to address why many 
actors, particularly among states, exclude or fail to recognise integrative potential, a 
lacuna that civil society currently (but often inadequately) tries to fill. Ruggie's 
principles, which might hold true for trade or other issues, are far from adequate when 
applied to multilateral arms control; much more needs to be done to develop a theory 
of multilateralism that encompasses security and arms control. 
For realists and neoliberals, multilateralism in self-interested anarchy is the art of the 
possible, bounded by relative power and interests. For new multilatcralists seeking 
solutions to global security problems, multilateralism is about widening the 
possibilities, offsetting dominant power and refraining interests to achieve collective 
benefits. These approaches appear to coexist in multilateral negotiations, and the 
interaction between them is a factor in convergence that requires further exploration. 
Illustrating examples of failure as well as success in attempts to reach regime- 
building convergence, it is hoped that this CTBT study has contributed to a better 
understanding of the processes and mechanisms of convergence, and especially the 
ways in which actors without high levels of attributive power can influence 
negotiating outcomes on important issues. The thesis opened with Fen Hampson's 
question about how and why it is possible for multilateral negotiations ever to 
succeed. 38 An important part of the answer can be found in the observation by Peter 
Haas and Emanuel Adler that political process is about "who learns what, when, to 
whose benefit, and why". 39 
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Notes 
1 President William J. Clinton, address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 24,1996. 
2 Accepting NPT language that characterised disarmament as an `ultimate goal' of the nonproliferation 
regime only slightly masked that the NWS actually considered disarmament to be remote, 
unachievable and, in real terms, undesirable. 
3 In the case of landmines, for instance, states like Finland, that regarded the role of landmines on its 
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APPENDIX 
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY 
PREAMBLE 
The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the States Parties"), 
Welcoming the international agreements and other positive measures of recent years in the 
field of nuclear disarmament, including reductions in arsenals of nuclear weapons, as well as in the 
field of the prevention of nuclear proliferation in all its aspects, 
Underlining the importance of the full and prompt implementation of such agreements and 
measures, 
Convinced that the present international situation provides an opportunity to take further 
effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all 
its aspects, and declaring their intention to take such measures, 
tressin therefore the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear 
weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control, 
Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear 
explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and 
ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure 
of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, 
Further recognizing that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus constitute a 
meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament, 
Convinced that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is through the 
conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear test-ban 
treaty, which has long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the 
field of disarmament and non-proliferation, 
Noting the aspirations expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon 
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all 
test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, 
Noting also the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to the protection of the 
environment, 
Affin-nin the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this Treaty and its objective 
to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to 
the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and 
security, 
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Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
BASIC OBLIGATIONS 
1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other 
nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its 
jurisdiction or control. 
2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way 
participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. 
ARTICLE II 
THE ORGANIZATION 
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. The States Parties hereby establish the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Organization") to achieve the object and purpose of this Treaty, to 
ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of 
compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties. 
2. All States Parties shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of 
its membership in the Organization. 
3. The seat of the Organization shall be Vienna, Republic of Austria. 
4. There are hereby established as organs of the Organization: the Conference of the States 
Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, which shall include the International Data 
Centre. 
S. Each State Party shall cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of its functions in 
accordance with this Treaty. States Parties shall consult, directly among themselves, or through the 
Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework 
of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating 
to the object and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Treaty. 
6. The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under this Treaty in the 
least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their 
objectives. It shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under 
this Treaty. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and 
military activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Treaty and, in 
particular, shall abide by the confidentiality provisions set forth in this Treaty. 
7. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and data 
that it receives in confidence from the Organization in connection with the implementation of this 
Treaty. It shall treat such information and data exclusively in connection with its rights and 
obligations under this Treaty. 
339 
S. The Organization, as an independent body, shall seek to utilize existing expertise and 
facilities, as appropriate, and to maximize cost efficiencies, through cooperative arrangements with 
other international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such arrangements, 
excluding those of a minor and normal commercial and contractual nature, shall be set out in 
agreements to be submitted to the Conference of the States Parties for approval. 
9. The costs of the activities of the Organization shall be met annually by the States Parties in 
accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to take into account differences in 
membership between the United Nations and the Organization. 
10. Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall be deducted in 
an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget. 
11. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its assessed contribution 
to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds 
the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the 
States Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is 
due to conditions beyond the control of the member. 
B. THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES 
Composition. Procedures and Decision-making 
12. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as "the Conference") shall be 
composed of all States Parties. Each State Party shall have one representative in the Conference, who 
may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. 
13. The initial session of the Conference shall be convened by the Depositary no later than 30 
days after the entry into force of this Treaty. 
14. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions, which shall be held annually, unless it decides 
otherwise. 
15. A special session of the Conference shall be convened: 
(a) When decided by the Conference; 
(b) When requested by the Executive Council; or 
(c) When requested by any State Party and supported by a majority of the States Parties. 
The special session shall be convened no later than 30 days after the decision of the Conference, the 
request of the Executive Council, or the attainment of the necessary support, unless specified otherwise 
in the decision or request. 
16. The Conference may also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference, in 
accordance with Article VII. 
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17. The Conference may also be convened in the form of a Review Conference, in accordance 
with Article VIII. 
18. Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the Conference decides 
otherwise. 
19. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each session, it shall 
elect its President and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new 
President and other officers are elected at the next session. 
20. A majority of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum. 
21. Each State Party shall have one vote. 
22. The Conference shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of members present 
and voting. Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken as far as possible by consensus. If 
consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the President of the Conference shall 
defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate 
achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If 
consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take a decision by a two-thirds 
majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue 
arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of 
substance unless otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance. 
23. When exercising its function under paragraph 26 (k), the Conference shall take a decision to 
add any State to the list of States contained in Annex Ito this Treaty in accordance with the procedure 
for decisions on matters of substance set out in paragraph 22. Notwithstanding paragraph 22, the 
Conference shall take decisions on any other change to Annex I to this Treaty by consensus. 
Powers and Functions 
24. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any 
questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty, including those relating to the powers and 
functions of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, in accordance with this Treaty. It 
may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues within the scope of 
this Treaty raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. 
25. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of, and review compliance with, this Treaty 
and act in order to promote its object and purpose. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive 
Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines to either of them for the exercise of 
their functions. 
26. The Conference shall: 
(a) Consider and adopt the report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty 
and the annual programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, as 
well as consider other reports; 
(b) Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties in 
accordance with paragraph 9; 
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(c) Elect the members of the Executive Council; 
(d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Director-General"); 
latter, 
(e) Consider and approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the 
(f) Consider and review scientific and technological developments that could affect the 
operation of this Treaty. In this context, the Conference may direct the Director-General to establish a 
Scientific Advisory Board to enable him or her, in the performance of his or her functions, to render 
specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Treaty to the Conference, to the 
Executive Council, or to States Parties. In that case, the Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed 
of independent experts serving in their individual capacity and appointed, in accordance with terms of 
reference adopted by the Conference, on the basis of their expertise and experience in the particular 
scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Treaty; 
(g) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and 
remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of this Treaty, in accordance with Article V; 
(h) Consider and approve at its initial session any draft agreements, arrangements, 
provisions, procedures, operational manuals, guidelines and any other documents developed and 
recommended by the Preparatory Commission; 
(i) Consider and approve agreements or arrangements negotiated by the Technical 
Secretariat with States Parties, other States and international organizations to be concluded by the 
Executive Council on behalf of the Organization in accordance with paragraph 38 (h); 
(j) Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions 
in accordance with this Treaty; and 
(k) Update Annex I to this Treaty, as appropriate, in accordance with paragraph 23. 
C. THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
Composition, Procedures and Decision-making 
27. The Executive Council shall consist of 51 members. Each State Party shall have the right, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article, to serve on the Executive Council. 
28. Taking into account the need for equitable geographical distribution, the Executive Council 
shall comprise: 
(a) Ten States Parties from Africa; 
(b) Seven States Parties from Eastern Europe; 
(c) Nine States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean; 
(d) Seven States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia; 
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(e) Ten States Parties from North America and Western Europe; and 
(f) Eight States Parties from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East. 
All States in each of the above geographical regions are listed in Annex I to this Treaty. Annex I to 
this Treaty shall be updated, as appropriate, by the Conference in accordance with paragraphs 23 and 
26 (k). It shall not be subject to amendments or changes under the procedures contained in Article VII. 
29. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference. In this connection, 
each geographical region shall designate States Parties from that region for election as members of the 
Executive Council as follows: 
(a) At least one-third of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled, 
taking into account political and security interests, by States Parties in that region designated on the 
basis of the nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as determined by international data as well as all 
or any of the following indicative criteria in the order of priority determined by each region: 
(i) Number of monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System; 
(ii) Expertise and experience in monitoring technology; and 
(iii) Contribution to the annual budget of the Organization; 
(b) One of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled on a rotational 
basis by the State Party that is first in the English alphabetical order among the States Parties in that 
region that have not served as members of the Executive Council for the longest period of time since 
becoming States Parties or since their last term, whichever is shorter. A State Party designated on this 
basis may decide to forgo its seat. In that case, such a State Party shall submit a letter of renunciation 
to the Director-General, and the seat shall be filled by the State Party following next-in-order 
according to this sub-paragraph; and 
(c) The remaining seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled by States 
Parties designated from among all the States Parties in that region by rotation or elections. 
30. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one representative on the Executive 
Council, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. 
31. Each member of the Executive Council shall hold office from the end of the session of the 
Conference at which that member is elected until the end of the second regular annual session of the 
Conference thereafter, except that for the first election of the Executive Council, 26 members shall be 
elected to hold office until the end of the third regular annual session of the Conference, due regard 
being paid to the established numerical proportions as described in paragraph 28. 
32. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit them to the 
Conference for approval. 
33. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from among its members. 
34. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions it shall meet 
as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and functions. 
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35. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote. 
36. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority of all its 
members. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority 
of all its members unless specified otherwise in this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the 
question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless 
otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance. 
Powers and Functions 
37. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Organization. It shall be 
responsible to the Conference. It shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it in accordance 
with this Treaty. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and 
guidelines of the Conference and ensure their continuous and proper implementation. 
38. The Executive Council shall: 
(a) Promote effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Treaty; 
(b) Supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat; 
(c) Make recommendations as necessary to the Conference for consideration of further 
proposals for promoting the object and purpose of this Treaty; 
(d) Cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party; 
(e) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft annual programme and budget of the 
Organization, the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty, the report on 
the performance of its own activities and such other reports as it deems necessary or that the 
Conference may request; 
(t) Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference, including the preparation of the 
draft agenda; 
(g) Examine proposals for changes, on matters of an administrative or technical nature, to 
the Protocol or the Annexes thereto, pursuant to Article VII, and make recommendations to the States 
Parties regarding their adoption; 
(h) Conclude, subject to prior approval of the Conference, agreements or arrangements 
with States Parties, other States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization and 
supervise their implementation, with the exception of agreements or arrangements referred to in sub- 
paragraph (i); 
(i) Approve and supervise the operation of agreements or arrangements relating to the 
implementation of verification activities with States Parties and other States; and 
(j) Approve any new operational manuals and any changes to the existing operational 
manuals that may be proposed by the Technical Secretariat. 
39. The Executive Council may request a special session of the Conference. 
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40. The Executive Council shall: 
(a) Facilitate cooperation among States Parties, and between States Parties and the 
Technical Secretariat, relating to the implementation of this Treaty through information exchanges; 
IV; and 
(b) Facilitate consultation and clarification among States Parties in accordance with Article 
(c) Receive, consider and take action on requests for, and reports on, on-site inspections in 
accordance with Article IV. 
41. The Executive Council shall consider any concern raised by a State Party about possible 
non-compliance with this Treaty and abuse of the rights established by this Treaty. In so doing, the 
Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties involved and, as appropriate, request a State 
Party to take measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To the extent that the Executive 
Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the following 
measures: 
(a) Notify all States Parties of the issue or matter; 
(b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference; 
(c) Make recommendations to the Conference or take action, as appropriate, regarding 
measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance in accordance with Article V. 
D. THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT 
42. The Technical Secretariat shall assist States Parties in the implementation of this Treaty. The 
Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive Council in the performance of their 
functions. The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the verification and other functions entrusted to it 
by this Treaty, as well as those functions delegated to it by the Conference or the Executive Council in 
accordance with this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall include, as an integral part, the 
International Data Centre. 
43. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with regard to verification of compliance with this 
Treaty shall, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol, include inter alia: 
(a) Being responsible for supervising and coordinating the operation of the International 
Monitoring System; 
(b) Operating the International Data Centre; 
(c) Routinely receiving, processing, analysing and reporting on International Monitoring 
System data; 
(d) Providing technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of 
monitoring stations; 
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(e) Assisting the Executive Council in facilitating consultation and clarification among 
States Parties; 
(f) Receiving requests for on-site inspections and processing them, facilitating Executive 
Council consideration of such requests, carrying out the preparations for, and providing technical 
support during, the conduct of on-site inspections, and reporting to the Executive Council; 
(g) Negotiating agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other States and 
international organizations and concluding, subject to prior approval by the Executive Council, any 
such agreements or arrangements relating to verification activities with States Parties or other States; 
and 
(h) Assisting the States Parties through their National Authorities on other issues of 
verification under this Treaty. 
44. The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by the Executive 
Council, operational manuals to guide the operation of the various components of the verification 
regime, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol. These manuals shall not constitute integral 
parts of this Treaty or the Protocol and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat subject to 
approval by the Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the States Parties 
of any changes in the operational manuals. 
45. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with respect to administrative matters shall include: 
(a) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of 
the Organization; 
(b) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft report of the Organization 
on the implementation of this Treaty and such other reports as the Conference or the Executive Council 
may request; 
(c) Providing administrative and technical support to the Conference, the Executive 
Council and other subsidiary organs; 
(d) Addressing and receiving communications on behalf of the Organization relating to the 
implementation of this Treaty; and 
(e) Carrying out the administrative responsibilities related to any agreements between the 
Organization and other international organizations. 
46. All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Organization shall be transmitted 
through their National Authorities to the Director-General. Requests and notifications shall be in one 
of the official languages of this Treaty. In response the Director-General shall use the language of the 
transmitted request or notification. 
47. With respect to the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat for preparing and submitting to 
the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization, the Technical Secretariat 
shall determine and maintain a clear accounting of all costs for each facility established as part of the 
International Monitoring System. Similar treatment in the draft programme and budget shall be 
accorded to all other activities of the Organization. 
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48. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the Executive Council of any problems that 
have arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions that have come to its notice in the performance 
of its activities and that it has been unable to resolve through consultations with the State Party 
concerned. 
49. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head and chief 
administrative officer, and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required. The 
Director-General shall be appointed by the Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive 
Council for a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not thereafter. The first Director- 
General shall be appointed by the Conference at its initial session upon the recommendation of the 
Preparatory Commission. 
50. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the Executive Council for the 
appointment of the staff and for the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The 
paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of 
service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of professional expertise, experience, 
efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as the Director- 
General, as inspectors or as members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to 
the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be 
guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper discharge 
of the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat. 
51. The Director-General may, as appropriate, after consultation with the Executive Council, 
establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific 
issues. 
52. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection 
assistants and the members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or 
from any other source external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action that might 
reflect adversely on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Organization. The 
Director-General shall assume responsibility for the activities of an inspection team. 
53. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of 
the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff and shall 
not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities. 
E. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
54. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under the jurisdiction or 
control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the 
exercise of its functions. 
55. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers, representatives of 
members elected to the Executive Council, together with their alternates and advisers, the 
Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff ofthe 
Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise 
of their functions in connection with the Organization. 
56. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in 
agreements between the Organization and the States Parties as well as in an agreement between the 
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Organization and the State in which the Organization is seated. Such agreements shall be considered 
and approved in accordance with paragraph 26 (h) and (i). 
57. Notwithstanding paragraphs 54 and 55, the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the 
Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the members of the staff of the Technical 
Secretariat during the conduct of verification activities shall be those set forth in the Protocol. 
ARTICLE III 
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES 
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary 
measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty. In particular, it shall take any necessary 
measures: 
(a) To prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place 
under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a 
State Party under this Treaty; 
(b) To prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity anywhere 
under its control; and 
(c) To prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons possessing its 
nationality from undertaking any such activity anywhere. 
2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate form of 
legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1. 
3. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the measures taken pursuant to this Article. 
4. In order to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, each State Party shall designate or set up a 
National Authority and shall so inform the Organization upon entry into force of the Treaty for it. The 
National Authority shall serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with 
other States Parties. 
ARTICLE IV 
VERIFICATION 
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. In order to verify compliance with this Treaty, a verification regime shall be established 
consisting of the following elements: 
(a) An International Monitoring System; 
(b) Consultation and clarification; 
(c) On-site inspections; and 
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(d) Confidence-building measures. 
At entry into force of this Treaty, the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification 
requirements of this Treaty. 
2. Verification activities shall be based on objective information, shall be limited to the subject 
matter of this Treaty, and shall be carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of States 
Parties and in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the effective and timely 
accomplishment of their objectives. Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the right of 
verification. 
3. Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Treaty to cooperate, through its National 
Authority established pursuant to Article III, paragraph 4, with the Organization and with other States 
Parties to facilitate the verification of compliance with this Treaty by, inter alia: 
(a) Establishing the necessary facilities to participate in these verification measures and 
establishing the necessary communication; 
(b) Providing data obtained from national stations that are part of the International 
Monitoring System; 
(c) Participating, as appropriate, in a consultation and clarification process; 
(d) Permitting the conduct of on-site inspections; and 
(e) Participating, as appropriate, in confidence-building measures. 
4. All States Parties, irrespective of their technical and financial capabilities, shall enjoy the 
equal right of verification and assume the equal obligation to accept verification. 
5. For the purposes of this Treaty, no State Party shall be precluded from using information 
obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized 
principles of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States. 
6. Without prejudice to the right of States Parties to protect sensitive installations, activities or 
locations not related to this Treaty, States Parties shall not interfere with elements of the verification 
regime of this Treaty or with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with 
paragraph S. 
7. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and to 
prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to this Treaty. 
B. Moreover, all necessary measures shall be taken to protect the confidentiality of any 
information related to civil and military activities and facilities obtained during verification activities. 
9. Subject to paragraph 8, information obtained by the Organization through the verification 
regime established by this Treaty shall be made available to all States Parties in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. 
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10. The provisions of this Treaty shall not be interpreted as restricting the international exchange 
of data for scientific purposes. 
11. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in 
the improvement of the verification regime, and in the examination of the verification potential of 
additional monitoring technologies such as electromagnetic pulse monitoring or satellite monitoring, 
with a view to developing, when appropriate, specific measures to enhance the efficient and cost- 
effective verification of this Treaty. Such measures shall, when agreed, be incorporated in existing 
provisions in this Treaty, the Protocol or as additional sections of the Protocol, in accordance with 
Article VII, or, if appropriate, be reflected in the operational manuals in accordance with Article II, 
paragraph 44. 
12. The States Parties undertake to promote cooperation among themselves to facilitate and 
participate in the fullest possible exchange relating to technologies used in the verification of this 
Treaty in order to enable all States Parties to strengthen their national implementation of verification 
measures and to benefit from the application of such technologies for peaceful purposes. 
13. The provisions of this Treaty shall be implemented in a manner which avoids hampering the 
economic and technological development of the States Parties for further development of the 
application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 
Verification Responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat 
14. In discharging its responsibilities in the area of verification specified in this Treaty and the 
Protocol, in cooperation with the States Parties the Technical Secretariat shall, for the purpose of this 
Treaty: 
(a) Make arrangements to receive and distribute data and reporting products relevant to the 
verification of this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, and to maintain a global communications 
infrastructure appropriate to this task; 
(b) Routinely through its International Data Centre, which shall in principle be the focal 
point within the Technical Secretariat for data storage and data processing: 
(i) Receive and initiate requests for data from the International Monitoring 
System; 
(ii) Receive data, as appropriate, resulting from the process of consultation and 
clarification, from on-site inspections, and from confidence-building 
measures; and 
(iii) Receive other relevant data from States Parties and international organizations 
in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol; 
(c) Supervise, coordinate and ensure the operation of the International Monitoring System 
and its component elements, and of the International Data Centre, in accordance with the relevant 
operational manuals; 
(d) Routinely process, analyse and report on International Monitoring System data 
according to agreed procedures so as to permit the effective international verification of this Treaty and 
to contribute to the early resolution of compliance concerns; 
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(e) Make available all data, both raw and processed, and any reporting products, to all 
States Parties, each State Party taking responsibility for the use of International Monitoring System 
data in accordance with Article II, paragraph 7, and with paragraphs 8 and 13 of this Article; 
data; 
System; 
(f) Provide to all States Parties equal, open, convenient and timely access to all stored 
(g) Store all data, both raw and processed, and reporting products; 
(h) Coordinate and facilitate requests for additional data from the International Monitoring 
(i) Coordinate requests for additional data from one State Party to another State Party; 
(j) Provide technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and operation of 
monitoring facilities and respective communication means, where such assistance and support are 
required by the State concerned; 
(k) Make available to any State Party, upon its request, techniques utilized by the 
Technical Secretariat and its International Data Centre in compiling, storing, processing, analysing and 
reporting on data from the verification regime; and 
(1) Monitor, assess and report on the overall performance of the International Monitoring 
System and of the International Data Centre. 
15. The agreed procedures to be used by the Technical Secretariat in discharging the verification 
responsibilities referred to in paragraph 14 and detailed in the Protocol shall be elaborated in the 
relevant operational manuals. 
B. THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM 
16. The International Monitoring System shall comprise facilities for seismological monitoring, 
radionuclide monitoring including certified laboratories, hydroacoustic monitoring, infirasound 
monitoring, and respective means of communication, and shall be supported by the International Data 
Centre of the Technical Secretariat. 
17. The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of the Technical 
Secretariat. All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be owned and 
operated by the States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for them in accordance with the 
Protocol. 
18. Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the international exchange of data and to 
have access to all data made available to the International Data Centre. Each State Party shall 
cooperate with the International Data Centre through its National Authority. 
Funding the International Monitoring System 
19. For facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System and specified in Tables 1- 
A, 2-A, 3 and 4 of Annex I to the Protocol, and for their functioning, to the extent that such facilities 
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are agreed by the relevant State and the Organization to provide data to the International Data Centre 
in accordance with the technical requirements of the Protocol and relevant operational manuals, the 
Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I, paragraph 4 of the 
Protocol, shall meet the costs of: 
(a) Establishing any new facilities and upgrading existing facilities, unless the State 
responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; 
(b) Operating and maintaining International Monitoring System facilities, including facility 
physical security if appropriate, and application of agreed data authentication procedures; 
(c) Transmitting International Monitoring System data (raw or processed) to the 
International Data Centre by the most direct and cost-effective means available, including, if 
necessary, via appropriate communications nodes, from monitoring stations, laboratories, analytical 
facilities or from national data centres; or such data (including samples where appropriate) to 
laboratory and analytical facilities from monitoring stations; and 
(d) Analysing samples on behalf of the Organization. 
20. For auxiliary network seismic stations specified in Table 1-B of Annex t to the Protocol the 
Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part 1, paragraph 4 of the 
Protocol, shall meet the costs only of: 
(a) Transmitting data to the International Data Centre; 
(b) Authenticating data from such stations; 
(c) Upgrading stations to the required technical standard, unless the State responsible for 
such facilities meets these costs itself; 
(d) If necessary, establishing new stations for the purposes of this Treaty where no 
appropriate facilities currently exist, unless the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs 
itself; and 
(e) Any other costs related to the provision of data required by the Organization as 
specified in the relevant operational manuals. 
21. The Organization shall also meet the cost of provision to each State Party of its requested 
selection from the standard range of International Data Centre reporting products and services, as 
specified in Part I, Section F of the Protocol. The cost of preparation and transmission of any 
additional data or products shall be met by the requesting State Party. 
22. The agreements or, if appropriate, arrangements concluded with States Parties or States 
hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the International Monitoring System shall 
contain provisions for meeting these costs. Such provisions may include modalities whereby a State 
Party meets any of the costs referred to in paragraphs 19 (a) and 20 (c) and (d) for facilities which it 
hosts or for which it is responsible, and is compensated by an appropriate reduction in its assessed 
financial contribution to the Organization. Such a reduction shall not exceed 50 per cent of the annual 
assessed financial contribution of a State Party, but may be spread over successive years. A State 
Party may share such a reduction with another State Party by agreement or arrangement between 
themselves and with the concurrence of the Executive Council. The agreements or arrangements 
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referred to in this paragraph shall be approved in accordance with Article 11, paragraphs 26 (h) and 38 
(i). 
Changes to the international Monitoring System 
23. Any measures referred to in paragraph 11 affecting the International Monitoring System by 
means of addition or deletion of a monitoring technology shall, when agreed, be incorporated into this 
Treaty and the Protocol pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs Ito 6. 
24. The following changes to the International Monitoring System, subject to the agreement of 
those States directly affected, shall be regarded as matters of an administrative or technical nature 
pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs 7 and 8: 
(a) Changes to the number of facilities specified in the Protocol for a given monitoring 
technology; and 
(b) Changes to other details for particular facilities as reflected in the Tables of Annex I to 
the Protocol (including, inter alia, State responsible for the facility; location; name of facility; type of 
facility; and attribution of a facility between the primary and auxiliary seismic networks). 
If the Executive Council recommends, pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 8 (d), that such changes be 
adopted, it shall as a rule also recommend pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 8 (g), that such changes 
enter into force upon notification by the Director-General of their approval. 
25. The Director-General, in submitting to the Executive Council and States Parties information 
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and evaluation in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 8 (b), shall include in the case of any 
proposal made pursuant to paragraph 24: 
(a) A technical evaluation of the proposal; 
(b) A statement on the administrative and financial impact of the proposal; and 
(c) A report on consultations with States directly affected by the proposal, including 
indication of their agreement. 
Temporary Arrangements 
26. In cases of significant or irretrievable breakdown of a monitoring facility specified in the 
Tables of Annex I to the Protocol, or in order to cover other temporary reductions of monitoring 
coverage, the Director-General shall, in consultation and agreement with those States directly affected, 
and with the approval of the Executive Council, initiate temporary arrangements of no more than one 
year's duration, renewable if necessary by agreement of the Executive Council and of the States 
directly affected for another year. Such arrangements shall not cause the number of operational 
facilities of the International Monitoring System to exceed the number specified for the relevant 
network; shall meet as far as possible the technical and operational requirements specified in the 
operational manual for the relevant network; and shall be conducted within the budget of the 
Organization. The Director-General shall furthermore take steps to rectify the situation and make 
proposals for its permanent resolution. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties of any 
decision taken pursuant to this paragraph. 
Cooperating National Facilities 
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27. States Parties may also separately establish cooperative arrangements with the Organization, 
in order to make available to the International Data Centre supplementary data from national 
monitoring stations that are not formally part of the International Monitoring System. 
28. Such cooperative arrangements may be established as follows: 
(a) Upon request by a State Party, and at the expense of that State, the Technical 
Secretariat shall take the steps required to certify that a given monitoring facility meets the technical 
and operational requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals for an International 
Monitoring System facility, and make arrangements for the authentication of its data. Subject to the 
agreement of the Executive Council, the Technical Secretariat shall then formally designate such a 
facility as a cooperating national facility. The Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to 
revalidate its certification as appropriate; 
(b) The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a current list of cooperating national facilities 
and shall distribute it to all States Parties; and 
(c) The International Data Centre shall call upon data from cooperating national facilities, 
if so requested by a State Party, for the purposes of facilitating consultation and clarification and the 
consideration of on-site inspection requests, data transmission costs being borne by that State Party. 
The conditions under which supplementary data from such facilities are made available, and under 
which the International Data Centre may request further or expedited reporting, or clarifications, shall 
be elaborated in the operational manual for the respective monitoring network. 
C. CONSULTATION AND CLARIFICATION 
29. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request an on-site inspection, States Parties 
should, whenever possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, among themselves or with or 
through the Organization, any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with 
the basic obligations of this Treaty. 
30. A State Party that receives a request pursuant to paragraph 29 directly from another State 
Party shall provide the clarification to the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case no 
later than 48 hours after the request. The requesting and requested States Parties may keep the 
Executive Council and the Director-General informed of the request and the response. 
31. A State Party shall have the right to request the Director-General to assist in clarifying any 
matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this 
Treaty. The Director-General shall provide appropriate information in the possession of the Technical 
Secretariat relevant to such a concern. The Director-General shall inform the Executive Council of the 
request and of the information provided in response, if so requested by the requesting State Party. 
32. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from 
another State Party on any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the 
basic obligations of this Treaty. In such a case, the following shall apply: 
(a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the requested State 
Party through the Director-General no later than 24 hours after its receipt; 
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(b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council as 
soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after receipt of the request; 
(c) The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward it to the 
requesting State Party no later than 24 hours after its receipt; 
(d) If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the 
right to request the Executive Council to obtain further clarification from the requested State Party. 
The Executive Council shall inform without delay all other States Parties about any request for 
clarification pursuant to this paragraph as well as any response provided by the requested State Party. 
33. If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obtained under paragraph 32 (d) to be 
unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request a meeting of the Executive Council in which States 
Parties involved that are not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. At such a 
meeting, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure in 
accordance with Article V. 
D. ON-SITE INSPECTIONS 
Request for an On-Site Insprction 
34. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article and Part II of the Protocol in the territory or in any other place under the 
jurisdiction or control of any State Party, or in any area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State. 
35. The sole purpose of an on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I and, to the extent 
possible, to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator. 
36. The requesting State Party shall be under the obligation to keep the on-site inspection request 
within the scope of this Treaty and to provide in the request information in accordance with paragraph 
37. The requesting State Party shall refrain from unfounded or abusive inspection requests. 
37. The on-site inspection request shall be based on information collected by the International 
Monitoring System, on any relevant technical information obtained by national technical means of 
verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, or on a 
combination thereof. The request shall contain information pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the 
Protocol. 
38. The requesting State Party shall present the on-site inspection request to the Executive Council 
and at the same time to the Director-General for the latter to begin immediate processing. 
Follow-up After Submission of an On-Site inspection Request 
39. The Executive Council shall begin its consideration immediately upon receipt of the on-site 
inspection request. 
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40. The Director-General, after receiving the on-site inspection request, shall acknowledge receipt 
of the request to the requesting State Party within two hours and communicate the request to the State 
Party sought to be inspected within six hours. The Director-General shall ascertain that the request 
meets the requirements specified in Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol, and, if necessary, shall assist 
the requesting State Party in filing the request accordingly, and shall communicate the request to the 
Executive Council and to all other States Parties within 24 hours. 
41. When the on-site inspection request fulfils the requirements, the Technical Secretariat shall 
begin preparations for the on-site inspection without delay. 
42. The Director-General, upon receipt of an on-site inspection request referring to an inspection 
area under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, shall immediately seek clarification from the 
State Party sought to be inspected in order to clarify and resolve the concern raised in the request. 
43. A State Party that receives a request for clarification pursuant to paragraph 42 shall provide 
the Director-General with explanations and with other relevant information available as soon as 
possible, but no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request for clarification. 
44. The Director-General, before the Executive Council takes a decision on the on-site inspection 
request, shall transmit immediately to the Executive Council any additional information available from 
the International Monitoring System or provided by any State Party on the event specified in the 
request, including any clarification provided pursuant to paragraphs 42 and 43, as well as any other 
information from within the Technical Secretariat that the Director-General deems relevant or that is 
requested by the Executive Council. 
45. Unless the requesting State Party considers the concern raised in the on-site inspection request 
to be resolved and withdraws the request, the Executive Council shall take a decision on the request in 
accordance with paragraph 46. 
Executive Council Decisions 
46. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the on-site inspection request no later than 96 
hours after receipt of the request from the requesting State Party. The decision to approve the on-site 
inspection shall be made by at least 30 affirmative votes of members of the Executive Council. If the 
Executive Council does not approve the inspection, preparations shall be stopped and no further action 
on the request shall be taken. 
47. No later than 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 
46, the inspection team shall transmit to the Executive Council, through the Director-General, a 
progress inspection report. The continuation of the inspection shall be considered approved unless the 
Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the progress inspection report, decides by a 
majority of all its members not to continue the inspection. If the Executive Council decides not to 
continue the inspection, the inspection shall be terminated, and the inspection team shall leave the 
inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with 
Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol. 
48. In the course of the on-site inspection, the inspection team may submit to the Executive 
Council, through the Director-General, a proposal to conduct drilling. The Executive Council shall 
take a decision on such a proposal no later than 72 hours after receipt of the proposal. The decision to 
approve drilling shall be made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council. 
356 
49. The inspection team may request the Executive Council, through the Director-General, to 
extend the inspection duration by a maximum of 70 days beyond the 60-day time-frame specified in 
Part II, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, if the inspection team considers such an extension essential to 
enable it to fulfil its mandate. The inspection team shall indicate in its request which of the activities 
and techniques listed in Part II, paragraph 69 of the Protocol it intends to carry out during the extension 
period. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the extension request no later than 72 hours 
after receipt of the request. The decision to approve an extension of the inspection duration shall be 
made by a majority of all members of the Executive Council. 
50. Any time following the approval of the continuation of the on-site inspection in accordance 
with paragraph 47, the inspection team may submit to the Executive Council, through the Director- 
General, a recommendation to terminate the inspection. Such a recommendation shall be considered 
approved unless the Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the recommendation, 
decides by a two-thirds majority of all its members not to approve the termination of the inspection. In 
case of termination of the inspection, the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the 
territory of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part ti, paragraphs 109 and 
110 of the Protocol. 
51. The requesting State Party and the State Party sought to be inspected may participate in the 
deliberations of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request without voting. The 
requesting State Party and the inspected State Party may also participate without voting in any 
subsequent deliberations of the Executive Council related to the inspection. 
52. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties within 24 hours about any decision by and 
reports, proposals, requests and recommendations to the Executive Council pursuant to paragraphs 46 
to 50. 
Follow-up After Executive Council Approval of 
an On-Site Inspection 
53. An on-site inspection approved by the Executive Council shall be conducted without delay by 
an inspection team designated by the Director-General and in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty and the Protocol. The inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry no later than six days 
following the receipt by the Executive Council of the on-site inspection request from the requesting 
State Party. 
54. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of the on-site 
inspection. The inspection mandate shall contain the information specified in Part II, paragraph 42 of 
the Protocol. 
55. The Director-General shall notify the inspected State Party of the inspection no less than 24 
hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, in accordance with Part 11, 
paragraph 43 of the Protocol. 
The Conduct of an On-Site Inspection 
56. Each State Party shall permit the Organization to conduct an on-site inspection on its territory 
or at places under its jurisdiction or control in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the 
Protocol. However, no State Party shall have to accept simultaneous on-site inspections on its territory 
or at places under its jurisdiction or control. 
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57. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol, the inspected State Party 
shall have: 
(a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate its 
compliance with this Treaty and, to this end, to enable the inspection team to fulfil its mandate; 
(b) The right to take measures it deems necessary to protect national security Interests and 
to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection; 
(c) The obligation to provide access within the inspection area for the sole purpose of 
determining facts relevant to the purpose of the inspection, taking into account sub-paragraph (b) and 
any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures; 
(d) The obligation not to invoke this paragraph or Part 11, paragraph 88 of the Protocol to 
conceal any violation of its obligations under Article I; and 
(e) The obligation not to impede the ability of the inspection team to move within the 
inspection area and to carry out inspection activities in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol. 
Access, in the context of an on-site inspection, means both the physical access of the inspection team 
and the inspection equipment to, and the conduct of inspection activities within, the inspection area. 
58. The on-site inspection shall be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent 
with the efficient and timely accomplishment of the inspection mandate, and in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in the Protocol. Wherever possible, the inspection team shall begin with the least 
intrusive procedures and then proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary to 
collect sufficient information to clarify the concern about possible non-compliance with this Treaty. 
The inspectors shall seek only the information and data necessary for the purpose of the inspection and 
shall seek to minimize interference with normal operations of the inspected State Party. 
59. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the on-site inspection and 
facilitate its task. 
60. If the inspected State Party, acting in accordance with Part 11. paragraphs 86 to 96 of the 
Protocol, restricts access within the inspection area, it shall make every reasonable effort in 
consultations with the inspection team to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with 
this Treaty. 
Observer 
61. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply: 
(a) The requesting State Party, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, may 
send a representative, who shall be a national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State 
Party, to observe the conduct of the on-site inspection; 
(b) The inspected State Party shall notify its acceptance or non-acceptance of the proposed 
observer to the Director-General within 12 hours after approval of the on-site inspection by the 
Executive Council; 
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(c) In case of acceptance, the inspected State Party shall grant access to the observer in 
accordance with the Protocol; 
(d) The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the 
inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the inspection report. 
There shall be no more than three observers from an aggregate of requesting States Parties. 
Reports of an On-Site Tnsaection 
62. Inspection reports shall contain: 
(a) A description of the activities conducted by the inspection team; 
(b) The factual findings of the inspection team relevant to the purpose of the inspection; 
(c) An account of the cooperation granted during the on-site inspection; 
(d) A factual description of the extent of the access granted, including the alternative 
means provided to the team, during the on-site inspection; and 
(e) Any other details relevant to the purpose of the inspection. 
Differing observations made by inspectors may be attached to the report. 
63. The Director-General shall make draft inspection reports available to the inspected State Party. 
The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide the Director-General within 48 hours with its 
comments and explanations, and to identify any information and data which, in its view, are not related 
to the purpose of the inspection and should not be circulated outside the Technical Secretariat. The 
Director-General shall consider the proposals for changes to the draft inspection report made by the 
inspected State Party and shall wherever possible incorporate them. The Director-General shall also 
annex the comments and explanations provided by the inspected State Party to the inspection report. 
64. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the inspection report to the requesting State 
Party, the inspected State Party, the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. The 
Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council and to all other States 
Parties any results of sample analysis in designated laboratories in accordance with Part 11, paragraph 
104 of the Protocol, relevant data from the International Monitoring System, the assessments of the 
requesting and inspected States Parties, as well as any other information that the Director-General 
deems relevant. In the case of the progress inspection report referred to in paragraph 47, the Director. 
General shall transmit the report to the Executive Council within the time-frame specified in that 
paragraph. 
65. The Executive Council, in accordance with its powers and functions, shall review the 
inspection report and any material provided pursuant to paragraph 64, and shall address any concerns 
as to: 
(a) Whether any non-compliance with this Treaty has occurred; and 
(b) Whether the right to request an on-site inspection has been abused. 
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66. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and functions, that 
further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 65, it shall take the appropriate measures in 
accordance with Article V. 
Frivolous or Abusive On-Site Inspection Requests 
67. If the Executive Council does not approve the on-site inspection on the basis that the on-site 
inspection request is frivolous or abusive, or if the inspection is terminated for the same reasons, the 
Executive Council shall consider and decide on whether to implement appropriate measures to redress 
the situation, including the following: 
(a) Requiring the requesting State Party to pay for the cost of any preparations made by the 
Technical Secretariat; 
(b) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to request an on-site inspection for a 
period of time, as determined by the Executive Council; and 
(c) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to serve on the Executive Council for 
a period of time. 
E. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 
68. In order to: 
(a) Contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from possible 
misinterpretation of verification data relating to chemical explosions; and 
(b) Assist in the calibration of the stations that are part of the component networks of the 
International Monitoring System, 
each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States Parties in 
implementing relevant measures as set out in Part III of the Protocol. 
ARTICLE V 
MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE 
COMPLIANCE, INCLUDING SANCTIONS 
1. The Conference, taking into account, inter a li the recommendations of the Executive 
Council, shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3. to ensure compliance 
with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this 
Treaty. 
2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the Executive Council to 
redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance and fails to fulfil the request within 
the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State Party from the 
exercise of its rights and privileges under this Treaty until the Conference decides otherwise. 
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3. In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Treaty may result from non- 
compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty, the Conference may recommend to States Parties 
collective measures which are in conformity with international law. 
4. The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council, may bring the 
issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations. 
ARTICLE VI 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of this Treaty shall be 
settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with the provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or more States 
Parties and the Organization, relating to the application or interpretation of this Treaty, the parties 
concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation 
or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this 
Treaty and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the 
Statute of the Court. The parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of actions being 
taken. 
3. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute that may arise concerning 
the application or interpretation of this Treaty by whatever means it deems appropriate, including 
offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a dispute to seek a settlement through a 
process of their own choice, bringing the matter to the attention of the Conference and recommending 
a time-limit for any agreed procedure. 
4. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States Parties or brought 
to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as it f inds necessary, establish or 
entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article 11, 
paragraph 26 (j). 
5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately empowered, subject to authorization 
from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give 
an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization. 
An agreement between the Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in 
accordance with Article II, paragraph 38 (h). 
6. This Article is without prejudice to Articles IV and V. 
ARTICLE VII 
AMENDMENTS 
1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments 
to this Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol. Any State Party may also propose 
changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto. Proposals for 
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amendments shall be subject to the procedures in paragraphs 2 to 6. Proposals for changes, in 
accordance with paragraph 7, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 8. 
2. The proposed amendment shall be considered and adopted only by an Amendment 
Conference. 
3. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Director-General, who shall 
circulate it to all States Parties and the Depositary and seek the views of the States Parties on whether 
an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States 
Parties notify the Director-General no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further 
consideration of the proposal, the Director-General shall convene an Amendment Conference to which 
all States Parties shall be invited. 
4. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular session of the 
Conference unless all States Parties that support the convening of an Amendment Conference request 
that it be held earlier. In no case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the 
circulation of the proposed amendment. 
5. Amendments shall be adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a majority 
of the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote. 
6. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of the 
instruments of ratification or acceptance by all those States Parties casting a positive vote at the 
Amendment Conference. 
7. In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, Parts I and Ill of the Protocol 
and Annexes 1 and 2 to the Protocol shall be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8, if the 
proposed changes are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature. All other 
provisions of the Protocol and the Annexes thereto shall not be subject to changes in accordance with 
paragraph B. 
8. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 7 shall be made in accordance with the following 
procedures: 
(a) The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the necessary 
information to the Director-General. Additional information for the evaluation of the proposal may be 
provided by any State Party and the Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly 
communicate any such proposals and information to all States Parties, the Executive Council and the 
Depositary; 
(b) No later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shall evaluate the proposal 
to determine all its possible consequences for the provisions of this Treaty and its implementation and 
shall communicate any such information to all States Parties and the Executive Council; 
(c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all information 
available to it, including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7. No later than 90 
days after its receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate 
explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall acknowledge receipt within 10 
days; 
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(d) If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, 
it shall be considered approved if no State Party objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the 
recommendation. If the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be 
considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after receipt of the 
recommendation; 
(e) If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the acceptance 
required under sub-paragraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including whether it fulfils the 
requirements of paragraph 7, shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next 
session; 
(f) The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary of any decision 
under this paragraph; 
(g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all States Parties 180 
days after the date of notification by the Director-General of their approval unless another time period 
is recommended by the Executive Council or decided by the Conference. 
ARTICLE VIII 
REVIEW OF THE TREATY 
1. Unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties, ten years after the entry into 
force of this Treaty a Conference of the States Parties shall be held to review the operation and 
effectiveness of this Treaty, with a view to assuring itself that the objectives and purposes in the 
Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any 
new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Treaty. On the basis of a request by any 
State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the conduct of 
underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review Conference decides by 
consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it shall commence work without delay, with 
a view to recommending to States Parties an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude 
any military benefits of such nuclear explosions. Any such proposed amendment shall be 
communicated to the Director-General by any State Party and shall be dealt with in accordance with 
the provisions of Article VII. 
2. At intervals of ten years thereafter, further Review Conferences may be convened with the 
same objective, if the Conference so decides as a matter of procedure in the preceding year. Such 
Conferences may be convened after an interval of less than ten years if so decided by the Conference 
as a matter of substance. 
3. Normally, any Review Conference shall be held immediately following the regular annual 
session of the Conference provided for in Article II. 
ARTICLE IX 
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 
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2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from 
this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have 
jeopardized its supreme interests. 
3. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all other States Parties, 
the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations Security Council. Notice of withdrawal 
shall include a statement of the extraordinary event or events which a State Party regards as 
jeopardizing its supreme interests. 
ARTICLE X 
STATUS OF THE PROTOCOL AND THE ANNEXES 
The Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol, and the Annexes to the Protocol form an integral 
part of the Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty includes the Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol and 
the Annexes to the Protocol. 
ARTICLE XI 
SIGNATURE 
This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature before its entry into force. 
ARTICLE XII 
RATIFICATION 
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according to their respective 
constitutional processes. 
ARTICLE XIII 
ACCESSION 
Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force may accede to it at any 
time thereafter. 
ARTICLE XIV 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
1. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of 
ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no case earlier than two years after its 
opening for signature. 
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2. If this Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the anniversary of its 
opening for signature, the Depositary shall convene a Conference of the States that have already 
deposited their instruments of ratification upon the request of a majority of those States. That 
Conference shall examine the extent to which the requirement set out in paragraph I has been met and 
shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be 
undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this 
Treaty. 
3. Unless otherwise decided by the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 or other such 
conferences, this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of the opening for signature of 
this Treaty, until its entry into force. 
4. All States Signatories shall be invited to attend the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 and 
any subsequent conferences as referred to in paragraph 3, as observers. 
5. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry 
into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of their 
instruments of ratification or accession. 
ARTICLE XV 
RESERVATIONS 
The Articles of and the Annexes to this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations. The 
provisions of the Protocol to this Treaty and the Annexes to the Protocol shall not be subject to 
reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of this Treaty. 
ARTICLE XVI 
DEPOSITARY 
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Treaty and shall 
receive signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments of accession. 
2. The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Signatories and acceding States of the date of 
each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry 
into force of this Treaty and of any amendments and changes thereto, and the receipt of other notices. 
3. The Depositary shall send duly certified copies of this Treaty to the Governments of the States 
Signatories and acceding States. 
4. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
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ARTICLE XVII 
AUTHENTIC TEXTS 
This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
ANNEX I TO THE TREATY 
LIST OF STATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 28 
rim 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Eastern Europe 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and I lerzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia. 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Middle East and South Asia 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kazakstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Maldives, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri 
Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan. Yemen. 
North America and Western Europe 
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece. I (oly See, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, United States of America. 
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South East Asia. the Pacific and the Far East 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia (Federated States of), Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam 
ANNEX 2 TO THE TREATY 
LIST OF STATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE XIV 
List of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally 
participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table I of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's April 1996 edition of "Nuclear Power Reactors In the World", 
and of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally 
participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table I of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's December 1995 edition of "Nuclear Research Reactors in the 
World": 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, I lungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, 
Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United 
States of America, Viet Nam, Zaire. 
PROTOCOL TO THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN 
TREATY 
PART I 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM AND INTERNATIONAL 
DATA CENTRE FUNCTIONS 
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. The International Monitoring System shall comprise monitoring facilities as set out in Article 
IV, paragraph 16, and respective means of communication. 
2. The monitoring facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System shall consist 
of those facilities specified in Annex I to this Protocol. The International Monitoring System shall 
fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals. 
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3. The Organization, in accordance with Article II, shall, in cooperation and consultation with the 
States Parties, with other States, and with international organizations as appropriate, establish and 
coordinate the operation and maintenance, and any future agreed modification or development of the 
International Monitoring System. 
4. In accordance with appropriate agreements or arrangements and procedures, a State Party or 
other State hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for International Monitoring System facilities and 
the Technical Secretariat shall agree and cooperate in establishing, operating, upgrading, financing. 
and maintaining monitoring facilities, related certified laboratories and respective means of 
communication within areas under its jurisdiction or control or elsewhere in conformity with 
international law. Such cooperation shall be in accordance with the security and authentication 
requirements and technical specifications contained in the relevant operational manuals. Such a State 
shall give the Technical Secretariat authority to access a monitoring facility for checking equipment 
and communication links, and shall agree to make the necessary changes in the equipment and the 
operational procedures to meet agreed requirements. The Technical Secretariat shall provide to such 
States appropriate technical assistance as is deemed by the Executive Council to be required for the 
proper functioning of the facility as part of the International Monitoring System. 
5. Modalities for such cooperation between the Organization and States Parties or States hosting 
or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the International Monitoring System shall be set out 
in agreements or arrangements as appropriate in each case. 
B. SEISMOLOGICAL MONITORING 
6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of seismological data to 
assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the 
establishment and operation of a global network of primary and auxiliary seismological monitoring 
stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International 
Data Centre. 
7. The network of primary stations shall consist of the 50 stations specified In Table I-A of 
Annex I to this Protocol. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements 
specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological Monitoring and the International Exchange of 
Seismological Data. Uninterrupted data from the primary stations shall be transmitted, directly or 
through a national data centre, on-line to the International Data Centre. 
S. To supplement the primary network, an auxiliary network of 120 stations shall provide 
information, directly or through a national data centre, to the International Data Centre upon request. 
The auxiliary stations to be used are listed in Table I-B of Annex 1 to this Protocol. The auxiliary 
stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for 
Seismological Monitoring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data. Data from the 
auxiliary stations may at any time be requested by the International Data Centre and shall be 
immediately available through on-line computer connections. 
C. RADIONUCLIDE MONITORING 
9. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of data on radionuclides 
in the atmosphere to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall 
include the establishment and operation of a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations and 
certified laboratories. The network shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the 
International Data Centre. 
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10. The network of stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere shall comprise an overall 
network of 80 stations, as specified in Table 2-A of Annex Ito this Protocol. All stations shall be 
capable of monitoring for the presence of relevant particulate matter in the atmosphere. Forty of these 
stations shall also be capable of monitoring for the presence of relevant noble gases upon the entry into 
force of this Treaty. For this purpose the Conference, at its initial session, shall approve a 
recommendation by the Preparatory Commission as to which 40 stations from Table 2-A of Annex I to 
this Protocol shall be capable of noble gas monitoring. At its first regular annual session, the 
Conference shall consider and decide on a plan for implementing noble gas monitoring capability 
throughout the network. The Director-General shall prepare a report to the Conference on the 
modalities for such implementation. All monitoring stations shall fulfil the technical and operational 
requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Radionuclide Monitoring and the International 
Exchange of Radionuclide Data. 
11. The network of radionuclide monitoring stations shall be supported by laboratories, which 
shall be certified by the Technical Secretariat in accordance with the relevant operational manual for 
the performance, on contract to the Organization and on a fee-for-service basis, of the analysis of 
samples from radionuclide monitoring stations. Laboratories specified in Table 2-13 of Annex I to this 
Protocol, and appropriately equipped, shall, as required, also be drawn upon by the Technical 
Secretariat to perform additional analysis of samples from radionuclide monitoring stations. With the 
agreement of the Executive Council, further laboratories may be certified by the Technical Secretariat 
to perform the routine analysis of samples from manual monitoring stations where necessary. All 
certified laboratories shall provide the results of such analysis to the International Data Centre, and In 
so doing shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual on 
Radionuclide Monitoring and the International Exchange of Radionuclide Data. 
D. HYDROACOUSTIC MONITORING 
12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of hydroacoustic data to 
assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the 
establishment and operation of a global network of hydroacoustic monitoring stations. These stations 
shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre. 
13. The network of hydroacoustic stations shall consist of the stations specified in Table 3 of 
Annex Ito this Protocol, and shall comprise an overall network of six hydrophone and five T-phase 
stations. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the 
Operational Manual for Hydroacoustic Monitoring and the International Exchange of I lydroacoustic 
Data. 
E. INFRASOUND MONITORING 
14. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of infrasound data to 
assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the 
establishment and operation of a global network of infrasound monitoring stations. These stations 
shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre. 
15. The network of infrasound stations shall consist of the stations specified in Table 4 of Annex I 
to this Protocol, and shall comprise an overall network of 60 stations. These stations shall fulfil the 
technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Infrasound Monitoring 
and the International Exchange of Infrasound Data. 
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F. INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTRE FUNCTIONS 
16. The International Data Centre shall receive, collect, process, analyse, report on and archive 
data from International Monitoring System facilities, including the results of analysis conducted at 
certified laboratories. 
17. The procedures and standard event screening criteria to be used by the International Data 
Centre in carrying out its agreed functions, in particular for the production of standard reporting 
products and for the performance of a standard range of services for States Parties, shall be elaborated 
in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre and shall be progressively developed. The 
procedures and criteria developed initially by the Preparatory Commission shall be approved by the 
Conference at its initial session. 
International Data Centre Standard Products 
18. The International Data Centre shall apply on a routine basis automatic processing methods and 
interactive human analysis to raw International Monitoring System data in order to produce and 
archive standard International Data Centre products on behalf of all States Parties. These products 
shall be provided at no cost to States Parties and shall be without prejudice to final judgements with 
regard to the nature of any event, which shall remain the responsibility of States Parties, and shall 
include: 
(a) Integrated lists of all signals detected by the International Monitoring System, as well 
as standard event lists and bulletins, including the values and associated uncertainties calculated for 
each event located by the International Data Centre, based on a set of standard parameters; 
(b) Standard screened event bulletins that result from the application to each event by the 
International Data Centre of standard event screening criteria, making use of the characterization 
parameters specified in Annex 2 to this Protocol, with the objective of characterizing, highlighting In 
the standard event bulletin, and thereby screening out, events considered to be consistent with natural 
phenomena or non-nuclear, man-made phenomena. The standard event bulletin shall indicate 
numerically for each event the degree to which that event meets or does not meet the event screening 
criteria. In applying standard event screening, the International Data Centre shall use both global and 
supplementary screening criteria to take account of regional variations where applicable. The 
International Data Centre shall progressively enhance its technical capabilities as experience is gained 
in the operation of the International Monitoring System; 
(c) Executive summaries, which summarize the data acquired and archived by the 
International Data Centre, the products of the International Data Centre, and the performance and 
operational status of the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre; and 
(d) Extracts or subsets of the standard International Data Centre products specified in sub- 
paragraphs (a) to (c), selected according to the request of an individual State Party. 
19. The International Data Centre shall carry out, at no cost to States Parties, special studies to 
provide in-depth, technical review by expert analysis of data from the International Monitoring 
System, if requested by the Organization or by a State Party, to improve the estimated values for the 
standard signal and event parameters. 
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International Data Centre Services to States Panics 
20. The International Data Centre shall provide States Parties with open, equal, timely and 
convenient access to all International Monitoring System data, raw or processed, all International Data 
Centre products, and all other International Monitoring System data in the archive of the International 
Data Centre or, through the International Data Centre, of International Monitoring System facilities. 
The methods for supporting data access and the provision of data shall include the following services: 
(a) Automatic and regular forwarding to a State Party of the products of the International 
Data Centre or the selection by the State Party thereof, and, as requested, the selection by the State 
Party of International Monitoring System data; 
(b) The provision of the data or products generated in response to ad hoc requests by States 
Parties for the retrieval from the International Data Centre and International Monitoring System 
facility archives of data and products, including interactive electronic access to the International Data 
Centre database; and 
(c) Assisting individual States Parties, at their request and at no cost for reasonable efforts, 
with expert technical analysis of International Monitoring System data and other relevant data 
provided by the requesting State Party, in order to help the State Party concerned to identify the source 
of specific events. The output of any such technical analysis shall be considered a product of the 
requesting State Party, but shall be available to all States Parties. 
The International Data Centre services specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be made available 
at no cost to each State Party. The volumes and formats of data shall be set out in the Operational 
Manual for the International Data Centre. 
National Event Screening 
21. The International Data Centre shall, if requested by a State Party, apply to any of its standard 
products, on a regular and automatic basis, national event screening criteria established by that State 
Party, and provide the results of such analysis to that State Party. This service shall be undertaken at 
no cost to the requesting State Party. The output of such national event screening processes shall be 
considered a product of the requesting State Party. 
Technical Assistance 
22. The International Data Centre shall, where required, provide technical assistance to individual 
States Parties: 
(a) In formulating their requirements for selection and screening of data and products; 
(b) By installing at the International Data Centre, at no cost to a requesting State Party for 
reasonable efforts, computer algorithms or software provided by that State Party to compute new 
signal and event parameters that are not included in the Operational Manual for the International Data 
Centre, the output being considered products of the requesting State Party; and 
(c) By assisting States Parties to develop the capability to receive, process and analyse 
International Monitoring System data at a national data centre. 
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23. The International Data Centre shall continuously monitor and report on the operational status 
of the International Monitoring System facilities, of communications links, and of its own processing 
systems. It shall provide immediate notification to those responsible should the operational 
performance of any component fail to meet agreed levels set out in the relevant operational manual. 
PART 11 
ON-SITE INSPECTIONS 
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
1. The procedures in this Part shall be implemented pursuant to the provisions for on-site 
inspections set out in Article IV. 
2. The on-site inspection shall be carried out in the area where the event that triggered the on-site 
inspection request occurred. 
3. The area of an on-site inspection shall be continuous and its size shall not exceed 1,000 square 
kilometres. There shall be no linear distance greater than 50 kilometres in any direction. 
4. The duration of an on-site inspection shall not exceed 60 days from the date of the approval of 
the on-site inspection request in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 46, but may be extended by a 
maximum of 70 days in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 49. 
5. If the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate extends to the territory or other place 
under the jurisdiction or control of more than one State Party, the provisions on on-site inspections 
shall, as appropriate, apply to each of the States Parties to which the inspection area extends. 
6. In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the inspected State 
Party but is located on the territory of another State Party or where the access from the point of entry to 
the inspection area requires transit through the territory of a State Party other than the inspected State 
Party, the inspected State Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning such 
inspections in accordance with this Protocol. In such a case, the State Party on whose territory the 
inspection area is located shall facilitate the inspection and shall provide for the necessary support to 
enable the inspection team to carry out its tasks in a timely and effective manner. States Parties 
through whose territory transit is required to reach the inspection area shall facilitate such transit. 
7. In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the inspected State 
Party but is located on the territory of a State not Party to this Treaty, the inspected State Party shall 
take all necessary measures to ensure that the inspection can be carried out in accordance with this 
Protocol. A State Party that has under its jurisdiction or control one or more areas on the territory of a 
State not Party to this Treaty shall take all necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the State on 
whose territory the inspection area is located of inspectors and inspection assistants designated to that 
State Party. If an inspected State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate that it took all 
necessary measures to ensure access. 
8. In cases where the inspection area is located on the territory of a State Party but is under the 
jurisdiction or control of a State not Party to this Treaty, the State Party shall take all necessary 
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measures required of an inspected State Party and a State Party on whose territory the inspection area 
is located, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law, to ensure that the on-site 
inspection can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol. If the State Party is unable to ensure 
access to the inspection area, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access, 
without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law. 
9. The size of the inspection team shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper 
fulfilment of the inspection mandate. The total number of members of the inspection team present on 
the territory of the inspected State Party at any given time, except during the conduct of drilling, shall 
not exceed 40 persons. No national of the requesting State Party or the inspected State Party shall be a 
member of the inspection team. 
10. The Director-General shall determine the size of the inspection team and select its members 
from the list of inspectors and inspection assistants, taking into account the circumstances of a 
particular request. 
11. The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange the amenities necessary for the 
inspection team, such as communication means, interpretation services, transportation, working space, 
lodging, meals, and medical care. 
12. The inspected State Party shall be reimbursed by the Organization, in a reasonably short 
period of time after conclusion of the inspection, for all expenses, including those mentioned in 
paragraphs 11 and 49, related to the stay and functional activities of the inspection team on the territory 
of the inspected State Party. 
13. Procedures for the implementation of on-site inspections shall be detailed in the Operational 
Manual for On-Site Inspections. 
B. STANDING ARRANGEMENTS 
Designation of Inspectors and Inspection Assistants 
14. An inspection team may consist of inspectors and inspection assistants. An on-site inspection 
shall only be carried out by qualified inspectors specially designated for this function. They may be 
assisted by specially designated inspection assistants, such as technical and administrative personnel, 
aircrew and interpreters. 
15. Inspectors and inspection assistants shall be nominated for designation by the States Parties or, 
in the case of staff of the Technical Secretariat, by the Director-General, on the basis of their expertise 
and experience relevant to the purpose and functions of on-site inspections. The nominees shall be 
approved in advance by the States Parties in accordance with paragraph 18. 
16. Each State Party, no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall 
notify the Director-General of the names, dates of birth, sex, ranks, qualifications and professional 
experience of the persons proposed by the State Party for designation as inspectors and inspection 
assistants. 
17. No later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty, the Technical Secretariat shall 
communicate in writing to all States Parties an initial list of the names, nationalities, dates of birth, sex 
and ranks of the inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation by the Director-General 
and the States Parties, as well as a description of their qualifications and professional experience. 
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18. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt of the initial list of inspectors and 
inspection assistants proposed for designation. Any inspector or inspection assistant included in this 
list shall be regarded as accepted unless a State Party, no later than 30 days after acknowledgment of 
receipt of the list, declares its non-acceptance in writing. The State Party may include the reason for 
the objection. In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed inspector or inspection assistant shall not 
undertake or participate in on-site inspection activities on the territory or in any other place under the 
jurisdiction or control of the State Party that has declared its non-acceptance. The Technical 
Secretariat shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of objection. 
19. Whenever additions or changes to the list of inspectors and inspection assistants are proposed 
by the Director-General or a State Party, replacement inspectors and inspection assistants shall be 
designated in the same manner as set forth with respect to the initial list. Each State Party shall 
promptly notify the Technical Secretariat if an inspector or inspection assistant nominated by it can no 
longer fulfil the duties of an inspector or inspection assistant. 
20. The Technical Secretariat shall keep the list of inspectors and inspection assistants up to date 
and notify all States Parties of any additions or changes to the list. 
21. A State Party requesting an on-site inspection may propose that an Inspector from the list of 
inspectors and inspection assistants serve as its observer in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 61. 
22. Subject to paragraph 23, a State Party shall have the right at any time to object to an Inspector 
or inspection assistant who has already been accepted. It shall notify the Technical Secretariat of its 
objection in writing and may include the reason for the objection. Such objection shall come into 
effect 30 days after receipt of the notification by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat 
shall immediately confirm receipt of the notification of the objection and inform the objecting and 
nominating States Parties of the date on which the inspector or inspection assistant shall cease to be 
designated for that State Party. 
23. A State Party that has been notified of an inspection shall not seek the removal from the 
inspection team of any of the inspectors or inspection assistants named in the inspection mandate. 
24. The number of inspectors and inspection assistants accepted by a State Party must be 
sufficient to allow for availability of appropriate numbers of inspectors and inspection assistants. If, in 
the opinion of the Director-General, the non-acceptance by a State Party of proposed inspectors or 
inspection assistants impedes the designation of a sufficient number of inspectors and Inspection 
assistants or otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the purposes of an on-site inspection, the 
Director-General shall refer the issue to the Executive Council. 
25. Each inspector included in the list of inspectors and inspection assistants shall receive relevant 
training. Such training shall be provided by the Technical Secretariat pursuant to the procedures 
specified in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections. The Technical Secretariat shall co- 
ordinate, in agreement with the States Parties, a schedule of training for the inspectors. 
Mvilef es and Immunities 
26. Following acceptance of the initial list of inspectors and inspection assistants as provided for 
in paragraph 18 or as subsequently altered in accordance with paragraph 19, each State Party shall be 
obliged to issue, in accordance with its national procedures and upon application by an inspector or 
inspection assistant, multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas and other relevant documents to enable 
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each inspector and inspection assistant to enter and to remain on the territory of that State Party for the 
sole purpose of carrying out inspection activities. Each State Party shall issue the necessary visa or 
travel documents for this purpose no later than 48 hours after receipt of the application or immediately 
upon arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry on the territory of the State Party. Such 
documents shall be valid for as long as is necessary to enable the inspector or inspection assistant to 
remain on the territory of the inspected State Party for the sole purpose of carrying out the inspection 
activities. 
27. To exercise their functions effectively, members of the inspection team shall be accorded 
privileges and immunities as set forth in sub-paragraphs (a) to (i). Privileges and immunities shall be 
granted to members of the inspection team for the sake of this Treaty and not for the personal benefit 
of the individuals themselves. Such privileges and immunities shall be accorded to them for the entire 
period between arrival on and departure from the territory of the inspected State Party, and thereafter 
with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions. 
(a) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by 
diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 
April 1961; 
(b) The living quarters and office premises occupied by the inspection team carrying out 
inspection activities pursuant to this Treaty shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded 
to the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations; 
(c) The papers and correspondence, including records, of the inspection team shall enjoy 
the inviolability accorded to all papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, 
paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The inspection team shall have the 
right to use codes for their communications with the Technical Secretariat; 
(d) Samples and approved equipment carried by members of the inspection team shall be 
inviolable subject to provisions contained in this Treaty and exempt from all customs duties. 
Hazardous samples shall be transported in accordance with relevant regulations; 
(e) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the immunities accorded to 
diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1,2 and 3, of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations; 
(f) The members of the inspection team carrying out prescribed activities pursuant to this 
Treaty shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to 
Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; 
(g) The members of the inspection team shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the 
inspected State Party, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for personal 
use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by 
quarantine regulations; 
(h) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the same currency and exchange 
facilities as are accorded to representatives of foreign Governments on temporary official missions; 
and 
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(i) The members of the inspection team shall not engage in any professional or 
commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected State Party. 
28. When transiting the territory of States Parties other than the inspected State Party, the 
members of the inspection team shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic 
agents pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Papers 
and correspondence, including records, and samples and approved equipment carried by them, shall be 
accorded the privileges and immunities set forth in paragraph 27 (c) and (d). 
29. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities the members of the inspection team shall 
be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected State Party and, to the extent that is 
consistent with the inspection mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that 
State. If the inspected State Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities 
specified in this Protocol, consultations shall be held between the State Party and the Director-General 
to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such 
an abuse. 
30. The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the inspection team may be waived by the 
Director-General in those cases when the Director-General is of the opinion that immunity would 
impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the 
provisions of this Treaty. Waiver must always be express. 
31. Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities accorded to members of the 
inspection team pursuant to this section, except for those accorded pursuant to paragraph 27 (d). 
Points of Entry 
32. Each State Party shall designate its points of entry and shall supply the required information to 
the Technical Secretariat no later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for it. These points of 
entry shall be such that the inspection team can reach any inspection area from at least one point of 
entry within 24 hours. Locations of points of entry shall be provided to all States Parties by the 
Technical Secretariat. Points of entry may also serve as points of exit. 
33. Each State Party may change its points of entry by giving notice of such change to the 
Technical Secretariat. Changes shall become effective 30 days after the Technical Secretariat receives 
such notification, to allow appropriate notification to all States Parties. 
34. If the Technical Secretariat considers that there are insufficient points of entry for the timely 
conduct of inspections or that changes to the points of entry proposed by a State Party would hamper 
such timely conduct of inspections, it shall enter into consultations with the State Party concerned to 
resolve the problem. 
Arrangements for Use of Non-Scheduled Aircraft 
35. Where timely travel to the point of entry is not feasible using scheduled commercial flights, an 
inspection team may utilize non-scheduled aircraft. No later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into 
force for it, each State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the standing diplomatic clearance 
number for non-scheduled aircraft transporting an inspection team and equipment necessary for 
inspection. Aircraft routings shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon 
between the State Party and the Technical Secretariat as the basis for such diplomatic clearance. 
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Approved Inspection Equipment 
36. The Conference, at its initial session, shall consider and approve a list of equipment for use 
during on-site inspections. Each State Party may submit proposals for the inclusion of equipment in 
the list. Specifications for the use of the equipment, as detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site 
Inspections, shall take account of safety and confidentiality considerations where such equipment is 
likely to be used. 
37. The equipment for use during on-site inspections shall consist of core equipment for the 
inspection activities and techniques specified in paragraph 69 and auxiliary equipment necessary for 
the effective and timely conduct of on-site inspections. 
38. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure that all types of approved equipment are available for 
on-site inspections when required. When required for an on-site inspection, the Technical Secretariat 
shall duly certify that the equipment has been calibrated, maintained and protected. To facilitate the 
checking of the equipment at the point of entry by the inspected State Party, the Technical Secretariat 
shall provide documentation and attach seals to authenticate the certification. 
39. Any permanently held equipment shall be in the custody of the Technical Secretariat. The 
Technical Secretariat shall be responsible for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment. 
40. As appropriate, the Technical Secretariat shall make arrangements with States Parties to 
provide equipment mentioned in the list. Such States Parties shall be responsible for the maintenance 
and calibration of such equipment. 
C. ON-SITE INSPECTION REQUEST, INSPECTION MANDATE 
AND NOTIFICATION OF INSPECTION 
On-Site Inspection Request 
41. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 37, the on-site inspection request shall contain at least the 
following information: 
(a) The estimated geographical and vertical co-ordinates of the location of the event that 
triggered the request with an indication of the possible margin of error, 
(b) The proposed boundaries of the area to be inspected, specified on a map and in 
accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3; 
(c) The State Party or States Parties to be inspected or an indication that the area to be 
inspected or part thereof is beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State; 
(d) The probable environment of the event that triggered the request; 
(e) The estimated time of the event that triggered the request, with an 
indication of the 
possible margin of error; 
(f) All data upon which the request is based; 
(g) The personal details of the proposed observer, if any; and 
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(h) The results of a consultation and clarification process in accordance with Article IV, or 
an explanation, if relevant, of the reasons why such a consultation and clarification process has not 
been carried out. 
Inspection Mandate 
42. The mandate for an on-site inspection shall contain: 
(a) The decision of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request; 
(b) The name of the State Party or States Parties to be inspected or an indication that the 
inspection area or part thereof is beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State; 
(c) The location and boundaries of the inspection area specified on a map, taking into 
account all information on which the request was based and all other available technical information, 
in consultation with the requesting State Party; 
(d) The planned types of activity of the inspection team in the inspection area; 
(e) The point of entry to be used by the inspection team; 
(f) Any transit or basing points, as appropriate; 
(g) The name of the head of the inspection team; 
(h) The names of members of the inspection team; 
(i) The name of the proposed observer, if any; and 
(j) The list of equipment to be used in the inspection area. 
If a decision by the Executive Council pursuant to Article IV, paragraphs 46 to 49, necessitates a 
modification of the inspection mandate, the Director-General may update the mandate with respect to 
sub-paragraphs (d), (h) and (j), as appropriate. The Director-General shall immediately notify the 
inspected State Party of any such modification. 
Notification of Inspection 
43. The notification made by the Director-General pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 55 shall 
include the following information: 
(a) The inspection mandate; 
(b) The date and estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry; 
(c) The means of arrival at the point of entry; 
(d) If appropriate, the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft; 
and 
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(e) A list of any equipment which the Director-General requests the inspected State Party 
to make available to the inspection team for use in the inspection area. 
44. The inspected State Party shall acknowledge receipt of the notification by the Director- 
General no later than 12 hours after having received the notification. 
D. PRE-INSPECTION ACTIVITIES 
Entry Into the Territory of the Inspected State Party. 
Activities at the Point of Entry and 
Transfer to the Inspection Area 
45. The inspected State Party that has been notified of the arrival of the inspection team shall 
ensure the immediate entry of the inspection team into its territory. 
46. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used for travel to the point of entry, the Technical Secretariat 
shall provide the inspected State Party with a flight plan, through the National Authority, for the flight 
of the aircraft from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of that State Party to the point of 
entry, no less than six hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall 
be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable 
to civil aircraft. The Technical Secretariat shall include in the remarks section of the flight plan the 
standing diplomatic clearance number and the appropriate notation identifying the aircraft as an 
inspection aircraft. If a military aircraft is used, the Technical Secretariat shall request prior 
authorization from the inspected State Party to enter its airspace. 
47. No less than three hours before the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last 
airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall ensure 
that the flight plan filed in accordance with paragraph 46 is approved, so that the inspection team may 
arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time. 
48. Where necessary, the head of the inspection team and the representative of the inspected State 
Party shall agree on a basing point and a flight plan from the point of entry to the basing point and, if 
necessary, to the inspection area. 
49. The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange parking, security protection, servicing 
and fuel as required by the Technical Secretariat for the aircraft of the inspection team at the point of 
entry and, where necessary, at the basing point and at the inspection area. Such aircraft shall not be 
liable for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges. This paragraph shall also apply to aircraft 
used for overflight during the on-site inspection. 
50. Subject to paragraph 51, there shall be no restriction by the inspected State Party on the 
inspection team bringing approved equipment that is in conformity with the inspection mandate into 
the territory of that State Party, or on its use in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this 
Protocol. 
51. The inspected State Party shall have the right, without prejudice to the time-frame specified in 
paragraph 54, to check in the presence of inspection team members at the point of entry that the 
equipment has been approved and certified in accordance with paragraph 38. The inspected State 
Party may exclude equipment that is not in conformity with the inspection mandate or that has not 
been approved and certified in accordance with paragraph 38. 
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52. Immediately upon arrival at the point of entry and without prejudice to the time-Game 
specified in paragraph 54, the head of the inspection team shall present to the representative of the 
inspected State Party the inspection mandate and an initial inspection plan prepared by the inspection 
team specifying the activities to be carried out by it. The inspection team shall be briefed by 
representatives of the inspected State Party with the aid of maps and other documentation as 
appropriate. The briefing shall include relevant natural terrain features, safety and confidentiality 
issues, and logistical arrangements for the inspection. The inspected State Party may indicate locations 
within the inspection area that, in its view, are not related to the purpose of the inspection. 
53. After the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team shall, as appropriate, modify the initial 
inspection plan, taking into account any comments by the inspected State Party. The modified 
inspection plan shall be made available to the representative of the inspected State Party. 
54. The inspected State Party shall do everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure 
the safe conduct of the inspection team, the approved equipment specified in paragraphs SO and 51 and 
baggage from the point of entry to the inspection area no later than 36 hours after arrival at the point of 
entry, if no other timing has been agreed upon within the time-frame specified in paragraph 57. 
55. To confirm that the area to which the inspection team has been transported corresponds to the 
inspection area specified in the inspection mandate, the inspection team shall have the right to use 
approved location-finding equipment. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team in this 
task. 
E. CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS 
General Rules 
56. The inspection team shall discharge its functions in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaty and this Protocol. 
57. The inspection team shall begin its inspection activities in the inspection area as soon as 
possible, but in no case later than 72 hours after arrival at the point of entry. 
58. The activities of the inspection team shall be so arranged as to ensure the timely and effective 
discharge of its functions and the least possible inconvenience to the inspected State Party and 
disturbance to the inspection area. 
59. In cases where the inspected State Party has been requested, pursuant to paragraph 43 (e) or in 
the course of the inspection, to make available any equipment for use by the inspection team in the 
inspection area, the inspected State Party shall comply with the request to the extent it can. 
60. During the on-site inspection the inspection team shall have, inter alia: 
(a) The right to determine how the inspection will proceed. consistent with the inspection 
mandate and taking into account any steps taken by the inspected State Party consistent with the 
provisions on managed access; 
(b) The right to modify the inspection plan, as necessary, to ensure the effective execution 
of the inspection; 
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(c) The obligation to take into account the recommendations and suggested modifications 
by the inspected State Party to the inspection plan; 
(d) The right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that may arise during 
the inspection; 
(e) The obligation to use only those techniques specified in paragraph 69 and to refrain 
from activities that are not relevant to the purpose of the inspection. The team shall collect and 
document such facts as are related to the purpose of the inspection, but shall neither seek nor document 
information that is clearly unrelated thereto. Any material collected and subsequently found not to be 
relevant shall be returned to the inspected State Party; 
(f) The obligation to take into account and include in its report data and explanations on 
the nature of the event that triggered the request, provided by the inspected State Party from the 
national monitoring networks of the inspected State Party and from other sources; 
(g) The obligation to provide the inspected State Party, at its request, with copies of the 
information and data collected in the inspection area; and 
(h) The obligation to respect the confidentiality and the safety and health regulations of the 
inspected State Party. 
61. During the on-site inspection the inspected State Party shall have, inter alia: 
(a) The right to make recommendations at any time to the inspection team regarding 
possible modification of the inspection plan; 
(b) The right and the obligation to provide a representative to liaise with the inspection 
team; 
(c) The right to have representatives accompany the inspection team during the 
performance of its duties and observe all inspection activities carried out by the inspection team. This 
shall not delay or otherwise hinder the inspection team in the exercise of its functions; 
(d) The right to provide additional information and to request the collection and 
documentation of additional facts it believes are relevant to the inspection; 
(e) The right to examine all photographic and measurement products as well as samples 
and to retain any photographs or parts thereof showing sensitive sites not related to the purpose of the 
inspection. The inspected State Party shall have the right to receive duplicate copies of all 
photographic and measurement products. The inspected State Party shall have the right to retain 
photographic originals and first-generation photographic products and to put photographs or parts 
thereof under joint seal within its territory. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide its 
own camera operator to take still/video photographs as requested by the inspection team. Otherwise, 
these functions shall be performed by members of the inspection team; 
(f) The right to provide the inspection team, from its national monitoring networks and 
from other sources, with data and explanations on the nature of the event that triggered the request; and 
(g) The obligation to provide the inspection team with such clarification as may be 
necessary to resolve any ambiguities that arise during the inspection. 
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Communications 
62. The members of the inspection team shall have the right at all times during the on-site 
inspection to communicate with each other and with the Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they 
may use their own duly approved and certified equipment with the consent of the inspected State Party, 
to the extent that the inspected State Party does not provide them with access to other 
telecommunications. 
Observer 
63. In accordance with Article IV, paragraph 61, the requesting State Party shall liaise with the 
Technical Secretariat to co-ordinate the arrival of the observer at the same point of entry or basing 
point as the inspection team within a reasonable period of the arrival of the inspection team. 
64. The observer shall have the right throughout the inspection to be in communication with the 
embassy of the requesting State Party located in the inspected State Party or, in the case of absence of 
an embassy, with the requesting State Party itself. 
65. The observer shall have the right to arrive at the inspection area and to have access to and 
within the inspection area as granted by the inspected State Party. 
66. The observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the inspection team throughout 
the inspection. 
67. Throughout the inspection, the inspection team shall keep the observer informed about the 
conduct of the inspection and the findings. 
68. Throughout the inspection, the inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities 
necessary for the observer similar to those enjoyed by the inspection team as described in paragraph 
11. All costs in connection with the stay of the observer on the territory of the inspected State Party 
shall be borne by the requesting State Party. 
Inspection Activities and Techniques 
69. The following inspection activities may be conducted and techniques used, in accordance with 
the provisions on managed access, on collection, handling and analysis of samples, and on overflights: 
(a) Position finding from the air and at the surface to confirm the boundaries of the 
inspection area and establish co-ordinates of locations therein, in support of the inspection activities; 
(b) Visual observation, video and still photography and multi-spectral imaging, including 
infrared measurements, at and below the surface, and from the air, to search for anomalies or artifacts; 
(c) Measurement of levels of radioactivity above, at and below the surface, using gamma 
radiation monitoring and energy resolution analysis from the air, and at or under the surface, to search 
for and identify radiation anomalies; 
(d) Environmental sampling and analysis of solids, liquids and gases from above, at and 
below the surface to detect anomalies; 
382 
(e) Passive seismological monitoring for aftershocks to localize the search area and 
facilitate determination of the nature of an event; 
(t) Resonance seismometry and active seismic surveys to search for and locate 
underground anomalies, including cavities and rubble zones; 
(g) Magnetic and gravitational field mapping, ground penetrating radar and electrical 
conductivity measurements at the surface and from the air, as appropriate, to detect anomalies or 
artifacts; and 
(h) Drilling to obtain radioactive samples. 
70. Up to 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with Article IV, 
paragraph 46, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct any of the activities and use any of 
the techniques listed in paragraph 69 (a) to (e). Following the approval of the continuation of the 
inspection in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 47, the inspection team shall have the right to 
conduct any of the activities and use any of the techniques listed in paragraph 69 (a) to (g). The 
inspection team shall only conduct drilling after the approval of the Executive Council in accordance 
with Article IV, paragraph 48. If the inspection team requests an extension of the inspection duration 
in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 49, it shall indicate in its request which of the activities and 
techniques listed in paragraph 69 it intends to carry out in order to be able to fulfil its mandate. 
71. The inspection team shall have the right to conduct an overflight over the inspection area 
during the on-site inspection for the purposes of providing the inspection team with a general 
orientation of the inspection area, narrowing down and optimizing the locations for ground-based 
inspection and facilitating the collection of factual evidence, using equipment specified in paragraph 
79. 
72. The overflight shall be conducted as soon as practically possible. The total duration of the 
overflight over the inspection area shall be no more than 12 hours. 
73. Additional overflights using equipment specified in paragraphs 79 and 80 may be conducted 
subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party. 
74. The area to be covered by overflights shall not extend beyond the inspection area. 
75. The inspected State Party shall have the right to impose restrictions or, in exceptional cases 
and with reasonable justification, prohibitions on the overflight of sensitive sites not related to the 
purpose of the inspection. Restrictions may relate to the flight altitude, the number of passes and 
circling, the duration of hovering, the type of aircraft, the number of inspectors on board, and the type 
of measurements or observations. If the inspection team considers that the restrictions or prohibitions 
on the overflight of sensitive sites may impede the fulfilment of its mandate, the inspected State Party 
shall make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means of inspection. 
76. Overflights shall be conducted according to a flight plan duly filed and approved in 
accordance with aviation rules and regulations of the inspected State Party. Flight safety regulations of 
the inspected State Party shall be strictly observed throughout alI flying operations. 
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77. During overflights landing should normally be authorized only for purposes of staging or 
refuelling. 
78. Overflights shall be conducted at altitudes as requested by the inspection team consistent with 
the activities to be conducted, visibility conditions, as well as the aviation and the safety regulations of 
the inspected State Party and its right to protect sensitive information not related to the purposes of the 
inspection. Overflights shall be conducted up to a maximum altitude of 1,500 metres above the 
surface. 
79. For the overflight conducted pursuant to paragraphs 71 and 72, the following equipment may 
be used on board the aircraft: 
(a) Field glasses; 
(b) Passive location-fording equipment; 
(c) Video cameras; and 
(d) Hand-held still cameras. 
80. For any additional overflights conducted pursuant to paragraph 73, inspectors on board the 
aircraft may also use portable, easily installed equipment for. 
(a) Multi-spectral (including infrared) imagery; 
(b) Gamma spectroscopy; and 
(c) Magnetic field mapping. 
81. Overflights shall be conducted with a relatively slow fixed or rotary wing aircraft. The aircraft 
shall afford a broad, unobstructed view of the surface below. 
82. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide its own aircraft, pre-equipped as 
appropriate in accordance with the technical requirements of the relevant operational manual, and 
crew. Otherwise, the aircraft shall be provided or rented by the Technical Secretariat. 
83. If the aircraft is provided or rented by the Technical Secretariat, the inspected State Party shall 
have the right to check the aircraft to ensure that it is equipped with approved inspection equipment. 
Such checking shall be completed within the time-frame specified in paragraph 57. 
84. Personnel on board the aircraft shall consist of. 
(a) The minimum number of flight crew consistent with the safe operation of the aircraft; 
(b) Up to four members of the inspection team; 
(c) Up to two representatives of the inspected State Party; 
(d) An observer, if any, subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party; and 
(e) An interpreter, if necessary. 
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85. Procedures for the implementation of overflights shall be detailed in the Operational Manual 
for On-Site Inspections. 
Manned Access 
86. The inspection team shall have the right to access the inspection area in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol. 
87. The inspected State Party shall provide access within the inspection area in accordance with 
the time-frame specified in paragraph 57. 
88. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 57 and paragraph 86 above, the rights and obligations of the 
inspected State Party shall include: 
(a) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and locations in accordance 
with this Protocol; 
(b) The obligation, when access is restricted within the inspection area, to make every 
reasonable effort to satisfy the requirements of the inspection mandate through alternative means. 
Resolving any questions regarding one or more aspects of the inspection shall not delay or interfere 
with the conduct of the inspection team of other aspects of the inspection; and 
(c) The right to make the final decision regarding any access of the inspection team, taking 
into account its obligations under this Treaty and the provisions on managed access. 
89. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 57 (b) and paragraph 88 (a) above, the inspected State party 
shall have the right throughout the inspection area to take measures to protect sensitive installations 
and locations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information not related to the purpose of the 
inspection. Such measures may include, inter alia: 
(a) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment; 
(b) Restricting measurements of radionuclide activity and nuclear radiation to determining 
the presence or absence of those types and energies of radiation relevant to the purpose of the 
inspection; 
(c) Restricting the taking of or analysing of samples to dctenrnining the presence or 
absence of radioactive or other products relevant to the purpose of the inspection; 
(d) Managing access to buildings and other structures in accordance with paragraphs 90 
and 91; and 
(e) Declaring restricted-access sites in accordance with paragraphs 92 to 96. 
90. Access to buildings and other structures shall be deferred until after the approval of the 
continuation of the on-site inspection in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 47, except for access to 
buildings and other structures housing the entrance to a mine, other excavations, or caverns of large 
volume not otherwise accessible. For such buildings and structures, the inspection team shall have the 
right only of transit, as directed by the inspected State Party, in order to enter such mines, caverns or 
other excavations. 
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91. If, following the approval of the continuation of the inspection in accordance with Article IV, 
paragraph 47, the inspection team demonstrates credibly to the inspected State Party that access to 
buildings and other structures is necessary to fulfil the inspection mandate and that the necessary 
activities authorized in the mandate could not be carried out from the outside, the inspection team shall 
have the right to gain access to such buildings or other structures. The head of the inspection team 
shall request access to a specific building or structure indicating the purpose of such access, the 
specific number of inspectors, as well as the intended activities. The modalities for access shall be 
subject to negotiation between the inspection team and the inspected State Party. The inspected State 
Party shall have the right to impose restrictions or, in exceptional cases and with reasonable 
justification, prohibitions, on the access to buildings and other structures. 
92. When restricted-access sites are declared pursuant to paragraph 89 (e), each such site shall be 
no larger than 4 square kilometres. The inspected State Party has the right to declare up to 50 square 
kilometres of restricted-access sites. If more than one restricted-access site is declared, each such site 
shall be separated from any other such site by a minimum distance of 20 metres. Each restricted- 
access site shall have clearly defined and accessible boundaries. 
93. The size, location, and boundaries of restricted-access sites shall be presented to the head of 
the inspection team no later than the time that the inspection team seeks access to a location that 
contains all or part of such a site. 
94. The inspection team shall have the right to place equipment and take other steps necessary to 
conduct its inspection up to the boundary of a restricted-access site. 
95. The inspection team shall be permitted to observe visually all open places within the 
restricted-access site from the boundary of the site. 
96. The inspection team shall make every reasonable effort to fulfil the inspection mandate 
outside the declared restricted-access sites prior to requesting access to such sites. If at any time the 
inspection team demonstrates credibly to the inspected State Party that the necessary activities 
authorized in the mandate could not be carried out from the outside and that access to a 
restricted-access site is necessary to fulfil the mandate, some members of the inspection team shall be 
granted access to accomplish specific tasks within the site. The inspected State Party shall have the 
right to shroud or otherwise protect sensitive equipment, objects and materials not related to the 
purpose of the inspection. The number of inspectors shall be kept to the minimum necessary to 
complete the tasks related to the inspection. The modalities for such access shall be subject to 
negotiation between the inspection team and the inspected State Party. 
Collection. Handling and Analysis of Samples 
97. Subject to paragraphs 86 to 96 and 98 to 100, the inspection team shall have the right to 
collect and remove relevant samples from the inspection area. 
98. Whenever possible, the inspection team shall analyse samples on-site. Representatives of the 
inspected State Party shall have the right to be present when samples are analysed on-site. At the 
request of the inspection team, the inspected State Party shall, in accordance with agreed procedures, 
provide assistance for the analysis of samples on-site. The inspection team shall have the right to 
transfer samples for off-site analysis at laboratories designated by the Organization only if it 
demonstrates that the necessary sample analysis cannot be performed on-site. 
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99. The inspected State Party shall have the right to retain portions of all samples collected when 
these samples are analysed and may take duplicate samples. 
100. The inspected State Party shall have the right to request that any unused samples or portions 
thereof be returned. 
101. The designated laboratories shall conduct chemical and physical analysis of the samples 
transferred for off-site analysis. Details of such analysis shall be elaborated in the Operational Manual 
for On-Site Inspections. 
102. The Director-General shall have the primary responsibility for the security, integrity and 
preservation of samples and for ensuring that the confidentiality of samples transferred for off-site 
analysis is protected. The Director-General shall do so in accordance with procedures contained in the 
Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections. The Director-General shall, in any case: 
(a) Establish a stringent regime governing the collection, handling. transport and analysis 
of samples; 
(b) Certify the laboratories designated to perform different types of analysis; 
(c) Oversee the standardization of equipment and procedures at these designated 
laboratories and of mobile analytical equipment and procedures; 
(d) Monitor quality control and overall standards in relation to the certification of these 
laboratories and in relation to mobile equipment and procedures; and 
(e) Select from among the designated laboratories those which shall perform analytical or 
other functions in relation to specific investigations. 
103. When off-site analysis is to be performed, samples shall be analysed in at least two designated 
laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure the expeditious processing of the analysis. The 
samples shall be accounted for by the Technical Secretariat and any unused samples or portions thereof 
shall be returned to the Technical Secretariat. 
104. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analysis of samples 
relevant to the purpose of the inspection. Pursuant to Article IV. paragraph 63, the Director-General 
shall transmit any such results promptly to the inspected State Party for comments and thereafter to the 
Executive Council and to all other States Parties and shall include detailed information concerning the 
equipment and methodology employed by the designated laboratories. 
Conduct of Inspections in Areas beyond the Jurisdiction 
or Control of any State 
105. In case of an on-site inspection in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State, the 
Director-General shall consult with the appropriate States Parties and agree on any transit or basing 
points to facilitate a speedy arrival of the inspection team in the inspection area. 
106. The States Parties on whose territory transit or basing points are located shall, as far as 
possible, assist in facilitating the inspection, including transporting the inspection team, its baggage 
and equipment to the inspection area, as well as providing the relevant amenities specified in paragraph 
11. The Organization shall reimburse assisting States Parties for all costs incurred. 
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107. Subject to the approval of the Executive Council, the Director-General may negotiate standing 
arrangements with States Parties to facilitate assistance in the event of an on-site inspection in an area 
beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State. 
108. In cases where one or more States Parties have conducted an investigation of an ambiguous 
event in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State before a request is made for an on-site 
inspection in that area, any results of such investigation may be taken into account by the Executive 
Council in its deliberations pursuant to Article IV. 
Post-Inspection Procedures 
109. Upon conclusion of the inspection, the inspection team shall meet with the representative of 
the inspected State Party to review the preliminary findings of the inspection team and to clarify any 
ambiguities. The inspection team shall provide the representative of the inspected State Party with its 
preliminary findings in written form according to a standardized format, together with a list of any 
samples and other material taken from the inspection area pursuant to paragraph 98. The document 
shall be signed by the head of the inspection team. In order to indicate that he or she has taken notice 
of the contents of the document, the representative of the inspected State Party shall countersign the 
document. The meeting shall be completed no later than 24 hours after the conclusion of the 
inspection. 
Departure 
110. Upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the inspection team and the observer shall 
leave, as soon as possible, the territory of the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall do 
everything in its power to provide assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team, 
equipment and baggage to the point of exit. Unless agreed otherwise by the inspected State Party and 
the inspection team, the point of exit used shall be the same as the point of entry. 
PART III 
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 
1. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 68, each State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, provide the 
Technical Secretariat with notification of any chemical explosion using 300 tonnes or greater of TNT- 
equivalent blasting material detonated as a single explosion anywhere on its territory, or at any place 
under its jurisdiction or control. If possible, such notification shall be provided in advance. Such 
notification shall include details on location, time, quantity and type of explosive used, as well as on 
the configuration and intended purpose of the blast. 
2. Each State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, as soon as possible after the entry into force of 
this Treaty provide to the Technical Secretariat, and at annual intervals thereafter update, information 
related to its national use of all other chemical explosions greater than 300 tonnes TNT-equivalent. In 
particular, the State Party shall seek to advise: 
(a) The geographic locations of sites where the explosions originate; 
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(b) The nature of activities producing them and the general profile and frequency of such 
explosions; 
(c) Any other relevant detail, if available; and 
to assist the Technical Secretariat in clarifying the origins of any such event detected by the 
International Monitoring System. 
3. A State Party may, on a voluntary and mutually acceptable basis, invite representatives of the 
Technical Secretariat or of other States Parties to visit sites within its territory referred to in paragraphs 
I and 2. 
4. For the purpose of calibrating the International Monitoring System, States Parties may liaise 
with the Technical Secretariat to carry out chemical calibration explosions or to provide relevant 
information on chemical explosions planned for other purposes. 
ANNEX I TO THE PROTOCOL 
Table I-A List of Seismological Stations Comprising the Primary Network 
State Responsible for Location Latitude Longitude Type 
Station 
I Argentina PLCA 40.7 S 70.6 W 3-C 
Paso Flores 
2 Australia WRA 193S 134.3E array 
Warramunga, NT 
3 Australia ASAR 23.7 S 133.9E array 
Alice Springs, NT 
4 Australia STKA 31.9 S 141.6E 3. C 
Stephens Creek, SA 
5 Australia MAW 67A S 62.9E 3. C 
Mawson, Antarctica 
6 Bolivia LPAZ 16.3 S 68.1 W 3-C 
La Paz 
7 Brazil BDFB 15A S 48.0 W 3-C 
Brasilia 
8 Canada ULMC 50.2 N 95.9 W 3-C 
Lac du Bonnet, Man. 
9 Canada YKAC 62.3 N 114.6 W array 
Yellowknife, N. W. T. 
10 Canada SCI! 34.8 N 66.8 W 3-C 
Schcffcrville. Quebec 
11 Central African BGCA 05.2 N 18.4 E 3-C 
Republic Bangui 
12 China I IAI 49.3 N 119.7 E 3C > array 
Hailar 
13 China 1211 36.1 N 103.8E 3-C > array 
Lanzhou 
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Station 
14 Colombia XSA 04.9 N 74.3 W 3-C 
El Rosal 
15 Cote d lvoire DBIC 06.7 N 04.9 W 3-C 
Dimbroko 
16 Egypt LXEG 26.0 N 33.0 E array 
Luxor 
17 Finland FINES 61.4 N 26.1 E array 
Lahti 
18 France PPT 17A S 149.6 W 3-C 
Tahiti 
19 Germany GEC2 48.9 N 13.7E array 
Freyung 
20 To be determined To be To be To be To be 
determined determined determined determined 
21 Iran (Islamic Republic Tl IR 33.8 N 31.4E 3-C 
of) Tehran 
22 Japan MJAR 36.5 N 138.2 E array 
Matsushiro 
23 Kazakstan MAK 46.8 N 82.0E array 
Makanchi 
24 Kenya KMBO 01.1 S 37.2 E 3-C 
Kilimambogo 
25 Mongolia JAVM 48.0 N 106.8 E 3-C > array 
Javhlant 
26 Niger New Site to be determined to be determined 3-C > array 
27 Norway NAO 60.8 N 10.8E array 
Hamar 
28 Norway ARAO 69.5 N 23.3 E array 
Karasjok 
29 Pakistan PRPK 33.7 N 73.3E array 
Pari 
30 Paraguay CPUP 26.3 S 37.3 W 3-C 
Villa Florida 
31 Republic of Korea KSRS 37.3 N 127.9E array 
Wonju 
32 Russian Federation KBZ 43.7 N 42.9E 3-C 
Khabaz 
33 Russian Federation ZAL 53.9 N 84.8E 3-C > army 
Zalcsovo 
34 Russian Federation NRI 69.0 N 98.0E 3-C 
Norilsk 
35 Russian Federation PDY 39.6 N 112.6E 3-C > array 
Peleduy 
36 Russian Federation PET 53.1 N 137.8E 3-C > array 
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy 
37 Russian Federation USK 44.2 N 132.0E 3-C > array 
Ussuriysk 
38 Saudi Arabia New Site to be determined t o be determined off" 
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Station 
39 South Africa ROSA 28.6 S 25.6 E 3-C 
Boshof 
40 Spain ESDC 39.7 N 04.0 W way 
Sonseca 
41 Thailand CMTO 18.8 N 99.0 E Wray 
Chiang Mai 
42 
1 
Tunisia TI IA 33.6 N 08.7E 3-C 
Thala 
43 Turkey BRTR 39.9 N 32.8 E array 
Beibashi 
The array is subject to 
relocation at Keskie 
44 Turkmenistan GEYT 37.9 N 58.1 E way 
Alibeck 
45 Ukraine AKASO 50.4 N 29.1 E may 
Malin 
46 United States of LJTX 29.3 N 103.7 W array 
America Lajitas, TX 
47 United States of MNV 38.4 N 118.2 W way 
America Mina, NV 
48 United States of PIWY 42.8 N 109.6 W array 
America Pinedale, WY 
49 United States of ELAK 64.8 N 146.9 W way 
America Eiclson, AK 
50 United States of VNDA 77.5S 161.9 E 3-C 
America Vanda, Antarctica 
Kcy: 3-C > array: Indicates that the site could start operations in the International Monitoring System as a three-component 
station and be upgraded to an array at a later time. 
abl -B List of Seismological Stations Comprising the Auxiliary Network 
State responsible Location Latitude Longitude Type 
for station 
I Argentina CFA 31.6 S 68.2 W 3-C 
Coronel Fontana 
2 Argentina USIIA 55. O S 68.0 W 3-C 
Ushuaia 
3 Armenia GNI 40.1 N 44.7 G 3-C 
Garni 
4 Australia CTA 20. I S 146.3 E 3-C 
Charters Towers, QLD 
S Australia FITZ 18.1 S 125.6 G 3-C 
Fitzroy Crossing, WA 
6 Australia NWAO 32.9 S 117.2 G 3-C 
Narrogin, WA 
7 Bangladesh CI IT 22.4 N 91.8 B 3-C 
Chittagong 
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for station 
8 Bolivia SIV 16. O S 61.1 W 3-C 
San Ignacio 
9 Botswana LBTB 25. O S 25.6E 3-C 
Lobatse 
10 Brazil PTGA 0.7 S 60.0 W 3-C 
Pitinga 
II Brazil RGNB 6.9 S 37.0 W 3-C 
Rio Grande do None 
12 Canada FRB 63.7 N 68.5 W 3-C 
Igaluit, N. W. T. 
13 Canada DLBC 58.4 N 130.0 W 3-C 
Dease Lake, B. C. 
14 Canada SADO 44.8 N 79.1 W 3-C 
Sadowa, Ont. 
15 Canada BBB 52.2 N 128.1 W 3-C 
Bella Bella, B. C. 
16 Canada MBC 76.2 N 119.4 W 3-C 
Mould Bay, N. W. T. 
17 Canada INK 68.3 N 133.3 W 3-C 
Inuvik, N. W. T. 
I8 Chile RPN 27.2 S 109.4 W 3-C 
Easter Island 
19 Chile LVC 22A S 68.9 W 3-C 
Limon Verde 
20 China BIT 40.0 N 116.2 E 3-C 
Bai j iatuan 
21 China KMI 25.2 N 102.8E 3-C 
Kunming 
22 China SSE 31.1 N 121.2E 3-C 
Sheshan 
23 China XAN 34.0 N 108.9E 3-C 
Xi'an 
24 Cook Islands RAR 21.2 S 159.8 W 3-C 
Rarotonga 
25 Costa Rica JTS 10.3 N 85.0 W 3-C 
Las Juntas de 
Abangares 
26 Czech Republic VRAC 49.3 N 16.6E 3-C 
Vranov 
27 Denmark SFJ 67.0 N 50.6 W 3-C 
Sondre Stromfjord, 
Greenland 
28 Djibouti ATD 11.5 N 42.9E 3-C 
Arta Tunnel 
29 Egypt KEG 29.9 N 31.8E 3-C 
Kottamya 
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30 Ethiopia FURL 8.9 N 38.7 E 3-C 
Furi 
31 Fiji MSVF 17.8 S 178.1 E 3-C 
Monasavu, Viti Levu 
32 France NOUC 22. I S 166.3 E 3-C 
Port Laguerre. New 
Caledonia 
33 France KOG 51N 52.7 W 3-C 
Kourou, French 
Guiana 
34 Gabon BAMB 1.7S 13.6E 3-C 
Bambay 
35 Germany/South Africa - 71.7 S 2.9 W 3-C 
SANAE Station, 
Antarctica 
36 Greece IDI 35.3 N 24.9 E 3-C 
Anogia, Crete 
37 Guatemala RDG MO N 90.3 W 3-C 
Rabir 
38 Iceland BORG 64.8 N 21.3 W 3-C 
Borgamcs 
39 To be determined To be determined To be To be To be 
determined determined determined 
40 Indonesia PACT 6.5S 107.0 E 3-C 
Cibinong. Jawa Barat 
41 Indonesia JAY 2.5 S 140.7 E 3-C 
Jayapura, Irian Jaya 
42 Indonesia SWI 0.9 S 131.3 E 3-C 
Sorong. Irian Jaya 
43 Indonesia PSI 2.7 N 98.9 E 3-C 
Parapat, Sumatera 
44 Indonesia KAPI 5. O S 119.8 E 3-C 
Kappang. Sulawesi 
Selatan 
45 Indonesia KUG 10.2 S 123.6 E 3-C 
Kupang. Nusatenggara 
Timur 
46 Iran KRM 30.3 N 57.1 E 3-C 
(Islamic Republic of) Kerman 
47 Iran MSN 31.9 N 49.3 C 3-C 
(Islamic Republic of) Masjed-e-Soleyman 
48 Israel MBI! 29.8 N 34.9 E 3-C 
Ei lath 
49 Israel PARD 32.6 N 33.3 C array 
Parod 
50 Italy ENAS 37.5 N 14.3 C 3-C 
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for station 
Enna, Sicily 
51 Japan JNU 33.1 N 130.9E 3-C 
Ohita, Kyushu 
52 Japan JOW 26.8 N 128.3 E 3-C 
Kunigami, Okinawa 
53 Japan JIU 33.1 N 139.8 E 3-C 
liachijojima, Izu 
1 
Islands 
54 Japan JKA 44.1 N 142.6 E 3-C 
Kamikawa-asahi, 
Ilokkaido 
55 Japan JCJ 27.1 N 142.2 E 3-C 
Chichijima, Ogasawara 
56 Jordan - 32.5 N 37.6 E 3-C 
Ashqof 
57 Kazakstan BRVK 53.1 N 70.3 E array 
Borovoye 
58 Kazakstan KURK 50.7 N 78.6 E array 
Kurchatov 
59 Kazakstan AKTO 50.4 N 58.0 E 3-C 
Aktyubinsk 
60 Kyrgyzstan AAK 42.6 N 74.5 E 3-C 
Ala-Archa 
61 Madagascar TAN 18.9 S 47.6 E 3-C 
Antananarivo 
62 Mali KOWA 14.5 N 4.0 W 3-C 
Kowa 
63 Mexico TEYM 20.2 N 88.3 W 3-C 
Tepich, Yucatan 
64 Mexico TUVM 18.0 N 94.4 W 3-C 
Tuzandepeti, Veracruz 
65 Mexico LPBM 24.2 N 110.2 W 3-C 
La Paz, Baja California 
Sur 
66 Morocco MDT 32.8 N 4.6 W 3-C 
Midclt 
67 Namibia TSUM 19.1 S 17.4 E 3-C 
Tsumcb 
68 Nepal EVN 28.0 N 86.8 E 3-C 
Everest 
69 New Zealand EWZ 43.5S 170.9 E 3-C 
Erewhon, South Island 
70 New Zealand RAO 29.2 S 177.9 W 3-C 
Raoul Island 
71 New Zealand URZ 38.3 S 177.1 E 3-C 
Urewera, North Island 
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72 Norway SPITS 78.2 N 16.4 E Array 
Spitsbergen 
73 Norway JMI 70.9 N 8.7 W 3-C 
Jan Mayen 
74 Oman WSAR 23.0 N 58.0 E 3-C 
Wadi Sarin 
75 Papua New Guinea PMG 9A S 147.2 E 3-C 
Port Moresby 
76 Papua New Guinea BIAL 5.3S 151.1 E 3-C 
Bialla 
77 Peru CAJP 7. O S 78.0 W 3-C 
Cajamarca 
78 Peru NNA 12. O S 76.8 W 3-C 
Nana 
79 Philippines DAV 7.1 N 125.6 E 3-C 
Davao, Mindanao 
80 Philippines TGY 14.1 N 120.9 E 3-C 
Tagaytay, Luzon 
81 Romania MLR 43.3 N 23.9E 3-C 
Muntele Rosu 
82 Russian Federation KIRV 58.6 N 49.4 E 3-C 
Kirov 
83 Russian Federation KIVO 44.0 N 42.7 E Array 
Kislovodsk 
84 Russian Federation OBN 55.1 N 36.6 E 3-C 
Obninsk 
85 Russian Federation ARU 56.4 N 58.6 E 3-C 
Arti 
86 Russian Federation SEY 62.9 N 152.4 E 3-C 
Seymchan 
87 Russian Federation TLY 51.7 N 103.6 E 3-C 
Talaya 
88 Russian Federation YAK 62. ON 129.7 E 3-C 
Yakutsk 
89 Russian Federation URG 51A N 132.3 I: 3-C 
Urgal 
90 Russian Federation BIL 68.0 N 166.4 E 3-C 
Bilibino 
91 Russian Federation TIXI 71.6 N 128.9E 3-C 
Tiksi 
92 Russian Federation YSS 47.0 N 142.8 E 3-C 
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 
93 Russian Federation MA2 59.6 N 150.8 B 3-C 
Magadan 
94 Russian Federation ZIL 53.9 N 57.0 E 3-C 
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Zilim 
95 Samoa AFI 13.9 S 171.8 W 3-C 
Afiamalu 
96 Saudi Arabia RAYN 23.6 N 45.6 E 3-C 
Ar Rayn 
97 Senegal MBO 14.4 N 17.0 W 3-C 
Mbour 
98 Solomon Islands HNR 9.4 S 160.0E 3-C 
Honiara, Guadalcanal 
99 South Africa SUR 32A S 20.8E 3-C 
Sutherland 
100 Sri Lanka COC 6.9 N 79.9E 3-C 
Colombo 
101 Sweden IIFS 60.1 N 13.7 C army 
Ilagfors 
102 Switzerland DAVOS 46.8 N 9.8E 3-C 
Davos 
103 Uganda MBRU 0.4 S 30.4E 3-C 
Mbarara 
104 United Kingdom EKA 55.3 N 3.2 W array 
Eskdalcmuir 
105 United States of GUMO 13.6 N 144.9E 3-C 
America Guam, Marianas 
Islands 
106 United States of PMSA 64.8 S 64.1 W 3-C 
America Palmer Station, 
Antarctica 
107 United States of TKL 35.7 N 83.8 W 3-C 
America Tuckalecchce Caverns, 
TN 
108 United States of PFCA 33.6 N 116.5 W 3-C 
America Pition Flat, CA 
109 United States of Yß11 41.7 N 122.7 W 3-C 
America Yreka, CA 
110 United States of KDC 57.8 N 152.5 W 3-C 
America Kodiak Island, AK 
III United States of ALQ 35.0 N 106.5 W 3-C 
America Albuquerque, NM 
112 United States of ATIU 52.8 N 172.7E 3-C 
America Attu Island, AK 
113 United States of ELK 40.7 N 1151 W 3-C 
America Elko, NV 
114 United States of SPA 90. O S -" 3-C 
America South Pole, Antarctica 
115 United States of NEW 48.3 N 117.1 W 3-C 
America Newport, WA 
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116 United States of SJG 18.1 N 66.2 W 3-C 
America San Juan, PR 
117 Venezuela SDV 8.9 N 70.6 W 3-C 
Santo Domingo 
118 Venezuela PCRV 10.2 N 64.6 W 3-C 
Puerto la Cruz 
119 Zambia LSZ 15.3S 28.2 E 3-C 
Lusaka 
120 Zimbabwe BUL to be advised to be advised 3-C 
Bulawayo 
Table 2-A List of Radionuclide Stations 
State responsible for 
station 
Location Latitude Longitude 
I Argentina Buenos Aires 34. O S 58.0W 
2 Argentina Salta 24. O S 63.0 W 
3 Argentina Bariloche 41. I S 71.3 W 
4 Australia Melbourne, VIC 37.5S 144.6 E 
S Australia Mawson, Antarctica 67.6 S 62.5 E 
6 Australia Townsville, QLD 19.2S 146.8 E 
7 Australia Macquarie Island 54. O S 159.0 E 
8 Australia Cocos Islands 12. O S 97.0 E 
9 Australia Darwin, NT 12A S 130.7 E 
10 Australia Perth, WA 31.9 S 116.0 B 
II Brazil Rio de Janeiro 22.5 S 43.1 W 
12 Brazil Recife US 33.0 W 
13 Cameroon Douala 4.2 N 9.9 B 
14 Canada Vancouver, B. C. 49.3 N 123.2 W 
15 Canada Resolute, N. W. T. 74.7 N 94.9 W 
16 Canada Yellowknife, N. W. T. 62.5 N 114.5 W 
17 Canada St. John's, N. L. 47.0 N 33.0 W 
18 Chile Punta Arenas 53. I S 70.6 W 
19 Chile I lange Roe, Easter Island 27. I S 108.4 W 
20 China Beijing 39.8 N 116.2 B 
21 China Lanzhou 33.8 N 103.3 B 
22 China Guangzhou 23.0 N 113.3 E 
23 Cook Islands Rarotonga 21.2 S 159.8 W 
24 Ecuador Isla San Crist6bal, Galapagos 
Islands 
1.0 S 89.2 W 
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25 Ethiopia Filtu 5.5 N 42.7 E 
26 Fiji Nadi 18.0 S 177.5 E 
27 France Papeete, Tahiti 17. O S 130.0 W 
28 France Pointe-6-Pitre, Guadeloupe 17.0 N 62.0 W 
29 France Reunion 21.1 S 55.6 E 
30 France Port-aux-Frangais, Kerguelen 49. O S 70.0 E 
31 France Cayenne, French Guiana 5.0 N 52.0 W 
32 France Dumont d'Urville, Antarctica 66. O S 140.0 E 
33 Germany Schauinsland/Freiburg 47.9 N 7.9 E 
34 Iceland Reykjavik 64.4 N 21.9 W 
35 To be determined To be determined To be 
determined 
To be 
determined 
36 Iran (Islamic Republic of) Tehran 35.0 N 52.0 E 
37 Japan Okinawa 26.5 N 127.9 E 
38 Japan Takasaki, Gunma 36.3 N 139.0 E 
39 Kiribati Kiritimati 2.0 N 137.0 W 
40 Kuwait Kuwait City 29.0 N 48.0 E 
41 Libya Misratah 32.5 N 13.0 E 
42 Malaysia Kuala Lumpur 2.6 N 101.5 E 
43 Mauritania Nouakchott I8.0 N 17.0 W 
44 Mexico Baja California 28.0 N 113.0 W 
45 Mongolia Ulaanbaatar 47.5 N 107.0 E 
46 New Zealand Chatham Island 44. O S 176.5 W 
47 New Zealand Kaitaia 35. I S 173.3 E 
48 Niger Bilma 18.0N 13.0 E 
49 Norway Spitsbergen 78.2 N 16.4 E 
50 Panama Panama City 8.9 N 79.6 W 
51 
1 
Papua New Guinea New Hanover 3. O S 130.0 E 
52 Philippines Quezon City 14.5 N 121.0 E 
53 Portugal Ponta Delgada, Sao Miguel. 
Azores 
37.4 N 25.4 W 
54 Russian Federation Kirov 58.6 N 49.4 E 
55 Russian Federation Norilsk 69.0 N 88.0E 
56 
1 
Russian Federation Pcleduy 59.6 N 112.6 E 
57 Russian Federation Bilibino 68.0 N 166.4 E 
58 Russian Federation Ussuriysk 43.7 N 131.9 E 
59 Russian Federation Zalesovo 53.9 N 84.8 E 
60 Russian Federation Pctropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy 53.1 N 158.8 E 
61 Russian Federation Dubna 56.7 N 37.3 E 
62 South Africa Marion Island 46.3S 37.0 E 
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State responsible for 
station 
Location Latitude Longitude 
63 Sweden Stockholm 59.4 N 18.0 E. 
64 Tanzania Dar es Salaam 6. O S 39.0 E 
65 Thailand Bangkok 13.8 N 100.5 E 
66 United Kingdom BIOT/Chagos Archipelago 7. O S 72.0 G 
67 United Kingdom St. Helena 16. O S 6.0 W 
68 United Kingdom Tristan da Cunha 37. O S 12.3 W 
69 United Kingdom I lalley, Antarctica 76. O S 28.0 W 
70 United States of America Sacramento, CA 38.7 N 121.4 W 
71 United States of America Sand Point, AK 55.0 N 160.0 W 
72 United States of America Melbourne, PL 28.3 N 80.6 W 
73 United States of America Palmer Station, Antarctica 64.5 S 64.0 W 
74 United States of America Ashland, KS 37.2 N 99.8 W 
75 United States of America Charlottesville. VA 38.0 N 78.0 W 
76 United States of America Salchaket, AK 64.4 N 147.1 W 
77 United States of America Wake Island 19.3 N 166.6 G 
78 United States of America Midway Islands 28.0 N 177.0 W 
79 United States of America Oahu, 111 21.5 N 158.0 W 
80 United States of America Up4 Guam 13.7 N 144.9 C 
Table 2- List of Radionuclide Laboratories 
State responsible for Name and place of laboratory 
Laboratory 
I Argentina National Board of Nuclear Regulation 
Buenos Aires 
2 Australia Australian Radiation Laboratory 
Melbourne. VIC 
3 Austria Austrian Research Center 
Seibersdorf 
4 Brazil Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry 
Rio de Janeiro 
5 Canada Health Canada 
Ottawa, Ont. 
6 China Beijing 
7 Finland Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Helsinki 
8 France Atomic Energy Commission 
Montlhdry 
9 Israel Soreq Nuclear Research Centre 
Yavne 
10 Italy Laboratory of the National Agency for the 
Protection of the Environment 
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State responsible for Name and place of laboratory 
Laboratory 
Rome 
11 Japan Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute 
Tokai, Ibaraki 
12 New Zealand National Radiation Laboratory 
Christchurch 
13 Russian Federation Central Radiation Control Laboratory, 
Ministry of Defence 
Special Verification Service 
Moscow 
14 South Africa Atomic Energy Corporation 
Pelindaba 
15 United Kingdom AWE Blacknest 
Chilton 
16 United States of McClellan Central Laboratories 
America Sacramento, CA 
Table 3 List of Hydroacoustic Stations 
State responsible 
for station 
Location Latitude Longitude Type 
I Australia Cape Leeuwin, 
WA 
34A S 115.1 E Ilydrophone 
2 Canada Queen Charlotte 
Islands, B. C. 
53.3 N 132.5 W T-phase 
3 Chile Juan Fernandez 
Island 
33.7 S 78.8 W I lydrophone 
4 France Crozet Islands 46.5 S 52.2 E Ilydrophone 
5 France Guadeloupe 16.3 N 61.1 W T-phase 
6 Mexico Clarion Island 18.2 N 114.6 W T-phase 
7 Portugal Flores 39.3 N 31.3 W T-phase 
8 United Kingdom BIOT/Chagos 
Archipelago 
7.3 S 72.4 E I lydrophone 
9 United Kingdom Tristan da Cunha 37.2 S 12.5 W T-phase 
10 United States of 
America 
Ascension 8. O S 14.4 W I lydrophone 
11 United States of 
America 
Wake Island 19.3 N 166.6 E 1lydrophone 
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Table 4 List of Infrasound Stations 
State responsible 
for station 
Location Latitude Longitude 
1 Argentina Paso Flores 40.7 S 70.6 W 
2 Argentina Ushuaia 55. O S 68.0 W 
3 Australia Davis Base, Antarctica 68A S 77.6 E 
4 Australia Narrogin, WA 32.9 S 117.2 E 
5 Australia Hobart, TAS 42. I S 147.2 E 
6 Australia Cocos Islands 12.3 S 97.0 E 
7 Australia Warramunga, NT 19.9 S 134.3 E 
8 Bolivia La Paz 16.3 S 68.1 W 
9 Brazil Brasilia 15.6S 48.0 W 
10 Canada Lac du Bonnet, Man. 50.2 N 95.9 W 
I1 Cape Verde Cape Verde Islands 16.0 N 24.0 W 
12 Central African 
Republic 
Bangui 5.2 N 18.4 E 
13 Chile Easter Island 27. O S 109.2 W 
14 Chile Juan Fernandez Island 33.8 S 80.7 W 
15 China Beijing 40.0 N 116.0 E 
16 China Kunming 25.0 N 102.8 E 
17 C6te d'Ivoire Dimbokro 6.7 N 4.9 W 
18 Denmark Dundas, Greenland 76.5 N 68.7 W 
19 Djibouti Djibouti 11.3 N 43.5 1: 
20 Ecuador Galapagos Islands 0.0 N 91.7 W 
21 France Marquesas Islands 10.0 S 140.0 W 
22 France Port LaGuem, New Caledonia 22. I S 166.3 E 
23 France Kerguelen 491S 69.1 E 
24 France Tahiti 17.6 S 149.6 W 
25 France Kourou, French Guiana 5.2 N 52.7 W 
26 Germany Freyung 48.9 N 13.7 E 
27 Germany Georg von Neumayer, Antarctica 70A S 8.4 W 
28 To be determined To be determined To be 
determined 
To be 
determined 
29 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of) 
Tehran 35.7 N 51.4 E 
30 Japan Tsukuba 36.0 N 140.1 E 
31 Kazakstan Aktyubinsk 50.4 N 58.0 E 
32 Kenya Kilimanbogo 1.3 S 36.8 E 
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State responsible 
for station 
Location Latitude Longitude 
33 Madagascar Antananarivo 18.8 S 47.5 E 
34 Mongolia Javhlant 48.0 N 106.8 E 
35 Namibia Tsumeb 19. I S 17.4 E 
36 New Zealand Chatham Island 44.0 S 176.5 W 
37 Norway Karasjok 69.5 N 25.5 E 
38 Pakistan Rahimyar Khan 28.2 N 70.3 E 
39 Palau Palau 7.5 N 134.5 E 
40 Papua New Guinea Rabaul 4. I S 152.113- 
41 Paraguay Villa Florida 26.3 S 57.3 W 
42 Portugal Azores 37.8 N 25.5 W 
43 Russian Federation Dubna 56.7 N 37.3 E 
44 Russian Federation Petropavlovsk- Kamchatskiy 53.1 N 158.8 E 
45 Russian Federation Ussuriysk 43.7 N 131.9 E 
46 Russian Federation Zalesovo 53.9 N 84.8 E 
47 South Africa Boshof 28.6 S 25.4 E 
48 Tunisia Thala 35.6 N 8.7 E 
49 United Kingdom Tristan da Cunha 37. O S 12.3 W 
50 United Kingdom Ascension 8. O S 14.3 W 
51 United Kingdom Bermuda 32.0 N 64.3 W 
52 United Kingdom BIOT/Chagos Archipelago 5. O S 72.0 E 
53 United States of 
America 
Eielson, AK 64.8 N 146.9 W 
54 United States of 
America 
Siple Station, Antarctica 75.5S 83.6 W 
55 United States of 
America 
Windless Bight, Antarctica 77.5S 161.8 E 
56 United States of 
America 
Newport, WA 483 N 117.1 W 
57 United States of 
America 
Pifton Flat, CA 33.6 N 116.5 W 
58 United States of 
America 
Midway Islands 28.114 177.2 W 
59 United States of 
America 
Ilawaii, III 19.6 N 155.3 W 
60 United States of 
America 
Wake Island 19.3 N 166.6 E 
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ANNEX 2 TO THE PROTOCOL 
List of Characterization Parameters for International 
Data Centre Standard Event Screening 
1. The International Data Centre standard event screening criteria shall be based on the standard 
event characterization parameters determined during the combined processing of data from all the 
monitoring technologies in the International Monitoring System. Standard event screening shall make 
use of both global and supplementary screening criteria to take account of regional variations where 
applicable. 
2. For events detected by the International Monitoring System seismic component, the following 
parameters, inter alia, may be used: 
- location of the event; 
- depth of the event; 
- ratio of the magnitude of surface waves to body waves; 
- signal frequency content; 
- spectral ratios of phases; 
- spectral scalloping; 
- first motion of the P-wave; 
- focal mechanism; 
- relative excitation of seismic phases; 
- comparative measures to other events and groups of events; and 
- regional discriminants where applicable. 
3. For events detected by the International Monitoring System hydroacoustic component, the 
following parameters, inter alia, may be used: 
- signal frequency content including comer frequency, wide-band energy, and mean centre 
frequency and bandwidth; 
- frequency-dependent duration of signals; 
- spectral ratio; and 
- indications of bubble-pulse signals and bubble-pulse delay. 
4. For events detected by the International Monitoring System infrasound component, the 
following parameters, inter alia, may be used: 
signal frequency content and dispersion; 
signal duration; and 
peak amplitude. 
5. For events detected by the International Monitoring System radionuclide component, the 
following parameters, inter alia, may be used: 
concentration of background natural and man-made radionuclides; 
concentration of specific fission and activation products outside normal observations; and 
ratios of one specific fission and activation product to another. 
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